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This  thesis  explores  the  relationship  between  social  and  individual  forms  of  ordering  social 
life  on  one  hand,  and  the  emergence  of  a  number  of  'spheres'  of  disorder  in  the  experience 
of  life  on  the  other.  In  modern  society  such  evidence  of  disorder  can  only  be  characterised 
in  terms  that  reinforce  the  negative  or  formless  experience  of  the  human  confrontation  with 
disorder.  Manifestations  of  radical  contingency  (taken  as  the  cognitive  residue  of  such 
disorder)  in  experience  are  thus  contrasted  with  the  progress  and  limits  of  reason  and  desire 
(which  create  the  'valuable'  part  of  life),  and  these  are  further  examined  within  a  language 
of  being  that  establishes  the  discordant  nature  of  the  relationship. 
It  is  argued  that  reason  and  desire,  in  creating  value,  always  construct  an  edifice  of 
social  and  personal  expectation  that  is  justified  on  the  basis  of  the  reliability  of  causal 
relations  between  phenomena  in  lived  experience,  and  in  so  doing  'make'  an  objective  and 
orderly  social  world. 
Several  notions  central  to  an  understanding  of  the  accumulation  of  categories  of  being 
in  modern  society  are  examined  as  the  positive  expression  of  the  conditions  of  autonomous 
action,  and  thus  as  crucial  determinants  of  value  and  identity.  The  central  relationship  is 
further  investigated  through  the  elaboration  of  three  negative  categories  of  experience, 
which  are  seen  to  contain  individual  and  social  forms  of  action  that  forcefully  remove,  or 
contradict  order  and  autonomous  freedom  as  it  is  here  defined.  The  thesis  is  therefore 
divided  into  three  parts.  Part  1  examines  the  loss  of  autonomy  through  gambling,  and 
specifically  through  the  singular  experience  of  the  wager,  which  is  seen  to  be  an 
intensification  of  the  motion  that  constitutes  life,  but  that  boldly  refuses  to  be  contained,  as 
rational  autonomy  would  dictate.  Part  2  deals  with  the  atomisation  of  knowledge  and 
experience  in  modern  society,  looking  specifically  at  instances  of  'non-representational'  art 
of  the  twentieth  century  as  the  residue  of  developments  that  had  as  a  positive  aim  the 
1.  Scanlan  2001 refinement  of  experience.  Part  3  deals  with  the  material  exclusion  of  various  kinds  of 
garbage  resulting  from  both  social  and  technological  progress,  and  from  the  emergence  of  a 
multiplicity  of  opportunities  for  the  establishment  of  self-identity  that  are  seen  as  both  a 
product  of  dividing  the  world  of  experience  into  ever  smaller  categories  (i.  e.,  the  refinement 
of  the  'objective'  world)  and  of  the  subjective  relationship  between  the  individual  in 
modern  society  and  the  world  of  objects. 
It  is  argued  that  the  dependence  of  categories  thus  employed  (in  ordering  both 
phenomenal  experience  and  the  object  world)  rest  on  a  language  of  being  that  establishes 
the  exclusivity  of  identity  relations,  and  as  such  creates  order  from  the  radically 
indeterminate  ground  of  being.  It  is  further  argued  that  forms  of  experience  that  move 
beyond  bounded  autonomous  action  or  away  from  objective  representations  of  the  world 
reveal  the  fragility  of  this  order.  It  is  concluded  that  the  regulating  principle  implicit  in  all 
forms  of  ordering  can  be  understood  to  exclude  the  degenerate,  the  unidentifiable,  and  the 
fragmentary  as  a  means  of  sustaining  life  against  the  radically  contingent,  and  thus  that 
value  in  social  being  can  only  be  consequent  upon  the  experience  of  disorder. 
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They  would  think  it  unreasonable  if,  while  the  whole  heaven  and  each  of  its  parts  have  order  and 
reason  in  their  shapes  and  powers  and  periods,  there  is  no  such  thing  in  the  first  principles  but,  [as 
Heraclitus  says],  the  most  beautiful  world  is  like  a  heap  of  rubbish  aimlessly  piled  up. 
THEOPHRASTUS 
Metaphysics 
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Acting  and  Being 
Or,  the  Masks  of  the  Imperceptible 
Habeas  Corpus 
At  times  like  this  it  is  difficult  to  avoid  the  intrusion  of  self-consciousness.  Let  me 
explain.  The  body  of  any  order  is  only  brought  to  bear,  only  presented,  by  means  of  a 
way  in  from  the  outside,  by  revealing  what  constitutes  the  order:  an  introduction,  so  to 
speak.  I  happen  to  stand  on  the  inside,  and  hope  that  I  may  be  able  to  show  you  the  way 
in.  An  introduction  is  therefore  also  a  welcome,  an  invitation,  and  a  way  of  showing  -  in 
short  it  is  the  point  of  insertion  that  leads  the  way  to  the  body. 
This  deserves  mention  because  I  am  self-conscious  enough  to  know  that  in 
describing  the  order  that  I  give  to  my  subject  there  is  a  high  degree  of  artifice  involved, 
and  that  this  is  especially  so  given  that  the  order  I  seek  to  present  here  has  as  its  subject 
the  question  of  disorder.  The  act  of  thus  showing  the  way  may  appear  to  invalidate  my 
own  thesis,  which  in  truncated  form  is  found  in  the  suggestion  that  the  value  we  find  in 
being,  in  living,  is  inherently  the  consequence  of  the  disorder  of  things.  But  a  note  of 
caution  is  due  here  also:  by  disorder  I  should  say  that  I  mean  that  the  state  of  being  is 
only  understood  fully  as  a  condition  that  undergoes  constant  renewal,  and  that  order  is 
therefore  not  always  as  determined  as  the  language  of  order  and  value,  of  rational 
discourse,  suggests.  And  this  is  the  whole  point  of  what  constitutes  the  body  of  this 
particular  order. 
Neither  do  I  intend  to  suggest  in  saying  this  that  being  is  chaos,  or  absolute 
meaninglessness;  on  the  contrary  I  suggest  that  it  is  rather  like  a  rule-bound  game  that  is 
for  the  most  part  understood,  and  in  many  respects,  could  be  seen  as  like  a  game  of 
cards,  a  game  of  poker  -  there  is  negotiation,  justification,  the  meeting  of  challenges, 
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and  so  on.  And  so,  with  these  counsels  is  mind,  the  order  I  here  attempt  to  bring  to  the 
subject  can  be  viewed  as  merely  one  more  reshuffling  of  the  pack  of  cards.  I  do  not 
pretend,  therefore,  that  this  is  some  truth  that  you  have  before  you,  or  that  this  is  the 
way  it  is;  although  like  all  hypotheses  this  particular  body  of  order  is  a  kind  of  pretence, 
a  gamble,  if  you  like,  on  how  this  little  corner  of  existence  may  be  understood  -  or  may 
not  be,  as  the  case  may  be.  The  meaning  of  this  is  further  conveyed  by  suggesting  that 
an  introduction  is  also  an  'opening  gambit,  '  and  whilst  I  may  feel  that  in  a  world  of 
games  such  a  determination  of  the  aim  of  this  work  would  be  the  more  appropriate 
designation,  self-consciousness  also  brings  convention  to  the  fore,  and  thus  precludes  me 
from  placing  the  words  'just  suppose'  at  the  top  of  the  page,  although  as  I  hope  to  show 
throughout,  this  Just  supposi  . ng  forms  the  significant  ground  for  being. 
Order  and  Contingency 
How  can  we  define  an  order  that  gathers  in  apparently  disconnected  figures  such  as  the 
gambler,  the  artist  of  the  twentieth  century,  and  the  consumer  of  mass  society?  How  can 
we  go  from  the  idea  of  the  speculative  motion  of  the  wager  to  the  idea  of  motion  as  fully 
realised  in  the  never-ending  accumulation  of  garbage?  On  the  face  of  it  these  ideas  and 
figures  appear  fragmentary,  unrelated,  and  properly  the  subject  of  specific  domains  of 
knowledge  that  have  developed  as  a  consequence  of  the  seemingly  multi-faceted 
character  of  modern  society.  Nevertheless,  every  specialization  takes  for  granted  an 
interconnected  set  of  assumptions  and  expectations  -  every  discipline  has  an  ontological 
ground,  a  basic  acceptance  of  what  there  is,  and  of  what  is  the  proper  object  of 
intellectual  endeavour.  Yet,  any  part  of  such  a  ground  may  be  dubious  from  the 
perspective  of  a  different  kind  of  specialist.  Specialised  knowledge  will  therefore  overlook 
a  significant  part  of  experience,  one  that  can  be  found  in  the  interconnectedness  of  the 
whole.  This  is  a  common  thread  that  runs  through  all  specializations,  connects  all  ideas, 
and  mediates  our  understanding  of  archetypal  figures  such  as  those  mentioned. 
Chance,  contingency,  or  radical  contingency  refers  always  to  the  unquantifiable 
remai'ns  of  our  knowledge  of  the  state  of  the  being  at  any  given  time.  Being,  in  turn,  is 
tied  to  questions  of  identity,  questions  that  are  pregnant  within  our  capacity  for 
understanding,  which  asks,  eternally,  the  existential  what  is  that?  The  fact  that  history 
shows  the  advance  of  reason  into  ever  more  corners  of  existence  might  suggest  that  the 
contingent  will  finally  be  eclipsed,  subsumed  under  some  great  objective  system  that  will 
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provide  a  God-like  inventory  of  everything.  I  But  this  is  to  reckon  without  the  capacity 
of  a  forward  movement  to  destabilize  reason,  to  subsume  objectivity  within  a  morass  of 
doubt.  The  strategies  of  reason  are  born  of  and  merely  hide  that  which  it  cannot 
objectify:  from  speculation  we  suffer  loss;  from  refinement  we  leave  some  residue;  and  in 
sorting  things  out  we  create  garbage. 
I  look  at  some  perspectives  on  radical  contingency  in  modern  society  through  the 
themes  of  loss,  residue,  and  garbage.  These  are  all  linguistic  categories  for  trying  to 
comprehend  what  cannot  be  fully  comprehended,  negative  categories  that  allow  us  to 
push  aside  the  contingent  as  something  that  apparently  has  no  part  of  meaning.  The 
speculative  curiosity  of  the  gambler  to  bet  all  on  the  hope  that  the  laws  of  nature  might 
be  annulled  reveals  that  in  knowledge  we  have  safety,  and  that  such  curiosity  should  be 
kept  within  reasonable  bounds.  This,  too,  is  reflected  in  the  way  society  accepts  and 
legitimizes  the  objects  of  plastic  creation,  an  acceptance  that  is  always  trying  to  assimilate 
the  effects  of  the  creative  process  within  a  gaze  that  cannot  help  ordering  things,  and  so 
the  creative  impulse  is  forced  to  break  aesthetic  conventions  in  a  kind  of  wager  as  well, 
which  ends  up  (by  the  end  of  the  twentieth  century,  as  I  argue)  presenting  us  with 
objects  which  only  exist  as  'objects'  with  the  aid  of  a  perceiving  eye  (which  is  to  say,  a 
comprehending  mind).  Finally,  in  modern  consumption  memory  is  banished  in  a  kind 
of  social  forgetting  that  allows  for  the  eventual  elevation  of  the  subject  as  the  artist  of  its 
own  creation;  identity  as  conventionally  understood  is  cast  aside  by  the  adoption  of  a 
succession  of  temporary  identities  -  the  masks  or costumes  of  modern  society  that  finally 
atomise  meaning  itself. 
Acting 
We  have  inherited  an  ancient  metaphysical  tradition  that  lies  within  the  workings  of 
reason,  and  this  is  found  in  the  way  we  give  meaning  to  the  world  and  in  our  place  in  it; 
that  is  to  say,  within  a  discourse  of  meaning.  When  Theophrastus  said  that  the 
philosophers  would  see  no  sense  in  reason  not  reflecting  a  beautiful  and  orderly  world  he 
identified  the  root  of  a  problem  that  still  hangs  over  western  thinking  today,  and  that  is 
the  idea  that  a  world  is  in  some  sense  given  -  almost  gifted  -  and  exists  independently  of 
'  This  is  a  general  point  that  is  not  intended  to  brush  aside  the  questions  raised  by  contemporary  rationalists  of 
Reason's  own  incompleteness.  See,  for  example,  Douglas  R.  Hoftstadter  (1980)  Gdde4  Escher,  Bach:  an  Eternal  Golden 
Braid,  Ha-rmondsworth. 
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us,  but  that  we  may  not  quite  see  it  properly  until  we  peel  back  these  outer  layers  that 
conceal  the  real  object.  One  thing  that  Theophrastus  would  have  little  idea  of  is  that 
thousands  of  years  later  the  language  he  utilised  to  describe  the  beautiful  and  orderly 
world,  would  -  as  the  principal  mediator  of  knowledge  -  also  be  the  very  thing  that 
frustrates  it. 
One  product  of  what  follows  is  that  the  problem  of  philosophical  realism  is  taken  to 
be  a  non-problem  on  condition  that  we  accept  that  reality  is  not  this  gift,  but  rather  it  Is 
the  creation  of  language,  and  it  is  language  that  makes  the  rational  world,  that  makes  the 
form  of  life,  and  that  this  is  all  there  is.  '  The  other  stuff-  the  nameless  and  the  formless, 
the  contingent  -  is  just  the  garbage  of  reason;  yet  this  also  tells  that  reason  is  itself 
contingent. 
Thus,  we  only  understand  the  empirical  givenness  of  social  actions,  the  prz*ma  faci'e 
evidence  of  social  facts,  within  a  context  that  includes  also  the  ghostly  presence  of  what 
is  not  seen,  what  is  not  yet  known.  Language  provides  an  illustration  of  this,  and  is  the 
medium  that  permits  the  elaboration  of  the  world  of  facts,  and  so  we  are  led  to  conclude 
from  this  that  reality  is  not,  as  Theophrastus  feared  all  those  centuries  ago,  a  "heap  of 
rubbish  aimlessly  piled  up,  "  but  rather  is  the  product  of  tidying  up  and  iving  an  order  9 
to  the  matter  of  existence,  and  so  reality  is  actually  like  a  heap  of  rubbish  that  is  carefully 
piled  up  into  the  meaningful  order  that  allows  life  to  proceed. 
Of  the  many  concepts  central  to  an  understanding  of  modern  society,  those  of 
'person,  '  'subject,  '  and  'individual,  '  depend  fundamentally  on  the  acceptance  that  in 
rational  autonomy  is  found  the  locus  of  some  core  of  will,  which  is  then  understood 
within  the  social  context  of  being  as  that  element  of  the  subjective  -  the  active  -  that  can 
be  made  object.  In  other  words  social  action  is  understood  only  in  the  sense  that  the 
individual  realises,  or  displays,  a  high  degree  of  regularity  and  predictability  in 
observable  movement,  and  to  the  extent  that  this  is  found,  movement  becomes  the  basis 
for  a  distinct  category  of  action,  the  rational.  ' 
'  Cf.  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1968)  Philosophical  Investigations.  Trans.  G.  E.  M.  Anscombe,  Oxford,  and  R.  Rorty 
(1980)  Philosophy  and  the  Mirror  ofNature,  Oxford. 
'  'Movement'  and  'action'  are  thus  not  always  the  same.  'Forbearance'  or  'patience'  are  highly  active  but  need 
involve  no  movement.  However,  movement  is  usually  what  we  see;  it  is  what  is  ordy,  so  to  speak,  on  the  surface  as  the 
evidence  that  is  then  constructed  in  the  notion  of  a  fact.  This  is  a  highly  complex  issue,  and  one  that  I  can  only  point 
to  within  the  context  of  notions  of  order  and  disorder.  See,  for  example,  Donald  Davidson  (1980)  Essays  on  Actions 
and  Events,  Oxford;  Laurence  Davis  (1979)  Theory  ofAction,  Englewood  Cliffs,  NJ.;  A.  1.  Melden  (196  1)  Free  Action. 
London. 
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The  difficulty  here  is  that  action  may  be  identifiable  on  the  basis  of,  for  example,  the 
observation  of  bodies  in  space,  but  this  does  not  describe  the  totality  of  being,  which 
extends  beyond  the  spatial  and  the  temporal.  '  We  can  see  here  an  example  of  our 
metaphysical  inheritance:  action  is  taken  to  be  what  has  a  rational  content,  namely  a 
property  of  the  subjective,  yet  it  is  also  taken  to  be  action  only  to  the  extent  that  it  is 
objectively  understood,  which  is  to  say  to  the  extent  that  it  conforms  to  the  expectations 
of  reason.  I  refer  to  Theophrastus  because  he  described  (and  dismissed)  the  fear  that 
order  is  merely  a  mask,  and  must  have  been  aware  that  there  were  doubts  concerning  the 
'first  principles'  -  knowledge  -  that  they  reflected  not  a  meaningful  order,  but  rather 
concealed  an  immanent  disorder,  the  rubbish  that  remains  formless  until  we  find  a  place 
for  it. 
This  ancient  inheritance  has  clear  implications  for  our  understanding  of  the  nature 
of  contingency  in  modern  society.  If  we  fail  to  see  that  knowledge  is  positively  expressed 
from  a  ground  of  contingency,  then  we  fail  to  see  that  the  more  refined  knowledge 
becomes,  and  the  further  reason  extends  into  all  corners  of  existence,  there  is  a 
corresponding  increase  in  contingency  as  the  negative  basis  of  this.  ' 
The  domain  of  a  sociological  understanding,  therefore,  includes  not  only  'activity,  ' 
or  what  is  said  and  done  and  described  in  the  categories  of  social  understanding;  it  also 
includes  'acting'  -  not  only  as  self-consciously  rational  behaviour,  but  as  some  kind  of 
'front,  '  or  as  the  appearance  of  orderly  motion  based  on  reasonable  assumptions  about 
the  social  meaning  of  the  variety  of  words  and  gestures  that  language  conveys.  The  social 
act  is  just  that  insofar  as  we  can  determine  the  prima  facie  meaning,  but  this,  as  we 
know,  privileges  our  capacity  to  make  sense  of  appearances,  of  what  is  on  the  surface  of 
life.  '  And  once  again  it  is  through  a  consideration  of  the  way  we  use  language  that  we 
understand  that  what  we  see  on  the  surface  is  merely  the  mask. 
As  far  as  action  is  determined  by  the  understanding  it  is  conveyed  by  a  name,  or 
what  we  might  equally  call  a  label,  and  through  this  it  finds  a  place  within  the  context  of 
See,  for  example,  Martin  Heidegger  (1962)  Being  and  Time.  Oxford  and  Cambridge. 
There  is  nothing  new  in  such  a  claim.  This  can  be  found  in  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1968)  Philosophical 
Investigations,  Oxford;  and  in  Willard  Quine  (1980)  From  a  Logical  Point  of  View  -  particularly  in  the  refutation  of 
the  Vienna  school  in  the  1953  essay  'Two  Dogmas  of  Empiricism,  '  which  is  reprinted  in  this  volume,  and  which 
argued  that  language  itself  was  the  barrier  to  dealing  with  problems  of  meaning. 
'  Max  Weber  elaborated  'meaningful'  social  action  in  a  number  of  possible  and  different  ways  -  for  the  most 
part  all  action  is  subjectively  'meaningful'  yet  still  objectively  rational  In  virtue  of  his  description  of  an  ideal  type  that  is 
seen  to  embody  a  certain  objective  spirit,  for  example,  of  capitalism,  or  of  bureaucracy.  See  H.  H.  Gerth  and  C. 
Wright  Mills  (1948)  From  Max  Weber:  Essays  in  Sociologv.  London 
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social  discourse;  it  becomes  meaningful.  If  we  know  what  something  is  -  If  It  has  a  name 
-  then  we  are  encouraged  to  believe  that  what  takes  place  in  life  is  understood.  The 
social  act,  therefore,  seems  to  have  objective  properties,  yet  a  glance  through  a 
dictionary,  for  example,  will  show  that  the  apparently  static  noun  -  the  name  -  is 
relayed  in  terms  of  a  further  array  of  names  that  attempts  to  identify  meaning  but  opens 
up,  at  the  same  time,  a  potentially  variable  field  of  understanding,  so  not  only  do  we 
have  the  residue  of  the  order  as  the  negative  basis;  the  positive  expression  of  knowledge 
is  mutable.  And  so  what  we  say  about  the  world,  and  about  the  social  act  particularly,  is 
given  through  identity;  that  is  to  say  identification  is  given  in  terms  of  something  being 
something  else,  is  expressed  in  statements  that  say  that  one  thing  or  property  I.  s  another 
similar  thing  or  property. 
The  history  of  humanity,  however,  shows  that  once  stable  identities  are  replaced  by 
new  identities  all  the  time,  and  that  the  is  of  being  refers  to  the  fluid,  verb-like  nature  of 
being,  and  this  is  the  aspect  of  being  that  is  the  imperceptible  depth  beneath  the  surface 
of  the  act.  The  is  of  identity  therefore  reveals  that  being  is  becoming,  and  that  the 
identifiable  act  becomes  then  acting,  or  metaphorically  speaking,  the  recognition  of  the 
mask  that  provides  the  surface  of  an  analytically  construed  meaning. 
The  everyday  language  that  mediates  knowledge  of  existence  therefore  remains  stuck 
within  the  logocentric  traditions  of  Western  culture,  which  date  back  as  far  as  ancient 
Greece,  and  in  which  the  capacity  of  speech,  the  'word,  '  or  reason  to  reach  some  truth 
about  the  world  is  given  primacy.  If  we  decide  to  call  this  tradition  the  tradition  of  the 
primacy  of  reason,  we  can  say  in  a  nutshell  that  reason  is  an  accumulation  of  strategies 
for  eliminating  contingency  from  a  determined  existence.  Nevertheless,  being  as  the 
ground  of  reason  proves  resistant  to  these  strategies  because  being  is  contingent,  which  is 
to  say  it  is  always  becoming! 
Speculative  Motion 
The  notion  of  being-as-becoming  introduces  us  to  a  difficulty  for  logocentric  views  of 
world  and  being.  The  verb  structure  of  our  language  of  being  suggests  that  language  has 
developed  and  is  utilised  to  understand  not  a  fixed  reality,  or  a  world  given,  but  rather  a 
changeable  existence:  life,  in  short,  is  motion;  begins  with  motion,  and  continues  as 
See  Jean-Luc  Nancy  (1993)  The  Birth  to  Presence,  Stanford,  CA_ 
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motion.  Modern  society  has  gone  to  elaborate  lengths  to  organize  motion  so  as  to 
remove  contingencies,  and  'social  motion,  '  the  entire  edifice  of  society,  as  Hobbes 
famously  realised,  was  a  defence  of  life  against  death,  with  death  here  being  the 
unceasing  terminus  of  all  motion  in  the  world.  This  idea  carries  through  to  the  present, 
where  movement  outside  the  bounds  of  expectation  is  often  understood  as  'abnormal,  ' 
'deviant,  '  or  evidence  of  'pathological'  states.  Action  is  then  -  as  the  evidence  of  reason  - 
motion  that  is  controllable. 
This  idea  of  motion  is  a  point  of  departure  in  the  attempt  to  understand  the 
contingency  of  being  that  is  evident  from  the  imperceptible,  unknown,  unfolding  aspect 
of  existence  that  the  language  of  our  common  discourse  directs  us  to.  The  edifice  of 
society,  then,  can  be  viewed  as  analogous  to  a  game,  which  is  built  upon  the  very 
activity,  the  acting,  that  determines  social  meaning  -  we  all  know  the  rules  of  this  game, 
but  we  are  unable  to  predict  how  it  will  all  end. 
As  an  example  of  this  I  take  the  reality  of  gambling,  the  gambling  game,  as  one 
social  manifestation  of  human  curiosity,  that  like  human  understanding,  takes  place 
within  broadly  agreed  upon  rules  and  conventions,  and  yet  which  also  allows  for  the 
possibility  of  reaching  beyond  what  is  known  into  the  ambiguity  of  what  is  unfolding  in 
experience.  '  This  is  the  fundamental  aspect  of  curiosity.  In  more  or  less  consolidating 
meaning  it  has  to  question  meaning.  This  then  moves  us  from  the  particular  form  of  the 
game  to  the  core  element  that  the  gambler  identifies  with  and  which  makes  it  unique, 
and  this  is  the  wager.  In  the  wager,  the  fluidity  of  phenomenal  relations,  of  causal 
mechanisms  as  understood  by  reason,  and  thus  of  being,  is  explored. 
The  wager  represents  speculative  motion  as  an  internal  and  subjective  property  of 
the  gambler,  and  one  that  is  therefore  difficult  to  understand  in  the  evidence  the  social 
world  of  gambling  may  give  us.  '  And  as  I  seek  to  show,  this  is  also  why  gambling  is 
commonly  understood  as  irrational,  and  more  recently  as  some  kind  of  illness  -  precisely 
because  the  wager  is  an  exceptional  and  boundless  movement,  and  the  unique  core  of 
i' 
'Curiosity'  is  a  term  I  intend  to  describe  a  kind  of  speculative  motion,  an  aspect  of  human  agency  that  is  not 
too  tied  to  expectations.  The  term,  however,  signifies  also  an  historically  'located'  tendency  of  the  natural  philosophers 
of  early  modernity.  Cf.  L.  Daston  and  K.  Park  (1998)  Wonders  and  the  Order  ofNature,  1150-1750,  New  York. 
')  See,  for  example,  Edward  Devereux.  (1980)  Gambling  and  the  Social  Structure,  New  York;  Erving  Goffman 
(1969)  'Where  the  Action  Is'  in  Interaction  Ritual,  London;  a-nd  Roger  Caillois (1979),  Man,  Play,  and  Games, 
London. 
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the  gambling  endeavour,  it  is  not  susceptible  to  the  kind  of  objectification  given  through 
a  rational  categorisation.  It  is  seen  not  as  rational  action,  but  as  an  exception  to  this.  'O 
There  are  gamblers,  of  course,  who  never  break  the  liminal  bounds  in  the  experience 
of  the  wager.  The  existential  extremity  of  the  wager  as  I  discuss  it  exists  on  a  different 
plane  from  the  everyday  'intermission'  of  what  is  called  petty  gambling.  The  gamblers 
here,  as  I  say,  might  as  well  be  gambling  with  their  lives  because  there  is  more  at  stake  in 
the  extreme  experience  of  the  wager  than  money,  or  prestige,  or  anything  else  that  seeks 
social  assent.  These  gamblers  I  discuss  are  seen  in  the  process  of  radical  self-creation,  of 
fast-forwarding  their  own  existence  to  the  point  where  the  experience  becomes  socially 
incommunicable,  and  devoid  of  any  meaning  in  these  terms.  Games,  by  contrast,  are 
socially  understandable,  and  in  sociological  explorations  are  conveyed  in  terms  of 
objective  characteristics  -  for  instance  in  terms  of  cultural,  class,  or  gender  aspects  of 
involvement.  I  leave  these  considerations  aside  to  suggest  that  the  game  is  only  the 
vehicle  towards  a  'stretching'  of  social  identity,  which  is  where  the  wager  takes  the 
gambler,  and  this  is  the  real  sociological  significance  of  such  an  act. 
Plasticity  and  Refinement 
We  can  understand  the  notion  of  the  mask  in  a  number  of  ways.  The  mask  is  not  only 
the  literal  surface  that  we  perceive,  the  'face'  or  appearance,  but  also  refers  to  the 
tendency  of  understanding  to  move  towards  refinement  as  a  consequence  of  masking  off, 
or  delimiting  an  area  of  interest  (as  you  would  employ  'masking  tape'  to  identify  an  area 
of  a  surface  to  be  painted,  for  example),  and  this  is  seen  in  both  of  these  regards  in 
artistic  creation  -  but  the  metaphor  operates  in  other  senses  in  this  regard  as  well, 
because  of  the  ludic  quality  of  artistic  creativity;  in  performance,  which  is  very  much  the 
donning  of  a  costume  or  a  mask,  and  also  In  the  framing  of  a  world  that  is  found  in 
painting.  The  mask also  has  a  more  literal  association  with  strange  objects  carved  of 
wood,  rendered  into  terrifying  visages  by  various  adornments  of  figure,  paint,  and 
objects  like  feathers.  These  masks  were  worn  in  primitive  societies  to  aid  various  kinds  of 
"  The  classification  of  gambling  as  an  illness  is,  of  course,  the  result  of  the  establishment  of  new  categories  of 
behavioural.  understanding,  specifically  those  given  in  the  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  (DSM)  of  the  American 
Psychiatric  Association.  This  is  the  predominant  trend  within  a  recently  established  field  of  gambling  studies,  and  is 
also  an  excellent  demonstration  of  how  the  human  understanding  finds  a  subject  of  study  as  a  result  of  defining  a 
category. 
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transformation;  to  mark  coming  of  age  rituals,  fertility  festivals,  rain  dances  and  so  on.  " 
I  argue  that  the  notion  of  the  mask  is  an  apt  metaphor  for  some  developments  in  non- 
representational  20,  h  century  art  in  the  sense  that  disguise  was  employed  to  reveal  both 
the  ambiguity  of  the  artistic  object,  and  the  tendency  of  the  art  world  to  organise  objects 
into  an  apparently  recognisable  aesthetic  order,  which  is  also  a  form  of  disguise. 
Artistic  creation  in  modern  society,  I  suggest,  develops  a  self-critical  and  self- 
conscious  awareness  to  the  point  that  it  understands  the  world  'made'  by  reason  as  a 
notion  of  objectivity,  as  a  mask,  that  conceals  the  contingency  of  being;  which  is  to  say 
it  sets  apart  the  sphere  of  creativity  -  the  new  or  unknown.  The  world  reason  makes 
here,  the  art  world,  is  the  world  of  regulated  experience,  of  the  world  now  understood  as 
a  field  of  sensual  experience  and  aesthetic  phenomena. 
Non-representational  art  of  the  2  O,  h  century  refers  not  to  an  essential  reality  but  rests 
on  figures,  signs,  images,  surfaces,  and  so  on,  and  so  the  form  itself  reveals  the 
contingency  of  the  'pictures'  we  make  of  the  world.  "  In  fact,  in  extreme  examples,  the 
20,  h  century  art  object  becomes  realised  not  as  an  immutable  object,  but  as  indivisibly 
subjective  in  its  representative  mode  because  it  is  so  objectively  meaningless  in  the 
important  sense  that  it  ends  up  owing  its  meaning  to  the  viewer.  This  is  taken  to  the 
limit  in  art  that  dernaterializes  the  objective  properties  of  the  functional  object  world. 
The  found  objects  of  art  suspend  the  conventions  of  meaning  in  favour  of  presenting 
aspects  of  the  ground  that  is  rearranged  in  meaning. 
We  bring  this  home  most  forcefully  by  moving  beyond  artistic  creation,  which  in 
the  20,  h  century  extends  from  the  ideal  or  the  eternal  to  the  fleeting:  from  the  sublime  to 
the  profane  as  revealed  through  the  objects  we  consume,  which  begin  showing  up  first  in 
collage  within  the  frame,  and  thence  as  a  means  of  destroying  the  expectations  of  a 
'framing  eye.  '  Thus,  the  eventual  material  and  linguistic  product  of  the  contingency 
found  in  this  curiosity  and  in  the  residue  of  aesthetic  refinement  is  found  in  garbage, 
both  physical  and  metaphorical. 
"  See,  for  example,  Claude  Uvi-Strauss  0  983)  The  Way  of  the  Masks,  London;  and  A.  David  Napier  (1986) 
Masks,  Transformation,  and  Paradox.  Berkeley. 
"  See  Mark  C.  Taylor  (1992)  Disfiguring:  Art,  Architecture,  and  Religion.  Chicago. 
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Sorts 
Consumption  makes  us  at  once  the  artists  and  the  objects  of  our  own  identity;  but  in 
creating  the  consuming  act  destroys  the  object  world.  Our  relationship  to  objects  is  seen 
in  both  the  renewal  of  identity  and  the  re-ordering  of  the  object  world  through  the 
collection  of  ever  more  objects  that  we  identify  with.  The  principal  condition  of  this 
renewal  is  found  in  our  capacity  to  forget,  and  forgetting  on  an  individual  basis  is 
reflected  in  the  collective  and  strategic  ignorance  that  reason  demands  as  a  condition  of 
its  own  progress,  and  that  we  see  in  the  development  of  specialization  in  the  production 
of  objects.  This,  too,  introduces  a  mutually  sustaining  relationship  between  the 
subjective  and  objective  realms  of  existence.  The  product  of  this  development  is  found 
in  the  lack  of  regard  we  give  to  physical  garbage.  The  remains  of  life  are  in  their  own 
way  sorted  -  into  bins,  trashcans,  dumps,  holes  in  the  ground,  incinerators,  and  so  on  - 
and  the  means  of  this  sorting  remains  largely  hidden  to  us,  and  so  almost  completes  a 
collective  blindness  to  the  life  of  the  objects,  from  their  'birth'  in  consumption  to  their 
'death'  in  discarding,  from  which  we  construct  our  fragile  identities. 
However,  no  matter  how  elaborate  the  social  conditions  of  life  become  in  allowing 
us  to  forget,  one  crucial  component  of  human  understanding  cannot  remain  buried  for 
long,  and  that  is  the  doubt  that  memory,  or  self-reflection  brings  to  the  surface.  In 
memory  we  make  an  orderly  world,  we  make  sense  of  things  by  promoting  certain 
experiences  above  others;  objects  and  events  are  assimilated  in  the  making  of  the  self. 
But  memory  is  also  a  swamp.  It  becomes  overwhelmed  by  the  physical  reality  of  dead 
matter,  of  the  contingency  of  existence,  when  garbage  becomes  visible,  and  the  surface 
order  is  thus  seen  to  conceal  a  depth  -  the  depth  of  self-consciousness  -  elements  of 
which  rise  to  the  surface  like  the  occasional  activity  on  the  surface  of  a  swamp; 
disappearing  eventually,  but  formless  and  indeterminate  enough  in  its  appearance  to 
disgust. 
Material  garbage  represents  the  truth  that  no  matter  ever  disappears,  and  that  reality 
is  therefore  just  the  creation  of  a  language  that  recycles,  that  builds  meaning  from  the 
mutability  of  profane  existence. 
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ONE 
LOSS 
So  use  all  that  is  called  Fortune.  Most  men  gamble  with  her,  and  gain  all,  and  lose  all,  as  the  wheel  rolls 
...  In  the  Will  work  and  acquire,  and  thou  hast  chained  the  wheel  of  Chance,  and  shalt  always  drag  her 
after  thee. 
RALPH  WALDoEMERSON 
Seff'Reliance 
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Curiosity  Is  animated  by  a  speculative  attempt  to  attain  a  firm  grasp  on  time  and  place. 
To  understand  what  strikes  us  as  anomalous,  or  to  grasp  the  hidden  of  allure  of  some 
natural  wonder,  is  to  exercise  concern  about  what  goes  on  around  us  throughout  our 
lives. 
In  reason,  curiosity  is  directed  within  certain  constraints;  to  what  is  perceptible,  or 
to  what,  in  other  words,  coheres  in  a  sensible  manner.  Thus,  where  a  child  may  marvel 
at  the  absolute  wonder  of  a  phenomenon  like  the  shooting  grass  that  seems  to  depart 
from  nowhere,  to  an  adult  the  wonder  is  replaced  by  blindness.  Reason,  which  develops 
with  age  and  maturity,  has  no  longer  any  need  of  such  curiosity  because  it  directs  the 
mind  away  from  the  ordered  path  of  previous  lives,  which  have  brought  us  to  the 
present  on  the  basis  of  a  sound  grasp  of  relations  between  phenomena.  ' 
Curiosity,  nevertheless,  is  also  what  drives  the  rational  scientific  mind  to  consolidate 
our  understanding  of  the  world;  whilst  every  hypothesis  is  a  speculative  stab  at  the 
future,  a  determined  move  that  says  'just  suppose,  '  it  is  still  a  move  that  is  made 
gradually,  with  care,  and  stopping  short  of  plunging  into  the  unknown. 
The  speculative  aspect  of  curiosity  is  never  overcome  however.  Where  society 
becomes  ordered  through  the  historical  application  of  reason  to  the  control  of  social 
relations,  we  see  in  'deviant'  or  'exceptional'  social  phenomena  a  subjective  removal  from 
these  confines;  a  withdrawal  from  the  normal  expectations  thus  occurs  within  modern 
society.  This  can  be  summed  up  in  the  character  of  the  gambler.  Where  life  itself  is 
'  Cf.  early  modern  notions  of  curiosity  in,  for  example,  Paula  Findlen  (1994)  Possessing  Nature:  Museums, 
Collecting  and  Scientific  Culture  in  Early  Modern  Italy,  Berkeley,  and  Lorraine  Daston  and  Katherine  Park  (1997) 
Wonders  and  the  Order  ofNature,  1150-1750,  New  York. 
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motion,  and  where  society  is  a  regulated  form  of  life,  the  gambler  takes  flight  from  the 
apparent  permanence  of  social  relations  to  engage  in  the  oscillatory  motion  found  in  a 
transient  existence  that  flits  back  and  forth  from  the  unity  of  being  characteristic  of 
normality  to  the  sensory  and  existential  dispersal  of  self  found  through  the  wager. 
However,  exceptional  though  gambling  is,  it  is  merely  an  intensification  or speeding  (.;  P  " 
up  of  the  regulated  movement  of  social  life.  An  important  duality  in  our  understanding 
of  modern  society  also  describes  a  movement  back  and  forth,  between  work  and  leisure. 
For  the  most  part  the  oscillatory  motion  here  never  becomes  pronounced  enough  to 
effect  an  erosion  of  being  -  we  are,  in  other  words,  never  too  far  from  the  rational 
ordering  of  our  lives  that  assumes  to  protect  us  against,  for  example,  moral,  physical  or 
mental  decline. 
The  gambler,  however,  courts  loss.  In  the  singularity  of  the  experience  of  the  wager 
the  gambler  repeatedly  takes  up  temporary  residence  in  a  gap  between  existence  and 
non-existence.  The  loss  for  the  gambler  is  taken  further  in  a  diminuation  of  the  power  of 
self-will,  which  sees  the  gambler  return  to  the  scene  of  past  defeats.  This  shell  of  a  person 
moves  forward,  retreats,  and  moves  forward  again  occupies  the  body  of  a  person  much 
like  a  zombie.  The  gambler  is  the  revenant  -  returning  from  inbetweeness  to  try  and 
reclaim  a  mislaid  autonomy. 
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There  is  no  fullness  of  pleasure  unless  the  precipice  is  near. 
ANATOLE  FRANCE,  The  Garden  ofEpicurus 
Picture  this  scene.  Two  men,  seen  in  a  grassy  meadow,  slowly  move  an  apparently 
irreducible  pile  of  large,  misshapen  stones,  carrying  them  to  a  central  point  in  the  plain. 
Once  in  position  these  form,  from  a  detached  perspective,  the  foundations  for  what  will 
eventually  be  a  perfectly  straight  wall. 
The  meadow  also  provides  the  grounds  for  a  large  house  situated  adjacently  and 
hidden  behind  some  trees,  which  encircle  the  clearing.  In  this  house  the  two  men  have 
recently  lost  a  game  of  poker.  Inside  the  house  another  man,  a  rather  prissy,  formal,  man 
dressed  in  a  brilliant  white  suit,  stands  above  a  large  model  and  puts  a  part  into  place 
(Plate  2).  It  is  a  stone  -a  small  replica  model  of  a  stone  to  be  precise  -  and  this,  in  turn, 
is  placed  within  a  model  wall.  The  building  of  this  model  seems  to  correspond  to  the 
activities  of  the  two  men  outside,  who  are  labouring  hard  in  the  rain  much  of  the  time. 
Or,  we  are  invited  to  consider,  the  men  building  the  wall  are  themselves  merely  actors  in 
a  great  drama  that  is  orchestrated  by  the  curious  architect  who  is  the  model  maker. 
Motion  and  the  Absolute 
In  another  representation  of  such  architecture  of  motion,  found  in  William  Blake's 
depiction  of  the  great  creator,  The  Ancient  ofDays,  we  see  the  Almighty  confer  an  order 
upon  creation.  This,  it  is  clear,  is  the  bequest  of  an  omnipotent  will  that  bestrides  and 
orders  life  itself,  having  dominion  over  all  below  (Plate  3).  '  The  similarity  between 
Blake's  vision  of  the  Almighty  and  the  model  maker  is  in  the  relation  it  throws  up 
between  ideas  of  order  and  'architect';  the  latter  is  understood  both  in  terms  of  a  self- 
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moving  capacity,  autonomy,  and  also  as  the  signifier  of  an  objective  organizer  of 
movements.  The  model  wall  that  provides  the  domain  for  the  white-suited  architect  also 
contains  the  figures  of  the  two  men  and  is  presented  as  an  objectively  ordered  creation; 
enclosed,  bound  and  finite.  It  is  not  a  model  of  the  World,  to  be  sure,  but  of  a  'City  of 
the  World,  '  an  idealistic  utopia  in  miniature  conforming  to  the  design  of  a  righteous 
social  harmony,  which  seeks  the  Absolute  status  of  logos,  which  is  to  say  that  it  assumes 
the  status  of  an  atemporal  transcendental  truth.  We  see  this  miniature  City  of  the  World 
explained  as  a  'just'  world  where  "good  finally  triumphs  over  evil".  A  world  where 
everything  that  happens  is  properly  apportioned;  where  excess  and  defect  are  met  by  an 
appropriate  corrective,  and  by  nothing  less  than  the  forced  return  of  the  weak  and 
foolish  to  the  straight  and  narrow  from  which  they  have  momentarily  deviated. 
This  is  also,  in  yet  another  variant  of  absolutist  control,  like  the  world  found  in 
Thomas  Hobbes'  Leviathan  of  165  1,  in  which  the  earliest  modern  ideas  of  reason  as  a 
means  to  avoid  death  are  introduced,  and  formalized  in  the  'rational  binding'  of  subjects 
under  a  sovereign  will  that  operates  as  the  architect  of  predictable  social  motion  (Plate 
4).  2 
To  return  to  the  meadow,  the  real  wall  that  is  under  construction,  and  that  happens 
to  detain  the  two  men,  gamblers  who  have  lost  at  a  card  game,  is  contained  in  a  world 
that  we  are  led  to  believe  reflects  the  mind  of  an  omniscient  power;  it  is  a  world  where 
"everything  happens  at  once,  "  which  suggests  that  this  is  a  world  that  realizes  a  divine,  or 
perhaps  a  despotic,  provenance.  After  all,  from  what  other  point  of  view  could 
everything  happen  at  once? 
In  this  fictional  scenario,  Paul  Auster's  1990  novel  The  Music  of  Chance,  no  action 
comes  without  consequence  in  the  well-ordered  City  of  the  World.  The  architect, 
assuming  dominion  over  motion  as  does  Blake's  Almighty,  or  Hobbes'  Sovereign 
Artificer,  decrees  that  known  causes  have  predictable  effects,  and  specific  acts  produce 
equally  definite  outcomes.  This,  too,  reflects  the  concern  evident  within  the  work  of  the 
This  image  was  produced  in  1794  as  the  frontispiece  of  Blake's  Europe:  A  Prophesy. 
Thomas  Hobbes'  'Sovereign  Artificer',  in  the  first  truly  modern  analysis  of  civil  society,  Leviathan  (1991), 
presented  the  consequences  of  action  beyond  reasonable  conduct  to  devastating  effect.  Shown  in  an  illustration  on  the 
title  page  of  this  work  is  the  Sovereign,  the  Nemesis-like  consequence  of  an  unruly  world.  Like  Blake's  divine  creator, 
he  hovers  over  his  domain,  although  not  with  a  compass  but  with  sword  and  staff  (representing  power  temporal  and 
ecclesiastical?  )  overseeing  the  artificial  construct  that  is  the  political  commonwealth.  In  chapter  16,  'Of  Persons, 
Authors  and  things  Personated,  '  Hobbes  notes  that  "Children,  Fooles,  and  Mad-men  that  have  no  use  of  Reason,  may 
be  Personated  by  guardians,  or  Curators;  but  can  be  no  authors  (during  that  time)  of  any  action  done  by  them,  longer 
then  (when  they  shall  recover  the  use  of  Reason)  they  shall  judge  the  same  reasonable.  "  0  13) 
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earliest  modern  philosophers  that  knowledge  be  established  on  the  basis  of  what  we  can 
apprehend  through  the  senses;  thus,  in  Hume's  language,  the  constant  conjunction  of 
contiguous  phenomena  is  a  good  enough  ground  in  principle  to  establish  knowledge  - 
although  most  causes  remain  unknown.  '  We  are  left  in  no  doubt  that  the  consequences 
of  objective  causality,  as  far  as  it  could  be  determined  that  is,  should  act  as  an  example  to 
the  'people'  who  populate  this  utopian  creation.  The  sketchy  rules  of  existence  in  the 
fictional  creation  are  conveyed  in  terms  that  intend  to  teach  the  virtues  of  simplicity: 
you  do  not  get  something  for  nothing  is  the  lesson  for  the  pair  of  gamblers  -  and  most 
importantly  the  physical  reality  of  these  great  stones,  the  Lockean  'primary  qualities' 
they  represent,  tell  us  that  that  virtue  itself  is  found  in  a  diligent  adherence  to  the  right 
action;  it  is  found  in  such  basic,  objectively  agreed  upon  human  ends as  the  meeting  of 
needs.  That  is  to  say,  in  other  words,  the  reward  of  simplicity  is in  the  safety  of  one  day 
following  another  in  much  the  same  way  as  always  -  not  in  reckless  speculation  on  the 
nature  of  the  laws  of  the  universe:  the  work  is  real  and  gambling  is  frippery.  And  as  we 
might  expect  virtue  is  manifested  as  a  property  of  work,  in  the  concentration  of  the 
mind  on  some  temporal  goal,  such  as  the  building  of  a  wall. 
We  also  see  here  that  transgressions  against  personal  moral  continence,  the 
imperative  that  is  surely  demanded  in  any  virtuous  world,  are  severely  punished. 
Profligacy  is  damned,  consolidation  rewarded.  '  Indeed,  these  two  men  building  the  wall, 
having  been  forewarned  a  day  before  of  the  fate  that  befalls  deviation  from  these 
principles,  foolishly  failed  to  observe  such  good  sense,  and  as  a  result  seem  to  have 
invited  their  own  Nemesis.  '  This  scenario  plays  out  a  number  of  themes  common  in 
many  traditional  understandings  of  gambling.  For  instance,  that  the  folly  of  invoking 
infinite  powers  (by  playing  with  chance)  will  result  in  a  reminder  of  your  temporal 
'  See  David  Hume  (1978)  A  Treatise  on  Human  Nature.  Oxford;  John  Locke  (1976)  An  Essay  Concerning 
Human  Understanding.  London.  The  development  of  modern  science  has  shown  that  many  causes  remained 
unknown  prior  to  technological  breakthroughs,  see  also  Catherine  Wilson  (1995)  The  Invisible  World.  -  Early  Modern 
Philosophy  and  the  Invention  ofthe  Microscope.  Princeton. 
4  Paul  Auster  (199  1)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  68-72.  Flower  and  Stone,  the  victorious  players  in  the  poker 
ga-mc  owe  their  position  to  a  windfall  from  a  lottery.  But  it  becomes  apparent  that  they  are  not  really  gamblers,  as  this 
is  placed  well  within  the  context  of  a  small  reward  for  years  of  diligence  and  hard  work.  They  would  purchase  a  single 
ticket  once  a  week  for  years,  all  the  while  sticking  to  their  routine:  before  the  windfall  they  always  had  their  weekly 
Dell  sandwiches  and  lottery  fantasies,  now  after  they  had  become  rich  they  were  no  less  ordered,  "Flower  mentioned 
they  always  had  hamburgers  on  a  Monday  night,  "  Nashe  observes  as  he  becomes  increasingly  convinced  that  there  is 
more  going  on  than  at  first  seems  apparent.  They  also  remain  parsimonious  despite  their  great  wealth.  At  one  point 
Stone  consumes  Flower's  unfinished  Monday  night  burger,  adding  for  effect  "Waste  not,  want  not.  " 
'  Paul  Auster,  (1990)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  76-87;  quotes:  79-80. 
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PLATE  2.  ARCHITECT  OF  MOTION,  from  The  Mmic  ofChance,  1993  (dir  Phillip  Haas).  The'architect' 
establishes  the  bounds  of  motion  within  the'city  of  the  world.  'With  authorial  power  he  forces  an  accord  between 
the  way  the  world  ought  to  be,  and  the  world  he  perceives  and  has  domain  over.  The  men  building  the  wall  are 
forced  to  accept  this  order,  to  agree  on  its  conditions  as  a  result  of  losing  a  wager.  The  settlement  is  enforced  on 
the  basis  of  its  proportionateness  (the  wall  contains  10,000  stones,  one  for  each  dollar  of  the  gambling  debt)  and 
its  correctness  (it  forces  the  two  losers  to  straigbten  themselves  out  --  this  is  also  reflected  in  the  meaninglessness 
of  this  straight  line  of  stones).  Cf.  Ian  Hacking(I  990)  The  Taming  of  Chance,  Cambridge,  on  the  etymology  of 
'the  normal'  as  the  right,  the  straight,  and  the  good.  (Ch.  19) 
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PLATE  3.  THE  ANCIENT  OF  DAYS.  William  Blake,  1794.  In  the  Book  ofDaniel,  the  Ancient  One  is 
presented  as  the  holy  creator  of  the  universe:  "7:  13-14  1  saw  in  the  night  visions,  and,  behold,  one  like  the 
Son  of  man  came  with  the  clouds  of  heaven,  and  came  to  the  Ancient  of  days,  and  they  brought  him  near 
before  him,  and  there  was  given  him  dominion,  and  glory,  and  a  kingdom,  that  all  people,  nations,  and 
languages,  should  serve  him.  His  dominion  is  an  everlasting  dominion,  which  shall  not  pass  away,  and  his 
kingdom  that  which  shall  not  be  destroyed.  "  This  image  was  published  as  the  frontispiece  to  Europe:  A 
Prophesy  and  accompanied  by  a  quote  ("When  He  set  a  compass  on  the  face  of  the  deep")  from  the  Book  of 
Proverbs  (8:  22-23,27-30). 
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PLATE  4.  FRONTISPIECE  OF  THOMAS  HOBBES'  LEVIATHAN,  165  1.  The  'objective'  power  of 
the  sovereign,  as  the  illustration  shows,  is  composed  of  the  many  subjects.  The  relationship  was  intended 
by  Hobbes  to  be  reciprocal;  subjectivity  of  motion,  would  -  in  all  but  "Children,  Fooles  and  Mad-men" 
-correspondingly  realize  an  objective,  rational,  will.  See  Thomas  Hobbes,  199  1,  Leviathan:  113. 
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mortality;  that  to  expect  a  life  free  of  work  is  to  err;  and  not  least  that  we  ought  by  now, 
after  many  centuries  of  accumulated  evidence,  of  learning,  have  acquired  the  power  of 
inference,  some  knowledge  of  causes,  at  least  to  the  extent  that  we  would  know  that  the 
only  certain  way  not  to  lose  a  poker  game  is  to  refrain  from  playing  in  the  first  place. 
Safety  first. 
An  equally  interesting  interpretation  suggests  that  what  is  dramatized  in  this  scene 
from  The  Music  of  Chance  is  the  idea  that  loosening  oneself  from  temporal  constraints 
through  gambling,  to  wager  on  the  eternal  being  of  atemporality,  becomes,  from  the 
point  of  view  of  an  architecture  of  motion  merely  unsustainable  action;  and  that  a  life 
lived  in  and  through  disorderly  or  itinerant  movements  ultimately  cannot  be  sustained. 
Because  the  gambler  hurtles  towards  the  future  with  a  vain  disregard  for  the  exigencies 
of  the  temporal  world,  as  the  gamblers  in  this  scenario  do,  they  provoke  this  'music  of 
chance';  in  this  case  it  is  the  restoration  of  a  manufactured  harmony. 
The  inability  to  calm  movement,  to  control  one's  actions,  thus  throws  up  the 
possibility  of  self-negation.  For  if  life  is  all  motion,  and  if  in  pursuing  the  itch  for  play 
the  gambler  adds  speed  to  the  motion  -  in  anticipation  of  the  wager  -  then  surely  it  only 
threatens  to  bring  forward  one's  own  demise?  In  The  Music  of  Chance  the  two  gamblers, 
Nashe  and  Pozzi,  end  up  stuck  in  this  meadow  in  the  middle  of  nowhere;  they  are  forced 
to  work  in  order  to  repay  their  gambling  debt,  and  so  like  prisoners  they  no  longer  have 
the  power  to  determine  their  own  movements.  '  Like  Thomas  Hobbes  wrote  in  165  1, 
those  that  have  no  use  of  reason  will  be  'personated'  by  guardians;  they  can  no  longer  be 
'author'  of  their  own  actions. 
Of  our  two  gamblers,  Jack  Pozzi,  a  professional  card  player  is  ostensibly  the  gambler 
of  the  tale.  Having  been  hijacked  at  gunpoint  whilst  actually  playing  poker  the  day 
before  he  met  Jim  Nashe,  and  only  several  days  before  he  now  finds  himself  building 
this  wall,  we  see  that  he  must  have  been  well  aware  of  the  dangers  of  such  a  life,  as  he 
recounts  the  reasons  for  his  disheveled  appearance  to  Nashe: 
'  In  some  of  the  literature  of  gambling  studies,  the  gambler  is  already  taken  to  be  a  prisoner  of  sorts.  The 
'compulsion'  to  gamble,  for  example,  is  taken  to  be  as  confining  as  the  constraints  on  movement  that  are  characteristic 
of  imprisonment.  In  the  remainder  of  this  section  I  discuss  why  this  characterization  is  a  merely  another  application  of 
a  notion  of  normality  as  regulated  motion.  Amongst  the  literature  in  this  field  see,  for  example,  Henry  Leiseur  (1984) 
The  Chase:  The  Career  of  the  Compulsive  Gambler.  Cambridge,  MA.  Most  work  in  this  field  departs  from  a  starting 
point  of  Sigmund  Freud's  well-known  essay  'Dostoevsky  and  Parricide,  '  see  J.  Strachey  (ed.  )  0  950)  Collected  Papers, 
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It's  weird  how  fast  things  can  happen.  One  minute,  I'm  about  to  raise  the  guy 
on  my  left,  thinking  what  a  smart,  high-class  dude  I  am,  and  the  next  minute 
I'm  flat  on  the  ground,  hoping  I  don't  get  my  brains  blown  out. 
It  is  not  at  all  apparent  at  this  point  that  Nashe  is  a  gambler.  Instead  we  see  that  he 
is  a  restless  traveller  who  has  been  living  out  of  a  suitcase  for  over  a  year:  "traveling  back 
and  forth  across  America  as  he  waited  for  [his]  money  to  run  out.  "  Eventually  it 
becomes  clear  that  he  is  the  real  gambler  of  the  piece.  ' 
In  devising  a  means  of  restitution  in  the  form,  more  or  less,  of  punishment,  the  two 
victors,  in  suggesting  that  the  wall  be  built  to  cover  the  debt  are  seen  to  be  the  bearers  of 
every  western  notion  of  temperance,  hard  work  and  stability!  This  wall,  upright, 
straight  and  true  is  an  emblem  for  the  maintenance  of  moral  and  physical  health.  The 
absurdity  of  their  situation  is  finally  revealed  by  the  knowledge  that  this  wall  is  on  the 
one  hand  meaningless  because  it  does  not  protect  any  property,  it  does  not  offer  any 
possibility  of  exclusion  (it  is  a  wall  one  can  walk  around);  yet  on  the  other  hand  it 
becomes  meaningful  because  it  confers  an  order  and  stability  on  the  lives  of  the  two 
men.  In  submitting  them  to  a  'normal'  routine,  it  trains  them  in  work.  It  forces  them  to 
obey  the  rules  of  a  temporal  existence,  the  rules  of  this  City  of  the  World!  That  this  wall 
is  built  so  straight  from  the  formal  material  of  the  roughly  hewn  stones,  corresponds 
metaphorically  to  the  straightening  out  of  Nashe  and  Pozzi;  the  moral  direction  of 
motion  as  adherence  to  the  straight  or  the  true  acts  as  a  reminder  that  any  movement 
whatsoever  is  the  basis  of  contingent  being,  that  to  move  forward  is  to  invite  chance. 
Gambling  in  particular,  as  the  motion  towards  the  suspension  of  reality  found  in  the 
wager,  does  no  more  or  less  than  promote  the  inflation  of  contingency  when  what  is 
known  is  cast  aside  in  this  speculative  act.  Thus,  the  moral  of  this  tale  is  understood  by 
vol.  5.  The  best  collection  of  literature  on  this  topic  can  be  found  in  J.  Halliday  and  P.  Fuller  (eds.  )  (1974)  The 
Psycholqy  of  Gambling,  London. 
7  Paul  Auster,  (1990)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  27. 
'  In  Freud's  'Dostoevsky  and  Parricide,  '  ibid,  it  is  suggested  that  the  gambler  seeks  this  kind  of  masochistic 
punishment. 
9  The  symmetry  between  the  crime  (the  gambling  debt)  and  the  punishment  (building  the  wall)  is  perfect:  they 
owe  ten  thousand  dolla-rs,  and  they  must  build  a  wall  of  ten  thousand  stones.  This  is  putting  money  to  work, rather 
than  dissipating  it  at  the  gambling  table.  See  Ian  Hacking  (1990)  The  Taming  of  Chance,  Cambridge,  where  the 
author  discusses  some  ancestors  of  the  modern  formulation  of  'normality'  For  example,  in  modern  European 
languages  the  word  is  derived  from  geometry,  meaning  "perpendicular,  at  right  angles,  orthogonal  [ 
... 
]  Normal  and 
orthogonal  are  synonyms  in  geometry  A  line  may  be  orthogonal  or  normal  (at  right  angles  to  the  tangent  of  a 
circle  say)  or  not.  That  is  a  description  of  the  line.  But  the  evaluative  'right'  lurks  in  the  background  of  right  angles.  It 
is  just  a  fact  that  an  angle  is  a  right  one,  but  it  is  also  a  'right'  angle,  a  good  one.  Orthodontists  straighten  out  the  teeth 
of  children:  they  make  the  crooked  straight.  But  they  also  put  teeth  right,  make  them  better.  Orthopaedic  surgeons 
straighten  bones":  162-63. 
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throwing  into  opposition  the  attractions  of  pragmatic  and  ordered  living  on  the  one 
hand,  with  the  unseen  fate  that  awaits  the  gambler  on  the  other,  and  suggests  that  it  is 
best  to  move  in  an  orderly  fashion,  avoiding  any  unexpected  twists,  turns,  or 
deviations.  " 
The  Inbetweenness  of  Experience 
However,  experience  also  tells  a  slightly  different  story.  Whilst  modernity  realizes  a 
rational  ordering  of  movement,  it  also  provides  a  challenge  to  this  in  establishing  its 
domain  on  the  basis  of  the  subjective  will,  free  and  sovereign,  and  this  is  what  provides 
grounds  for  conflict.  Modernity  elevates  the  individual  to  a  status  that  is  prior  to  all  else, 
and  thus  we  have  the  distinctively  modern  view  of  the  individual  as  the  irreducible  core 
of  value,  of  the  subject  as  'end-in-itself,  '  to  use  the  language  of  a  modern  moral 
philosophy  as  elaborated  by  Immanuel  Kant.  "  Yet,  we  see  that  everywhere  in  modern 
life  the  individual  is  easily  identified  in  terms  that  distort  the  meaning  of  this  value.  The 
modern  world's  obsession  with  quantifying  all  aspects  of  life  is  a  sorting  of  subjectivity 
according  to  certain  apparent  objective  properties.  The  subject  becomes  effectively,  a 
pile  of  attributes  -  nationality,  gender,  racial  origin,  and  so  on  -  that  can  be  hastily 
assembled,  aggregated,  into  social  types  (or  more  likely,  consumer  categories).  12 
This  urge  to  pin  things  down,  to  establish  firm  and  reliable  definitions,  is  at  once  a 
denial  to  the  sovereign  subject,  and  also  in  promoting  subjective  identification  with  an 
empirical  'reality'  is  an  attempt  to  undermine  the  inherent  contingency  of  a  being  that  is 
always  being  born.  It  is  an  attempt  to  be  certain  about  things,  and  in  the  most  general 
sense  it  is  seeking  a  way  to  regulate  movement  precisely  because  movement  is  the 
condition  of  being  itself-,  and  this  refers  not  only  to  physical  movement,  but  also  the 
movement  of  identities,  meanings,  and  discourses.  And  the  desire  of  modern  society  to 
See  Gerda  Reith  (1999)  The  Age  of  Chance:  Gambling  in  Western  Culture,  London:  81-87. 
See  Robert  B.  Pippin  (199  1)  Modernity  as  a  Philosophical  Problem,  Oxford:  1-  15;  and  Harvie  Ferguson  (2000) 
Modernity  and  Subjectivity:  1-19,  for  different  ways  of  looking  at  the  notion  of  the  'subject'.  Ferguson,  taking 
Descartes  as  a  starting  point,  notes  that,  "A  fundamental  shift  has  occurred.  Where,  for  the  premodern  world,  human 
experience  was  always  defined  as  subordinate  to,  and  dependent  upon,  a  greater,  extraempirical  reality  which  it 
symbolized,  Modernity,  in  its  most  general  form,  reverses  this  relation  and  identifies  the  real  with  the  experienced.  " 
(3)  Pippin,  departing  from  a  perspective  of  German  Idealism,  suggests  that  the  modern  social  compromise,  rational 
autonomy,  resulting  from  an  urge  to  control  rests  on  the  failure  of  morality,  which  becomes  evident  in  the  practical 
limits  of  'human  nature',  and  this  forces  us  to  settle  for  legality  not  morality.  This  was  perhaps  in  the  mind  of  Hobbes 
as  well  as  it  seems  to  form  the  basis  for  sovereign  power  in  Leviathan  (I  1-  12),  although  the  effect  would  seem  to 
compromise  autonomy  thus  understood. 
"  The  ends  to  which  such  attributes  can  be  put  are  discussed,  for  example,  in  Geoffrey  C.  Bowker,  and  Susan 
Leigh  Star  (1999)  Sorting  Things  Out:  Classification  and  its  Consequences.  Cambridge,  MA. 
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banish  'error'  in  this  regard  conceals  a  tension  between  the  subjective  desire  for 
movement  and  an  objective  inclination  to  regulate  movement.  The  interesting  thing  to 
note  is  that  these  both  reside  within  the  individual.  This  compromise  is  a  Hobbesian 
accommodation  of  the  subject  in  society.  " 
To  the  extent  that  reconciling  these  two  sources  of  motion  becomes  increasingly 
difficult  in  modern  society,  we  see  merely  that  the  subjectivity  of  motion  is  ultimately 
irresistible.  That  it  breaks  out  of  the  order  that  provides,  ultimately,  the  framework  or 
the  'vehicle'  for  rational  thought  and  action.  So,  the  problem  of  reconciling  subject  with 
object  lies  in  the  fact  that  the  acceleration  of  modern  life,  and  the  pace  with  which 
change  is  forced  upon  us,  inhibits  the  creation  of  finite  identities.  The  potential  for 
movement  becomes  apparent  in  modernity  with  the  creation  of  an  infinity  of  objects 
with  which  we  can  identify;  relations  are  established  and  broken  with  a  careless  brevity 
that  makes  the  reconciliation  of  the  subject  with  'reality'  impossible. 
If  relations  become  fluid  in  modern  society,  are  only  established  superficially,  then  it 
makes  it  difficult  to  stand  still  in  the  midst  of  it  all,  to  stand  firm  when  all  around 
mutates,  and  thus  also  to  be  a  diligent  adherent  to  anything,  or  to  be  identifiably  one 
thing  or  another  for  very  long.  This  state  of  affairs  draws  us  back  to  some  fundamental 
distinctions.  The  philosophical  understanding  of  identity  tells  us  that  all  truths  are  true 
only  contingently;  which  is  to  say  that  all  truths  might  not  always  be  true  -  that  this  is  a 
notion  that  changes  -  and  so  we  should  not  expect  that  that  the  accuracy  of 
identification  will  be  firm  whilst  the  human  understanding  continues  to  seek  more 
secure  foundations  for  knowledge.  So,  the  way  we  speak  about  phenomena,  the  everyday 
language  we  use  to  identify  and  refer  to  the  world  can,  on  closer  examination,  reveal  the 
barely  hidden  contingency  of  being,  particularly  insofar  as  our  language  conventions 
serve  to  pull  a  veil  over  the  meaningless.  But  more  seriously,  the  difficulty  of  establishing 
13  Hobbes's  significance  is,  I  would  argue,  apparent  both  in  terms  of  his  method  (of  resolution  and 
composition),  and  in  the  conclusions  he  draws  for  morality  (his  scepticism  of  the  power  of  self-regulation).  It  can  be 
argued  that  Hobbes  created  a  world  from  a  host  of  arbitrarily  defined,  historical  objects,  and  sought  to  universalize 
them,  thus  determining  that  society  is  composed  of  a  collection  of  social  atoms.  The  contentious  nature  of  this 
outcome  is  not  contested  here,  but  is  dealt  with  elsewhere.  See,  for  example  C.  B.  MacPherson  (1962)  The  Political 
Theory  of  Possessive  Individualism:  Hobbes  to  Locke  (Oxford).  The  point  I  want  to  stress,  and  that  is  important  to  my 
theme  of  movement  having  a  degenerative  tendency,  is  that  Hobbes  went  from  a  notion  of  man  as  internal  motion  in 
matter,  that  is  to  say,  from  a  notion  in  which  everything  begins  with  the  (rather  loosely  defined,  perhaps)  subject,  on 
experience  that  is  grounded  on  the  sensation  of  motion,  to  a  profound  unease  at  the  implications  of  this,  and  thus 
reaching  the  same  kind  of  conclusions  about  morality  (self-regulation  was  impossible  because  of  the  nature  of  man) 
that  German  Idealism  reached  (in  the  view  of  Pippin),  but  for  different  reasons  that  is,  morality  fails  because  of  the 
'death  of  God'.  In  grounding  morality  in  sovereign  power,  in  the  law  no  less,  had  Hobbes  already  implicitly  Idled' 
God?  See  also  D-D.  Raphael  0  977)  Hobbes:  Morals  and  Politics,  London. 
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finite,  objectively  transparent  identities  draws  us  also  into  a  premodern  notion  of 
identity  as  the  unchanging  essence  of  a  thing. 
For  Aristotle  identity  is  established  not  on  the  basis  of  this  pile  of  attributes  that 
modern  society  forms  into  some  whole,  but  rather  in  the  conception  of  the  living 
organism  as  movement,  and  of  this  movement  as  the  ever  changing  core  of  being,  and 
that  is  to  say  that  identity  over  a  period  of  time  is  found  in  the  persistence  of  some 
essence  that  remains  within  a  continually  changing  material  existence.  "  Living  things 
are,  then,  a  continual  flux  of  matter,  which  means  that  identification  in  terms  of  those 
parts  that  change  is  not  really  an  identification  of  the  unchanging  element.  Bodily 
changes  over  time  may  make  a  person  appear  different,  for  example,  but  we  know  that 
something  identifiable  remains  within  this  external  reality  -  even  where  a  person  never 
appears  to  be  the  same,  and  seems  to  occupy  limitless  identities. 
The  implications  of  being  conceived  as  an  existence  lived  in  thepresent,  is  that 
motion  can  do  no  other  than  unfold  a  baffling  human  geography  of  possibility.  Being  in 
this  sense  is  denied  from  the  earliest  modern  philosophy  as  a  suitable  candidate  for  the 
understanding,  although  an  analogy  between  language  and  being  is  striking:  the 
philosophers  of  the  modern  analytic  tradition  who  have  descended  from  the  17"  century 
empiricists  are  willing  to  accept  in  terms  of  reasoning  what  they  have  dropped  since 
Aristotle  in  terms  of  metaphysics,  and  that  is,  that  the  empirically-given,  the  noumena, 
is  really  in  continual  flux.  Every  movement  within  our  ceaseless  becoming  not  only 
carries  our  knowledge  of  a  past  that  might  have  been  otherwise,  but  it  carries  it  into  a 
present  built,  apparently,  on  faith  or  promise.  It  arrives  in  front  of  unknowable 
mutations.  Not  certainty  as  we  may  like  to  think. 
And  so  the  history  of  the  subject  is  realized  in  modern  terms  at  once  in  both 
Hobbesian  terms,  that  is  to  say  as  the  embodiment  of  this  physical  objectivity  (society), 
and,  we  may  say,  in  Cartesian  terms  as  the  source  of  an  infinite  subjectivity 
(consciousness).  We  can  see  that  by  distinguishing  the  vehicle  for  action  from  the 
capacity  for  action  that  gambling  in  modern  society  finally  realises  -  specifically  in  the 
wager  -a  metaphysical  or  existential  being  that  is itself  a  momentary  denial  of  what 
Robert  Pippin  has  called  'the  social  rationalization'  of  modern  life,  the  mask  of  which  is 
"See  G.  E.  M.  Anscombe  and  P.  T.  Geach  (1961)  Three  Philosophers:  Aristotle,  Aquinas,  Frege,  Oxford:  55.  There 
is  a  distinction  over  changes  that  are  accidental,  and  those  that  are  necessary,  but  one  which  I  cannot  go  into  here. 
Suffice  it  to  say  that  Aristotle's  essentialism  allows  for  the  existence  of  a  non-material  soul,  and  this  is  one  reason  why 
the  Ancients  were  discarded  by  Hobbes  and  others  following,  in  favour  of  a  philosophy  grounded  in  empirical  reality. 
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defined  in  terms  of  the  identity  of  abstract  qualitles,  or  the  pile  of  attributes  that 
constitute  the  appearance  of  what  is  'real.  ' 
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Games  always  cover  something  deep  and  intense,  else  there 
would  be  no  excitement  in  them,  no  pleasure,  no  power  to  stir  us. 
ANTOINE  DE  SAINT-Exup]ýRY,  Airman  ý  Odyssey 
All  action  takes  place  within  a  well  defined  set  of  norms  and  expectations,  of  rules,  laws, 
conventions,  restrictions,  and  so  on.  We  might  think  of  it  in  the  following  terms:  You 
leave  your  home  to  go  to  work  in  the  morning,  you  wait  for  traffic  to  pass  before  you 
can  cross  the  road  to  catch  a  train,  or yet  again,  you  may  be  in  the  traffic  sitting  in  a  car 
waiting  for  pedestrians  to  cross  the  road.  At  your  place  of  work  you  come  up  against 
order  and  organization  at  all  times  -  from  the  occupational  hierarchy  to  identification 
codes,  or  names  that  give  a  face  to  the  unseen. 
The  interesting  thing  about  this,  however,  is  that  it  is  knowledge  that  passes  largely 
unnoticed;  it  exists  simply  as  the  necessary  routine  that  becomes  the  norm.  So,  it  may 
only  be  on  occasion  that  one's  place  within  a  larger  'body'  becomes  apparent;  for 
example  you  have  certain  unwelcome  duties  you  must  perform,  or  a  particularly 
demanding  superior  has  unreasonable  expectations  of  you.  Even  the  'non-work'  part  of 
this  existence  is  determined  for  you,  as  the  clock  becomes  the  condition  of  temporal 
experience.  You  may  be  required  to  eat  at  a  specified  time,  return  to  your  home  at  a 
regulated  time;  you  even  take  your  holiday  at  a  time  when  it  has  been  suitably  arranged 
-  either  by  yourself  or someone  else  -  not  to  interfere  with  your  working  existence. 
Of  importance  here  is  the  notion  that  we  may  still  refer  to  such  apparently 
externally  determined  motion  as  'active.  '  This  is  clear  if  we  introduce  a  distinction 
between  types  of  motion.  For  instance,  we  also  partake  in  a  variety  of  more  or  less 
involuntary  motions,  mostly  on  entering  the  'sphere'  of  play,  these  become  involuntary 
in  that  play  necessitates  the  suspension  of  rational  goals.  So,  there  is  work  and  there  is 
play,  and  both  are  motion.  Yet  at  the  same  time,  the  conditions  of  experience  in  modern 
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society,  especially  in  modern  cities,  do  not  allow  us  to  make  such  a  clear  cut  distinction 
between  something  we  designate  'active'  and  something  entirely  different,  play,  that 
indicates  a  loss,  an  absence,  or  even  a  voluntary  stripping-away  of  the  will,  a  submission 
to  that  which  we  might  just  call  non-intentional  'movement'.  As  play  arises  from  action 
-  that  is,  there  is  a  motion  to  play  -  it  is  only  when  caught  up  in  the  essential  part  of  this 
loosening,  the  aspect  of  play  that  Roger  Caillois  distinguished  as  vertigo,  that  we  can  see 
a  transition  from  the  active  to  the  non-active,  that  is  to  say  the  motion  to  play  is  frozen 
in  suspense.  '  Until  the  player  reaches  this  point  of  disorientation  all  motion  has  a 
direction. 
From  an  objectively  viewed  perspective,  we  may  glimpse  human  motion  on  a  large- 
scale  -  think,  for  example,  of  taking  an  aerial  view  that  would  reveal  all  below. 
Movements  may  look  to  have  a  relatively  high  degree  of  regularity  from  a  distant 
perspective,  and  they  may  appear  to  realize  rational  goals.  This  is  not  at  all  deceptive, 
but  its  truth  lies  only  in  the  fact  that  such  movements,  are,  precisely,  regulated,  and  as 
such  they  realize  some  goal,  an  objective  'intention.  '  Now  if  we  again  take  up  this  aerial 
perspective,  then  zoom  in  we  soon  realize  that  the  situation  under  view  -  the  more  or 
less  regular  movement  of  phenomena  -  becomes  infinitely  more  fine-grained!  Indeed, 
the  objectively  observed  motion  provided  by  an  aerial  view  soon  looks  like  something 
other  than  action.  For  example,  we  see  neither  beginning  nor  end,  neither  origins  nor 
destinations,  and  therefore  the  motion  of  the  individual  in  a  mass  becomes,  from  the 
objective  point  of  view,  meaningless.  From  here  we  are  atoms,  and  from  this  lofty 
standpoint  every  Catom'  also  becomes  like  every  other,  interchangeable  in  its  objectivity.  ' 
And  so  we  may  say  that  the  urban  environment  as  the  vehicle  of  motion,  as  that  which 
gives  it  regularity,  'intends'  to  direct  movement,  but  we  also  see  that  in  reality,  and 
See  Roger  Caillois  (1962)  Man,  Play  and  Games,  London:  5-  10. 
21  use  this  expression  as  shorthand  for  a  complexity  that  is  related  to  our  power  to  comprehend  ever  more 
infinite  details  in  phenomena.  The  notion  of  actions  having  a  'fine-grained'  character  is  found  amongst  analytic 
philosophers  of  action  to  refer  to  the  causal  complexity  of  action.  Inadvertently,  such  a  move  at  once  fudges  the  issue 
of  the  infinite  nature  of  consciousness,  treating  it  as  a  problem  of  identification  in  descriptions  of  action,  yet,  rather 
than  providing  a  solution,  it  draws  attention  to  the  inescapable  infinity  of  such  'quantum  level'  identity.  Hugh 
McCann  gives  a  good  example  of  this:  "In  their  most  usual  formulation,  fine-grained  theories  treat  events,  and  states 
too,  as  exemplifications  by  substances  of  properties  at  a  time.  In  the  case  of  actions  the  properties  are  act  properties, 
and  a  criterion  for  individuation  is  provided  according  to  which  two  actions  are  identical  just  in  case  they  involve  the 
same  agent,  the  same  property,  and  the  same  time.  "  (18)  Which  is  to  say  that  there  is  a  high  level  of  difficulty 
involved  in  sorting  out  intentional  actions  from  non-intentional  events.  Thus  he  asks  "when  John  Wflkes  Booth 
moved  his  finger,  thereby  firing  a  gun,  thereby  killing  Lincoln,  did  he  perform  three  discrete  actions,  or  were  there 
relations  of  identity  or  inclusion  among  them?  "  That  is  to  say,  no  matter  how  far  reason  can  go  in  offering  an 
explanation,  doubt  can  always  be  cast.  See  McCann  (1998)  Works  ofAgency,  Ithaca. 
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within  these  broad  regulative,  physical  conditions,  that  there  is  a  yet  more  detailed 
human  movement,  and  that  motion  originates  from  a  non-observable  base, 
consciousness.  4 
In  contrasting  the  spatio-temporal  vehicle  for  rational  motion,  with  the  more 
complicated  finely  grained  nature  of  action  we  can  see  that  an  objective  understanding 
goes  only  so  far.  The  closer  we  zoom  in  on  the  apparently  organised  cityscape,  on  the 
individual,  we  see  a  heterogeneity  in  the  humanly  constructed  landscape  -  it,  too, 
composed  of  individuals.  Here,  with  a  barely  concealed  capacity  for  acting  against 
reason  in  myriad  ways  are  the  conscious  minds  of  these  countless  social  atoms, 
potentially  wayward  and  capable  of  bursting  forth  in  unpredictable  motion. 
The  fact  that  the  wandering  impulse  is  largely  contained  within  the  city  and  society 
is  evident  in  the  extent  to  which  urban  planning  seeks  to  attain  a  practically  assimilable 
consciousness  of  the  geography:  city  streets,  dwellings,  meeting  places,  places  of  business, 
directional  signs,  are  all  thus  vehicles  for  motion.  That  is  to  say  our  movements  are 
mediated  through,  or  made  possible  by  such  a  vehicle.  '  As  a  determining  reality  the 
cityscape  at  once  compromises  our  active  impulses,  and  yet  also  permits  them;  our 
spatial  and  temporal  environment  regulates  all  kinds  of  motion  by  a  cunning  assembly 
of  psychological  barriers  that,  for  instance,  place  work  and  leisure,  play  and  rational 
freedom  at  opposite  ends  of  the  same  continuum.  ' 
In  the  modern  cities  of  the  West,  space  is  often  mapped  in  linear  and  grid-like 
systems,  in  ideal  terms  offering  an  ease  of  manouever  in  subjective  terms;  for  example  in 
'  On  the  historical  background  of  the  understanding  of  the  subject  as  'social  atom,  '  see  H.  Ferguson  (2000) 
Modernity  and  Subjectivity,  Charlottesville:  chapter  one. 
'  We  can  suggest  some  affinity  here  between  the  observation  of  such  movement  and  the  Brownian  motion  of 
molecules.  The  irregular,  oscillatory  movement  of  particles  placed  in  liquid  and  observed  by  powerfiA  microscopes 
confirmed,  for  Einstein,  the  existence  of  particles.  See  Heinz  R.  Pagels  (1982)  The  Cosmic  Code,  New  York. 
'  The  use  of  this  Aristotelian  categorization  will  become  apparent  below.  For  an  outline  of  motion  and  vehicle, 
see  Anthony  Kenny  (1989)  The  Metaphysics  of  Mind,  Oxford:  72ff.  The  point  here  is  that  we  must  not  confuse  a 
capacity,  which  is  potential,  with  its  exercise,  or  vehicle,  which  is  a  given  reality.  In  terms  of  the  subjective  assimilation 
of  space  Norman  Crowe  makes  an  interesting  point  with  regard  to  the  architecture  of  a  building,  which  we  may 
accept  as  a  manifestation  of  a  similax  order  to  that  sought  by  the  city  planner:  "The  harmonic  relationship  of  one  part 
a  ground  plan  to  another  can  only  be  observed  in  a  drawing  of  the  plan,  where  the  whole  plan,  like  the  facade  of  a 
building,  can  be  seen  all  at  once.  The  actual  experience  of  the  ground  plan  while  moving  through  the  rooms  and 
corridors  of  a  complex  building  takes  place  in  time  as  a  sequence  of  perceptual  events.  These  events  must  be  sensed  as 
parts  of  an  overall  conceptual  framework  that  is  not  directly  visible.  "  (102)  And,  "we  intuitively  recognize  a  well- 
ordered  plan,  even  when  we  cannot  tell  exactly  what  orders  that  plan;  we  simply  perceive  a  design  unity,  the  source  of 
which  may  not  be  immediately  apparent.  "  (103)  See  N.  Crowe  (1995)  Nature  and  the  Man-Made  World,  Cambridge, 
MA. 
"  Cf.  Edward  Devereux  (1980)  Gambling  and  the  Social  Structure,  New  York.  Gambling  is  viewed  as  an 
institutional  ised  solution  to  "potentially  disruptive  forces"  that  have  principally  an  economic  basis,  rather  as  a 
consequence  of  the  ordering  of  social  action  in  the  sense  I  identify;  although  gambling  he  believed  was  generated  by 
'normal'  behaviour  and  expectations  reaching  some  breaking  point,  with  the  game  acting  as  a  release  (949). 
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allowing  one  to  obtain  a  mental  picture  of  rectilinear  motion,  say,  in  the  calculation  that 
it  will  take  you  x  minutes  to  get  to  a  particular  part  of  the  city.  The  matrices  of  the  grid 
become  also  part  of  a  network  of  interrelated  routes  providing  the  objective 
infrastructure  for  the  efficient  movement  of  large  amounts  of  people  -  public  transport 
7 
timetables,  for  example,  also  depend  on  being  able  to  chart  time  over  space.  Yet,  the 
grid  does  not  realise  a  determinist  control  over  the  movement  that  takes  place  within  -  it 
still  manages  to  effect  this  movement  of  people  without  having  "a  singular  focus,  or  clear 
image"  and  could  be  seen  also  as  a  particular  social  form  of  incomplete  relations;  thus  it 
may  actually  constitute  "spatial  interruptions,  fractures,  and  lags.  "'  In  some  grid  systems 
many  different  routes  interconnect  at  certain  points.  On  'open  grids,  '  for  example  -  that 
is,  systems  where  traffic  flow  is  multi-directional  as  opposed  to  filtered  or  uni-directional 
-  the  system  can  accommodate  a  variety  of  itineraries,  responding  to  any  number  of 
plans,  which  are  often  at  cross-purposes! 
We  may  not  always  remain  conscious  of  the  fact  that  movements  within  the  cities  of 
modern  society  are  made  within  definite  objective  parameters.  The  world  we  inhabit  is, 
in  other  words,  rationally  directed.  In  modern  cities  the  aim  is  a  practical  one,  and  that 
is  to  effect  the  swift  movement  of  people  and  goods.  "  The  design  of  a  rational 
environment  is  also  and  not  incidentally  intended  to  reduce  the  exceptions  that  would 
upset  this  order;  in  other  words  it  is  a  construction  that  attempts  to  minimise  chance 
and  to  anticipate  unwelcome  surprises.  This  fact  can  account  for  the  difficulty,  as  Walter 
Benjamin  wrote,  of  really  getting  lost  in  a  city.  Simply  losing  one's  place  really  only 
'  Whilst  no  claim  about  space  as  the  physical  ordering  of  time  could  be  made  about  the  premodern  city  it  is 
worth  noting  some  continuities.  The  ancient  Greek  'polis'  had  already  perfected  the  geometrically  linear  style  we  now 
associate  with  modern  cities.  Perhaps  modern  city  geometry,  like  that  found  in  New  York's  Long  Island,  for  example, 
just  realize  this  to  an  even  greater  extent.  Thus  streets  are  identified  by  number  and  position  (at  90-degree  intervals)  - 
so,  West  5"  Street,  and  so  on.  In  fact  the  ancient  Greek  polis  was  more  than  just  the  physical  city.  As  Norman  Crowe, 
ibid,  says,  "Central  to  the  idea  of  the  polis  was  the  agreement  that  the  polity  binds  the  community  together;  each 
citizen  of  the  polis  is  aware  that  he  shared  a  destiny  with  all  other  citizens,  just  as  all  citizens  share  in  the  common 
history  of  their  polis.  "  (N.  Crowe,  ibid.  I  11)  It  is  worth  asking  to  what  extent  this  is  still  an  aim  of  the  city?  See  note 
on  the  planner  as  value  technician,  below.  It  is  also  important  in  this  respect,  when  thinking  of  gambling  as  alterity,  of 
the  necessity  of  the  removal  of  self  to  another  place,  in  order  to  get  'loose',  if  you  like.  Gambling  is  a  'loosening'. 
8  M.  Christine  Boyer,  (1994)  The  City  of  Collective  Memory,  Cambridge,  Mass.:  490-9  1.  See  also  George  R. 
Collins  (1959)  'Linear  Planning  Throughout  the  World,  'Journal  of  the  Society  ofArchitectural  Historians.  Vol.  18,3: 
74-93;  and  Peter  Marcuse  (1987)  'The  Grid  as  City  Plan:  New  York  City  and  Laissez-faire  Planning  in  the 
Nineteenth  Century.  '  Planning  Perspectives,  Vol.  2,3:  287-3  10. 
'  This,  of  course,  probably  simplifies  the  subject  to  an  unhelpful  degree.  The  reader  who  thinks  this  too  crude, 
however,  should  see  Albert  Pope  (1996)  Ladders,  Houston  and  New  York.  The  author  identifies  twelve  distinct  grid 
or  'ladder'  types. 
'0  In  historical  terms  it  is  debatable  whether  or  not  cities  only  existed  to  provide  means  of  exchange.  The  ancient 
Greek  polis  (see  previous  footnote)  was  also  concerned,  probably  primarily  so,  with  the  harmony  of  man  and  nature. 
Economic  functions  may  have  served  this  same  end,  as  well.  Aristotle,  for  example,  speaks  of  justice  in  exchange,  or 
the  attainment  of  'harmony.  '  See  Aristotle  (1980)  Nicomachean  Ethics,  Oxford. 
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requires  ignorance,  perhaps  the  removal  of  the  internalized  geography  of  the  city,  but 
certainly  a  forgetting  ('losing'  oneself  is,  he  argues,  another  matter).  The  point  is  that 
any  difficulty  in  negotiating  city  terrain  will  only  be  temporary  -  until  remedied  for 
example  by  the  abundant  means  available  in  the  modern  city  for  effecting  a  movement 
from  one  place  to  another.  So  we  look  at  a  street  map;  ask  for  directions;  take  a  train  or 
a  bus,  a  taxi,  and  so  on.  " 
City  grids,  which  are  known  principally  from  the  objective  perspective  of  the  map 
represent,  as  do  the  maps  themselves,  an  idealized  and  disembodied  or  dispersed 
knowledge  of  the  terrain  -  this  is  not  a  wilderness  here;  your  expectations  on  turning  an 
unknown  corner  of  a  city  street  will  be  limited,  and  your  capacity  for  surprise,  too,  is 
confined  by  the  gradual  assimilation  of  this  knowledge.  "  What  the  rational  mind  has 
achieved  in  this  sense  is  something  akin  taking  a  wilderness,  if  we  can  imagine  some 
infinite  geography,  and  impose  on  it  this  idea,  this  'reality'  that  is  the  city.  Which  is  to 
say,  the  city  becomes  object,  complete  with  relations  of  identity  that  substantiate  causal 
expectations,  and  it  is  by  such  means  that  the  finite  order  of  the  modern  city  is 
maintained  -  which  is  not,  of  course,  to  say  that  it  is  always  well-ordered. 
It  may  be  stretching  credulity  to  say  that  the  modern  city  achieves  the  desired 
harmony  of  reason,  but  this  has,  nonetheless,  remained  as  much  of  a  concern  in  modern 
times  as  ancient.  13  Indeed,  the  early-to-mid-twentieth  century  saw,  for  the  first  time,  the 
city  planner  grapple  with  an  emerging  problem  of  an  expanding  urban  mobility 
resulting  from  the  growth  in  road  vehicles  in  the  previous  fifty  years.  "  This  was  clearly  a 
"  That  these  features  are  predominantly,  maybe  exclusively,  found  in  the  West  is  highlighted  by  the  example  of 
Tokyo.  Whilst Japan  since  the  end  of  the  Second  World  War  is  often  assumed  to  have  taken  on  the  modern  values  of 
the  West,  it  seems  that  the  Japanese  city  (particularly  Tokyo)  stands  as  an  exception  to  this.  Donald  Ritchie  notes 
that:  "although  Japanese  municipalities  [ 
... 
I  may  appear  to  be  reassuringly,  or  distressingly,  Western,  even  a  short 
acquaintance  with  these  modern-seeming  cities  indicates  they  are  not  Western  nor,  indeed,  in  any  Western  sense, 
modern  [ 
... 
]  Another  indication  of  the  difference  occurs  when  Western  visitors  attempt  to  locate  an  address.  Their 
assumptions  are  that  a  city  is  planned,  that  there  is  a  logic  to  be  discerned  in  its  structure.  Empty-cored  Tokyo, 
however,  initially  exhibits  nothing  of  the  sort.  "  There  are  complex  historical  reasons  for  this,  which  are  summed  up  in 
a  basic  cultural  difference:  "As  elsewhere  in  Japan,  the  civic  concern  which  Westerners  are  accustomed  to  in  their  own 
cities,  the  assumption  that  a  private  address  is  a  public  matter,  seems  to  be  missing.  "  See  Donald  Ritchie  (1999) 
Tokyo,  London:  13-14. 
"  The  famous  map  of  London  Underground,  designed  by  Underground  engineer  Harry  Beck  in  1933,  is 
exceptional  in  this  regard,  as  being  easily  recalled  in  memory,  but  also  in  the  way  that  it  does  not  correspond  to  the 
actual  geography  of  the  city  it  'represents.  ' 
"  See  Norton  E.  Long  0  95  8)  'The  Local  Community  as  an  Ecology  of  Games,  '  American  Journal  of  Sociology, 
Vol.  64  (3):  251-261. 
See,  for  example,  John  May  (1966)  Living  In  Cities,  London:  "The  first  car  appeared  in  Brita.  1n  as  early  as 
1888,  and  by  the  outbreak  of  the  First  World  War  there  were  about  a  quarter  of  a  million  motor  vehicles  on  the  roads 
of  Britain.  In  1964,  the  number  was  over  twelve  and  one-quarter  millions"  (19)  The  need  for  greater  organization 
prompted  the  well-known  Buchanan  Report  which  saw  traffic  management  in  terms  of  the  accommodation  of  the 
emerging  urban  chaos  by  "improving  signal  installations,  eliminating  right-hand  turns,  instituting  one-way  systems, 
clearing  the  streets  of  parked  cars,  improving  signs...  to  improve  the  flow  of  traffic.  "  That  is,  by  refining  principles  of 
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challenge  to  the  desire  for  urban  harmony,  and  hence  the  city  planner  re-emerges  as 
technocrat,  or  even,  as  the  'scientist'  of  imaginations.  Such  elite  social  architects  pursued 
a  vision  that  incorporated  as  a  necessary  element  of  the  enterprise  the  fashioning  of 
human  minds.  This  was  the  planner  as  'value  technician,  '  expressed  as  such  in  the 
patrician  tones  of  one  who  knows  that  a  lack  of  order  in  movement  can  have  a 
debilitating  effect  on  the  maintenance  of  the  body  politic: 
As  scientists,  or  technicians,  we  work  with  facts  to  arrive  at  truth,  using 
methods  and  language  appropriate  to  our  tasks,  and  our  way  of  handling 
problems  are  not  subject  to  outsiders'  criticisms.  " 
Appropriately,  the  minds  of  the  many  were  thought  capable  of  attaining  a  harmony 
bequeathed  by  this  elite;  rather  than  it  emanating  from,  as  in  ancient  times,  man  )s 
communion  with  nature. 
Forgetting,  Strategic  and  Reckless 
Yet,  the  most  important  aspect  of  the  finite  nature  of  such  rationalism  is  the  collective 
mind  that,  in  a  demonstration  of  hope,  attempts  to  realize  it.  Once  again,  if  we  zoom 
from  our  objective  perspective  further  into  our  hypothetical  urban  landscape  we  see, 
perhaps,  a  seething  mass  of  bodies  in  motion,  social  'atoms'  meeting  and  parting.  If  we 
penetrate  this  yet  further  the  'atoms'  become  conscious,  and  the  consciousness  of  each 
individual  remains  we  see  -  despite  the  lines  and  grids  that  'move'  the  physical 
individual  -  infinite;  there  is  no  knowing,  ultimately,  the  intentions  that  compel 
16  movement. 
Nevertheless  the  objective  order  is  undoubtedly  assimilated  in  the  sense  that  the 
body  can  only  move  within  the  spatial  environment  that  it  finds  itself  in.  If  one  does  get 
lost,  the  straight  lines  of  a  highway,  to  take  one  example,  offer  the  comfort  that  someone 
else  has  been  there  before,  and  that  the  logic  of  planning  being  relatively  constant,  there 
organization.  Colin  Buchanan,  author  of  the  original  report,  quoted  in  Elderedge  (1967)  Taming  Megalopolis.  New 
York:  379 
"  Thomas  A.  Reiner  (1967)  'The  Planner  as  Value  Technician'  in  Elderedge  (ed.  )  ibid:  232. 
16  That  is  to  say,  establishing  objective  'causes'  of  action  requires  such  a  delimitation  of  the  subject,  conveyed 
with  a  meticulous  care  for  the  use  of  language  that  ultimately  we  can  end  up  talking  about  the  structure  of  sentences. 
So,  in  terms  of  explanation,  Cartesian  Dualism  persists,  although  Donald  Davidson  for  one,  tries  to  meet  the 
requirements  of  both  by  introducing  a  notion  of  'anomalous  monism'  -  that  is  the  idea  that  mind  and  body  are 
related  in  action  and  movement,  but  not  in  any  way  that  can  be  generalized  in  terms  of  scientific  laws,  and  this  he 
argues  does  not  contradict  Humean  causation,  which,  he  suggests,  pertains  only  to  conjunctions  individuated.  See 
Davidson  (1980)  Fssays  on  Actions  and  Events,  Oxford. 
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will  be  some  kind  of  similarity  to  other  rational  environments  you  may  have  become 
used  to.  This  is  what  Benjamin  refers  to  when  he  speaks  of  the  difficulty  of  experiencing 
surprise  in  the  city:  the  difficulty  is  in  forgetting  when  the  concrete  facts  (streets,  signs, 
places)  are  presented  with  seeming  immediacy,  almost  without  barrier  and  as  a  reflection 
of  the  internal  consciousness.  So  the  reasonableness  of  the  physical  geography  of  urban 
society  depends  on  a  subjective  identification  with  it,  on  adherence  to  the  'facts.  '  The 
city  IS  'us.  '  We  are  the  city  -  at  least  this  is  the  case  in  most  of  the  West.  17 
On  the  other  hand,  we  have  the  city  as  a  living,  breathing,  moving  entity  that  is 
constantly  overcoming  this,  not  to  say  producing,  within  the  harmony,  the  seeds  of 
conflict.  In  the  hustle  and  bustle  of  ceaseless  traffic,  itself  an  immanent  threat  to 
stability,  knowledge  becomes  the  attention  paid  to  particulars,  like  parking  your  car 
between  the  white  lines,  which  is  to  say,  knowledge  becomes  very  general  and  abstract. 
Where  gaps  in  knowledge  are  apparent,  because  for  instance  movement  is  too  rapid  to 
be  contained  within  bounds  of  expectation  (or  'normality'),  so  too  is  the  contingency  of 
social  existence.  Within  the  city  therefore,  is  concealed  a  subjectivity  that  can  propel 
itself  forward  on  this  lack  of  real  knowledge. 
A  gambler,  in  moving  in  a  way  that  looks  objectively  aimless  (in  that  his  motion 
removes  long-term  goals)  is  engaged  in  acts  of  abandonment  and  forgetting.  In  Auster's 
The  Music  of  Chance,  there  is  little  inclination  on  the  part  of  Nashe  and  Pozzi,  the  two 
gamblers,  to  rely  on  knowledge,  on  the  kind  of  reasonableness  that  demands  caution  by 
its  very  nature.  The  consequence  for  them  has  the  whiff  of  morality  about  it.  Both 
having  demonstrated  a  reluctance  to  impose  an  order  on  their  own  lives,  it  is  done  for 
them  by  the  victorious  Flower  and  Stone.  Like  Hobbes'  sovereign,  Flower  and  Stone 
become  the  'authors'  of  Nashe  and  Pozzi's  actions.  If  Nashe  and  Pozzi  were  in  aimless 
flight  prior  to  the  fateful  poker  game,  what  resulted  from  their  gambling  was  the 
restoration  of  a  kind  of  organization,  a  grounding  in  reality.  For  once  they  are  forced  to 
give  in  to  time,  and  also  to  another  bully,  the  budget.  "  Here,  Flower  and  Stone  are  the 
(  value  technicians,  '  and  Stone  more  precisely  a  contemporary  version  of  the  Hobbesian 
sovereign,  the  great  'architect,  '  who  builds  not  only  a  city,  but  refashions  the  minds  of 
men  who  give  in  to  subjective  impulses  arising  from  too  much  disordered  activity. 
17  Cf  Georg  Sirnmel  (197  1)  'The  Metropolis  and  Mental  Life,  '  On  Individual  and  Social  Forms,  Chicago. 
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It  is  an  inescapable  fact  that  we  can  remain  convinced  of  our  power  to  control  life 
only  by  relying  on  our  previous  experience  of  certain  phenomena  being  brought  into 
relation  with  each  other.  This  is  to  identify,  to  delimit  and  therefore  objectify  reality. 
The  constant  conjunction  of  phenomena,  and  the  emergence  of  beliefs  regarding  the 
causal  relations  of  existence,  allows  a  certain  degree  of  confidence  in  the  future.  This  is 
undeniable.  Yet,  it  also  seems  that  the  objectification  of  a  world  so  understood  realizes 
some  kind  of  psychological  dependency,  particularly  in  the  sense  that  the  more  we  have 
controlled  our  world,  the  more  we  seem  to  rely  on  the  elimination  of  the  contingent. 
As  a  result  of  a  habitual  forgetting  that  provides  the  ground  of  modern  social  life, 
and  which  in  modernity  has  actually  become  almost  a  demand  in  virtue  of  the 
specialization  of  all  departments  of  knowledge,  what  is  known  then  takes  the  form  of  a 
number  of  ontological  assumptions.  That  is  to  say,  knowledge  amounts  to  a  kind  of 
faith  in  causal  relations  that  takes  for  granted  that  certain  things  are  outside  our  control, 
and  that  things  are  just  the  way  they  are  because  our  common  experience  convinces  us 
that  we  may  be  able  to  trust  in  others  who  have  assumed  control  over  various  parts  of 
our  lives  in  modern  society  -  and  the  list here  would  extend  from  the  bus  driver  to  the 
organisations  who  produce  our  food  to  the  people  we  elect  to  operate  the  government  of 
the  society  we  live  in.  "  The  existence  of  a  hidden  'network'  of  trust  suggests  that  we 
come  through  a  process  of  acquaintance  or  learning  to  act  in  a  habitual  manner,  in  ways 
that  reveal  our  internalization  of  an  entire  range  of  rational  expectations  and  values.  As  a 
result  of  the  'strategic'  forgetting  of  the  extent  to  which  our  lives  depend  on  others, 
action  at  times  becomes  a  more  or  less  automatic  activity,  and  as  far  as  certain  types  of 
rectilinear  motion  are  concerned  we  do  not  even  need  to  think. 
Once  again,  in  thinking  of  urban  organization,  the  regulation  of  traffic  flow  is  one 
example  of  the  need  for  decision  making  having  been  substantially  limited  in  modern 
experience.  Under  the  automated  control  of  traffic  one  may  often  follow  the  flow  of 
"  See  Frederick  and  Steven  Barthelme  (2000)  Double  Down,  Boston  and  New  York.  The  authors  speak  of 
winning  as  "a  victory  over  money,  the  tyrant  that  has  been  pushing  you  around  your  whole  life"  (91).  Budgetary 
constraints  also  figure  as  a  structural  determinant  of  gambling  in  Edward  Devereux  (1980)  ibid,  chapter  19. 
"  Some  notion  of  trust  would  seem  to  be  employed  in  the  earliest  of  the  social  contract  tradition,  in  forming  the 
basis  of  what  we  would  call  these  days  'constitutional  government.  '  John  Locke,  for  example,  took  trust  to  be  "the 
bond  of  society.  "  See  John  Locke  (1993)  Political  Writings,  Harmondsworth:  182,  and  section  142  of  the  Second 
Treatise  of  Government  (any  edition).  And  on  the  social  contract  tradition,  see  for  example,  the  selections  by  Hume, 
Rousseau,  and  Locke  in  Ernest  Barker  (ed.  )  (1969)  The  Social  Contract,  Oxford.  With  relevance  to  the  contingency  of 
modern  social  relations,  and  the  consideration  of  trust  as  the  'collection  of  hidden  principles'  that  make  'good  and 
prosperous  societies,  '  see  Francis  Fukuyama  (1995)  Trust:  The  Social  Virtues  and  the  Creation  ofProsperity.  New  York. 
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movement  rather  than  the  signal  for  movement.  "  If  we  take  the  motor  vehicle  as  the 
pre-eminent  encapsulation  of  the  modern  freedom  to  move,  and  as  the  statement  of  a 
desire  for  transcendence,  we  can  see  this  to  some  extent,  insofar  as  motion  and  rest 
always  are  made  possible  through  a  particularly  delimited  aspect  of  the  urban  geography. 
A  road  is  not  simply  a  line,  but  it  is  lines  within  lines,  and  these  may  cut  through 
imagination  as  much  as  they  do  the  physical  terrain.  In  popular  imagination  the  road 
objectifies  the  possibility  of  alterity  ('Hit  the  road'  being  a  particularly  common 
injunction  to  draw  a  line  under  experience).  But  what  usually  goes  without  mention,  but 
is  unwittingly  expressed  at  all  times,  is  that  the  road  is  merely  a  vehicle  for  experience. 
This  sleeping  belief  is  often  expressed,  rather,  in  terms  of  a  desire  to  have  the  freedom  to 
move,  to  do,  and  to  be.  So,  the  line-as-road  permits  transcendence,  but  the  finer  it 
becomes,  this  line,  the  more  it  actually  becomes  constricting.  It  can  compel,  with  legal 
sanction,  uniformity.  Thus,  as  a  vehicle  for  motion  we  have  either  the  crude  line, 
anything  from  dirt  tracks  to  highways,  lines  upon  which  your  view  may  extend  far  into 
the  distance;  or,  providing  a  finer  vehicle  for  movement,  lines  such  as  those  seen  at  road 
intersections  or  parking  lots,  lines  which  box  you  in.  Attaining  a  temporary  state  of  rest 
-  in  this  case  that  would  be  to  park  a  car  -  is  only  possible  by  utilizing  these  routes,  only 
by  stopping  many  times  at  traffic  signals,  obeying  directional  signs,  and  finally  parking 
the  vehicle  within  the  lines  provided.  Once  again  if  we  consider  this  in  the  broadest 
terms,  in  terms  of  the  spatial  orientation  of  the  subject,  the  emblems  of  such  a  rational 
organization  as  the  flow  of  traffic  depends  on,  help  us  to  construct  subsequent 
expectations  of  regularity  in  phenomena.  " 
Forgetting,  as  a  crucial  aspect  of  psychological  orientation,  requires  -  under  certain 
conditions  -  regularity  and  orderliness  (although  we  need  recall  nothing  of  this  after  a 
time),  to  the  extent  that  we  build  systems  around  compartmentalized  'knowledge.  "' 
"  For  example,  most  people  step  onto  a  plane  without  pondering  on  the  physics  of  flight.  We  drive  our  cars  at 
great  speeds  in  the  knowledge  that  most  drivers  pay  similar  attention  to  the  need  for  safety. 
"  Cf.  Peter  Conrad  (1999)  Modern  Times,  Modern  Places,  London.  Here  is  a  description  of  traffic  at  Potsdamer 
Platz  in  1905,  almost  20  years  before  the  introduction  of  the  traffic  first  signal  in  Europe  in  the  same  place:  "A  Berlin 
newspaper  had  kept  a  vigil  in  Potsdamer  Platz,  and  in  a  single  hour  counted  416  streetcars,  146  buses,  564  carriages, 
538  assorted  unclassifiable  vehicles,  54  coaches  and  138  tricycles  battling  across  it:  entropy  in  action"  (62)  And  in 
terms  of  the  disorientating  effects  of  our  faith  in  social  and  geographical  order,  we  need  only  note  the  ease  with 
h 
which 
the  merest  alteration  to  the  established  organization  can  produce  unpredictable  results.  The  Observer,  Feb.  18  2001 
reported  that,  "Vandals  caused  traffic  chaos  in  Todand,  Isle  of  Wight,  after  they  left  eight  road  signs  pointing  the 
wron  q2Way* 
'Driving,  '  motoring,  '  and  'traffic'  signify  different  levels  of  forgetting,  and  variations  in  knowledge:  the  early 
freedom  of  movement  found  in  the  car  would  have  been  a  qualitatively  different  experience  under  conditions  where 
traffic  was  unregulated  compared  with  what  we  know  today.  Driving  one  of  the  first  cars  would  have  had  more  in 
common  with  driving  a  horse  and  cart  than  driving  a  modern  car.  For  insightful  comments  on  the  role  of  forgetting 
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This  is  true  of  intellectual  as  well  as  of  physical  systems;  as  much  a  feature  of  cultures 
and  ideologies  as  well,  but  particularly  so  in  the  history  of  science  and  technology.  The 
historical  development  of  specialization  in  the  sciences  was  part  of  an  attempt  to  more 
efficiently  conquer  nature,  which  is  to  say  it  is  an  attempt  to  rule  out  uncertainty.  Again, 
zooming  in  to  our  hypothetical  urban  landscape  from  an  objective  position  we  see  the 
difficulties  in  maintaining  this  level  of  expectancy  in  a  living  environment:  we  see,  for 
instance,  (irrational',  inconsistent  motion,  most  often  manifested  in  behaviour  that  is 
irregular  in  some  way,  and  we  see  this  because  the  city,  whilst  providing  an  organization 
of  expectations,  also,  and  as  a  consequence,  throws  a  light  on  anomalous  phenomena. 
Thus,  we  see  social  problems.  We  see  criminal  activity.  This  too  is  chance.  And  though 
we  try  to  control  it,  it  demands  ever  more  cunning  devices.  It  is  interesting  that  a 
manufacturer  of  contemporary  security  products,  based  in  Brazil,  markets  an  anti-theft 
scanning  device,  an  item  we  are  all  used  to  seeing  situated  at  shop  doorways,  as  The 
Aleatork  Raffle  Detector.  This  device  (Plate  5)  is  designed  to  inhibit  the  movement  of 
aleatoric  people.  "' 
Taking  an  objective,  or  scientific,  view  therefore  will  downplay  these  things  as 
'irregularities,  '  because  such  an  approach  gets  caught  up  in  a  high  degree  of  abstraction. 
We  see  in  objective  terms  only  what  happens  for  the  most  part,  and  so  the  irrational,  the 
criminal,  and  the  deviant  are  simply  exceptional  (become  so)  from  the  point  of  view  of 
the  definition  of  the  normal,  which  of  course,  like  all  objectification  is  rendered  in 
tautological  terms.  It  is  past.  The  objective  position,  which,  by  understanding  social 
existence  in  terms  of  order,  ignores  subjective  capacities.  " 
Hobbes  understood  (in  his  justification  of  sovereign  power)  that  such  an 
objectification  is  not  necessarily  tyrannical,  and  to  so  characterize  it  would  be  to  misstate 
the  basis  of  rational  autonomy,  which  we  understand  in  an  awareness  that  the  social 
order  subsists  in  virtue  of  an  acceptance  of  limits  on  personal  freedom,  for  the  sake  of  a 
in  self-creation,  see  Nietzsche's  essay  'On  the  Utility  and  Liability  of  History  for  Life'  (1995)  in  Unfashionable 
Observations,  Volume2.  Stanford:  83-168. 
23  Of  course,  when  a  criminal  is  reformed  he  goes  'straight,  '  or  ties  to  stick  to  the  'straight  and  narrow.  ' 
"  The  'is'  of  identity  may  not  always  be  clear.  In  terms  of  existential  statements  a  'stative'  verb  may  express  a 
bodily  or  mental  state,  as  opposed  to  an  action  or  movement.  The  'durative'  form  of  a  verb  would  express  continuous 
movement.  This  is  really  tangential  to  the  point  made,  but  is  explored  for  example  in  Charles  H.  Kahn  (1986) 
'Retrospective  on  the  Verb  to  be  and  the  Concept  of  Being',  and  in  David  Wiggins  (1980)  Sameness  and  Substance, 
Oxford.  The  point  is  generally  related  to  asking  what  something  like  the  wager  is,  rather  than  say,  why  people  gamble, 
which  is  the  more  commonly  asked  question,  and  one  that  restricts  it  to  looking  at  formal  elements,  it  seems.  So,  the 
'what  is  it'  question  draws  our  attention  to  metaphysical  difficulties. 
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PLATE  5.  SORTE10  ALEATORIO.  Magnetic  Co.,  1999.  In  English:  'The  Aleatory  Raffle  Detector.  ' 
This  is  a  product  similar  to  numerous  others  positioned  at  the  exit  points  of  retail  outlets  the  world  over, 
and  marketed  by  a  Brazilian  security  firm.  Rather  interestingly  we  note  the  injunction  to  sort  out  the 
random.  The  caption  reads,  "The  Aleatory  Raffle  detector  is  used  in  industries,  entrances,  parking, 
markets,  etc...  The  equipment  detects  aLeatoric  people  who  can  be  inspected,  inhibiting  thefts,  weapon 
transportation,  or  other,  depending  on  its  use"  (emphasis  mine).  This,  as  far  as  I  am  aware,  is  the  first 
instance  of  such  individuals  being  designated  by  the  appropriately  improvisational-sounding  adjective 
'aleatoric'  -  appropriate  because  thieves,  we  may  suppose,  tend  to  make  things,  make  life,  up  as  they  go. 
(Source..  http:  //Www.  "tagnetic.  cam.  br) 
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shared  need  for  certainty  in  some  things,  particularly  physical  safety  and  material  well- 
being.  And  so,  most  people  stick  to  the  'straight  and  narrow'  in  terms  of  conforming  to 
the  rational  imperatives  of  having  well  defined  goals;  they  pay  their  taxes  and  invest  in 
pensions.  They  act  with  a  stealth  of  interest.  Thus,  rational  autonomy  when  seen 
objectively  might  be  taken  to  represent  a  relatively  harmonious  social  situation.  And 
there  is,  as  the  Ancient  Greeks  understood  in  their  notion  of  the  polis,  a  coming 
together  of  interests  in  the  city.  However,  this  is  understood  as  an  expectation  based  on 
the  relation  of  one  person  to  another,  and  of  these  to  the  whole.  The  point  is  that  we 
may  forget  this,  but  it  is  there  beneath  our  feet  -  the  physical  organization  of  the  city 
represents  an  attempt  at  this  ideal  harmonious  state. 
For  example,  if  we  visualize  a  particular  instance  of  a  physical  longing  for  stability, 
we  will  see  something  like  that  seen  in  Ed  Ruscha's  aerial  photographs  of  Los  Angeles 
parking  lots  (Plate  6).  Once  again,  it  is  hopefully  not  straining  the  point  to  suggest  that 
such  an  organization  is  illustrative  of  an  at  least  formal  rhythm,  if  not  harmony,  in  social 
existence.  25  That  is  to  say,  it  produces  in  one  form  the  general  regularity  in  modern 
society's  spatial  organization  of  experience,  or  again,  it  is  evidence  that  we  properly  act 
on  the  basis  of  expectations;  it  suggests  a  unity  of  sorts.  Whilst  this  refers  to  empty 
spaces  (in  respect  of  Ruscha's  images),  it  is  interesting  to  see  what  happens  when  these 
are  filled  up.  Objectifications  of  motion  in  such  spaces,  for  example,  in  speeded  up  film 
of  city  traffic,  allow  us  observe  the  realization  of  this  loosely  defined  rhythm:  the  ebb 
and  flow  of  bodies  and  motor  vehicles  at  points  of  momentary  rest  such  a  traffic  signals 
fluctuate  to  the  orchestrations  of  an  unseen  conductor.  Phenomena  thus  viewed,  and 
taken  as  a  whole,  merely  reinforce  the  impression  of  a  'social  singularity'  of  movement 
that  conforms  to  some  unheard  rhythm,  and  reveals  that  for  some  of  the  time  we 
unconsciously  move,  not  freely,  but  as  'passengers'  taken  up  by  the  vehicle  of  the  city.  In 
some  variants  this  takes  on  the  mark  of  authority: 
WALK  (Go) 
DON'T  WALK  (Stop) 
"  Is  rhythm  a  precondition  of  harmony?  No.  Nor  does  rhythm  correspond  to  harmony.  Maybe  I  am  straining  to 
make  the  point  here,  but  what  I  am  suggesting  is  that  there  is  realized  in  these  social  forms  a  unity  of  purpose. 
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PLATE  6.  MAY  COMPANY,  6067  WILSHIRE  BLVD.  Ed  Ruscha,  1967.  Here  we  see  an  example  of 
the  city  as  'vehicle.  '  From  the  less  obviously  regulated  darts  of  the  freeway  -which  carry  motorists  within 
what  Reyner  Banham  in  Los  Angeles:  The  Architecture  of  Four  Ecologies  (London,  Allen  Lane:  1971)  calls 
the  autopia:  "the  freeway  system  in  its  totality  is  now  a  single  comprehensible  place,  a  coherent  state  of 
mind,  a  complete  way  of  life,  the  fourth  ecology  of  the  Angeleno"  (213)  -  to  the  more  finely  arranged 
lines  of  the  grid  of  the  car  park,  where  automobiles  are  symmetrically  sorted.  See  Edward  Ruscha,  Thirty- 
four  Parking  Lots  in  Los  Angeles  (Np,  Los  Angeles:  1967). 
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1  26 
Hobbes  would  surely  have  been  impressed.  -- 
Gambling,  and  by  this  I  mean  ultimately  the  wager,  differs  significantly  from  these 
objective  varieties  of  motion  and  rest.  On  the  face  of  it  the  wager  emerges,  like  any  other 
demonstration  of  subjective  will,  from  the  background  of  such  a  day-to-day  reality.  But 
more  interestingly,  it  is  against  this  'normalized'  causal  process  that  we  can  distinguish 
the  radical  nature  of  the  phenomenal  world  as  encountered  by  the  gambler,  and  suggest 
that  what  makes  gambling  unique  is  that  it  destroys  the  Hobbesian  ideal  of  motion.  In 
the  city  things  may  or  may  not  be  relatively  stable,  but  in  actuality  the  mind  of  the 
individual  changes  with  greater  ease  than  the  physical  geography.  The  gambler  thus 
moves  out  of  a  'sphere'  of  habitual  causal  awareness,  itself  a  selective  amnesia,  and 
becomes  an  exemplar  of  this,  propelled  by  an  act  of  subjective  will  into  a  liminal  state  in 
pursuit  of  some  ill-defined  otherness.  " 
That  is  not  to  say  all  expectations,  that  all  causal  powers  are  lost.  Certainly  events 
are  constantly  conjoined  when  brought  into  relation  in  gambling,  but  such  regularities 
refer  only  to  formal  attributes  of  the  situation,  as  in  the  rules  of  a  particular  game.  Thus, 
if  you  possess  a  Royal  Flush  you  win,  or  if  you  hold  the  six  numbers  drawn  in  a  lottery 
you  win  the  Jackpot,  and  so  on.  The  game,  with  its  set  of  rules  and  expectations  is  just 
another  vehicle  for  motion,  at  a  more  detailed  level  of  action  -  which  is  to  say  the  wager 
releases  the  subject  and  the  rules  and  conventions  of  the  game  are  transformed  into  a 
world  of  absolute  freedom.  In  this  broad  sense  the  city  is  a  game,  as  is  society.  They  are 
formal  and  rule-bound. 
However,  the  lack  of  constancy  in  the  gambling  experience  is  uniquely  a  feature  of 
the  wager  -  and  strictly  speaking  not  of  the  game  -  and  one  that  designates  each 
instance,  each  plunge,  as  a  discrete  feature  of  a  gambler's  experience;  the  profane 
corollary  of  spiritual  submission.  The  game  is  object,  it  remains  stable  and  therefore  it  is 
simply  the  vehicle  for  play  and  all  that  entails. 
CausalAnomalies 
It  is  frequently  noted  that  gambling  breeds  a  variety  of  superstitions,  all  of  which  would 
seem  to  rest  on  the  imperceptible  nature  of  causes  in  such  unknown,  or  unknowable 
2'  In  the  United  States,  jaywalking,  the  willful  disregard  of  such  means  of  orga-nizing  movement  is  punishable  in 
law.  These  jaywalkers,  we  might  say,  are  also  'aleatoric  people'  (see  also  plate  5,  below). 
'-  Cf.  Victor  Turner  (1977)  The  Ritual  Process:  Structure  andAnti-Structure,  Ithaca:  Chapter  three. 
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territory.  "  This  should  be  no  surprise.  An  inability  to  bring  events  into  relation  through 
the  singular  experience  produces  good  grounds  for  imputing  unlikely  causal  powers  in 
phenomena,  or  with  even,  it  seems,  with  regard  to  the  power  of  people  to  upset  the 
'natural'  order  of  things. 
Take  Paul  Auster's  Nashe;  whilst  his  proxy,  Jack  Pozzi,  continues  to  play  cards  he 
retreats  from  the  game  and  steals  a  model  figure  from  the  'City  of  the  World.  '  Later 
Pozzi  becomes  convinced  that  they  were  cursed  from  that  point  onwards,  as  it  coincided 
with  the  start  of  the  losing  streak  that  sealed  their  fate.  Hindsight  provided  the 
realization  of  the  cause  of  that  failure.  "We'd  come  to  the  point  where  everything  was 
turning  into  music  for  us,  and  then  you  have  to  go  upstairs  and  smash  all  the 
instruments,  "  he  says.  "You  tampered  with  the  universe,  my  friend,  and  once  a  man 
does  that,  he's  got  to  pay  the  price.  "" 
This  is,  of  course,  an  outrageous  conflation  of  separate  events;  the  superstitious 
mind  is  struggling  to  explain  the  unexplainable,  that  is,  chance.  But  just  as  the  objective 
view  of  the  city  reveals  a  certain  kind  of  regularity,  a  causal  determinateness,  that 
particular  objectivity  is,  like  the  superstitious  conflation  of  cause  and  effect,  not  at  all 
what  is  going  on  at  the  'quantum'  level  of  subjectivity. 
If  we  focus  on  the  fact  that  such  discrete  events,  as  realized  in  superstitious  beliefs, 
do  not  conform  to  'reality'  we  miss  an  important  point.  And,  for  example,  a  'scientific' 
view  of  gambling,  as  offered  by  probabilistic  reasoning,  is not  really  about  the  what  of 
gambling,  but  seems,  on  the  contrary,  to  be  concerned  with  bringing  to  the  fore  an 
objective  means  of  'correcting'  faulty  gambling  beliefs  to  our  attention.  It  has  absolutely 
nothing  to  say  about  the  subjectivity  of  the  gambler,  which  is  manifold  in  the  way  it 
resists  objectification.  And  insofar  as  we  speak  about  the  experience  of  the  wager  there  is 
no  room  here  for  probability.  Probability  enumerates  a  concrete  reality,  this  is  not 
denied,  but  in  creating  an  object  it  'destroys'  an  essence.  The  wager,  as  the  essence,  is  the 
possibility  of  an  alternative  reality,  and  that  is  the  difference:  probability  is,  by  contrast, 
built  upon  the  formal  properties  of  the  game,  on  quantifiable  and  variable  'facts.  ' 
There  is  no  science  of  chance  that  can  make  sense  of  the  profound  singularity  of  the 
wager.  A  probabilistic  'mapping'  of  chance  rests  on  an  ever  more  infinite  series  of  plays. 
In  other  words,  we  might  expect  a  genuine  gambler  to  abandon  any  Hobbesian  hopes  of 
"  For  a  summary  see  Gerda  Reith  (1999)  The  Age  of  Chance:  Gambling  in  Western  Culture,  London:  6-9. 
Scanlan  2001  48 Vehicle,  Motion  and  Stealth 
certainty,  of  the  mastery  of  future,  or  of  conjuring  a  previous  conjunction  of  events 
within  the  limitation  of  an  experience  as  singular  as  the  wager.  With  the  wager  we  are 
reminded  of  the  precarious  social  relations  that  society  rests  upon.  The  wager  is,  in  fact, 
ludicrous.  It  deflates  rationality  with  a  sharp  guffaw.  The  interesting  thing  is  that  this 
can  be  scary  enough  to  prompt  the  erection  of  defences.  Bataille,  for  instance,  observed 
that  chance  never  really  disappears,  but  the  illusion  we  are  usually  left  with  that  would 
point  to  the  contrary  arises  purely  as  a  result  of  the  act  of  calculating  itself,  an  act  which 
is  nothing  else  but  the  exclusion  of  the  contingent.  It  is,  in  other  words,  to  forget.  This, 
as  we  have  seen,  is  such  a  defence.  " 
Play,  in  all  its  forms,  realises  a  'non-rational'  motion.  It  is  a  movement  which  is 
repetition  rather  than  rectilinear  or  developmental,  which  is  to  say  we  cannot  grasp  this 
in  terms  of  causes  or  ends.  This  motion  becomes  attractive  to  many  participants,  not 
least  the  figure  of  the  gambler,  because  of  its  associations  with  chance.  It  is  at  once 
recognition  of  the  attractiveness  of  uncertainty,  and  perhaps,  implicitly,  a  denial  of  the 
objective  organization  of  the  world,  in  every  sense;  temporal,  spatial  and  psychological.  " 
A  glimpse  of  an  accelerated  physical  causality  is  afforded  by  gambling  activity,  and  the 
more  significant  the  wager,  the  greater  the  challenge  to  the  individual  willing  to  test  his 
own  mortal  powers  against  chance.  In  an  unguarded  moment  of  arrogance  Dostoevsky 
wrote  to  his  wife  that,  in  gambling,  he  had  on  numerous  occasions: 
Observed  as  I  approached  the  gambling  table  that  if  one  plays  coolly,  calmly 
and  with  calculation,  i.  ti.  s  qui  . te  impossible  to  lose!  I  swear  -  it  is  an  absolute 
impossibility!  It  is  blind  chance  pitted  against  my  calculation;  hence  I  have  an 
advantage  over  it.  " 
'9  Paul  Auster  (199  1)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  138. 
30  See  Georges  Bataille  (1997)  the  essay  on  'Chance'  in  The  Bataille  Reader,  Oxford:  "The  human  mind  is  set  up 
to  take  no  account  of  chance,  except  insofar  as  the  calculations  that  eliminate  chance  allow  you  to  forget  it;  that  is,  not 
take  it  into  account.  But  going  as  far  as  possible,  reflection  on  chance  strips  the  world  bare  of  the  entirety  of  predictions 
in  which  reason  encloses  it.  Like  human  nakedness,  the  nakedness  of  chance  -  which  in  the  last  resort  is  definitive  -  is 
obscene  and  disgusting:  in  short  divine.  Since  the  course  of  things  of  the  world  hangs  on  chance,  this  course  is  as 
depressing  for  us  as  a  King's  absolute  power"  (39). 
"  There  have  always  been  exceptions  to  this  ordering  of  space.  Indeed,  the  science  of  probability  first  came  to 
terms  with  spatial  contingencies  when  it  became  increasingly  important  to  move  valuable  goods  over  unmapped  or 
uncharted  territory  -  this  gave  birth  to  the  so-called  'aleatory  contract,  '  which  was  the  exchange  of  a  present  and 
certain  value  for  a  future,  uncertain  one.  See  Gerd  Gigirenzer,  et  al  (1989)  The  Empire  of  Chance,  Oxford. 
32  He  ended  this  letter,  however,  by  stating  that  he  could  "never  maintain  my  coolness  and  detachment  in 
gambling  for  longer  than  ha6F  an  hour  at  a  time  ... 
"  This  letter  was  written  after  many  previous  experiences  had 
disproved  his  belief  in  the  fallibility  of  chance  (a  letter  to  Anna,  his  wife,  dated  May  22,1867)  See  Frank,  Joseph  and 
Goldstein,  David  1.  (eds.  )  Selected  Letters  of  Fyodor  Dostoevsky  (1987):  245.  Similar  faith  in  self-control  can  be  seen 
arising  from  Marcel  Duchamp's  short-lived  involvement  with  gambling.  In  1924  he  began  "experimenting  with 
roulette  and  trente-et-quarante  at  the  casino,  trying  out  various  systems.  "  Thinking  that  he  could  do  this  quite 
objectively,  and  without  succumbing  to  the  temptations  of  the  wager,  he  described  in  more  detail  his  attempts  to 
work  out  a  "martingale,  "  or  system,  for  winning  at  roulette.  He  had  been  winning  regularly,  he  said,  and  he  thought 
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Not  only  is  this  a  stunning  demonstration  of  a  misunderstanding  of  the  limits  of 
causal  reasoning  within  the  context  of  the  wager,  it  is  a  fine  example  of  how  far  human 
foolishness  can  extend  itself.  It  is  also  a  commonplace  amongst  gamblers,  this  conviction 
of  infallibility.  Yet  the  reasons  for  extending  hope  beyond  reason  in  such  an  optimistic 
manner  may  serve  to  mitigate  some  of  the  Dostoevsky's  hubris,  and  may  incline  us  to 
suggest  that  one  of  the  factors  at  work  in  such  a  misapprehension  of  power  and 
causation  lies  with  the  confining  logic  of  reason  itself.  Perhaps  the  faith  we  extend  to 
slow  and  careful  motion  misleads  us  as  to  the  extent  of  our  own  powers,  unknowingly 
baffles  us,  leaving  us  blind  to  the  essential  contingency  of  life. 
A  gambling  game,  whatever  form  it  may  take  (and  it  can  be  as  little  as  an  agreement 
between  two  people  to  wager  on  an  uncertain  future  event),  is  therefore  as  likely  to  be 
the  means  for  expressing  a  controlled  calculation  as  it  is  for  permitting  the  wager.  But 
the  wager  makes  a  fool  of  anyone,  and  that  again  is  why  it  is  so  ludicrous.  We  can  put  it 
another  way.  A  movement  by  stealth  is  a  movement  that  has  in  mind  the  future.  It  is  an 
accumulation  of  interest,  both  in  the  financial  sense  that  gave  us  the  idea  of  compound 
interest,  and  in  the  more  general  sense  that  it  requires  a  great  deal  of  conscious  effort,  an 
intensity  of  interest,  in  fact. 
Gambling  cannot  approximate  to  such  a  deliberate  and  calculated  motion  because 
of  the  simple  fact  that  the  essence  of  a  particular  instance  of  a  game  is  a  metaphysical  re- 
ordering  of  all  notions  of  subject  and  object.  In  the  wager  such  a  distinction  falls  from 
the  player  like  a  second,  unnecessary,  skin.  All  becomes  one.  The  discreteness  of 
experience  in  high-tension  play  particularly,  renders  such  an  intensity  of  interest,  as  is 
required  to  take  a  rational  approach,  useless.  Gambling  denies  the  past.  It  negates  the 
accumulated  knowledge  of  causes,  in  order  to  constantly  take  up  the  present  again  and 
again,  forcing  it  into  confrontation  with  the  future. 
he  had  found  a  successful  pattern.  "My  statistics  give  me  full  confidence,  "  he  said.  I  am  going  to  play  there  in  this 
frame  of  mind:  a  mechanized  mind  against  a  machine.  Nothing  romantic  in  the  venture,  or  luck.  "  Duchamp  sold 
bonds  in  this  venture  to  interested  investors.  The  Monte  Carlo  Bond  as  it  was  known,  was  ended  by  a  combination  of 
boredom  at  the  effort  involved  in  a  system  based  on  repeated  play,  and  the  diminishing  financial  returns  of  this 
method.  All  that  remains  are  the  bond  certificates,  which  consist  of  a  Man  Ray  photo  of  Duchamp's  head  imposed  on 
a  roulette  table,  with  the  pun  moustiques  domestiques  demistock,  printed  repeatedly.  See  Calvin  Tomkins  (1998) 
Duchamp:  A  Biography,  New  York:  253-67. 
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Men  [ 
... 
]  being  frequently  driven  into  stra-its  where  rules  are  useless,  and 
being  often  kept  fluctuating  pitiably  [ 
... 
I  by  the  uncertainty  of  fortune's 
greedily  coveted  favours,  they  are  consequently,  for  the  most  part, 
very  prone  to  credulity. 
BARUCH  SPINOZA,  Tractatus  Theologico-Politicus 
What  is  hope  but  a  wish  for  some  state  of  affairs  that  may  realise  our  desires  and 
intentions  -  whether  or  not  we  can  actually  bring  them  about  is  another  matter.  '  Hope 
perhaps  reaches  as  well  to  something  beyond  what  is  habitually  delivered  as  a  matter  of 
routine?  '  To  have  faith  in  an  alternative  state  of  affairs  is  to  hold  out  some  hope  that  the 
normal  course  of  causal  relations  terminates  not  in  what  is  usual,  but  instead  breaks  free 
of  the  determination  of  a  constant  repetition  of  events,  breaching  the  more  or  less 
recurrent  motion  of  everyday  life.  The  possibility  of  transformation  can  only  be 
anticipated  by  hope  -  certainly  this  is  a  partial  vision  of  what  lies  ahead.  Nor  does  it 
amount  to  a  belief,  which  in  terms  of  modernity  becomes  a  manifestation  of  degrees  of 
certainty,  rather  than  an  earlier  form  of  belief  as  a  bearing  witness  to  some  divine 
revelation.  Beliefs  are  substantiated  by  'facts';  they  are  solid,  capable  of  being  'grasped,  ' 
whilst,  by  contrast,  hopes  are  barely  within  grasp.  The  uncertainty  the  gambler  finds  in 
the  wager  reallses  one  form  of  hope  through  a  specific  event. 
There  is  a  liquidation  of  reason  in  this  notion  of  hope  -  barely  resting  on  what  is 
likely,  never  mind  on  fact.  Hope  can  dissipate  into  nothing  just  as  easily  as  it  is 
constituted  in  the  body  of  some  knowledge.  At  such  a  point  in  experience,  when  hopes 
Cf.  Ernest  Bloch  (199  5)  The  Principle  ofHope,  2  Vols.  Cambridge,  MA. 
Kierkegaard  suggested  that  our  obligations  to  others  realise  an  oppressive  routine  that  becomes  solidified  as  the 
customary,  what  he  refers  to  as  a  "deadly  continuity.  "  This  is  not  so,  however,  because  of  its  predictability,  but  rather 
because  it  removes  the  subjective  capacity  for  what  he  calls  rotation.  Instead,  custom  moves  us  by  an  external  force  - 
11  custom  is  like  the  wind  and  weather,  something  completely  indeterminable.  "  Soren  Kierkegaard  (1987)  'Rotation  of 
Crops'  in  Eitherl0r,  Part  L  Princeton:  281-300. 
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are  up  in  the  air,  suspended  between  realization  and  dissipation,  hope  actually  stalls 
motion;  the  anxiety  produced  by  this  inbetweenness  signifies  that  a  liminal  state  has  been 
reached.  A  Maybe.  To  venture  toward  the  future  as  in  gambling  is  both  an  act  of 
abandonment  and  of  forgetting,  but  it  is  a  consciously  taken  step;  leaving  behind  and 
ignoring  what  one  knows  do  not  merely  happen.  The  future  is  willed  in  doing  so.  So, 
the  suspense  encapsulated  by  the  wager  is  neither  resignation  (giving  up)  nor  negation 
(denial).  It  is,  rather,  an  affirmation  of  the  present  -a  Perhaps. 
In  the  wager  the  gambler  invites  movement  to  take  over.  There  occurs  a  removal  of 
psychological  barriers  (and  other  defences)  that  normally  direct  movement,  and  this  is 
what  makes  the  gambling  experience  so  unique  and  also  what  makes  it  so  compelling 
against  all  objective  knowledge  that  the  net  effect  of  a  continuation  of  gambling  is 
simply  loss.  Gambling,  then,  travels  between  belief  and  hope,  and  in  some  of  the  best- 
known  descriptions  of  this  to-ing  and  fto-ing  we  see  also  a  high  degree  of  anxiety  -a  fear 
of  where  the  unfolding  present  may  take  one.  Belief  is  left  behind  in  the  wager  for  the 
sake  of  realizing  an  uncertain  moment.  The  abandonment  of  reason,  and  of  routine,  is 
thus  essential  in  order  to  venture  beyond  habit  and  is,  as  a  matter  of  necessity, 
demanded  by  the  situation,  which  is  to  say  that  the  past  can  have  no  influence  on  an 
encounter  with  chance,  none  beyond  propelling  motion  forward. 
The  wager  unfolds  as  the  anticipation  of  an  unknown  future,  a  calling  forth  of  some 
indefinable,  yet  curiously  eternal  or  universal  all-consuming  power  that  moves  life 
forward.  This  is  reflected  in  that  ancient  practice  of  dicing;  at  times  dice  would  be 
thrown  to  divine  the  will  of  the  gods.  In  coming  to  rest  the  dice  would  reveal  the 
allocation  of  justice  whilst  affirming  a  cosmological  mysteriousness.  3 
By  the  seventeenth  century,  however,  the  meting  out  of  justice  by  these  methods 
was  largely  extinct  in  the  modern  world.  It  was  first  Blaise  Pascal  who  gave  birth  to  a 
new  understanding  of  chance,  and  although  this  was  not  yet  equivalent  to  modern 
conceptions  of  chance  (as  his  well-known  wager  ponders  on  the  enigma  of  God's 
3  EventuAy,  modern  judicial  processes  inaugurated  a  course  of  legal  proceedings  carried  out  in  accordance  with 
well-defined  rules  and  principles.  Nevertheless,  invoking  chance  has  been  noted  amongst  those  in  positions  of  legal 
authority.  In  his  history  of  gambling  in  the  United  States,  Play  the  Devi4  New  York,  Henry  Chafetz  (1962)  tells  of 
one  particularly  unconventional  judge:  "White-whiskered  Judge  Campbell  owned  a  saloon  on  Main  Street  in  Benicia, 
California,  during  the  1880's,  and  he  officially  administered  justice  over  the  bar,  consulting  the  dice  before  imposing 
penalties  on  transgressors.  If  a  three  and  a  two  showed  up,  the  offender  served  five  days  or  five  months,  depending  on 
His  Honour's  mood.  He  seldom  jailed  his  best  customers,  though  he  was  capable  of  handing  out  stiff  sentences. 
When  a  well-known  character  was  hauled  up  before  him  [  ... 
]  Campbell  shook  the  dice  without  waiting  to  hear  either 
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existence),  it  nonetheless  moves  beyond  the  ancient  practice  of  invoking  of  some  divine 
will  to  propose  a  basis  for  decision-making  when  reason  fails;  it  suggests  that  any  motion 
to  the  future  -  even  a  pondering  of  the  future  -  provokes  an  inflation  of  contingency.  As 
Ian  Hacking  said,  a  decision  is  required  because,  "a  game  is  on  at  the  other  end  of  an 
infinite  distance,  and  heads  or  tails  is  going  to  turn  up.  Which  way  will  you  bet?  "'  The 
wager,  of  course,  remains  unresolved,  and  the  mystery  thereafter  substantiated, 
according  to  Pascal,  in  terms  of  a  simple  choice,  and  logic  dictates  that  to  wager  that 
God  exists  dominates  the  alternative  wager  of  his  non-existence.  In  hypothetical  terms, 
then,  the  wager  may  continue  to  instantiate  such  a  metaphysical  insurance  policy 
without  resolution,  but  practically,  gambling  affords  a  means  of  seeing  a  limited 
resolution  of  play.  This  may  be  temporary,  but  it  separates  the  practical  from  the 
metaphysical.  ' 
The  uncertainty  of  play  can  be  anticipated,  and  may  be  apparent  prior  to  the  wager; 
although  this  can  be  partially  resolved  in  the  sense  that  reason  comes  to  comprehend  the 
form  of  the  wager  (that  is  to  say,  the  rules  of  the  game).  The  game  itself  prompts  a  need 
to  understand  something  unknown,  and  can  be  itself,  enigmatic.  An  obscure  and 
detailed  incomprehension  comes  over  the  uninitiated;  a  "Chinese  puzzle,  "  as 
Dostoevsky's  Alexei  recalled  after  his  first  visit  to  the  roulette  tables. 
It  is  important  to  see  then  that  the  incomprehensibility  of  the  wager  lies  in  the  fact 
that  the  apparent  puzzle  of  the  situation  is  not  overcome  by  mere  knowledge  of  the  rules 
of  a  game.  In  fact,  the  game  provides  only  formal  conditions  for  the  wager.  That  is  to 
say,  in  wagering  games  are  of  secondary  importance,  in  that  they  may  vary  and  so  the 
wager  -  being  the  consummation  of  the  play,  its  essence  -  is  what  always  remains  the 
same.  It  is  universally  the  affirmation  of  the  contingent  that  is  realized  through  gambling 
I.  n  the  wager.  And  given  the  distinct  nature  of  the  individual  wager,  this  must  remain  so: 
whatever  events  have  preceded  the  present  wager  have  no  direct  bearing  on  the 
complaint  or  defense.  'Here  you  are  again,  Padie  McAlony,  '  he  said,  'lazy,  lousy,  and  shiftless;  with  no  more 
destin 
4 
ation  than  a  balloon  in  midair,  and  less  visible  means  of  support.  Take  a  six  spot  on  the  house"':  140. 
Ian  Hacking  (1975)  The  Emergence  ofProbability,  Cambridge:  66-67. 
If  Pascal  was  trying  to  illustrate  the  point  that  faith  is  not  attainable  through  deliberation  this  would  have  been 
equally  reflected  in  a  pre-Reformation  view  of  gambling  as  relatively  harmonious  with  the  Church.  Peter  Fuller  noted 
that:  "Catholic  and  pre-Reformation  Church  of  England  divines  frequently  emphasized  the  structure  and  symbolism 
of  gambling  as  being  a  metaphorical  equivalent  of  the  Christian  hierarchy.  Cards,  in  particular,  presented  a  ready- 
made  simile  for  the  Great  Chain  of  Being;  the  gambler's  attitude  to  those  cards,  with  all  its  optimism,  blind  faith, 
irrational  certitude,  struggle  and  acceptance  of  arbitrary  decisions,  paralleled  what  the  church  considered  to  be  a 
desirable  attitude  towards  God,  and  his  ordering  of  the  universe.  "  See  J.  Halliday  and  P.  Fuller  (eds)  The  Psychologv  of 
Gambling,  London:  60. 
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allotment  of  chance,  and  thus  whatever  patterns  seem  to  have  been  thrown  up  in 
previous  experience  have  no  necessary  effect  on  what  will  follow.  '  The  laws  of  the 
universe,  for  all  practical  purposes,  are  annulled  and  renewed  with  each  play. 
Movement  to  Future  Unfolding 
Attempts  to  meet  gambling  with  reason  are  really  a  denial  of  the  ineluctable  force  of 
chance,  and  more  pathetically  we  might  suggest,  such  attempts  betray  a  denial  of  play, 
perhaps  even  an  inability  to  play.  For  as  soon  as  a  gambler  becomes  caught  up  in  trying 
to  fashion  the  future  according  to  some  pre-ordained  design  he  ceases  gambling;  instead 
he  is  engaged  in  work,  just  as  surely  as  if  he  were  clocking  in  at  the  office  or  the  factory 
and  saving  to  pay  for  the  necessities  of  life. 
In  work  we  'hold  on,  '  consolidate.  In  gambling  it  is  necessary  to  let  go,  to  get 
'loose.  '  The  willful  abandonment  of  orderly  paths,  of  modes  of  thinking  that  ease  day- 
to-day  activity,  is  therefore  an  affront  to  the  values  of  modern  society.  This  can  be  seen 
in  the  shock  that  wayward  tendencies  in  motion  provoke,  illustrating,  as  they  do,  an  ill 
discipline  of  nature  if  not  outright  dissolution  -  every  social  category  that  is  described  in 
the  language  of  otherness  moves  in  a  different  step  relative  to  some  idea  of  the  normal; 
hobos,  gypsies,  'dropouts'  of  various  kinds,  and  in  short,  everything  that  comes  to  be 
identified  as  theforeign.  ' 
In  Dostoevsky's  The  Gambler  Alexei  clearly  realizes  a  relationship  of  concordance 
between  gambling  and  movement,  with  the  latter,  in  the  person  of  the  gambler,  as  the 
summation  of  a  characteristically  disordered  code  for  living.  He  is,  in  other  words, 
conscious  of  its  shock  value;  of  being  seen  as  an  unstable  character.  In  one  memorable 
scene  we  see  Alexei  remonstrating  with  two  of  his  social  superiors,  as  he  ostentatiously 
flouts  the  values  of  capital  accumulation  they  hold  so  dear  -  by  announcing  that  "as  a 
Russian"  he  is  not  only  incapable  of  such  a  detailed  interest  in  the  future  as  this  would 
require,  but  is,  indeed,  inclined  towards  a  contrary  wastefulness  that  is  actually  the 
denial  of  stability  and  normality: 
6  This  is  not,  however,  to  deny  that  a  wager  prior  in  experience  influences  a  decision  to  gamble  again  only  to  say 
that  no  gambling  experience  will  usually  conform  to  the  conditions  of  statistical  probability. 
'  On  the  notion  of  the  foreign  to  our  sense  of  social  and  personal  value  see  Julia  Kristeva  (199  1)  Strangers  to 
Ourselves.  Tra-ns.  L.  Roudiez,  New  York. 
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"It  still  remains  to  be  seen  which  is  more  repulsive  -  Russian  haphazardness  or 
German  accumulation  of  wealth  through  honest  labor.  "  Alexei  says. 
"What  a  monstrous  thought!  "  the  General  cried. 
"How  very  Russian!  "  The  Frenchman  exclaimed. 
To  which  Alexei  responded  by  a  further  shock-provoking  outburst.  "I'd  rather 
spend  my  life  like  a  nomad  under  a  tent  than  worship  the  German  idol.  "' 
And  it  is  as  a  modern  day  nomad  that  we  first  encounter  Nashe  in  Paul  Auster's  The 
Music  of  Chance  -a  man  constantly  moving  to  an  unknown  destination,  with  a  car  as 
both  the  closest  thing  he  has  to  fixed  property,  and  as  also  the  carriage  of  all  his  hopes  as 
he  proceeds  on  a  never-ending  coast-to-coast  road  trip  across  America.  We  are 
introduced  to  Jim  Nashe  as  he  leaves  his  family,  with  ostensibly  a  goal  in  mind,  we 
understand,  as  he  plans  to  travel  to  Massachusetts,  although: 
As  it  happened,  he  soon  found  himself  traveling  in  the  opposite  direction.  That 
was  because  he  missed  a  ramp  to  the  freeway  -a  common  enough  mistake  - 
but  instead  of  driving  the  extra  twenty  miles  that  would  have  put  him  back  on 
course,  he  impulsively  went  up  the  next  ramp,  knowing  full  well  that  he  had 
just  committed  himself  to  the  wrong  road.  It  was  a  sudden  unpremeditated 
decision,  but  in  the  brief  time  that  elapsed  between  the  two  ramps,  Nashe 
understood  that  there  was  no  difference,  that  both  ramps  were  finally  the  same.  9 
Such  a  removal  of  expectations  can  only  become  apparent  through  motion,  in  that 
any  human  movement  beyond  fixed  routine  being  consciously  chosen  invites  chance 
along. 
In  recollections  of  gamblers,  the  leaving  behind  of  the  past  can  always  be  contrasted 
by  the  radical  difference  it  can  realize.  Gambling,  as  a  mode  of  being,  thus  moves  far 
beyond  the  confines  of  a  game,  and  may  actually  come  to  represent  a  constant  wagering 
of  the  self.  So,  we  see  in  Jack  Richardson's  Memoir  of  a  Gambler,  our  optimistic 
'chancer'  sharing  a  police  cell  with  a  transvestite  a  short  while  after  taking  flight  from  the 
woman  who  loves  him  for,  instead,  a  life  as  a  gambler.  "  Before  embarking  on  his 
journey  he  remembers  sitting  beside  his  lover,  unable  to  continue  within  the  confines  of 
routine,  with  his  stable,  yet  unrewarding,  life  as  a  writer  as  the  stake  in  a  larger  game: 
'  In  Fyodor  Dostoevsky  (1980)  The  Gambler,  New  York:  43.  The  General  only  gambles  in  order  to  appear 
wealthy,  to  save  face  -  an  important  aspect  to  games  where  the  social  reception  of  one's  acts  overtakes  their  subjective 
importance.  Erving  Goffman  (1972)  discusses  saving  face  in  'Where  the  Action  Is,  '  Interaction  RituaZ  London. 
Paul  Auster  (199  1)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  6. 
Jack  Richardson  0  979)  Memoir  ofa  Gambler,  New  York:  24. 
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I  admitted  that  all  the  chaos  I  was  going  into  frightened  me  and  that  I  might 
someday  grow  numb  even  to  the  pleasures  of  gambling.  I  was  heading  west  in 
the  morning  simply  to  prove  that  the  peace  surrounding  me  was  not  my  final 
fate.  '' 
And  in  another  recollection,  Frederick  Barthelme's  distaste  for  the  normal  settled 
life  is  seen  in  "never  unpacking  boxes"  -  the  boxes  that  contained  his  life,  forever 
portable  and  an  emblem  of  his  inability  to  be  at  'home.  '  It  is  clear  that  if  certainty  is 
found  in  the  warmth  and  security  of  familiarity,  we  can  see  that  the  nomadic  tendencies 
of  the  gambler  merely  reflect  an  unending  fascination  with  chance,  and  with  the  idea 
that  the  present  must  always  be  renewed.  And  so  why  make  plans  when  the  options 
tomorrow  may  be  different? 
In  his  essay  on  chance  Georges  Bataille  characterises  the  contingency  produced  by 
gambling  as  a  kind  of  extreme  anguish.  That  is  to  say,  as  manifested  in  the  subjective 
experience  of  the  gambler,  it  becomes  a  mark  of  personal  suffering  -  it  is  a  physical 
ailment  in  the  sense  that  it  offers  only  a  pain  that  is  never  more  than  temporarily  eased. 
Chance  is  like  an  open  wound  upon  the  body  of  the  gambler,  which  he  seeks  to  close  by 
overcoming  chance.  But  in  this  choice  of  action  the  gambler  misunderstands  the  nature 
of  the  pain,  because  this  is  a  discomfort  that  cannot  be  removed  by  continuing  to  open 
the  wound  to  see  if  it  might  have  healed;  the  anguish  may  demand  the  repetition  of 
play,  but  it  is  not  resolved  as  a  result.  Chance,  according  to  Bataille,  can  never  come  to 
rest,  and  the  wager  itself,  which  constantly  seeks  to  resolve  the  anguish  of  one's 
vulnerability  but  fails  because  time  and  cause  begin  once  again  after  the  resolution  of 
each  wager;  an  effect  that  is  never  matched  in  subjective  satisfaction  or  rest.  It  is  instead 
the  point  of  departure  for  a  're-beginning,  '  a  movement  to  a  destination  unknown. 
Chance,  Bataille  said,  demands  that  this  end  to  movement  never  arrives,  and  the  perfect 
way  of  attaining  a  concordance  with  chance  is  to  keep  moving.  " 
When  gambling  becomes  a  job,  on  the  other  hand,  then  the  particular  form  of  the 
game  takes  precedence  over  the  wager,  principally  because  an  acquired  skill  at,  say,  poker 
will  allow  the  player  to  put  some  limits  on  the  outcome  of  the  wager,  or  even  to 
determine  -  to  calculate  -  the  most  appropriate  conditions  for  the  wager:  to  play  the 
Richardson,  ibid:  26. 
Georges  Bataille  (1997)  'Chance,  '  in  The  Batai&  Reader,  Oxford:  37-  54. 
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probabilities  (Plate  7).  "  "Card  counting  made  playing  seem  like  a  job,  "  observe 
Frederick  and  Steven  Barthelme,  "like  solid-waste  management.  We  already  had  jobs,  so 
it  didn't  make  sense  to  play  blackjack  that  way.  ""  Because  with  work,  like  concerns  with 
tomorrow  in  general,  the  future  is  mortgaged,  and  a  ceiling  is  placed  on  hope,  to  the 
extent  that  hopes  are  met  incrementally,  stealthily,  if  at  all. 
The  attraction  of  the  wager  is  that  it  is  an  all-or-nothing  experience,  a  singular, 
dizzying  one-off  affirmation  of  existence,  full  of  dread  and  wonder  -  pursued  for  its 
capacity  to  astonish,  yet  also  the  source  of  this  agonizing  terror  that  produces  dread. 
Should  a  player  consider  the  odds  against  winning  too  great,  or  in  other  words  if  the  fear 
of  losing  is  taken  as  a  reason  to  withhold  from  the  play,  then  it  is  probable  that  the  game 
is  approached  like  a  job,  rather  than  gambling  to  be  open  to  the  forces  of  play.  For  in 
truth,  to  a  gambler  -  as  compared  to  simply  a  player  of  games  -  the  odds  do  not  really 
matter.  Chance  remains  at  all  times  the  field  of  possibilities  to  the  gambler,  and  this  idea 
is  not  best  encapsulated  by  this  other  idea  of  'the  odds,  '  which  really  presupposes  a  prior 
calculation  having  taken  place.  At  the  extremes  of  wagering  there  is  no  question  of 
calculation;  the  odds  don't  even  arise  as  a  matter  for  consideration  when  one  moves 
beyond  the  mask  of  the  game  -  beyond  the  perceptible,  manageable,  features  of  the 
game.  "  This  is  clear  in  the  motivation  of  Jim  Nashe  in  The  Music  of  Chance,  for 
example;  leaving  behind  the  past  was  a  way  of  sweeping  away  the  obligations  of  routine. 
It  was  for  Nashe,  the  narrator  remarks,  "a  dizzying  prospect  -  to  imagine  all  that 
freedom,  to  understand  how  little  it  mattered  what  choice  he  made.  "  16 
There  is  an  almost  childish  aspect  to  the  defiance  of  reason  in  this  restlessness.  It  is 
clear  that  within  the  evaluative  context  of  a  discourse  of  normality  that  the  denial  of 
strategies  of  calculation  indicates  that  the  gambler  is  'irrational'  or  'superstitious.  '  Even 
to  imagine  yourself  immune  to  the  consequences  of  your  choices  is  a  kind  of  madness,  a 
conspicuous  realignment  of  one's  orientation  to  reality.  These  charges,  though  perfectly 
reasonable,  nevertheless  founder  on  that  basis.  Reason  misunderstands  the  profound  ease 
with  which  the  gambler  colludes  in  stripping  away  his  own  power  of  willing.  I  did  not 
wish  to  be  a  mystic  at  the  tables,  "  Jack  Richardson  says: 
See  The  Probability  ofa  Gambler  ý  Ruin,  which  presents  an  excellent  illustration  of  the  'mapping'  of  chance. 
Frederick  and  Steven  Barthelme  (2000)  Double  Down,  Boston  and  New  York:  8  1. 
It  is  impossible  to  make  a  book  to  determine  the  likelihood  of  Pascal's  Wager;  the  more  serious  a  wager  then 
the  less  likely  it  will  even  be  assimilable  under  'odds.  ' 
'6  Paul  Auster  (199  1)  The  Music  of  Chance,  London:  6 
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Dropping  chips  at  random  as  though  the  heavens  owed  me  happy  endings. 
However,  I  was  also  loath  to  become  the  victim  of  some  involved  mathematical 
system  that  tries,  through  binomial  camouflage,  to  squirm  around  the  fact  that 
almost  every  bet  in  a  casino  carries  odds  against 
it.  17 
Nevertheless  the  gambler  as  the  willful  agent  of  his  own  destruction  is  viewed  as  the 
exception  within  the  broader  social  acceptability  of  gambling.  But  the  destructive 
capacity  of  the  wager,  as  I  have  said,  is  never  realised  in  petty  gambling.  If  we  fail  to 
realize  the  negligibility  of  'the  odds'  to  what  gambling  really  is,  in  other  words,  then 
misunderstanding  follows  also  as  a  confusion  over  what  happens  under  conditions  of 
play  -  the  calculative  aspect  of  trying  to  control  chance  is  ultimately  contrary  to  play.  To 
look  at  the  surface,  the  games  or  the  ways  we  can  categorise  the  players,  is  the  real 
misunderstanding  of  what  is  really  going  on  under  conditions  of  play,  because  play  is 
about  abandoning  these  categories. 
Yet  no  matter  how  the  memoirs  of  gamblers  repeat  this  simple  truth  -  that  the  only 
way  to  play  the  game  is  to  allow  oneself  to  be  played  -  it  does  not  alter  a  common 
confusion  of  the  conditions  of  gambling  with  the  workable  situation  so  beloved  of 
reason.  Such  wizened  calculating  machines  as  cardsharps,  con  men,  and  even  the  odd 
scientist  have  enjoyed  using  gambling  as  a  workable  situation.  Even  knowledge  of  the 
inherent  uncertainty  of  gambling  has  failed  to  prevent  some  of  the  most  spectacular 
attempts  to  tame  chance.  No,  those  dissolute  and  inveterate  gamblers  are  simply 
(  chumps'  we  are  led  to  believe  by  some  who  place  their  faith  in  reason;  they  just  don't 
know  how  this  chance  thing  really  works,  that's  all. 
To  play  the  odds  for  profit,  for  example,  one  needs  either  a  limitless  supply  of 
money  (the  'bank'  will  always  have  more  resources  than  the  player),  or  a  ready  supply  of 
the  aforementioned  'chumps'  as  opponents;  these  would  be  characterised  as  players  who 
play  to  lose,  or  who  are  perhaps  untutored  in  the  game,  its  potential  scams.  "  But,  as  it 
turns  out,  things  are  not  always  what  they  seem:  in  an  interesting  recollection  of  a 
"  Jack  Richardson  (1979)  Memoir  of  a  Gambler,  New  York:  30.  Aside  from  memoirs,  much  of  the  gambling 
literature  -  specifically  the  academic  literature  -  is  devoted  to  the  faulty  reasoning  of  gamblers.  These  may  be 
interesting  from  an  academic  point  of  view,  but  really  only  reinforce  the  pejorative  employment  of  that  particular 
description.  From  the  gambler's  point  of  view,  to  assess  the  wager  according  to  the  standards  of  reason  is  rather  like 
using  a  chocolate  teapot  for  a  brew-up:  there  is  little  point  and  it  will  all  end  in  a  mess  eventually. 
"'  See  Anthony  Holden  (1990)  Big  Dea4  London.  In  this  memoir  retells  how  he  would  sit  in  on  games  with 
amateurs,  acting  like  a  'klutz',  like  he  hadn't  played  before  'in  the  interests  of  mopping  up  later  on.  '  (7)  There  is  quite 
a  history  of  the  gambler  represented  as  a  kind  of  cheat,  as  someone  who  will  fleece  you  if  you  should  be  vulnerable 
enough.  Henry  Chafetz's  (1962)  Play  the  Devi4  New  York,  observes  that  the  Mississippi  riverboat  gamblers  of  the  I  9th 
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daring,  but  ultimately  futile,  gambling  experiment,  Thomas  Bass  in  The  Newtonian 
Casino,  reveals  in  the  course  of  recounting  the  adventures  of  a  group  of  scientists 
attempting  to  operate  a  scam  at  the  roulette  tables  (using  a  miniature  shoe-fitted 
computer),  chance  will  make  a  chump  of  even  the  most  rational  scientist. 
Nor  was  the  irony  of  this  lost  on  Bass,  as  we  see  amongst  the  revelations  of  an 
enterprise  that  seriously  entertained  the  belief  in  reason  overcoming  chance,  he  is  sincere 
enough  to  place  his  experiences  beneath  an  epigram  bearing  the  name  of  Niels  Bohr: 
"Prediction  is  very  difficult,  "  Bohr  had  said,  "especially  of  the  future.  " 
This  was  realized  to  be  true  in  retrospect,  although  we  are  left  wondering  at  the  lack 
of  scepticism  at  the  outset  of  the  enterprise,  at  their  unbridled  optimism.  Were  they 
really  as  naive  as  all  those  marble-headed  believers  in  luck?  Those  'chumps'?  It  seems 
that  the  power  of  reason  is,  at  times,  intoxicating.  " 
There  may  be  only  two  ways  to  win  at  gambling.  The  first  is  by  being  lucky.  The 
second  is  by  cheating  -  and  even  then  you  need  a  great  deal  of  luck  to  carry  it  off 
without  being  caught.  A  professional  will  tell  you  that  there  is  a  third  way.  Skill. 
But  the  elevation  of  skill  restricts  the  motion  to  a  workmanlike  activity,  rather  than  the 
unhindered  free  motion  of  the  gamble,  and  besides  that,  this  skill  still  finally  rests  on 
chance;  on  the  confluence  of  a  staggering  number  of  variables  beginning  with  the  player, 
and  then,  if  he  is  playing  poker,  for  instance,  extending  to  the  people  sitting  at  the  table 
with  him,  and  continuing  into  considerations  of  the  atmospheric  conditions  of  a  room 
and  what  effect  these  may  have.  Never  can  all  the  variables  be  brought  under  control. 
Thomas  Bass  and  his  friends  found  that  whilst  they  were  able  to  predict  the  fall  of  a 
roulette  ball  with  relative  accuracy  under  laboratory  conditions,  once  in  the  casino 
environment  the  first  obstacle  to  a  realization  of  expectations  was  confronted  in  the 
form  of  the  croupier  -  how  hard  would  he  spin  the  wheel?  When  would  he  release  the 
ball?  And  from  this  they  then  found  that  unexpected  sights,  smells,  and  other  people 
could  upset  their  attempts  to  re-create  the  impossibly  'real'  conditions  of  the  laboratory. 
A  controlled  environment  has  possibly  nothing  in  common  with  the  unfolding  events  of 
a  serious  gambling  situation. 
century  were  underworld  figures,  perceived  capable  of  any  crime:  'the  gamblers  are  coming'  was  a  'signal  for  alarm'  in 
the  river  towns.  55. 
"  See  Thomas  A.  Bass  (1990)  The  Newtonian  Cafino.  Bass  was  one  of  the  group  as  well.  Their  inability  to 
conquer  chance  had  interesting  side  effects,  leading  them  to  developments  in  chaos  theory. 
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PLATE  7.  THE  PROBABILITY  OF  A  GAMBLER'S  RUIN.  As  an  indication  of  the  contrast  between 
gambling  and  work,  consider  this  chart  designed  by  Allan  Wilson  and  printed  in  his  1970  book  The 
Casino  Gambler's  Gui&.  To  attain  a  predetermined  certainty  of  success  the  player  would  use  this  'map'  of 
chance  as  it  suited  particular  games.  As  Thomas  Bass  explained:  "take  as  an  example  the  average  card- 
counter  who  plays  blackjack  with  aI  percent  advantage  over  the  house.  Find  the  curve  on  the  diagram 
representing  this  player's  edge  of  +1  percent.  Now  let's  say  the  card  counter  wants  to  play  blackjack  with 
an  80  percent  certainty  of  doubling  his  money.  He  calculates  his  proper  bank-to-bet  ratio  by  locating  the 
intersection  of  the  +I  percent  curve  and  the  horizontal  80  percent  success  line.  He  then  drops  down  to  the 
bottom  of  the  graph  to  see  that  he  should  divide  his  bank  into  70  units.  A  gambler  betting  all  his  money 
on  the  first  draw  would  be  playing  with  a  bank  of  one  unit,  while  a  more  conservative  player  might  wish 
to  extend  the  curve  and  play  with  a  bank  divided  into  more  than  a  hundred  units.  "  See  Thomas  A.  Bass, 
1990,  The  Newtonian  Casino,  pp.  156-158. 
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And  so,  the  problem  in  bringing  reason  to  bear  in  gambling  is  that  it  soon  becomes 
apparent  that  one  mind  against  chance  has,  effectively,  as  we  say  no  chance;  none  beyond 
luck.  Even  the  marshalling  of  a  collective  effort  cannot  ultimately  reduce  the  variables 
outside  of  one's  control.  Thus,  to  fully  engage  in  a  wager,  to  forget  about  working  the 
situation,  means  also  forgetting  the  probabilities.  To  the  gambler  as  pursuer  of  the 
Maybe,  consideration  of  the  probabilities  in  calculation  is  as  confining  as  the  straitjacket 
on  a  madman:  it  quells  an  intrinsic  propensity  to  disorder. 
In  the  memoirs  of  gamblers,  and  in  the  fictional  accounts  of  gambling,  the  fallibility 
of  reason  seeps  from  the  pages  in  recollections  of  dashed  beliefs  in  'degrees  of  certainty,  ' 
'sure  things'  and  'hot  hands'  -  all  sincerely  held  on  the  flimsy  basis  of  one's  partial 
knowledge  of  the  situation  mixed  with  the  conviction  of  personal  skill.  The  dawning 
awareness  of  the  inevitability  of  loss  provokes  a  tacit  recognition  of  the  aloneness  of  the 
wager.  This  seems  inescapable. 
Gamblers  are  fundamentally  loners,  and  the  wager  is  a  moment  of  existential 
presentness  difficult  to  share  in  any  commonly  held  understanding  of  being  as  rational 
autonomy,  which  is  to  say,  in  terms  that  are  understood  as  'reasonable.  '  The  loner  status 
of  the  gambler  is  not  Just  a  matter  of  other  players  being  potential  opponents  in  a  game; 
it  is  a  matter  of  the  difficulty,  if  not  impossibility,  of  gambling  in  groups.  "With  groups" 
David  Thomson  suggests  in  his  history  of  gambling  in  Nevada,  "the  whole  thing 
becomes  like  a  stock  market.  When  individuals  gamble  they  pit  themselves  against  the 
weight  of  others,  and  of  history.  They  also  mean  to  redesign  the  future.  ""  The  nomadic 
impulse  is  compromised  in  agreement  with  others  to  pursue  a  common  goal,  which  we 
would  understand  as  a  kind  of  'settlement,  '  that,  as  the  word  suggests,  restricts  freedom 
of  movement.  Once  again,  we  are  taken  back  to  the  Hobbesian  settlement,  the  rational 
binding  of  desire,  and  to  the  Kantian  autonomy  of  reason  as  a  limit  on  the  speculative 
aspect  of  the  human  instinct.  It  is  within  this  context  we  note  with  interest  that  the 
forerunners  of  the  founders  of  Las  Vegas  were  the  1  9,  h  century  gold  prospectors,  men 
'0  See  David  Thomson  (1999)  In  Nevada:  the  Land,  the  People,  and  God,  London:  22.  Thomson's  history  of 
Nevada  is  Illuminating,  revealing  the  closeness  of  the  Nevada  of  the  gambling  towns  of  Reno  and  Las  Vegas,  to  the 
spirit  of  prospectors  who  opened  up  the  harsh  desert  landscapes,  leaving  behind  -  in  a  demonstration  of  hopes 
cherished  and  abandoned  -  as  many  ghost  towns  as  settlements. 
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who  had  a  contempt  for  the  very  idea  of  society  as  a  limitation  on  freedom  of 
movement. 
21 
But  most  notable  in  all  attempts  to  meet  the  wager  with  reason,  all  this  attention  to 
detail,  is  that  there  is  too  much  emphasis  on  past  and  future  -  of  the  mounting  losses, 
the  lessons  of  experience,  and  of  the  consequences  for  the  future.  Thus,  the  blinkers,  we 
might  say,  are  never  really  removed,  and  there  is  no  chance  for  experience  to  arrive 
unmediated,  and  this  is  a  crucial  difference  between  reason  and  wager.  It  marks  the 
departure  of  the  gambler  from  normality.  To  confront  the  future  requires  immediacy, 
seen  in  a  bold  and  sure  removal  of  strategies  of  calculation  and  forethought,  which 
would  only  serve  to  mediate  the  wager,  thereby  reducing  its  potency. 
When  playing  these  games,  in  other  words,  there  is  a  point  at  which  action  must 
stop,  deliberation  must  be  abandoned,  and  the  non-intentional  movement  of  the  play 
takes  over  the  player.  This,  players  refer  to  as  'the  action'  or  'the  juice.  ' 
Gamblers  that  are  motivated  by  a  desire  for  'the  Juice'  are  not  really  interested  in 
winning  or  losing,  if  we  take  these  to  have  a  financial  meaning,  although  winning  is 
preferable  to  the  extent  it  permits  the  extension  of  play.  We  see  in  Dostoevsky's  Alexei, 
for  example,  that  the  play  becomes  all  there  is  -  piles  of  money  are  pushed  onto  red,  or 
black,  as  if  in  a  dream.  And  whilst  his  initiation  to  gambling  is  towards  the  end  of 
securing  the  love  of  Paulina,  instead  he  ends  up  loving  gambling  for  its  own  sake.  He 
carries  the  anguish  that,  as  Georges  Bataille  said,  cannot  be  relieved.  This  too  is  the  story 
of  many  who  go  in  search  of  'the  juice.  ' 
The  Body  in  Pain 
The  wager  approaches  a  total  openness  that  removes  a  prior  tension  built  up  in  pursuit 
of  'the  juice,  '  which  is  to  say  that  the  tension  initially  arises  as  a  matter  of  pursuing  the 
essence  of  play.  This  is  the  anxiety  that  Georges  Bataille  spoke  of,  the  restlessness  that 
never  finds  a  suitable  resolution,  and  in  which  everything  that  has  been  willed  stops  for  a 
moment  once  this  motion  to  wager  is  undertaken.  But  motion  does  not  cease. 
"  It  is  worth  quoting  Thomson  0  999)  further  on  this.  "There  are  Nevadans,  a-nd  not  only  the  prospectors  holed 
up  at  the  ends  of  remote  box  canyons,  who  would  prefer  no  government  at  all.  In  the  early  years,  Nevada  was  so 
empty,  arid  a-nd  inhospitable,  it  attracted  those  people  who  were  willing  to  live  apart  from  all  semblance  of  order.  I  sat 
in  a  diner  in  Fallon  once,  eating  my  lunch  and  listening  to  two  men  at  another  table  who  were  on  such  a  steady 
matter-of-fact  rant  against  all  government  and  all  'theys'  who  sought  to  impose  regulations  of  any  kind.  It  was  a 
wonder  that  they  were  ready  to  abide  by  the  institution  of  the  diner,  its  agenda  (the  menu),  or  the  white  lines  on  the 
ta-rmac  of  the  diner's  parking  lot.  "  (33) 
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Outwardly  it  may  appear  so,  concealed  by  the  gambler's  habitual  resort  to  adopting  a 
'face'  appropriate  to  the  situation. 
This  is  the  'cool-headed,  '  or  'marble-headed'  approach,  which  we  also  know  as  the 
poker  face  that  conceals  the  restlessness  of  unseen  emotions.  As  Dostoevsky's  Alexei,  for 
example,  watches  the  General  win  twice  in  succession  at  the  roulette  table,  and  twice 
double  his  stake,  to  then  simply  lose  it  all  in  a  single  play,  he  remarks  on  the  turmoil 
behind  the  apparent  calm  of  the  mask.  The  general  "smiled  and  walked  away  with 
perfect  control.  "  As  a  gambler,  Alexei  also  knew  that  the  General  must  have  been 
desperately  struggling  to  prevent  the  mask  from  slipping.  Underneath  such  a  calm 
display,  he  knew  it  was  a  kind  of  hell,  an  exquisite  torture.  I  am  convinced  that  black 
cats  were  clawing  at  his  heart,  "  Alexel  remarks  of  the  difficulty  of  containing  the  violent 
swing  of  alternating  hopes  and  fears,  the  oscillation  of  affirmation  and  denial, 
momentarily  calmed  in  the  wager,  are  now  barely  concealed. 
The  reaction  of  gamblers  to  the  dreadful  delivery  of  chance  is  often  expressed  in 
terms  that  show  it  to  be  all  consuming;  the  mental  anguish  that  finds  momentary  relief 
before  the  resolution  of  the  wager,  is  replaced  in  its  immediate  aftermath  by  'physical' 
shocks.  Prior  to  embarking  on  a  winning  streak,  Alexei  himself  experiences  bodily 
sensations  of  madness-inducing  discomfort,  of  "fiery  ants"  crawling  all  over  his  body.  " 
This  is  a  common  enough  kind  of  psychophysical  state  related  in  experiences  of 
gambling.  Before  and  after  each  wager  there  is  the  predictable  ebb  and  flow  of  emotions 
-  one  second  dazed,  moments  later  frenzied:  "Casually  she  flipped  her  card  down  with 
the  corner  of  the  jack.  Was  an  ace.  I  felt  that,  "  says  Ray  in  Frederick  Barthelme's  Bob 
The  Gambler.  It  was  the  sensation  of  "an  electric  shock,  a  four-by-two  brought  down 
across  my  back.  ""  Nevertheless,  Ray  keeps  playing  as  the  losses  mount  and  he  is  thrown 
back,  yet  again,  into  this  to-ing  and  fto-ing.  "I  felt  as  if  rows  of  needles  were  running 
along  the  tops  of  my  shoulders  and  up  both  sides  of  my  neck  into  the  scalp  behind  my 
ears,  "  he  says.  And  later  still  he  admits  a  final  numbing  effect  in  the  tension.  "I  felt  like  a 
robot,  "  he  says.  " 
The  ultimate  removal  of  self  in  the  affirmation  of  the  'maybe'  of  the  wager  occurs  in 
a  moment  of  suspense.  The  player  is  taken  over  by  the  play  itself,  as  if  cast  up  into  the 
"  Fyodor  Dostoevsky  (198  1)  The  Gambler,  New  York  ind  London:  144. 
23  Frederick  Barthelme  (1997)  Bob  The  Gambler,  Boston  and  New  York:  132. 
Ibid:  133-34. 
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air  by  a  whirlwind  -  released  by  gravity,  hovering  above  the  ground  as  if  on  a  balloon, 
suspended  on  a  high  wire  with  no  safety  net  -  the  loss  of  a  connection  to  anything  is  felt 
dizziness  of  the  head  that  may  be  accompanied  by  nausea.  The  moment  of  submission 
can  have  a  brief  calming  effect,  and  although  preceded  by  a  frenzy  following  the  placing 
of  the  wager,  producing  a  heightened  sensory  movement  during  which  "the  nerves  may 
stand  on  end  and  scream  to  themselves,  "  it  is  nevertheless  taken  over  by  "a  tranquility  as 
from  heaven.  "" 
But  the  suspense  also  threatens  violence  in  the  resolution  of  the  wager,  which  is 
drawn  out  tortuously: 
It's  ruthless.  Completely  ruthless.  The  cards  terrorize  you.  Seconds  stretch.  It's 
like  having  the  worst  flu  you  can  imagine  for  twenty  seconds.  " 
In  their  memoir  of  a  hectic  period  of  gambling,  the  Barthelme  brothers,  Frederick 
and  Steven,  remark  that  the  involuntary  play  of  chance  begins  a  movement  that  takes 
over  from  the  last  act,  the  placing  of  the  wager.  Thus  motion  succeeds  action.  The  player 
actually  ceases  at  this  point  to  be  a  player  at  all,  and  instead  becomes  an  observer  of  the 
scene  that  unfolds;  detached,  yet  still  involved,  it  is  like  being  taken  outside  of  oneself, 
held  aloft,  and  then  violently  shaken: 
Every  gesture  is  half  speed,  quarter  speed,  eighth  speed.  The  dealer's  hands  - 
many  wear  lots  of  rings  and  bracelets,  and  the  women  paint  and  polish,  and 
trick  up  their  nails  with  inlaid  stars  and  such  -  move  across  your  field  of  vision 
like  spirits.  Blood  rushes  to  your  head,  a  sensation  like  a  sudden  rise  in  pressure. 
Your  head  is  going  to  explode.  " 
At  this  point  contingency  is  inflated  to  such  an  extent  that  the  outcome  may  as  well 
involve  your  living  or  dying.  It  attains  this  kind  of  psychological  significance  to  the 
player.  This  is  to  jaywalk  across  a  road  with  neither  stop  signs  nor  speed  restrictions.  It 
becomes  an  instance  of  submission  before  a  terrifying  and  uncontrollable  power,  and  the 
consequences  no  longer  seem  to  matter  to  the  gambler. 
2S  Stephen  Crane  (1902)  'A  Game  of  Poker,  '  in  Last  Words,  London:  263.  Also  Dostoevsky  The  Gambler,  I 
became  frantic,  seized  the  remaining  two  thousand  gulden,  and  threw  them  on  the  first  twelve  numbers  -  just  like 
that,  without  any  calculation.  Well,  I  must  say,  I  spent  a  moment  of  suspense  simi-lar,  perhaps,  to  that  experienced  by 
Madame  Blanchard  as  she  floated  down  over  Paris  from  her  bal-loon.  "  144 
"  F.  Barthelme,  ibid:  167. 
"'  Frederick  and  Steven  Barthelme  (2000)  Double  Down,  Boston  and  New  York:  118-19. 
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Towards  the  end  of  another  failed  venture  at  the  gambling  tables,  Dostoevsky  wrote 
to  his  wife  of  the  mental  and  physical  loosening: 
My  hands  were  shaking,  my  thoughts  confused.  I  was  somehow  almost  glad,  I 
kept  saying,  'Let  it  be,  let  it  be! 
)28 
What  begins  in  the  wager  as  a  momentary  cessation  of  action,  begun  with  neither 
resignation  ('no  more')  nor  denial  CI  refusel  but  by  the  granting  of  conditions  under 
which  chance  will  be  allowed  to  take  over,  becomes  an  existential  moment,  almost  a 
denial  of  the  real  world  beyond  this  singular  experience.  This  is  the  experience  of  a 
Perhaps,  which,  as  Rodolphe  Gasche  wrote,  signifies  "without  exception,  a  deficit  of 
knowledge,  if  not  a  total  lack  of  cognition.  ""  Thus,  whilst  metaphorically  suspended  in 
midair,  the  gambler's  body  and  mind  lose  all  composure,  all  semblance  of  rational 
control  -  there  is  nothing  to  'grab  on  to,  '  no  tangible  'reality,  '  only  the  flux  of  events. 
We  might  wonder  if  the  world  can  even  exist  for  the  gambler  at  this  point? 
In  fact,  the  will  under  these  conditions  is  not  merely  denied  -  it  is  stripped  bare, 
and  lashed  into  submission  before  it  is  reawakened  in  the  frenzied  grasping  for 
something  to  hold  onto.  These  moments  are  intensifications  of  the  normal  state  of 
being,  which  is  concealed  by  the  form  reason  gives  to  experience.  The  contingency  of 
one's  existence  is  affirmed  in  the  lack  of  knowledge  that  describes  what  Jean-Luc  Nancy 
has  called  the  "birth  to  presence.  "  Under  conditions  of  becoming,  no  'rational' 
understanding  seems  to  suffice.  If  the  world  is  held  in  suspense  during  such  aC  birth,  ' 
then  the  facts  of  knowledge,  as  they  were,  mean  nothing.  Of  course,  this  is  a  perfect 
correlate  to  the  wager:  there  is  no  knowledge;  there  are  no  facts  that  make  any  difference 
to  the  outcome  of  the  wager.  It  is  the  suspension  of  not  only  the  gambler,  but  also  of  all 
categories  of  objective  meaning. 
The  scientific  temperament  will  not  allow  that  reason  feels  drawn  to  such  a  'non- 
place,  '  nor  does  it  allow  any  room  to  accommodate  the  possibility  that  the  'facts'  of 
knowledge  are  always  in  question,  because  that  would  be  just  the  same  as  granting  the 
impossibility  of  a  state  of  rest,  or  the  liquidation  of  reason.  In  contrast  to  reason  and 
science,  which  demand  at  least  a  provisional  statement  of  the  state  of  knowledge  be 
issued  to  direct  or  reprimand  curiosity,  the  motion  to  wager  is  one  instance  of  curiosity 
2'  Fyodor  Dostoevsky  (1988)  Complete  Letters,  Ann  Arbor.  See  letter  to  Anna,  May  21,1867. 
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unleashed.  Reason  demands  the  objectification  of  the  world.  But,  as  the  true  gambler 
has  discovered,  objectivity  is  rubbished  in  the  wager;  thereafter  the  gambler  is  guided  by 
one  truth  -  knowing  is  the  name  we  give  to  knowledge  and  also  to  a  lack  of  knowledge. 
It  is  always  becoming. 
Rodolphe  Gaschý  (1999)  OfMinimal  Things.  174. 
j  Scanlan  2001  66 The  Revenant 
Even  after  months  of  play  and  months  of  losses,  even  years  of  losses, 
we  still  thought  we  might  win. 
FREDERICK  AND  STEVEN  BARTHELME,  Double  Down 
The  wager  is  a  'maybe'.  In  gambling,  the  stakes  are  first  raised,  then  chance  takes  over, 
and  the  autonomous  action  of  the  subject  ceases  until,  for  example,  the  fall  of  the  die 
provides  a  resolution.  As  we  have  seen,  the  gambler  appears  to  be  in  control  of  his 
movements  prior  to  the  wager  because  they  are  determined  acts.  Nevertheless,  the 
aftermath  of  the  wager  can  see  the  gambler  subject  to  an  array  of  uncontrollable 
disturbances  of  a  physical  and  psychological  nature  that  intrude  upon  the  subjective 
control  of  will.  Thus,  the  parasite  invades  and  takes  over  its  host  to  the  gambler  -  the 
gambler  begins  this,  but  thereafter  the  control  of  his  movements  belongs  to  something 
else. 
Gambling,  in  the  sense  of  speculating  on  the  future  is  to  venture,  to  hazard-  to  try 
and  accelerate  time  and  cause  whilst  the  corporeal  remains  rooted  in  the  present.  ' 
Gambling,  viewed  in  the  totality  of  its  course  (pre-  and  post-wager)  is  a  perpetual 
restlessness  only  momentarily  interrupted  by  the  overtaking  of  play.  And  so  within  any 
notion  of  gambling  we  cannot  deny  that  the  aim  of  such  internal  movement  is  found  in 
the  final  plunge  into  uncertainty.  And  whilst  the  wager  makes  explicit  the  fact  that 
sub'ective  will  is  both  realised  in  attaining  the  uncertain  state)  and  held  in  abeyance  (in  j0 
being  overtaken  by  chance),  it  is  nevertheless  the  case  that  gambling  enterprise  is 
'  On  the  other  hand  life,  suspended  between  birth  and  death,  can  be  taken  as  one  big  gamble  that  is  never 
resolved  until  death.  More  particularly,  everyday  life  in  modern  society  also  involves  many  endeavours  of  which  the 
outcome  is  unknown  -  choosing  a  career,  a  partner,  a  home.  Whereas  the  speed  of  events  in  wagering  makes  the 
resolution  of  the  bet  more  or  less  immediate,  the  'bets'  we  make  in  life,  according  to  Erving  Goffman,  are  marked  by  a 
delayed  resolution:  "the  period  during  which  the  consequences  of  [a]  bet  are  determined  [ 
... 
I  will  be  long,  sometimes 
extending  over  decades,  followed  by  disclosure  and  settlement  phases  that  are  themselves  lengthy.  See  Erving  Goffman 
(1967)  Interaction  Ritual.  155-56. 
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characterised  by  a  movement  that  is  as  equally  necessary  as  the  suspense  brought  about 
in  and  by  the  wager.  Which  is  to  say  that  the  activity  can  also  be  seen  as  the  conscious 
crossing  of  some  threshold  that  separates  non-gambling  from  gambling,  and  'normal' 
activity  from  exceptional  activity. 
Gambling  can  then  be  located  apart  from  'normal'  conditions  of  experience,  both  in 
terms  of  the  motion  of  the  body  in  space  (entering  a  different  environment,  such  as  a 
casino,  or  as  we  saw  with  Paul  Auster's  character  Jim  Nashe,  taking  the  wrong  road), 
and  in  terms  of  the  organization  of  time  in  a  regular  cycle  (the  weekend,  the  holiday, 
and  so  on).  To  venture  over  the  threshold  is,  therefore,  to  'flow'  out  of  everyday  life. 
Once  this  step  is  taken  -a  move  that  is  itself  a  bold  departure  from  norms  and 
expectations  -  then  all  rules  are  up  for  reconsideration,  and  the  conditions  of  experience 
can  no  longer  be  assumed  to  fall  into  a  pattern  of  regularity. 
This  departure  opens  a  human  and  physical  geography  that  often  assumes  the  form 
of  a  radically  charged  sensorium,  unfolding  a  disorientating  panoply  of  sights,  sounds, 
and  smells.  The  surprise  of  the  environment  awakens  the  mind  to  a  heightened  state  of 
sensitivity  and  provokes  the  necessity  of  reducing,  if  not  abandoning,  normal 
expectations.  This  will,  of  course,  be  variable  in  terms  of  the  actual  space  entered,  but 
this  is  not  the  crucial  determinant  in  the  disorientation  effect.  For  instance,  there  is 
certainly  a  difference  in  magnitude  in  walking  on  the  one  hand  into  a  familiar  local 
bookmaker's  to  place  a  bet,  and  on  the  other  driving  across  the  Mojave  Desert  from  afar 
to  enter  Las  Vegas  for  similar  reasons.  The  latter  involves  a  more  drawn  out  re- 
orientation  of  self,  and  a  more  emphatic  demonstration  of  the  power  contained  in  an  act 
of  removing  oneself  to  another  kind  of  place.  So  it  is  within  the  subject,  and  in  the 
subjective  response  to  altered  spatio-temporal  conditions,  that  the  stripping  away  of 
normal  experience  takes  place. 
Transcendence 
Las  Vegas  is,  of  course,  the  modern  gambling  playground  taken  to  impossible  extremes. 
Whilst  the  experience  of  such  a  radically  'unreal'  place  is  generally  unrepresentative  of 
gambling  experiences  as  a  whole,  it  is  the  place  that  provides  the  obvious  example  of 
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gambling  being  constituted  of  a  transcendence  of  the  mundane  into  a  state  of  mental 
and,  in  this  case,  physical  otherworldliness.  ' 
Las  Vegas  is  taken  as  the  fullest  realization  of  the  totality  of  the  possibilities  offered 
to  the  gambler,  in  that  the  city  as  a  whole  creates  the  most  permissive  environment  for 
all  kinds  of  wagering.  The  sense  of  removal,  of  the  significance  of  difference  is  palpable 
before  there  is  even  a  gaming  table  or  slot  machine  in  sight.  '  Driving  across  the  Mojave 
Desert  in  the  direction  of  the  Nevada  border,  for  example,  temptation  is  thrown  up  at 
regular  intervals  in  the  form  of  gigantic  roadside  invitations.  First  Chance!  State  Line  42 
Minutes  one  reads  (Plate  8).  This  is  a  neat  inversion  of  the  normal  expectation  that  that 
the  arrival  of  a  destination  should  be  computed  and  expressed  in  terms  of  the  distance 
remaining  in  miles  or  kilometers.  How  far  is  forty-two  minutes  you  are  left  to  wonder? 
Well,  that  depends  on  the  speed  with  which  you  move,  in  which  case  it  is  almost 
tempting  to  think  of  the  sign  as  an  invitation  to  press  the  accelerator  pedal  a  little  harder 
and  simply  make  those  forty-two  minutes  move  even  faster. 
Las  Vegas  provides  the  means  to  subvert  all  kinds  of  identity  relations  that  enable  us 
to  firmly  locate  ourselves  within  reality.  From  the  gaudy  hotels  and  bars  of  Fremont 
Street  and  the  Strip  -  the  drive-in  wedding  chapels  to  the  glorious  neon  facades  of 
nighttime  -  reason  may  justifiably  suggest  one's  temporary  loss  in  a  waking  dream.  In 
just  a  minute  you'll  pass  through  St.  Mark's  Square  in  Venice,  and  take  a  gondola  to  ... 
Treasure  Island.  There,  right  in  front  of  your  eyes,  as  you  step  back  onto  land  -  that  is, 
the  pavement  -  is  a  gigantic  battleship,  pirates  swinging  from  the  masts,  the  air  ripped 
by  cannon  fire.  These  phenomena  are  only  too  'real.  "  You  have  just  moved  from  the 
Venetian,  a  hotel-casino  that  inside,  amongst  the  gambling  halls  and  shopping  malls, 
contains  'Venice,  Italy,  '  to  a  view  that  takes  in  the  Treasure  Island  hotel-casino,  by 
comparison  more  sedate,  although  this  does  not  convey  the  nonetheless  fantastical  re- 
orientation  involved  when  arriving  at  such  a  place.  Taxis  pull  up  in  front  of  the  hotel  to 
2  As  I  have  said  in  the  introduction  to  this  work,  the  subject  of  disorder  necessarily  becomes  also  the  subject  of 
A  exceptions  and  deviations  from  the  norm.  In  other  words,  it  is  precisely  that  which  is  not  representative  that 
provides  the  material  of  this  work,  because  this  is  what  also  illustrates  the  contingency  of  knowledge  and  order. 
See  F.  Anderton,  and  J.  Chase  (1997)  Las  Vegas:  A  Guide  to  Recent  Architecture.  London 
This  may  be  seen  as  just  an  exaggeration  of  what  is  common  to  most,  if  not  all,  gambling  environments,  and 
that  is  that  they  are  constructed  to  mark  off  the  experience  as  existing  apart  from  the  normal.  See,  for  example,  Jamie 
Reid  (1993)  A  Licence  to  Print  Money.  Edinburgh;  Michael  Konick  (1999)  The  Man  With  the  $100,000  Breasts,  and 
Other  Gambling  Stories.  Las  Vegas;  John  D.  Rosecrance  (1985)  The  Degenerates  of  Lake  Tahoe.  New  York;  Gerda 
Reith  (1999)  The  Age  of  Chance:  Gambling  in  Western  Culture.  London. 
Scanlan  2001  69 The  Revenant 
ffm.  "W  w--I- 
Net￿ 
-  '__  . _. 
*  .,  WI 
iIIW, 
4, 
Jýt 
A900  11  4ýi, 
I 
-  ----' 
4W-# 
AA  AL 
I 
Aw  'k 
'It  10  41, 
PLATE  8.  MOTION  TO  WAGER.  It  is  interesting  that  the  separateness  of  Las  Vegas  becomes  apparent 
on  driving  through  the  Mojave  Desert.  Miles  from  the  Nevada  border  temptations  are  thrown  up  at 
regular  intervals,  increasing  the  perception  that  some  liminal  boundary  approaches.  On  the  Las  Vegas 
strip  tourists  are  conveyed  from  street  level  to  passes  over  the  road  that  conveniently  direct  one,  in  an  ever 
so  subtle  manner,  to  the  door  of  the  next  hotel-casino,  and,  of  course,  respite  from  the  sweltering  heat. 
(Photographs  by  author) 
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be  met  by  a  man  attired  to  look  like  a  pirate  from  Robert  Louis  Stevenson's  tale  -  as  the 
door  of  your  taxi  opens  you  hear  an  indeterminate,  although,  it  seems,  caricatured  voice 
of  a  sea-faring  fellow,  perhaps  from  the  17h  or  18'h  century,  say:  "may  I  take  your  bags, 
Cap'n?  "  You  have  just  moved  between  two  realities;  although  the  truth  is  you  have 
merely  moved  a  few  hundred  yards,  or  a  few  miles.  ' 
The  fantastical  dimension  is  most  evident  in  these  ludicrous,  not  to  say  over-the-top 
hotel-casinos,  and  is  one  that  is  easily  transferred  to  imagination.  On  approaching  the 
city  road  at  night  Las  Vegas  appears  as  a  bountiful  forest  surrounded  by  desert,  an 
invitation  to  total  indulgence  after  the  privations  of  'normality.  '  From  the  fauna  and 
flora  of  the  neon  forest  that  passes  for  a  skyline,  thrown  into  seductive  relief  by  the 
blackness  of  the  sky  all  around,  to  the  apparent  mirage  of  the  hotel  Mirage  itself  -  the 
lush  greenery  of  Polynesia  in  the  desert.  This  stands  as  the  ultimate  Las  Vegas  metaphor 
the  mask  of  a  surface  that  is  all  illusory.  '  No  water  in  the  desert?  That's  reality  -  in  the 
sweltering  heat  of  Las  Vegas,  however,  a  fine  spray  of  cool  water  may  accompany  a  walk 
from  a  pavement  onto  a  moving  walkway,  this  leading  finally  to  the  air-conditioned 
gaming  rooms  of  the  tastelessly  opulent  casinos. 
Arriving  at  the  airport  is  an  equally  dramatic  and  disorientating  experience  as  well. 
The  difference  of  the  environment  is  thrust  upon  you  immediately.  You  move  through  a 
"maze  of  what  used  to  be  one-armed  bandits,  now  replaced  by  sophisticated  video  slots, 
surrounded  by  bars,  cocktail  waitresses  and  all  the  seductive  trappings  of  a  downtown 
casino"  -  and  this  is  before  claiming  your  luggage.  '  You  could  be  forgiven  for  thinking 
that  this  was  it.  That  you  had  actually  landed  directly  at  the  casino,  and  in  a  way  you 
have,  because  the  total  orientation  of  the  city  is  towards  gambling.  And  here,  in  the 
airport,  amongst  the  loudspeaker  announcements  and  the  aimless  looking  zigzagging  of 
travelers,  you  hear  the  sound  of  an  insistent  voice  underpinned  by  a  hubbub  of  rhythmic 
jangling  and  clatter,  it  sings  a  welcoming  hymn  to  all  this  chaos: 
How  I  wish  that  there  were  more  than  the  twenty-four  hours  in  a  day 
'  The  mock  battle  at  the  Treasure  Island  hotel  casino  is  a  re-enactment  of  a  scene  from  R.  L.  Stevenson's  Treasure 
Island.  However,  in  Las  Vegas  the  battle  between  the  Hispaniola  and  HMS  Britannica  takes  place  every  90  minutes  of 
the  evening.  Every  day. 
'  Cf.  Tom  Wolfe  0  965)  The  Kandy-Kolored  Tangerine-Flake  Streamline  Baby.  New  York. 
7Anthony  Holden  (1990)  Big  Dea4  New  York:  2. 
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Even  if  there  wereforty  more  I  wouldn't  sleep  a  minute  away 
Oh,  there's  blackjack  andpoker  and  the  roulette  wheel 
A  fortune  won  and  lost  on  every  deal 
Allyou  need  is  a  strong  heart  and  a  nerve  ofsteel 
Viva  Las  Vegas! 
Someone  has  just  hit  the  jackpot  on  one  of  numerous  new'Elvis'  slot  machines  that 
are  littered  all  over  the  place.  The  jangle  of  falling  coins  as  they  hit  the  aluminium 
collecting  cup  is  serenaded  by  Elvis's  injunction  to  'keep  on  the  run,  '  and  'have  some 
fun.  '  The  irony  of  Elvis  Presley's  sad  demise  in  this  eternal  city  does  not  go  unnoticed, 
although  it  does  not  remove  the  feeling  that  there  is  nowhere  better  to  get  fast  and 
loose.  '  The  meaninglessness  of  time  here,  the  utter  superfluity  of  clocks  is  as  evident  in 
the  twenty-four  hour  availability  of  anything  you  might  want  as  it  is  in  the  casinos, 
traditionally  devoid  of  clocks  and  natural  light,  lest  reality  should  find  a  way  in. 
Whilst  the  possibilities  for  gambling  are  everywhere  in  Las  Vegas  to  the  extent  that 
you  cannot  really  escape  it,  most  of  the  casinos  are  concentrated  within  an  area  of  several 
miles  of  the  city  known  as  The  Strip,  which  runs  straight  through  the  newest  part  of  the 
city.  The  concentration  of  gambling  opportunities  has  a  double  benefit.  It  enables  the 
gambler  an  ease  of  movement  between  casinos,  and  it  allows  the  casinos  to  more 
effectively  pull  you  in  their  direction,  often  literally  so.  '  Whilst  this  is  most  obvious  in 
Las  Vegas  of  all  the  gambling  places  in  Nevada,  with  its  higher  concentration  of  casinos, 
there  is  no  less  of  an  attempt  to  suggest  a  similar  kind  of  opulence,  of  a  change  of 
fortune  beckoning,  in  some  smaller  towns.  Where  opulence  is  absent  the  suggestion  of 
transcendence  remains.  They  too  will  have  dream  palaces  with  "some  name  like  Nugget, 
Bonanza,  or  Lucky  Strike,  names  that  defy  the  listless  air  of  the  place  and  its  hollow 
assurance  of  transformation.  "  10 
In  a  further  demonstration  of  the  subjectivity  of  experience,  this  hollow  assurance  is 
also  the  lightning  flash  of  hope  that  appears  suddenly  in  the  invitation  to  wager. 
'A  further  irony  lies  in  the  suggestion  that  the  singer  barely  eked  out  an  existence  in  his  final  years  at  this  place, 
as  his  fortune  dwindled  whilst  his  manager  lost  many  millions  of  his  money  a  the  roulette  tables.  See  Peter  Guralnick 
(1999)  Careless  Love:  The  Unmaking  ofElvis  Presley.  New  York. 
9  On  Las  Vegas  strip  this  has  been  engineered  to  an  extreme  degree  of  efficiency.  Hotel-casinos  are  connected  by 
moving  sidewalks,  and  sometimes  also  by  monorail.  The  scorching  heat  in  high  season  can  be  unbearable,  but  the 
casinos  kindly  offer  pleasant  movement  between  one  air-conditioned  palace  and  the  next.  Pavements  come  to  an 
abrupt  end  at  road  intersections  on  the  Strip,  and  there  is  no  allowance  made  for  the  possibility  that  the  pedestrian 
might  wa-nt  to  take  the  direct  route  to  the  other  side  of  the  road,  i.  e.,  by  walking  across  the  road.  Instead,  an  escalator 
takes  you  up  from  sidewalk  level,  across  and  above  the  road  towards  the  entrance  of  the  next  casino.  At  this  point  it  is 
over  one  hundred  degrees.  You  are  offered  the  choice  of  continuing  through  the  casino,  or an  escalator  back  down  to 
the  sweltering  heat  of  the  street. 
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Entering  a  casino  the  atmosphere  comes  like  a  smack  in  the  face.  "Steve  swears  it's  the 
air  conditioning,  "  Frederick  Barthelme  says: 
As  soon  as  it  hits  you,  he  says,  you  )  re  gone.  We  open  the  doors  and  we're 
washed  with  treated  air,  the  din,  the  scent  of  money,  liquor,  smoke,  adrenalin 
and  after-shave.  We're  keyed  up  now,  hopeful.  We  walk  with  a  sure  step  and 
purpose.  Something  is  suddenly  clear,  precise,  desired.  " 
The  transforming  power  of  this  other  world,  however,  was  realized  also  in  the  fact 
that  it  was  denied  right  up  to  the  moment  transcendence  became  unavoidable.  That  is, 
until  it  grabbed  them  both  by  the  lapels  and  slowly  shook  them  out  of  their  planned 
strategies  of  moderation  -  always  fated  to  end  in  loss.  Such  plans  usually  lasted,  they  say: 
A  half  hour,  sometimes  an  hour  or  two,  after  we  hit  the  pushy  maroon  indoor- 
outdoor  carpet,  nodded  in  passing  to  the  sullen  security  guard  at  his  stand  in 
front  of  the  half-dozen  glass  doors,  smelled  the  turbocharged  air  conditioning.  " 
The  atmosphere,  in  other  words,  eventually  wins  out:  it  is  sensory  overload  against 
reason.  No  contest  to  the  weak-willed  gambler.  The  experience  may,  in  formal  terms, 
simply  appear  as  a  backdrop  for  the  action,  or,  as  in  the  casino  the  furniture  one  moves 
around,  but  it  contributes  an  often  under-estimated  effect  to  the  experience:  it  charms 
and  disarms  those  who  go  in  search  of  'the  juice.  '  It  is  a  major  part  of  what  constitutes 
C  the  juice.  "'  Entering  these  palaces  of  lost  inhibitions  is  itself  a  physical  movement  that 
ultimately  prompts  the  psychological  'vertigo,  '  as  Roger  Caillois  said,  in  a  loss  of 
autonomous  control: 
When  the  cards  are  coming  your  way,  and  when  your  five  thousand  turns  to 
ten,  your  ten  to  twenty,  its  mesmerizing.  Suddenly  that  business  they  always  say 
about  feeling  like  you'll  live  forever  becomes  a  little  bit  true,  because  you've 
crossed  over  some  line,  gone  into  some  other  territory,  become  somebody  else.  " 
'0  David  Thomson  (1999)  In  Nevada,  London:  60. 
F.  &  S.  Barthelme  (2000)  Double  Down,  New  York:  43. 
Ibid:  III 
It  may  be  apocryphal  but  Bugsy  Siegel,  one  of  the  founders  of  Las  Vegas  as  it  was  in  legendary  times  of 
gangsterism,  is  rumoured  to  have  said  that  'with  Las  Vegas  I  no  longer  needed  to  rob  people.  You  just  put  them  in  a 
casino  and  they  will  do  it  themselves.  ' 
"  F.  and  S.  Barthelme,  ibid:  105.  Cf.  Roger  Caillois  (1962)  Man,  Play  and  Games,  London.  In  Edmund 
Bergler's  (1958)  Psycholog  of  Gambling,  this  is  recognized  as  a  failure  of  the  'reality  principle'  to  overcome  the 
'pleasure  principle':  17-18. 
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This  is  the  gambler  as  zombie.  The  re-animated,  will-less,  reincarnation  of  a 
thousand  defeats;  metaphorically  killed  at  the  tables,  this  revenant  is  continually  drawn 
back  to  the  scene  of  death  itself. 
The  Bends  and  Curves  ofMind 
The  appearance  of  the  gambler  in  this  regard  -  as  one  who  returns  to  the  scene  of  loss  - 
baffles  reason  because  we  can  have  no  knowledge  or  the  origin  of  such  a  need.  "  It  is 
curious,  too,  that  the  tendency  of  the  mask  of  appearance  to  lead  to  confusion 
contradicts  Hobbes'  understanding  of  the  rational  actor  as  someone  who  moves  freely. 
In  Hobbes'  picture  the  individual  is  always  concerned  with  accommodating  action 
within  an  external,  changing  environment;  quite  the  opposite  of  the  zombie-like 
movement  of  the  gambler,  who,  in  ignoring  all  rational  signals,  remains  oblivious  to  the 
sights  and  sounds  that  should,  but  fail  to,  reawaken  sense.  Nevertheless,  from  one 
standpoint  both  act  like  automata.  16 
Hobbes'  language  of  psychology,  which  appears  to  render  the  human  subject  as 
more  or  less  a  functionally  responsive  automaton,  or  a  calculating  machine,  nevertheless 
contains  something  more  in  this  idea  of  motion,  a  seemingly  modern  view  of  calculation 
and  how  it  relates  to  ancient  ideas  of  action  and  character,  and  how  these  in  turn  refer 
back,  somewhat  loosely,  although  reflecting  a  continuity,  to  modern  ideas  of  the  normal. 
Consider  the  Hobbesian  individual,  caught  between  a  desire  for  what  is  pleasing  and  the 
necessity  of  avoiding  pain.  He  acts  (that  is,  chooses),  after  deliberation,  in  a  manner  that 
seeks  out  the  smoothest  path,  attaining  a  balance  between  the  two  contrary  forces,  which 
will  go  some  way  towards  the  satisfaction  of  desire,  whilst  also  placing  a  limitation  on 
threats  towards  well  being.  This  rational,  calculating  individual  is  trying  to  chart  an 
orderly  path  that  will  open  up  before  his  eyes,  affording  some  scope  for  dealing  with  the 
"  Cf,  Halliday,  J.  and  Fuller,  P.  (1974)  The  Psychology  of  Gambling,  London.  Psychology  offers  some 
explanations  of  the  persistence  of  gambling  behaviour,  for  example,  it  is  often  regarded  as  more  or  less  masochistic 
behaviour.  The  point  I  am  making,  however,  is  that  autonomy  consists  of  what  can  be  seen  or  heard  -in  other  words, 
the  rationality  is  in  the  words  and  deeds  of  the  actor  and  how  these  are  interpreted.  My  position  derives  from  the 
work  of  Donald  Davidson,  and  this  is  a  perspective  on  rational  action  that  is  explored  in  his  1980  collection  Essays  on 
Actions  and  Events  (Oxford)  -  It  is  in  this  Davidsonian  sense  that  the  'empirically'  available  evidence  of  rational  motives 
is  absent  because  the  movement  of  a  continual  return  to  this  scene  of  loss  is,  by  definition,  irrational,  and  thus 
contradicts  what  the  accumulation  of  causal  knowledge  ought  to  reveal  to  the  subject. 
"  Hobbes:  "For  seeing  life  is  but  a  motion  of  Limbs,  the  beginning  whereof  is  in  some  principall  part  within; 
why  may  we  not  say,  that  all  Automata  (Engines  that  move  themselves  by  springs  and  wheeles  as  doth  a  watch)  have 
an  artificiall  life?  For  what  is  the  Heart,  but  a  Spring-,  and  the  Nerves,  but  so  many  Strings;  and  the  Joynts,  but  so  many 
Wheeles,  giving  motion  to  the  whole  Body,  such  as  was  intended  by  the  Artificer?  "  See,  Hobbes  (1991)  Leviathan, 
Cambridge:  9.  Cf  Daniel  Tiffany  (2000)  Toy  Medium,  Berkeley,  CA. 
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contingencies  of  existence.  This  attempt  to  chart  a  more  or  less  straight  line  stems,  as 
Hobbes  makes  clear,  from  a  fear  of  death.  " 
Hobbes  addressed  the  problem  of  how  we  may  live  together  in  a  world  that  was 
conceived  as  matter  in  motion,  a  motion  moreover  with  the  potential  for  explosive 
conflict.  He  saw  reason  take  a  form  that  has  become  familiar  throughout  the 
development  of  the  modern  world;  which  is  to  say,  reason  would  be  the  basis  of  social 
stability,  meaning  that  rational  action  was  necessary  in  order  to  plan  ahead,  and  for 
example,  to  make  predictions  about  the  future.  And  so  reason  is  derived  from  the 
necessity  of  addressing  the  contingent,  in  other  words  the  whole  history  of  reason  is 
about  excluding  what  is  not  understood,  or  what  is  dangerous,  or  anomalous. 
If  we  add  to  this  the  particular  state  of  such  a  modern  consciousness  -  inwardly 
directed  (conscious  of  the  threat  of  harm)  as  much  as  it  is  facing  the  world  (acting  on 
the  basis  of  these  perceptions),  and  always  caught  up  in  doubt  of  one  sort  or  another 
(over  beliefs,  choices  of  action,  which  arise  from  our  sense  of  motion  in  others).  At  this 
point  we  can  see  that  the  failure  to  maintain  'harmony'  in  the  Hobbesian  picture  arises 
because  of  an  inability  to  stem  a  doubt  over  one's  own  survival,  which  should  be 
rationally  replaced  by  the  assurance  given  by  the  collective  binding  of  subjects;  that  is, 
by  a  limitation  on  individual  motion.  This  constitutes  a  directedness  that  should  negate 
the  anxiety  produced  by  doubt.  We  have  then  to  consider  that  consciousness  as  seen  by 
Rene'  Descartes  -  doubting  -  as  the  "immanent  principle  of  self-movement,  "  and  the 
movement  that  persists  within  the  subject  at  all  times,  undermines  Hobbesian  rational 
action,  or  to  put  it  another  way:  doubt  seeks  to  be  certain  of  the  future,  yet  undermines 
the  stability  of  a  self  that  would  be  so  certain.  " 
Doubt  is  thus  not  only  a  manifestation  of  uncertainty;  doubting  itself  also  represents 
a  dissatisfaction,  or  an  uneasiness  with  the  way  things  are  -  and  if  we  refer  this  doubting 
back  to  knowledge  -  as  Descartes  himself  did  -  it  is  implicitly  distrustful  of  the  'facts'  as 
manifested  in  the  accumulation  of  certainties.  We  can  look  at  this  in  practical  terms: 
under  the  habitual  constraints  of  modern  living,  as  symbolized,  for  example,  by  the 
'-  Leviathan,  Chapter  6  on  The  Passions,  and  Chapter  13  The  Natural  Condition  of  Mankind.  Hobbes'  whole 
psychology  of  man  has  been  claimed  to  be  in  error  as  it  rests  on  a  misrepresentation  of  this  'natural  condition'.  See, 
for  example,  C.  B.  MacPherson  (1962)  The  Political  Theory  ofPossessive  Individualism,  Oxford.  McPherson,  however, 
starts  from  an  equally  specious  point  of  view  that  all  men  are  naturally  co-operative.  The  intractability  of  these 
arguments,  common  to  all  'state  of  nature'  arguments  does  not  divert  us  from  the  point  here,  which  is  that  Hobbes' 
entire  psychology  of  man  rests  on  some  idea  of  motion,  and  that  this  has  some  connection  to  ideas  of  the  best  way  of 
living  now  and  in  ancient  times. 
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discretely  arranged  categories  of  'work'  and  'play';  by  the  division  of  labour,  and  also  by 
the  more  specific  allotment  of  time  to  particular  roles  and  tasks,  the  'internal  motion'  of 
the  doubting  subject  must  be  expressed  in  Cartesian  terms.  However,  doubt  becomes  in 
modern  society  the  source  of  all  calculations  undertaken  to  move  away  from  doubt  itself 
to  stem  the  immanent  disorder  that  lies  within,  which  is  to  say  the  doubt  of  the  subject 
becomes,  in  social  terms,  manifested  as  a  more  or  less  Hobbesian  social  order. 
A  state  of  controlled  movement  (the  equilibrium  of  normal  movement,  for  example) 
actually  compels  one  to  motion  beyond  this  state;  it  provokes  restlessness  and  a  desire 
for  variability  in  experience.  "  We  are  not  so  mechanical  in  our  activities  that  necessary 
roles  and  tasks  can  be  withstood  for  very  long  periods  of  time.  "  The  self-conscious 
subject  submits,  for  the  most  part,  therefore,  to  the  rational  imperatives  of  life,  although 
always  in  the  knowledge  that  society  will  not  make  of  him  a  prisoner,  confined  to  careful 
movements  along  straight  lines,  or  sign-posted  streets. 
The  dual  nature  of  our  consciousness  of  the  world  and  of  the  self  as  a  part  of  and 
apart  from  this  world  is  summed  up  by  ideas  of  motion  (the  adherence  to  spatio- 
temporal  objectivity)  and  suspense  (transcending  the  limits  of  space  and  time),  and  so  by 
the  importance  we  attach  to  mindfulness  on  the  one  hand,  and  forgetfulness  on  the 
other.  And  that  is  to  say,  each  property  of  such  duality  requires  the  other;  the  character 
of  identity  as  difference  provides  the  only  grounds  for  making  the  distinction. 
Forgetfulness  is  inclusion  as  much  as  exclusion,  and  as  such  it  becomes  manifest  in  the 
focus  of  attention. 
Most  gambling  opportunities  are  created,  and  exist  in  the  full  knowledge  of  the 
oscillatory  character  of  modern  life.  Without  play,  work  becomes  impossible  and 
meaningless.  We  travel  back  and  forth  between  the  two,  but  this  once  again  is  in  origin 
an  inward  movement;  the  subject,  in  adhering  to  the  separation,  simply  objectifies  the 
spatio-temporal  reality,  it  becomes  part  of  consciousness.  And  with  the  exception  of 
professional  players  (whose  status  as  gamblers  can  be  doubted),  all  gambling  will  usually 
18  Harvie  Ferguson  (2000)  Modernity  and  Subjectivity,  Charlottesvdle:  4. 
'9  Without  wishing  to  suggest  that  a  fiinctional  analysis  of  gambling  comes  closest  (if  that  is  at  all  possible)  to 
revealing  the  sources  of  motivation  in  gambling,  it  must  still  be  admitted  that  there  is  a  human  desire  for  variable 
behaviour,  emanating  from  a  similar  source  to  that  of  Descartes'  doubt  -  that  is,  from  uncertainty  or  scepticism. 
"  Hobbesia-n  motion  is  only  determined  to  the  extent  that  external  stimuli  direct  the  mind's  attention  to  the 
circumstances  and  consequences  of  movement.  Once  again  this  does  not  go  as  far  as  suggesting  a  structural-functional 
account  of  action  insofar  as  it  is  not  argued  that  a  specific  set  of  conditions,  when  faced  by  the  individual,  will  always 
produce  a  necessary  effect.  That  Hobbes  was  being  prescriptive  -  rather  than  providing  some  kind  of  systemic  analysis 
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be  a  temporary  activity.  This  is  why  gambling  is  about  movement  to  and  fro  as  much  as 
it  is  about  suspense.  It  is  the  movement  of  self  from  one  place  to  another  -  and  the 
wager  is  destination,  or  rest.  And  to  reach  a  destination  implies  a  journey. 
The  'distance'  traveled  is  important  as  well.  If  nothing  is  at  stake,  then  the 
destination  will  not  differ  radically  from  where  one  normally  'resides,  '  and  so,  the 
furthest  one  can  'travel'  is  the  product  of  wagering  everything.  Not  having  anything  at 
stake  makes  for  a  non-gambling  situation.  Professional  players  may  have  only  a  passing 
involvement  with  the  existential  being  of  the  true  gambler.  Gambling  is  their  Job.  '  They 
move  to  and  fro  just  as  people  who  work  in  'regular  jobs'  do  -  they  simply  invert  the 
expectation  by  working  at  games,  rather  than  playing  at  games.  They  do  not  habitually 
expose  themselves  to  the  same  kind  of  risk  as  a  gambler.  "  If  this  is  doubted  just  consider 
what  a  professional  card  player,  for  example,  actually  does.  This  individual  is  a  highly 
primed  calculating  machine,  capable  of  sitting  at  a  poker  table  for  hours  on  end  without 
need  for  either  sustenance  or  relief.  This  involves  a  high  degree  of  concentration:  the 
mind  must  constantly  be  at  work  attempting  to  stay  on  top  of  the  situation. 
The  legendary  poker  player  Nick  the  Greek  once  said  "going  to  the  bathroom 
during  a  poker  or  a  dice  game  is  a  mistake.  You  might  miss  a  hot  hand  worth  a  hundred 
thousand.  ""  To  deny  such  basic  physical  needs  takes  a  monumental  effort  of  will.  The 
non-Professional  gambler,  on  the  other  hand,  the  player  in  search  of  the  juice,  begins  in 
play,  to  hover  between  existence  and  non-existence:  already  relieved  of  the  mental 
constraints,  already  metaphorically  incontinent. 
Professional  players  are  Hobbesian  calculators  engaged  with  games  -  they  are 
pragmatic  and  utilitarian  in  outlook.  They  have  plans,  goals,  and,  if  you  like,  road  maps 
to  determine  their  rational  expectations  of  rectilinear  movement.  On  the  other  hand, 
those  in  search  of  the  juice  dispense  with  all  this  useless  knowledge  because  they 
understand  something  else  about  gambling,  and  that  is  in  the  tacit  admission  provided 
by  evidence  of  returning  to  the  scene  of  a  previous  demise,  that  in  the  wager  the  real 
contingency  of  existence  is  glimpsed  -  in  other  words,  the  possibility  of  one's  own  non- 
-  is  evidenced  by  the  fact  that  his  argument  rests  on  the  idea  that  war,  for  example,  results  from  a  failure  to  act  with 
full  deliberation. 
"  Anthony  Holden,  ibid:  5,  makes  clear  the  distinction:  "The  difference  between  a  gambler  and  a  poker  player  is 
a  crucially  simple  one.  A  gambler,  be  he  one  who  bets  on  horses  or  sports  events,  on  casino  games  or  raindrops 
running  down  window-panes,  is  someone  who  wagers  unfavourable  odds.  A  poker  player,  if  he  knows  what  he  is 
doing,  is  someone  who  wagers  favourable  odds.  The  one  is  a  romantic,  the  other  a  realist.  It  is  a  distinction  worthy  of 
an  inscription  on  a  Greek  urn.  " 
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existence.  The  removal  of  rational  strategies  delivers  an  immediacy  of  experience  that  is 
the  attraction  of  the  wager. 
In  the  immediate  you  are  nowhere.  In  the  'now'  there  are  no  maps  -  it  is  the 
ultimate  non-place.  "  There  can  be  no  calculation  of  futures,  and  no  denial  of  bodily 
movements  in  plunging  into  chance.  The  inability  to  retain  a  firm  grip  on  oneself  can 
have,  as  we  saw,  unlikely  physical  symptoms.  Most  curious  of  these  is  said  to  have 
accompanied  a  losing  streak  by  Dostoevsky,  who  experienced  such  a  loss  of  power  over 
himself,  over  bodily  functions,  that  he  attained  orgasm  at  the  roulette  table.  On  losing, 
no  less.  24 
So,  it  is  precisely  the  distance  traveled  from  the  habitual,  from  day-to-day  routines 
and  expectations  that  raises  the  importance  of  the  wager  as  the  primary  and  defining 
feature  of  a  pure  gambling  experience.  This  does  not  suggest  for  a  moment  that  all  that 
passes  for  gambling  actually  attains  this  essential  state  of  the  wager.  But  neither  can  we 
deny  that  the  further  the  subject  intentionally  moves  from  the  day-to-day  pattern  of  life, 
the  more  contingency  threatens  to  'blow  up,  '  or  spout  forth  over  the  road  ahead.  All 
gambling,  then,  is  ultimately  reducible  to  the  wager,  and  the  more  boldly  that  mediating 
factors  are  removed  (or  that  they  can  be  ignored),  the  more  significant  the  wager.  The 
wager  is  singular  and  as  such  it  directs  the  player  inward,  to  the  infinity  of  the  subjective. 
And  so,  we  may  say,  this  is  not  the  proper  kind  of  subject  for  analysis,  or  for  scientific 
explanation  -  it  cannot  be  adequately  objectified. 
In  the  contemporary  literature  of  scientific  and  now  medical  research  on  the  subject 
of  gambling  there  is  no  room  made  for  the  wager,  although  much  is  made  of  the  variety 
of  gambling  forms,  of  concrete  features  of  certain  games,  and  of  myriad  other  kinds  of 
classification  in  attempts  to  understand  or  explain  the  'why'  of  gambling.  We  can  argue 
that  this  would  be  the  wrong  question  to  ask,  because,  as  we  have  seen  games  provide 
only  the  'permission'  to  wager.  This  'why,  '  the  seeking  of  causes,  is  always  at  the  expense 
of  the  'what'  of  gambling  -  as  for  example,  the  lack  of  knowledge  of  what  is  happening 
in  gambling;  or  what  sets  it  apart  from  other  forms  of  interaction,  from  modes  of 
experience  with  which  it  is  sometimes  compared,  and  so  on. 
22  Cited  in  Paul  Lyons  (1999)  (ed.  )  The  Quotable  Gambler,  New  York:  167. 
Cf  Marc  Aug6  (1995)  Non-Places:  Towards  an  Anthropology  ofSupermodernity,  London. 
This  claim  is  made  by  Alan  Wykes  (1964)  Gambling,  London.  He  does  not  reference  the  source,  except  to  say 
that  it  was  contained  in  a  letter  to  his  wife. 
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Arguing  for  the  centrality  of  the  wager  to  an  understanding  of  gambling  might  also 
be  construed  as  an  essentialist  strategy,  as  a  denial  of  'the  facts,  '  a  metaphysical 
obfuscation.  This  might  be  the  case,  insofar  as  communication  of  the  meaning  of  the 
wager  necessitates  the  statement  of  unverifiable  sensory  experiences.  In  this  sense  the 
wager  is  also  a  denial  of  reality.  However,  this  is  not  the  point  at  stake  here.  The  wager 
has  no  essence  -  there  is  no  universal  experience.  On  the  other  hand  the  experiences  of 
the  wager  are  united  in  one  thing,  and  that  is  the  denial  -  in  various  ways  -  of  the  real. 
The  wager  is  nothing  in  the  sense  that  where  the  real  is  something  identifiable,  it  is  pure 
nothingness. 
So,  whilst  poker  players,  or  horseplayers,  may  certainly  derive  pleasure  from  an 
understanding  of  the  various  rules  and  norms  that  constitute  the  game,  and  from  an 
opportunity  to  display  skill,  the  point  is  that  to  wager  requires  no  formal  games  at  all.  In 
fact,  the  most  extreme  examples  of  the  wager  probably  involve  the  player  essentially 
wagering  against  himself,  as  Nashe,  in  The  Music  of  Chance  clearly  does.  "  By 
comparison,  analysis  of  patterns  of  lottery  play,  or  slot  play  or  any  other  type  of  game 
really  only  reveals  the  extent  to  which  the  importance  of  being  is  ignored  because  it  does 
not  fully  manifest  itself  as  part  of  the  mask  of  appearance  that  is  the  domain  of  rational 
enquiry.  To  purchase  a  lotto  ticket  once  or  twice  a  week,  or  to  bet  on  a  horse  a  few  times 
a  year  may  be  a  lot  less  like  gambling  than,  for  instance,  boarding  a  train  without  either 
a  ticket  or  knowledge  of  its  destination.  Which  is  to  say,  again,  that  the  game  is  just  the 
vehicle.  And  although  there  can  be  a  quantitative  determination  of  the  seriousness  of  the 
wager  the  extent  of  this  seriousness  cannot  really  be  communicated  by  objective  'facts,  ' 
such  as  money  staked,  or  regularity  of  play,  and  so  on.  As  we  saw  in  the  case  of 
Dostoevsky's  Alexei  he  gambled  first  for  someone  else  -  for  the  woman  he  loved,  then 
because  gambling  was  the  only  thing  he  could  love;  it  was  the  only  way  he  could  be. 
The  motion  that  leads  to  the  point  of  suspense  can  only  have  meaning  when  the 
precipice  is  near,  that  is,  when  'being'  is  itself  in  question.  This  is  a  determination  that 
can  only  be  made  subjectively,  a  point  understood  by  Frederick  and  Steven  Barthelme 
when  they  remark  that  gambling  was  a  complex  interaction  of  many  things  -  of 
challenge,  daring,  boldness,  and  making  those  close  to  you  fearful,  but  not  about  money 
spent,  or  hours  devoted  to  feeding  slots.  It  was,  as  they  say,  a  seriousness  that  could  be 
"  Although  it  is  also  implicitly  gambling  against  normality  -  the  internalised  structure  of  expectations. 
j  Scanlan  2001  79 The  Revenant 
summed  up,  paradoxically,  in  terms  of  childishness;  like  screaming  "Look,  Ma.  No 
hands!  " 
This  also  brings  us  back  to  a  certain  inescapable  part  of  the  description  of  gambling. 
To  gamble  is  to  venture,  to  hazard,  to  move  so  as  to  place  oneself  in  doubt.  It  is  difficult 
to  objectively  determine  when  such  a  point  is  reached  because  such  an  understanding 
would  seek  to  place  finite  bounds  on  what  is  a  unique  experience,  or  for  instance, 
suggest  that  a  certain  type  of  action  is  equal  to  danger.  Once  again,  the  wager  only 
permits  self-identification. 
Certainly,  what  is  happening  in  gambling  for  all  to  see  is  that  a  game  is  being 
played,  but  because  the  act  of  gambling  constitutes  an  emergent  reality  what  is  really 
going  on  ventures  well  beyond  such  evidence,  beyond  cards,  chips,  slot  machines  and 
other  'fixtures.  '  Not  only  is  the  gambler  suspended,  in  the  sense  that  being  is  pregnant  at 
the  point  of  the  wager,  but  the  entire  gambling  situation  forces  him  into  collision  with 
others  similarly  engaged,  coming  together  and  moving  apart  to  create  a  heightened  level 
of  contingency.  It  is  a  situation  marked  by  total  flux.  People  become  like  atoms 
bouncing  to  and  fro,  appearing  out  of  nowhere,  and  occasionally  crashing  into  each 
other,  before  pinging  off  in  another  direction. 
It  may  be  productive  if  we  can  think  about  it  in  a  slightly  different  way.  The  verb 
(  to  gamble'  becomes  co-extensive  with  all  other  verbs:  it  signifies  the  notion  that  being  is 
always  being  born.  So,  to  be  is  to  be  neither  one  thing  nor  another.  "  Thus,  by  plunging 
into  gambling  from  a  state  of  relative  control,  the  wager  returns  to  consciousness  the 
lurking  contingency  of  existence,  the  fact  that  you  might  not  have  been  born;  that,  for 
instance,  you  will  die.  It  is  an  inflation  of  contingency,  that,  as  Georges  Bataille  says, 
reason  allows  us  to  forget  for  the  most  part,  but  which  is  always  there  as  a  disease  that 
lies  dormant  within  the  organism,  a  latent  force  with  a  potential  to  overtake  one.  "  The 
immanent  nature  of  the  wager  is  laden  with  consequences  of  which  the  gambler  can 
know  little  and  expect  even  less.  This  is  a  movement  that  escapes  the  definition  of 
(normal.  ' 
26  Jean-Luc  Nancy  0  993)  The  Birth  to  Presence,  Stanford,  CA:  "To  be  born  is  not  to  have  been  born,  and  to 
have  been  born.  It  is  the  same  with  all  verbs:  to  think  is  not  yet  to  have  thought,  and  already  to  have  thought.  Thus 
I  to  be  born'  is  the  verb  of  all  verbs:  the  'in  the  midst  of  taking  place'  that  has  neither  beginning  nor  end.  "  (2)  See  also 
Charles  H.  Kahn,  'Retrospective  on  the  verb  'to  be'  and  the  concept  of  being',  in  Knouuttila,  S.  and  Hintikka,  J. 
(1986)  (eds.  )  The  Logic  ofBeing,  Dordrecht. 
2-  See  Georges  Bataille  (1997)  'Chance'  in  The  Batai&  Reader.  London. 
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What  a  Hobbesian  idea  of  motion  as  safety  does,  on  the  other  hand,  is  serve  as  a 
link  to  connect  ancient  and  modern  ideas  about  the  'normal.  '  In  ancient  times)  the 
'normal'  or  'mean'  related  to  ideas  of  good  character,  virtue,  a  successful  life,  and  so  on; 
and  in  modern  times  to  ideas  of  normality  as  the  absence  of  pathology.  "  In  all  cases 
what  we  are  given  is,  more  or  less,  a  prescription  for  'commodious'  'good'  or  'healthy' 
living  that  rests  upon  the  rational  understanding  and  direction  of  motion,  right  down  to 
those  Hobbesian  internal  motions  (impulses,  desires,  needs),  which  is  to  say,  reason  is 
the  basis  for  continued  motion  (that  is,  living),  and  as  such  is  an  attempt  to  deflect  the 
degenerative  quality  of  movement. 
Straightening 
The  objective  nature  of  the  'normal'  is  also  historically  evident  in  the  determination  of 
the  positive  values  of  ethical  systems,  which  are  basically  concerned  with  controlling 
movement,  and  remaining  within,  for  example,  the  confines  of  a  'golden  mean,  '  or some 
similar  name  for  the  measure.  Thus,  the  right  path  is  one  that  strikes  a  balance  between 
the  individual  and  the  social.  But  this  does  not  describe  a  fixed  path,  because  changing 
circumstances  demand  a  realignment  with  objective  conditions  as  they  are  encountered. 
Thus,  there  is  an  importance  in  ethical  considerations  especially  of  the  appropriateness 
of  an  action,  of  it  being  understood  as  a  response  to  external  demands,  of  it  having  a 
built-in  flexibility.  It  does  not  stray  one  way  or  another,  but  settles  into  a  more  or  less 
straight  path  -  and  his  is  the  crucial  feature  -  that  is  always  between  extremes;  it 
represents  moderation,  harmony,  balance,  and  the  avoidance  of  pitfalls  on  either  side.  " 
Aristotle's  doctrine  of  the  mean  is  an  early  example  of  this  presentation  of  virtue  as  the 
attainment  of  balance  between  vices  of  excess  and  defect.  What  I  mean  to  suggest  is  that 
ideas  of  'the  mean',  of  Hobbesian  'reason'  and  modern  'normality'  all  share  something. 
At  the  very  least,  they  share  a  hope  that  the  pernicious  dualism  of  self  and  other  can  be 
overcome.  This  may  be  stated  in  various  ways. 
For  instance,  in  Aristotelian  terms  the  good  life  is  the  rational  life,  lived  according  to 
the  mean.  Living  according  to  the  mean  was  a  way  of  trying  to  resolve  the  conflict 
between  self-interest  and  morality,  of  living  well,  or  flourishing;  and  striking  a  balance 
"  Cf  Georges  Canguilhern  (1989)  the  Normal  and  the  PathologicaL  New  York. 
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between  hubris  and  moirai  -  between  self-will  and  the  acceptance  of  fate,  or  chance.  " 
This  demands  a  community  of  interests.  Hobbes'  conception  of  reason  as  the  outcome 
of  'deliberation,  '  was,  too,  a  kind  of  balancing  act  between  the  conflicting  desires  of 
oneself  and  others,  with  commodious  living  as  the  ultimate  aim.  One  difference  here  is 
that  Hobbes  stipulates  two  broad  extremes  which  direct  individual  action  -  desire  and 
fear  -  under  which  can  be  subsumed  all  manner  of  subjective  beliefs  and  desires  about 
orientations  to  the  world. 
Whilst  in  contemporary  language  'normality'  seems  to  have  assumed  the  properties 
of  both  of  these  prior  dualities,  and  the  'normal'  is  represented  (in  terms  of  motion)  as 
ordered,  organized,  goal-directed,  or  centered  action;  that  is,  in  terms  of  action  it  can  be 
seen  to  correspond  to  an  earlier  Greek  or  Aristotelian  conception  of  reason.  "  And  this 
too  implies  something  very  similar  to  a  Hobbesian  'rational  binding'  of  desire.  We 
cannot  avoid  here  the  medical  import  of  this  movement  in  terms  of  the  modern  usage  of 
the  term  'normal',  especially  as  it  has  come  to  influence  the  scientific,  or  objective, 
understanding  of  gambling.  In  modern  terms,  then,  to  deviate  from  the  norm  is  also 
meant  to  suggest  a  movement  away  from  a  centre  that  constitutes  health,  and  from  this 
towards  a  more  or  less  pathological  state. 
A  significant  difference  which  separates  the  meanings  of  deviation  from  the  norm 
and  deviation  from  the  mean,  is  that  in  the  former  case  in  falling  away  from  the  norm 
we  are  absolved  of  responsibility  (in  the  sense  that  the  individual  is  taken  to  be  unwell), 
whilst  with  the  latter  we  attract  blame  for  a  failure  to  act  appropriately.  Hobbesian  ideas 
"  Cf  E.  Lesky  (1976)  The  Vienna  Medical  Scholl  of  the  IY'  Century,  Baltimore.  This  was  given  a  modern 
rendition  in  the  medical  theory  of  John  Brown  where  health  signified  a  normal  level  of  stimulation  between  the 
sthenic  (over-stimulation)  and  asthenic  (understimulation). 
'0  Cf.  Martha  C.  Nussbaum  (1986)  The  Fragility  of  Goodness:  Luck  and  Ethics  in  Greek  Tragedy  and  Philosophy. 
Cambridge. 
"  This  is  explored  in  Ian  Hacking  (1999)  The  Taming  of  Chance,  Ch.  19.  On  the  danger  of  confusing  ancient 
and  modern  ideas  of  'normal'  he  says  of  Aristotle's  conception  of  the  mean  that  it  "is  almost  as  playful  as  the  normal 
[in  contemporary  usage].  The  idea  of  a  mean  or  intermediate  (that's  a  description)  which  is  excellent  (an  evaluation)  is 
one  of  the  most  familiar  of  Aristotle's  teachings.  He  did  not  have  the  is/ought  hang  ups  inculcated  by  Hume.  The 
golden  mean  (as  the  phrase  is  commonly  understood)  is  golden  (good)  and  lies  (as  a  matter  of  fact)  between  extremes. 
Aristotle  was  subtle  and  careful.  He  wrote,  'Virtue  is  a  mean  between  two  vices,  one  of  excess  and  one  of  deficiency.  ' 
Then  something  less  easy  to  construe:  'As  far  as  its  substance  and  the  account  stating  its  essence  are  concerned,  virtue 
is  a  mean;  but  as  far  as  the  best  and  the  good  are  concerned,  it  is  an  extremity.  "'  (164)  However  it  unclear  to  me 
whether  the  caution  urged  by  Hacking  is  necessary  so  long  as  it  is  clear  that  the  discussion  here  centres  on  motion, 
and  not  on  the  predictive  power  of  science.  As  I  will  discuss  below,  modern  ideas  of  pathology  -  that  is,  the 
conventional  opposite  of  the  normal  -  are  about  motion,  and  they  are  expressed  in  terms  of  a  discourse  that  does  not 
avoid  being  evaluative.  That  Aristotle  is  talking  about  action  is  clear  if  we  understand  the  difference  between  substance 
and  essence.  It  appears  that  in  Aristotle  the  'ought'  is  more  important  than  the  'is'  because  virtue  is  the  substance;  it 
adheres  in  the  middle  course,  the  mean.  The  essence  of  the  mean  course  is  to  do  the  best,  or  to  live  the  good  life.  We 
may  note  that  this  formulation  of  the  essence  of  the  mean  (i.  e.,  pursuit  of  the  best  in  life)  encourages  the  pursuit  of  an 
extremity,  and  not  a  mean  (the  best  is  surely  at  the  limit  of  striving  and  not  simply  a  mean?  ) 
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of  motion  of  course  involve  a  pragmatic  imperative  that  is  neither  one  nor  the  other  of 
these,  but  which  tends  towards  the  same  effect,  at  the  risk  of  some  danger  we  strike  a 
balance.  Thus  the  imperative  is  to  act  cautiously,  or  risk  the  inflation  of  injurious 
possibilities.  This  is  a  means  of  self-regulation. 
To  return  to  the  modern  idea  of  disordered  movement"  as  'abnormal,  '  as  pathology, 
Ian  Hacking  suggests,  for  example,  that  although  Aristotle's  conception  of  the  mean 
cannot  be  directly  equated  in  the  fullest  sense  with  the  modern  'normal,  '  medicine 
provides  a  striking  example  of  a  continuity  in  meaning.  Whilst  "health  as  the  mean  [ 
... 
] 
was  part  of  the  old  medicine,  "  it  took  August  Comte,  and  the  social  sciences  to  really 
take  this  idea  to  our  current  understanding,  to  place  the  medical  notion  and  the  ethical 
notion  together.  It  was  the  idea  that  the  pathological  was  defined  as  deviation  from  the 
normal  that  Comte  elevated,  thus  establishing  the  belief  that  all  characteristics  of  a  thing 
were  to  be  defined  relative  to  the  normal  state.  Accordingly,  what  Comte  actually 
expressed,  and  bequeathed,  was  "a  fundamental  tension  in  the  idea  of  the  normal  -  the 
normal  as  existing  average,  and  the  normal  as  figure  of  perfection  to  which  we  may 
3333  progress. 
By  bringing  the  two  notions  together  in  a  modern  idea  of  'normal'  what  we  have  is  a 
concept  with  two  distinct  applications.  One  the  one  hand  we  have  the  medical  notion, 
that  of  the  preservation  of  the  physical  organism,  which  teaches  us  to  guard  against 
debilitation  and  dissolution.  Whilst  on  the  other  hand  the  ethical  notion  is  directed 
towards  out  future  perfectibility,  our  capacity  to  rationally  choose  appropriate  means  to 
our  goal.  And,  Hacking  adds,  "The  normal  stands  indifferently  for  what  has  been,  good 
health,  and  for  what  shall  be,  our  chosen  destiny.  That  is  why  the  benign  and  sterile- 
sounding  word  'normal'  has  become  one  of  the  most  powerful  ideological  tools  of  the 
twentieth  century.  "" 
"  Cf.  the  motion  of  turbulence  and  fluidity,  which  in  modern  society  is  seen  in  movements  that  are  normal,  yet 
unpredictable.  See  Z.  Bauman  (2000)  Liquid  Modernity.  Cambridge;  and  Hillel  Schwartz  (1996)  'Torque:  The  New 
Kinaesthetic  of  the  Twentieth  Century,  '  in  Crary,  Jonathan  and  Sanford  Kwinter  (1992)  Zone  6.  -  Incorporations.  New 
York:  70-127 
Ian  Hacking  (1990)  The  Taming  of  Chance-  168. 
Ibid:  169. 
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Babylon  is  nothing  but  an  infinite  game  of  chance. 
JORGE  Luis  BORGES,  The  Lottery  in  Babylon 
'Violently  thumping  the  platter,  the  bones  mount  changing  colors  with  the  windy 
whisking  of  their  hands  to  and  fro  which  action  in  that  sport  they  much  use,  smiting 
themselves  on  the  breast  and  thighs,  crying  Hub  Hub  Hub.  They  may  be  heard  playing 
this  game  a  quarter  of  a  mile  off.  "'  So  wrote  William  Wood  in  his  New  England's 
Prospect  of  1634,  reporting  his  encounter  with  some  Iroquois  people  playing  a  game  he 
called  'Hubbub.  " 
It  is  not  recorded  whether  or  not  William  Wood  took  a  dislike  to  this  game,  to  what 
he  may  have  regarded  as  a  confused  mess  of  noise  and  bodily  movement.  A  17  h  century 
New  England  colonist  like  Wood  may  have  derived  the  name  for  this  game  from  a 
relatively  contemporary  association  of  a  'hubbub'  as  the  confused  shouting,  or  battle  cry 
of  'savage'  peoples,  although  it  is  likely  that  this  name  can  be  traced  back  to  an  earlier 
association  with  the  story  of  the  Tower  of  Babel  in  Genesis;  here  we  see  Jehovah  render 
the  speech  of  the  builders  of  the  city  of  Babylon  a  meaningless  uproar  of 
incommensurable  tongues  -  thus  nothing  can  be  heard  but  the  hubbub.  Babylon  is  thus 
the  symbol  of  all  confusion,  of  all  that  makes  no  sense,  of  an  assemblage  of  parts  that  are 
difficult  to  reconcile.  ' 
The  distaste  for  gambling  found  in  the  words  of  puritans,  preachers,  and  sometimes, 
politicians,  is  a  comment  upon  the  moral  health  of  the  gambler,  and  this  concern  can  be 
See  Henry  Chafetz  (1960)  Play  The  Devil-  A  History  of  Gambling  in  the  United  States,  1492-1950.  New  York:  8 
'  in  his  Games  of  the  North  American  Indians,  Volume  1,  Stewart  Culin  gives  a  detailed  description  of  this  dice 
game,  which  was  universal  amongst  tribes  of  the  east  and  west,  and  was  known  by  various  designations.  For  example, 
as  'u's&a'tina'  (literally  striking  or  throwing  against  something)  by  the  Arapaho,  and  'mo'nshimanh'  by  the 
Cheyenne.  See  Culin  (1992):  53-55. 
3  Cf,  Jorge  Luis  Borges'  1944  essay  'The  Lottery  in  Babylon,  '  in  Fictions  (2000),  Harmondsworth. 
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understood  to  have  been  transposed  in  modern  society  into  a  medical  concern  for  lasting 
health,  and  thus  an  unease  with  regard  to  the  sustainability  of  the  social  fabric,  under 
conditions  where  laxity  of  moral  sense  or  reason  both  lead  to  a  loosening  of  control  over 
body  and  mind,  and  so  a  threat  to  the  maintenance  of  some  social  equilibrium.  We  can 
bring  all  these  anxieties  to  a  common  root  once  we  understand  the  fundamental  point  in 
all  cases  is  that  what  we  should  be  mindful  of  is  the  notion  that  motion  can,  or  should, 
be  controlled;  it  is  to  the  potentially  debasing  consequences  of  motion,  that  the  stigman 
attached  to  gambling  finds  its  origin.  It  is  only  by  means  of  order  and  control  that  the 
motion  can  be  saved  from  becoming  degenerative.  Uncontrollable  gamblers  are  known 
as  'degenerates'  without  any  ironic  intent;  if  motion  is  'loose'  it  lacks  a  definite  purpose, 
and  can  have  no  rational  goal.  That  is  gambling.  In  virtue  of  definition  alone  it  is  not 
(normal.  ' 
In  modern  society  the  social  and  moral  concerns  about  the  ill-effects  of  gambling, 
which  have  accompanied  gambling  to  varying  degrees  since  ancient  times,  become  an 
attempt  to  wrestle  with  the  problem  that  the  turbulent  motion  involved  is  not  just 
unpredictable,  or  just  submission  to  the  arbitrary,  but  also  more  importantly,  perhaps,  it 
is  that  the  continual  oscillation  involved  threatens  to  expose  life  in  all  its  mutability.  It 
brings  to  bear  the  horrible  reality  that  lurks  within  both  individual  and  the  organism, 
namely  their  eventual  deterioration.  Equally  dangerous  from  a  moral,  and  now  medical, 
viewpoint  is  the  fact  that  the  lack  of  firm  habits  can  erode  good  character,  or  what  is 
even  worse,  mitigating  the  potential  for  normality.  '  In  modern  psychiatry,  for  example, 
in  what  has  emerged  as  the  paradigm  of  the  scientific  and  medical  approach  to  the 
activity,  gambling  beyond  normal  limits  is  taken  as  both  a  manifestation  of  an  addiction 
(in  that  It  is  claimed  to  progress  from  relatively  harmless  indulgence  to  ever  more  serious 
levels);  or  an  example  of  pathological  behaviour  (in  that  the  individual  gambler  is 
compelled  to  seek  out  gambling  opportunities). 
Although  these  both  seem  to  refer  to  a  similar  general  statement  of  the  abnormal, 
the  latter  is  actually  more  revealing  because  in  the  current  taxonomy  it  places  gambling 
amongst  a  group  of  impulse  control  disorders,  along  with  such  other  recognised  illnesses  as 
'  Cf  S  lavoj  Zizek  (1996)  The  Indivisible  Remainder.  London,  and  Gaston  Bachelard's  essay  'The  Hand  Dreams: 
On  Material  Imagination'  in  McAllester  Jones  (199  1)  Gaston  Bachelard:  Subversive  Humanist,  Madison,  Wisconsin. 
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kleptomania,  pyromania,  and  intermittent  explosive  disorder.  '  The  compulsion,  of 
course,  removes  any  element  of  will  power.  Thus,  in  terms  of  the  evidence  for  addiction, 
the  attraction  of  the  disorientating  effects  of  the  wager,  it  is  suggested,  provokes  or 
inflames  a  distaste  for  normal  movement  into  an  inability  to  submit  to  rational 
imperatives. 
But  as  disorder,  gambling  goes  much  further  than  the  most  perfunctory  diversions 
from  'reality'  or  from  what  is  taken  to  be  routine.  Such  superficial  'wandering'  may 
simply  be  found  in  the  wishes  and  desires  that  now  and  again  come  to  the  fore  of 
consciousness  -  in  daydreaming,  or  in  absentmindedness,  for  instance  -  before 
disappearing  again  without  much  of  a  threat  to  the  goal-directed  rational  motion  of 
habit. 
The  Motion  of  Degeneration 
Curiously,  and  in  an  inverse  characterization  of  what  most  people  would  think  is  illness, 
this  idea  of  the  stability  of  the  subject,  as  expressed  in  terms  of  the  maintenance  of  body 
and  mind,  and  that  as  a  function  of  the  self-control  of  rational  autonomy,  has  now 
become  accepted  to  such  an  extent  that  it  is  now  suggested  that  people  are  addicted  to 
staying  fit,  or  working  out  (as  it  is  so  aptly  known).  That  is  to  say,  such  people  have 
developed  an  unhealthy  relationship  with  their  own  health,  culminating  in  the  unusual 
situation  that  finds  the  desire  to  fend  off  the  debilitating  natural  movement  of  life 
(ageing)  can  itself  be  destructive  to  mental  well-being.  Thus  modern  society  produces 
the  supreme  irony  in  that  it  has  elevated  the  desirability  of  physical  health  to  such  an 
extreme  that  people  actually  become  sick  in  trying  too  vigorously  to  attain  it. 
This,  Eve  Kosofsky  Sedgwick  refers  to  as  one  of  many  modern  'epidemics  of  the 
will.  "  And  so,  'addiction'  to  the  exercise  of  bodily  autonomy  actually  results  in  a  life 
lived  as  the  ghost  of  an  autonomous  person,  which  is  to  say,  in  the  hollow  repetition  of 
'  See  Allen  F.  Collins  'The  Pathological  Gambler  and  the  Government  of  Gambling.  '  History  of  The  Human 
Sciences,  Vol.  9,  No.  3,1996:  69-100. 
'  See  Sedgwick  (1992)  'Epidemics  of  the  Will'  in  Crary  and  Kwinter  (eds.  )  Zone  6.  -  Incorporations,  New  York: 
"In  any  absence  of  any  projective  hypostatization  of  a  'foreign'  substance,  the  object  of  addiction  here  seems  to  be  the 
body  itself  More  accurately  the  object  of  addiction  is  the  exercise  of  those  very  qualities  whose  lack  is  supposed  to 
define  addiction  as  such:  bodily  autonomy,  self-control,  will  power.  The  object  of  addiction  has  become,  precisely, 
enjoyment  of  'the  ability  to  choose  freely,  and  freely  to  choose  health.  '  It  seemed  logically  clear  from  the  moment  [in 
the  1980's]  of  this  development  that  if  exercise  was  addictive,  nothing  couldn't  be;  the  exercise  addict  was  really  the 
limit  case  for  evacuating  the  concept  of  addiction,  once  and  for  all,  of  any  necessary  specificity  of  substance,  bodily 
effect  or  psychological  motivation  [ 
... 
I  Addiction,  under  this  definition,  resides  only  in  the  structure  of  a  will  that  is 
always  somehow  insufficiently  free,  a  choice  whose  volition  is  insufficiently  pure"  (583-84). 
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meaningless  movement  that  ends  up  becoming  the  only  point  of  existence.  In  other 
words,  such  a  ceaseless  activity  of  safety  measures  and  careful,  stealthy,  movements  begin 
to  look  devoid  of  free  will.  This  is  the  existential  compound  interest  of  modern  living; 
with  pension  benefits  and  a  healthy  body,  who  knows,  it  may  be  possible  to  cheat  death. 
However,  instead  of  being  merely'good'  now  in  the  hope  of  the  eternal  life  of  the  next 
world,  there  is  in  this  case  no  afterlife  due  as  a  consequence  of  this  particular  form  of 
self-control  -  this,  instead,  is  replaced  by  the  hope  that  the  wish  for  eternal  youth  may 
be  fulfilled. 
But  an  intensive  concentration,  as  Aristotle  noted,  knocks  life  out  of  balance,  and 
actually  tends  toward  the  erosion  of  character.  In  a  modern  formulation  this  becomes  a 
concern  over  mental  health,  and  thus  a  medical  problem  (rather  than  simply  a  moral 
problem).  '  Gambling,  as  a  form  of  self-absorption,  and  as  inwardly  directed  motion, 
becomes  'addictive'  in  virtue  of  its  implicit  denial  of  an  external  world  that  demands 
equal  attention  to  that  given  by  the  subject  to  the  whims  of  personal  desire. 
As  exceptional  motion,  gambling  is  also  an  implicit  threat  to  the  social  fabric  in  the 
sense  that  boldness  in  motion  forces  bodies  into  contact  at  a  speed,  and  with  a  lack  of 
foreknowledge,  that  can  undermine  existing  attempts  at  maintaining  a  'safe'  or  'healthy' 
existence.  Gambling,  as  we  have  seen,  intervenes  as  an  almost  Cartesian  doubt  of  the 
'real'  world  -  it  separates  the  subject  from  the  reality  of  an  objective  world,  and  directs 
self-consciousness  inwards.  Against  the  best  efforts  of  social  rationality  to  restrict 
subjectivity  to  a  Kantian  autonomy,  the  inwardly  directed  motion  of  the  gambler  eludes 
external  judgements  of  what  is  appropriate  action  because  it  is  largely  imperceptible  to 
the  outside.  This  is  part  of  the  crucial  failure  of  the  gambler  to  meet  the  conditions  of 
rational  objectivity  -  rational  autonomy  only  makes  sense  under  conditions  that  allow  a 
social  understanding  that  becomes  a  case  of  'being-with-others,  '  and  not  in  the 
singularly  indivisible  terms  of  existential  being  as  experienced  by  a  serious  gambler.  For  a 
gambler  caught  up  in  the  wager,  we  can  imagine,  there  is  no  possibility  of  society,  for 
there  is  no  basis  for  understanding  or  reciprocity.  8 
'  Intellectual,  or  philosophical  (as  opposed  to  religious  or  political)  moralists  have  often  insisted  on  the 
variability  of  life  as  being  of  great  benefit  to  the  character.  This  ranges  from  John  Stuart  Mill's  famous  declaration  that 
rather  Socrates  dissatisfied,  than  a  pig  satisfied'  to  such  modern  commonplaces  as  'travel  broadens  the  mind.  ' 
'  Although,  this  is  not  to  overlook  the  fact  that  many  gamblers  claim  that  fellow  gamblers  are  among  the  most 
honest  people  there  are.  Certainly,  the  game  is  social,  and  it  represents  a  formalization  of  an  agreement  between 
players.  It  is  a  set  of  binding  rules.  I  wouldn't  deny  this.  All  I  say  is  that  this  is  just  the  vehicle  for  the  essential 
experience  of  the  wager. 
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A  corollary  of  the  indivisibility  of  the  wager  is  expressed  in  terms  of  the  effect  of  the 
wager  on  the  very  social  understanding  it  implicitly  denies.  For  despite  the  exceptional 
nature  of  this  experience,  there  can  be  no  causal  vacuum  (as  we  saw,  the  gambler 
eventually  returns  to  the  'normal'),  and  thus  no  action  in  a  social  or  cultural 
environment,  we  can  be  sure,  is  ever  wholly  without  consequences.  Herein  lies  what  has 
been  one  of  the  main  sources  of  tension  within  public  morality  when  it  comes  to 
gambling:  the  existential  grip  of  the  wager  as  the  locus  of  all  determinate  motion  toward 
that  end  can  only  be  experienced  by  participation  in  its  essence,  by  a  deliberative  act  of 
wagering,  yet  the  consequences  of  this  motion  have  a  potential  impact  on  other  parts  of 
society  -  for  example,  on  spouses,  families,  work  colleagues,  or  even  the  taxpayer.  '  So, 
whilst  the  gambler  takes  all  the  risks,  or  puts  all  at  stake,  he  does  so  only  by  moving  out 
of  the  real  world,  as  a  part  of  which,  of  course,  he  exists  in  a  prior  condition  of  relative 
normality. 
The  degenerative  power  of  gambling  lies  with  the  subjective  immersion  in  the 
immediate  that  destroys  not  only  the  perception  of  reality,  but  for  all  practical  purposes 
of  action,  and  because  of  the  unexpected  power  of  this  motion,  it  destroys  reality  itself 
by  a  gradual  erosion.  The  disorganization  implied  by  the  absence  of  external  constraints 
upon  action  thus  contributes  to  a  lack  of  mindfulness  that  can  be  corrosive  in  both 
moral  and  physical  terms,  and  this  is  fully  evident  to  the  most  serious  seekers  of  'the 
juice.  "' 
The  knowledge  of  potential  ruin  can  be  alluring  and  dangerous  in  equal  part, 
because  it  brings  with  it  an  awareness  of  the  essential  aloneness  of  such  a  fundamental 
experience,  and  this  is  a  consciousness  that  cannot  easily  be  communicated,  and  which 
thus  may  serve  to  reinforce  the  powerful  grip  this  isolation  can  have  on  the  gambler. 
And  as  such  the  inward  motion  reaches  a  kind  of  completion,  and  from  the  prior 
ceaseless  movement  being  is  restored  or  affirmed  in  the  immediacy  that  follows  the 
hollow  resolution  of  the  wager.  That  this  lasts  only  momentarily  does  not  alter  the  fact 
'  Are  the  ill  effects  of  gambling  as  they  have  come  to  be  recognized  offset  by  the  public  revenues  raised  by  taxes 
on  the  activity?  The  growth  of  modern  gambling  seems  to  suggest  so.  In  the  UX,  Australia,  and  the  (increasingly, 
also)  the  United  States  gambling  has  expanded  as  governments,  for  the  most  part  operating  within  a  framework  of  a 
public  distaste  of  direct  taxation,  seek  novel  means  of  raising  revenues,  which  of  course  then  go  towards  public 
projects  or  charitable  causes.  This,  of  course,  is  nothing  new.  For  the  historical  development  of  this,  see  Gerda  Reith 
0  999)  The  Age  of  Chance..  Gambling  in  Western  Culture,  London:  especially  54-58;  and  Henry  Chafetz,  ibid:  20-28, 
on  the  development  of  the  lottery  in  the  United  States  during  the  18  h  century. 
"  Cf  e.  g.,  J.  Richardson  (1979)  Memoir  of  a  Gambler,  New  York;  F.  and  S.  Barthelme  (2000),  Double  Down, 
Boston;  and  Jonathan  Rendall  (1999)  Twelve  Grand'  the  Gambler  as  Hero,  London. 
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that  this  is  the  core  of  the  experience.  Of  equal  importance  is  that  the  risks  and 
attractions  are  undoubtedly  bound  up  with  notions  of  mortality,  and  it  is  not  without 
surprise  that  all  serious  gamblers  realize  that  that  there  is  a  definite  and  unavoidable 
terminus  in  this  life.  So,  the  impulse  to  wager  rests  on  a  perception  that  'normality'  is 
itself  a  slow  death,  that  work  becomes  the  Sisyphean  return  of  the  same,  by  contrast  with 
which  gambling  becomes  the  route  to  a  realm  of  apparently  absolute  freedom.  " 
The  Wager  as  Tragedy 
The  wager  is  a  temporary  removal  from  this  inevitability.  It  is  not  without  interest  either 
that  Las  Vegas's  most  fervent  gamblers  seem  to  be  well  past  middle  age,  and  may  be 
more  intent  than  most  in  fighting  against  the  'way  of  all  flesh.  '  For  people  who  are 
"facing  the  waning  of  sexuality  and  imminent  death,  "  Las  Vegas,  it  has  been  suggested, 
represents  the  last  promise  of  the  American  Dream,  offering  the  hope  that  you  may  still, 
in  some  small  way,  beat  the  odds.  "  But,  unfortunately,  the  odds  of  losing  in  casino 
gambling  are  like  the  odds  on  dying,  which  is  to  say  they  are  perfect  in  the  long  run.  In 
other  words,  not  dying  is  as  likely  as  anyone  but  the  casino  walking  away  from  the 
gaming  tables  with  the  profits.  This  too,  is  where  a  subjective  desire  not  to  be  dead  in 
advance  comes  up  against  a  cautious  objective  stewardship  of  life,  which  also  aims  to 
fend  off  death,  but  makes  life  appear  moribund  in  doing  so. 
The  metamorphosis  of  appearances,  which  is  witnessed  as  the  denial  of  reasonable 
expectations,  can  become  repellant  to  a  sudden  exposure  because  it  destroys 
conventional  means  of  sensory  identification.  Anything  that  moves,  that  mutates,  lacks 
definition.  It  is  'squishy,  '  'unformed,  '  neither  yet  one  thing  nor  another.  It  raises 
questions.  We  say  'what?  '  because  we  are  not  quite  sure  of  what  it  might  become,  or 
''  In  Seneca's  The  Apocolocyntosis  the  dice  playing  emperor  Claudius  is  set  straight  by  the  punishment  of  such  a 
routine,  forced  to  throw  dice  from  a  bottomless  cup  forever.  In  Paul  Auster  (1990)  The  Music  of  Chance,  the  two 
central  characters  (as  discussed  above,  chapter  one),  Nashe  and  Pozzi,  are  set  to  work  on  budding  the  wall  in  a  similar 
I  straightening  out,  '  with  their  means  of  ending  this  punishment  always  being  snatched  away  from  them,  by  ever  more 
intricate  means  of  calculating  their  debt. 
"  A.  K.  Richards  and  A.  D.  Richards,  (1997)  'Gambling,  Death,  and  Violence:  Hollywood  Looks  at  Las  Vegas.  ' 
Psychoanalytic  Review,  84(5):  770.  The  modal  age  of  gamblers  was  found  by  Las  Vegas  Chamber  of  Commerce  to  be 
between  55  and  65.  Of  course,  this  may  just  reflect  a  greater  availability  of  time  upon  retiral  from  work,  and  more 
disposable  wealth  when  compared  to  younger  people.  The  same  point  was  made  in  more  florid  terms  by  Tom  Wolfe 
(1965)  The  Kandy  Kolored  Tangerine  Flake  Streamline  Baby,  New  York:  "The  allure  is  most  irresistible  not  to  the 
young  but  the  old.  No  one  in  Las  Vegas  will  admit  it  -  it  is  not  for  the  modern,  glamorous  notion  -  but  Las  Vegas  is 
a  resort  for  old  people.  In  those  last  years,  before  the  tissue  deteriorates  and  the  wires  of  the  cerebral  cortex  hang  in  the 
skull  like  a  clump  of  dried  seaweed,  they  are  seeking  liberation.  "  See  also  Mario  Puzo  (1977)  Inside  Las  Vegas,  New 
York.  This  book  is  filled  with  photographs  of  Vegas  patrons,  the  overwhelming  number  of  whom  look  past  middle 
age. 
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might  do.  The  formless  throws  up  visions  of  decay  and  degeneration.  "  And  as  we  have 
seen,  gambling  is  not  a  'normal'  form  of  action  -  its  appearance  is  protean  in  that  the 
gambler  assumes  many  unpredictable  forms.  Gambling  becomes  like  untamed  nature  in 
all  its  flux.  Sloughing  off  reason,  gambling  becomes  'loose'  in  reaching  for  an  irrational 
goal,  although  it  is  really  the  wager  that  fully  shakes  off  the  binds  of  order  and 
predictability.  To  advocates  of  a  religious  morality  gambling  was,  in  the  words  of  one, 
cc  the  perversion  of  a  right  and  natural  love  of  adventure  ...  till  it  becomes  the  debased 
thrall  of  a  world  that  is  arbitrary  and  fortuitous.  ""  To  be  caught  up  in  the  smallest  twists 
and  turns  of  your  own  existence,  as  the  gambler  is  in  the  wager,  runs  counter  to  all 
historical  pleas  for  social  harmony  and  individual  character.  It  also  contributes  to  ideas 
of  mental  disorder,  and  thus  gambling  in  the  twentieth  century  becomes  an  illness. 
What  modern  psychiatry  often  characterizes  as  the  compulsion,  and  what  is  also 
referred  to  not  quite  accurately  as  'chasing  losses'  (the  phrase  is  unfortunate  because  of 
the  financial  implications  of  'loss'  within  the  context  of  gambling),  but  which  the 
gambler  calls  'the  juice'  -a  need  for  repetition  of  play  -  practically  closes  out  the  rest  of 
the  world.  The  significance  of  the  loss  is  in  the  objective  view  taken  of  it,  which  is  rather 
more  akin  to  moral  and  religious  notions  of  the  loss  of  any  restraints  of  subjective 
conscience.  In  the  'catastrophe'  of  the  wager,  as  Walter  Benjamin  in  his  brief  notes  on 
the  subject  said,  gambling  becomes  "the  ideal  of  the  shock-engendered  experience.  ""  As 
the  play  reaches  a  denouement,  loss  takes  on  a  new  form,  something  quite  different  from 
a  monetary  deficit.  It  is  the  unfolding  of  will  and  the  loss  of  subjective  power  that 
becomes  apparent.  "Losing  [money]  never  feels  like  the  worst  part  of  gambling"  at  this 
point,  write  the  Barthelme  brothers,  adding  that  it  is  rather  quitting  the  game  that  often 
does.  The  severity  of  the  gradual  loss  of  control  becomes  of  tragic  proportions: 
It  is  a  terrible  feeling  to  be  far  ahead  and  then  start  losing  in  a  way  you  just  can't 
stop  -  an  ineluctable  fall,  like  gravity.  It  makes  for  a  frenzied  abandon.  You 
don't  care  about  money  anymore.  You  want  to  lose  it.  You  stuff  cash  into  the 
slots  as  fast  as  it  will  go,  and  even  as  you're  doing  it  you  now  it's  hopeless.  16 
"  Cf.  William  Ian  Miller  0  997)  Anatomy  of  Disgust.  Cambridge,  Mass.;  Max  Nordau  (1993)  Degeneration. 
Lincoln,  NE. 
"  R.  H.  Charles,  Archdeacon  of  Westminster,  quoted  in  J.  Halliday  and  P.  Fuller  (1974)  The  Psychology  of 
Gambling,  London:  68 
15  Walter  Benjamin  (1999)  TheArcades  Project.  See  Convolute  014,4:  515.  He  also  comments,  "by  constantly 
raising  the  stakes,  in  the  hopes  of  getting  back  what  is  lost,  the  gambler  steers  toward  absolute  ruin.  "  It  is  not  money 
that  is  'lost'  I  would  suggest,  but  rather  the  experience  of  pure  being.  This  is  what  has  to  be  replayed,  and  money  is 
simply  the  means  that  allows  this. 
"  Steven  and  Frederick  Barthelme  (2000)  Double  Down,  Boston:  67. 
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The  shock-engendered  experience  is  also  like  a  death;  the  gambler  visits  the  demise  of 
the  self  as  the  autonomous  subject  -  only  to  return  again,  the  revertant.  What 
connection  between  the  subject  and  the  world  can  now  be  left;  what  now  is  'reality'? 
This  is  'cursed  traffic,  '  in  the  language  of  moral  condemnation.  These  Las  Vegas 
degenerates  are  modern  day  Babylonians  caught  up  in  the  interminable  agitation  of 
disordering  confusion  -  they  are  slippery,  intemperate,  and  preoccupied  with  a  private 
universe  in  which  time  and  space  are  denied.  The  turbulence  of  the  gambling  situation 
delivers  the  subject  as  a  shadow  of  the  autonomous  ideal,  a  mere  caricature  of  civilized 
humanity.  In  this  fall  from  goodness,  which  approximates,  in  the  end,  to  an  idea  like 
that  of  hell,  it  makes  no  difference  how  one  takes  reality,  whether  we  acquiesce  in  it,  or 
scorn  it,  because  it  is  after  all  an  infinite  game  of  chance  to  the  gambler.  " 
Henry  Chafetz,  in  an  entertaining  history  of  gambling  in  America,  tells  of  preachers 
prophesying  that  the  Lord  would  one  day  settle  accounts  with  the  gamblers.  On  one 
particular  day  it  appeared  that  the  time  had  finally  come: 
At  2.15am  on  December  16,1811,  it  seemed  the  preachers  were  right.  The 
earth  trembled  and  the  houses  were  knocked  off  their  foundations  all  through 
the  valley.  Honest  men  shivered,  but  the  black  legs  showed  a  deplorable  lack  of 
interest  in  divine  displeasure  and  the  Lord's  display  of  anger.  One  god-fearing 
gent  dashed  into  a  Louisville  gambling  hell  and  shouted,  'Gentlemen!  How  can 
you  be  engaged  in  this  way  when  the  world  is  so  near  its  end?  '  The  gamblers 
reluctantly  looked  up  and  one  of  them  softly  commented,  'What  a  pity  that  so 
beautiful  a  world  should  be  destroyed!  ""' 
Exhibiting  a  preoccupation  with  pleasure,  gambling  was  still  seen  for  a  long  time  (and 
still  is  to  some  extent),  together  with  a  host  of  'sins  of  the  flesh'  that  contributed  to  the 
erosion  of  the  soul  as  well  as  the  body.  Thus  if  men  did  not  have  the  capacity  to  exert  a 
power  over  themselves,  the  preachers  and  moralists  warned,  they  were  inadvertently 
willing  an  invitation  to  eternal  damnation.  "  Far  from  being  dependable,  or  predictable, 
17  Cf.  J-L  Borges,  ibid. 
Chafetz,  ibid:  50 
In  early  modern  times,  as  Piero  Camporesi  tells  us,  this  'other  country'  was  described  as  proportionate  to 
earthly  overindulgences,  meeting  them  with  a  "hell  of  the  five  senses.  "  It  is interesting  to  bring  together  the  17' 
century  view  of  a  state  of  anarchy  as  visualized  by  Hobbes,  and  which  propels  him  to  permit  the  legislation  of 
sovereign  power  to  cease  the  infernal  motion  of  men  without  a  notion  of  society,  and  to  place  it  next  to  Baroque  views 
of  hell.  "[ 
... 
]  no  Culture  of  the  Earth;  no  Navigation,  nor  use  of  the  commodities  that  may  be  imported  by  Sea;  no 
Commodious  Building;  no  Instruments  of  moving,  and  removing  such  things  as  require  much  force;  no  knowledge  of 
the  face  of  the  Earth;  no  account  of  Time;  no  Arts;  no  Letters;  no  Society;  and  which  is  worst  of  all,  continuall  fea-re, 
and  danger  of  violent  death;  And  the  life  of  man,  solitary,  poor,  nasty,  brutish,  and  short.  "  (Leviathan,  Ch.  13)  What 
Hobbes  saw  as  the  condition  of  life  in  the  17"  century  only  needed  to  be  further  intensified  in  death,  carried  on  into 
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or  trustworthy,  this  man,  the  gambler  in  search  of  'the  juice,  '  slips  out  of  reach  and  is 
never  what,  or  where,  you  expect  him  to  be:  shifty,  rootless  and  suspended  between 
destinations;  now  you  see  him,  now  you  don't.  "  As  'loosened'  movement,  gambling 
hurtles  towards  the  final  full  stop  ever  faster  -  but  the  problem  is  that  there  is  no 
resolution. 
A  Profane  Transubstantiation 
Yet,  a  ceaseless  and  potentially  destructive  motion  of  another  sort  matches  the 
dissolution  threatened  by  gambling  (Plate  9).  We  know  that  life  is  movement,  but  the 
peculiar  thing  about  gambling  is  how  well  it  is  actually  suited  to  modern  life.  The 
fleeting  nature  of  the  wager,  for  example,  is  matched  by  the  impermanence  of  social  and 
economic  relations  in  modern  society.  Beneath  the  surface  of  the  everyday,  there  is 
ceaseless  movement  of  another  sort,  because  to  everything  in  modern  society  there  is 
attached  a  latent  motive  power,  and  because  of  this  nothing  stands  still. 
Money,  as  the  universal  equivalent,  possesses  the  capacity  to  become  anything,  to 
move  anywhere,  and  to  facilitate  the  exchange  of  entirely  unrelated  goods.  What, 
indeed,  could  be  more  impermanent?  Money  has  none  of  the  Lockean  primary  qualities 
that  permit  the  identification  of  appearances,  it  is  thus  timeless,  formless,  and  in 
constant  transformation.  Insofar  as  it  makes  sense  to  describe  something  so  elusive,  so 
non-objective,  as  anything,  we  might  say  that  money  may  be  considered  as  the  universal 
and  concrete  form  of  possibility.  Certainly,  we  can  analyze  money  tautologically:  one- 
pound  sterling  is  one  hundred  pence;  one  dollar  is  one  hundred  cents,  and  so  on.  But 
this  tells  us  nothing.  The  truth  is,  as  Marx  saw,  that  money  is  neither  one  specific  thing, 
nor  another;  it  is,  rather,  more  curious  in  its  power  -  it  is  a  "magic  thing,  "  possessed  of 
occult  powers.  "  It  is  "the  Philosopher's  Stone  the  alchemists  have  sought  in  vain.  ))22  It 
eternity  in  Hell.  Thus,  Jacques-Paul  Migne,  quoted  by  Piero  Camporesi:  "Unbearable  thirst,  the  punishment  of 
hunger,  of  stench,  of  horror,  of  fear,  of  want,  of  darkness,  the  cruelty  of  tortures,  the  presence  of  demons,  the  ferocity 
of  wild  beasts,  the  cruelty  of  attendants,  the  rending  by  undying  worms,  pain  without  alleviation,  bonds  without 
release,  eternal  death,  punishment  without  end,  the  absence  of  Christ  after  beholding  him.  "  See  P.  Camporesi  (1991) 
The  Fear  ofHell,  Pennsylvania:  6. 
See  Reith  (1999):  86,  for  the  source  of  the  phrase  'this  cursed  traffic'  in  relation  to  gambling. 
Quotes  from  Karl  Marx  (1954)  Capita4  London:  96  and  152.  In  chapter  two,  Marx  claims  the  development 
of  money  can  be  found  in  'Nomad  races'  because  'all  their  worldly  goods  consist  of  moveable  objects  and  are  therefore 
directly  alienable'  (92). 
22  See  Christof  Asendorf  (1993)  Batteries  ofLife:  On  the  History  of  Things  and  Their  Perception  in  Modernity.  30. 
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PLATE  9.  SINS  OF  THE  FLESH.  Gambling  has  been  seen  for  a  long  time  as  a  sign  of  degeneration. 
More  often  in  the  past  than  in  the  present  it  was  placed  alongside  other  C  sins  of  the  flesh.  '  This  is  a 
woodcut  by  a  16"  Century  Swiss  artist,  Urs  Graf.  The  woman  is  giving  her  husband's  money  to  her  lover 
(right);  the  gambling  equipment  (backgammon  and  cards)  adds  to  the  scene's  immorality.  The  motto 
below  says:  "Think  of  the  end,  that  is  my  advice:  for  everything  ends  in  death.  "  From  Alan  Wykesý  1964, 
Gambling,  London. 
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can  be  everything  and  nothing  for  a  brief  period,  but  always  changes  into  something 
else. 
The  modern  market  economy  demands,  as  well,  that  the  change  never  ends,  that 
money  be  kept  in  circulation  providing,  for  the  body  social,  the  same  effect  as  the  blood 
that  courses  through  the  veins  of  the  corporeal  body.  If  everyone  decided  to  settle  for 
compound  interest  instead  of  engaging  in  acts  of  exchange,  or  ceased  consuming  goods 
and  services,  then  the  economy  would  grind  to  a  halt.  "  Gambling  looks  like  a  market 
gone  mad,  but  of  course  this  is  only  so  in  terms  of  the  features  of  gambling  that  are 
external  to  the  singular  experience  of  the  wager;  which  is  to  say  that  the  fact  that  a  lot  of 
money  is  pushed  around  should  not  mislead  us.  More  interesting  than  it  being 
compared  to  a  market  is  that  somewhere  like  Las  Vegas,  as  some  kind  of  gambling  ideal, 
can  so  easily  be  viewed  as  kind  of  hell. 
The  speed  with  which  money  circulates  in  a  gambling  environment  attains  a  new 
level  of  acceleration,  which  means  that  it  never  actually  becomes  anything  for  most  of 
the  time.  It  remains,  in  a  sense,  constantly  suspended  and  never  realizing  any  distinct 
form  that  is  transferable  to  a  non-gambling  situation.  The  absence  of  readily  analyzable 
exchange  equivalents  provides  a  heightened  awareness  of  the  unreality  of  the  situation. 
Steven  and  Frederick  Barthelme  observe  that  when  standing  in  a  casino  with  ten 
thousand  dollars  in  hand  it  was  no  longer  even  the  embodiment  of  value,  as 
conventionally  understood.  Instead  it  was  "just  playing  time,  time  at  the  table  or  in 
front  of  the  slots.  ""  That  the  gambler  can  be  caught  up  in  a  violently  destructive  spiral 
perhaps  only  becomes  evident  on  reflection  of  just  how  lacking  in  any  definite  properties 
money  can  become  inside  a  casino,  especially  when  contrasted  with  the  perception  of 
money  in  'normal'  life.  "At  home,  "  as  David  Thomson  says: 
You  do  much  of  your  marketing  on  some  kind  of  credit  system  that  turns  into 
paper  records.  Yet,  when  you  gamble,  in  the  speed  and  excitement  of  the  action 
at  the  tables,  there  is  no  accounting,  no  paper  trail.  " 
Exchange,  as  understood  by  classical  economics  simply  does  not  take  place  because 
money  is  not  transformed  into  any-thing.  It  is  simply  suspended  as  the  token  of  the 
13  Arguably  under  free  market  conditions.  In  the  rhetoric  of  economists  the  management  of  the  modern  market 
economy  is  largely  concerned  with  defeating  inflation.  This  rests,  it  seems,  on  attaining  a  balance  between  peoples' 
spending  and  saving  -  too  much  of  either  and  the  whole  edifice  is  under  threat. 
2'  F.  &  S.  Barthelme,  ibid:  85. 
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gambler's  hopes,  these  also  suspended.  The  fact  that  no  new  form  is  assumed,  that  no 
exchange  of  commodities  takes  place,  means  that  there  is  now  nothing  to  slow  down  the 
movement  of  money.  To  the  gambler,  the  ceaseless  motion  of  money  acts  as  a 
counterpoint  to  the  subjective  experience  of  the  wager  (which,  of  course,  need  not 
involve  money  or  commodities).  It  simply  persists  as  the  possibility  of  transformation,  as 
found  in  the  'juice,  '  which  may  be  terrible  or  wonderful,  or  an  explosion  of  both 
sensations. 
The  modern  casino  takes  things  even  further  in  terms  of  injecting  an  element  of 
unreality  to  events.  Through  some  muted  transubstantiation  money  is  reborn  as  the 
gambling  chip,  further  blurring  realities.  "A  hundred  dollars  is  a  lot  of  money,  "  Steven 
and  Frederick  Barthelme  write: 
Think  of  it  outside  the  casino  and  it  translates  into  lots  of  things,  lots  of  goods 
and  services  consuming  -  shirts,  dinners,  hamburgers,  movie  tickets,  tire 
repairs,  shots  for  the  dogs  or  cats,  computer  software,  sets  of  bed  sheets.  But  in 
the  casino  it  was  a  single  bill.  In  chips  it  was  one  black.  One. 
So  insubstantial  is  the  chip  that  "it  looked  like  it  didn't  have  a  chance  of  anything  but  a 
dance  into  the  dealer's  rack.  ""'  The  chip  now  becomes  the  ultimate  symbol  of  the 
unreality  of  the  situation,  and  merely  formalizes  the  abstractness  that  the  gambler  had 
always  seen  in  money,  and  which  was,  for  example,  described  by  Dostoevsky's  Alexei  in 
The  Gambler:  "In  a  daze,  I  pushed  all  that  pile  onto  the  red,  but  then  I  suddenly  came  to 
my  senses.  Cold  fear  ran  down  my  spine  and  made  my  hands  and  legs  tremble.  ,  27  The 
lack  of  distinction  in  the  'pile'  of  money,  the  sense  that  it  would  be  wagered  no  matter 
what  it  amounted  to,  is  almost  matched  by  the  ridiculousness  of  a  jackpot  payout  that 
has  no  commensurability  with  the  amount  staked;  for  one  dollar  and  one  pull  of  the  arm 
on  a  slot  machine,  you  could  win  a  million.  This,  the  Barthelme's  say,  often  amounts  to 
a  kind  of  joke:  "When  people  hit  a  jackpot  first  they  laugh,  then  they  scream  [ 
... 
I  this 
money  just  fell  on  you  and  it  makes  no  sense.  It's  as  nonsensical  as  love  or  cancer.  ,  21 
"  David  Thomson  (1999)  In  Nevada,  London:  22  1. 
26F.  &  S.  Barthelme,  ibid:  84.  Although  not  able  to  partake  of  a  similar  smorgasbord  of  consurnables  Karl  Marx 
-  in  attempting  to  explain  that  all  money  was  ultimately  reducible  to  labour-time  (and  perhaps  as  a  consequence  of 
his  frequent  visits  to  the  pawnbroker  with  the  family  linen)  -  famously  wrestled  with  the  insubstantiality  of  money  as 
value:  "any  commodity  considered  as  universal  equivalent,  consists  of  an  infinite  series  of  equations  such  as  -  Iyard  of 
linen  =  2lbs.  of  coffee;  I  yard  of  linen  =  Ihlb.  of  tea;  I  yard  of  linen  =  8lbs.  of  bread;  I  yard  of  linen  =6  yards  of  calico; 
yard  of  linen  =  and  so  on.  "  See  K.  Marx  0  970)  Contribution  to  a  Critique  ofPolitical  Economy,  London:  46. 
2-  Fyodor  Dostoevsky  (198  1)  The  Gambler,  New  York:  144. 
"'  F.  &  S.  Barthelme,  ibid:  92. 
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Las  Vegas  merely  takes  the  transformation  seen  in  money  to  extremes;  in  fact  it 
extends  into  the  actual  physical  structure  of  the  place,  which  itself  never  remains  static 
for  long,  as  beyond  the  gaming  tables  frequent  visitors  will  observe  the  city  morphs  into 
an  ever  more  fantastic  dream  world.  Las  Vegas  is  life  as  continual  movement  writ  large.  " 
Buildings  are  ripped  apart  and  replaced  with  new  palaces  of  sin  at  alarming  speed.  The 
erosion  of  normal  social  relations  and  expectations  does  not  end  with  gambling  and 
architecture.  In  fact,  Las  Vegas  presents  itself  as  a  panacea  for  all  the  modern  'ills'  of 
normality.  Unhappy?  Get  married  immediately.  Or,  alternatively  get  divorced  faster 
than  anywhere  else  will  allow.  But  of  course,  there  appears  to  be  little  chance  that  such 
instant  gratification  can  match  the  rush  felt  on  winning  or  losing  a  fortune  in  an  instant 
-  the  possibility  of  a  momentarily  transformation  (that  becomes  mistaken  for  an  eternal 
transformation)  still  provides  the  foundation  for  the  rest  of  the  pleasures  on  offer. 
Beyond  the  extremity  of  Las  Vegas  there  has  also  been  a  historical  change  in 
perceptions.  The  most  notable  thing  about  gambling  now,  at  the  beginning  of  the 
twenty-first  century  is  how  commonplace  it  is  everywhere  in  modern  societies,  how 
available  the  means  for  gambling  are,  and  how  little  it  is  scorned.  It  is  interesting  to  note 
how  Walter  Benjamin's  Arcades  Project,  composed  as  recently  as  the  first  half  of  the  last 
century,  threw  gambling  together  with  prostitution,  and  how  far  this  is  from  what  is 
now  generally  thought  about  gambling,  so  'de-profaned'  has  it  become  in  certain  forms. 
One  only  has  to  think  of  pictures  of  Irish  nurses  from  less  than  fifty  years  ago  (Plate  10), 
drawing  the  numbers  for  the  national  sweepstake  in  their  clean  starched  uniforms, 
appearing  as  if  nothing  but  a  representation  of  goodness  itself,  as  a  cure  for  all  ills.  And 
to  see  that  in  the  cause  of  goodness  this  'contagious  distemper'  as  one  irate  moralist'o 
described  gambling  has  now  had  its  essential  destructiveness  concealed  by  the  way  in 
which  it  has  been  marshaled  to  meet  some  social  and  financial  deficit,  that  it  has  become 
to  an  extent  accepted  in  certain  forms  as  'normal.  ' 
The  gradual  assimilation  of  gambling  in  modern  society,  however,  conceals  the 
whiff  of  danger  that  will  always  be  attached  to  an  activity  that  has  the  potential  to 
become  totally  disordered.  To  some  pulpit  moralists  preaching  damnation,  gambling  is 
"  Cf.  F.  Anderton  and  J.  Chase  0  997)  Las  Vegas:  A  Guide  to  Recent  Architecture,  London.  As  the  authors 
explain,  the  impermanence  of  constructions  in  Las  Vegas  can  also  be  seen  in  the  fact  that  no  single  architect  is  ever 
associated  with  these  buildings.  They  are  the  anonymous  architects  of  unglamorous  firms  that  would  never  assume  to 
bequeath  something  permanent  -  their  job  is  just  to  keep  coming  up  with  more  spectacular  buildings. 
"  See  Henry  Chafetz,  ibid:  38. 
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PLATE  10.  GOOD  HEALTH.  The  Irish  hospitals  sweepstake  was  established  in  1930  to  raise  money 
for  hospitals.  The  'Sweeps'  as  it  was  known,  was  only  legal  in  Ireland,  although  it  sought  to  circumvent 
restrictions  on  advertising  abroad  -  particularly  in  the  United  States  -  by  the  use  of  promotional 
gimmicks,  as  John  Scarne  notes:  "One  of  the  most  effective  [ 
...  I  was  the  floating  ashore  along  our  Atlantic 
coast  of  a  great  many  fish-shaped  bottles,  each  containing  a  paper  entitling  the  finder  to  a  drink  of  his 
choice  at  any  tavern  and  asking  him  to  drink  to  good  luck  in  the  Irish  Sweepstakes.  See  John  Scarne, 
1974,  Scarne's  New  CompLete  Guide  to  Gambling.  There  is  an  irony,  of  course,  in  these  six  nurses  - 
guardians  of  good  health  -  encouraging  what,  by  the  middle  of  the  20'  century  and  thanks  to  the 
influence  of  the  Churches'  Council  on  Gambling  in  the  United  Kingdom,  was  regarded  as  thoroughly 
dissolute  behaviour.  It  seems,  however,  that  Ireland  had  for  some  time  diverged  from  the  more  Protestant 
Britain  where  gambling  was  concerned.  In  1924  the  Archdeacon  of  Westminster  wrote:  "In  the  Roman 
Churches  lotteries  are  a  recognized  means  of  procuring  funds  for  religious  purposes.  In  the  southern 
provinces  of  Ireland  this  evil  is  [ 
... 
I  wholly  unrestrained  [ 
... 
I  in  a  raffle  organized  on  behalf  of  a  religious 
institution  before  the  establishment  of  the  Free  State  the  prizes  included  a  cameo  of  Leo  XIII  specially 
presented  by  the  Pope  himself.  "  See  J.  Halliday  and  P.  Fuller,  1974,  The  Psycbolýgy  of  Gambling.  -  71.  The 
photograph  is  by  Derrick  0.  Michelson,  1961. 
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taken  for  dissolution;  as  a  manifestation  of  uncontrollable  movement  it  is  a  vice.  And  to 
modern  medical  science,  it  is  taken  as  an  'illness,  '  which  is  to  say,  a  controllable  yet 
insidious  reminder  of  the  dangers  of  disordered  physical  and  psychological  movement. 
This,  too,  brings  us  back  to  the  centrality  of  motion  to  our  whole  understanding  of 
gambling.  The  moral  and  medical  condemnation  of  gambling  seems  to  come  from  the 
fact  that  it  reveals  a  lack  of  definite  habits,  an  absence  of  strong  movements  that,  in 
privileging  safety,  follow  the  steps  of  previous  lives  (perhaps  our  own  lives),  routinely 
wearing  orderly  and  reasonable  paths  on  the  landscape.  Like  the  line  that  bisects  a 
normal  curve,  the  orderly  path  appropriately  avoids  deviations  to  left  and  right,  and  acts 
as  a  guard  against  excess  and  defect.  The  cursed  traffic  of  deviations  from  the  norm 
makes  reality  dubious  for  the  gambler  seeking  'the  juice'  and  once  the  wager  thus 
'claims'  the  gambler,  the  potential  for  disorder  is  all  too  clear,  as  the  Barthelme  brothers 
note,  in  a  kind  of  wagering  that  speculates  on  an  alternative  reality: 
A  gambler  feels  a  powerful  rush  of  vindication  in  winning,  but  it's  not  about 
beating  the  casino  or  the  blackjack  dealer  or  the  slot  machine.  It's  not  even 
really  about  beating  money.  It's  about  beating  logic.  It's  about  chance 
confirming  everything  you  knew  but  could  make  no  place  for  in  your  life.  " 
The  gambler  effectively  pushes  rational  autonomy  to  the  limit  because  chance 
contradicts  the  counsels  of  rational  freedom.  In  the  examples  I  have  looked  at  (which  are 
extreme  cases  of  gambling  and  loss)  the  players  move  far  from  rational  or  social 
constraints  upon  action,  but  crucially  they  do  this  from  within  such  constraints.  It  is  the 
fact  that  these  gamblers  emerge  firom  society,  from  a  given  set  of  social  relations,  that 
makes  the  activity  so  contingent  in  a  radical  sense;  it  has  its  root  in  what  we  now  refer  to 
as  the  'normal'  -  yet  it  is  radically  contingent  in  a  further  sense,  and  that  is  because  the 
destructive  spiral  the  activity  may  begin  (equally,  it  may  not)  can  be  without  limit. 
Gambling  thus  presents  in  one  form  thepotential  of  rational  autonomy  as  the  freedom 
of  self-creation  to  realise  itself,  but  also  necessarily  as  the  source  of  a  socially  destructive 
impulse  that  constitutes  part  of  what  freedom  can  contribute  to  its  own  destruction.  I 
have  merely  attempted  here  (taking  a  value  neutral  position  to  the  subject)  to  gain  new 
insights  into  why  the  nature  of  the  wager  ensures  that  disorder  will  always  ensue,  and 
that  pushed  to  the  limit,  so  will  destruction. 
"  F.  &  S.  Barthelme,  ibid:  97. 
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TWO 
RESIDUE 
Modern  painting,  like  modern  thought  generally,  obliges  us  to  admit  a  truth  which  does  not  resemble 
things,  which  is  without  any  external  model  and  without  any  predestined  instruments  of  expression,  and 
which  is  nevertheless  truth. 
MAURICE  MERLEAU-PONTY,  Signs 
j  Scanlan  2001  99 Residue 
Refinement  is  an  effect  of  differentiation,  an  act  that  selects  and  relates  in  experience  the 
elements  of  a  phenomenal  world,  turning  the  act  into  a  creative  making  of  the  world. 
Thus,  refinement  is  cause  and  consequence  of  judgement,  the  interaction  that  produces 
differentiation. 
Often,  it  seems  that  a  distillation  of  phenomenal  experience  separates  a  domain  of 
aesthetic  existence  from  the  rational  utility  that  otherwise  orders  the  objects  of  the 
world.  Thus,  refinement  organises  experience  into  the  graceful  and  the  gauche,  the 
tasteful  and  the  kitsch.  Refinement  separates,  withdraws,  and  distills  a  sphere  of  value 
from  the  crudity  of  existence,  which  itself  remains,  in  terms  of  our  knowledge  of  it, 
inexact  or  random  in  its  natural  condition. 
The  pull  of  attraction  that  guides  us  towards  certain  appearances,  or  certain  objects, 
makes  little  sense  without  some  idea  that  in  looking  at  the  world  we  are  guided  by 
notions  of  familiarity  and  difference,  and  in  this  respect,  we  cannot  overlook  the  role 
knowledge  plays  in  helping  us  to  identify  phenomena  -  to  discern  and  thus  refine  a 
visual  ordering  of  experience.  To  look  at  the  world,  to  visualize  the  beauty  or  symmetry 
in  things,  in  their  relations,  is  to  make  a  mask-like  appearance.  And  so,  looking  is  also  an 
act  of  revision,  or  editing. 
However,  in  'discerning'  the  well-proportioned  order  that  we  give  phenomena,  and 
which  produces  the  aesthetic  realm,  we  groom  a  finely  nuanced  existence  that  conceals 
awareness  that  refinement  also  produces  a  necessary  residue.  In  fact,  the  hidden 
byproduct  of  refinement  reveals,  if  seen,  the  discreteness  of  phenomena  -  that  the 
residual  elements  constitute  a  jumble  of  inexactness. 
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Reason,  too,  proceeds  by  refining  knowledge,  which  is  seen  in  the  separation  of 
phenomena  into  ever  more  particular  elements,  which  in  combination  constitute  the 
world  of  appearance  as  we  understand  it.  In  modern  physics  the  world  of  appearance  is 
theoretically  resolved  -  by  an  act  of  refinement,  no  less  -  into  a  world  of  discretely 
moving,  yet  hidden  particulars;  undermining  the  notion  that  the  world  of  phenomena 
are  related  in  the  way  our  visual  ordering  privileges  the  regularity  in  appearance.  We 
proceed,  however,  on  the  basis  that  what  we  do  picture  in  looking  at  the  world  does  bear 
some  resemblance  to  'reality'  -  but  this  is  only  to  the  reality  produced  by  the  snapshot 
effect  of  looking,  which  as  I  say,  filters  phenomena  into  a  meaningful  visual  and 
conceptual  field. 
In  modern  society  the  plastic  arts  can  be  seen  as  a  particular  concentration  of  the 
activity  that  becomes  manifest  in  a  world-moulding,  one  that  sees  reason  effectively 
derive  the  bounds  of  the  sensible,  thus  separating  the  random.  Artists,  particularly  those 
of  the  20th  century,  have  taken  refinement  to  the  non-place  of  the  residual,  to  the 
impoverished  material  world  of  objects  that  were  distilled  from  a  prior  existential 
grooming;  the  aesthetic  is,  thus,  overturned  by  the  artist  who  takes  up  residence  in  the 
very  notion  of  plasticity.  This  is  the  realm  of  the  impermanent,  the  protean,  the  fluid, 
the  unpredictable  and  the  confusing. 
Nevertheless,  we  know  that  from  coarse  matter  great  riches  are  mined:  from  the 
depths  of  the  sea,  oil  and  its  triumphant  byproduct,  plastic.  It  is  fitting  that  plastic  -  the 
garbage  of  oil  refinement  -  becomes  the  material  of  modern  life  par  excellence;  capable  of 
assuming  constantly  renewed  forms,  it  is  the  source  of  great  value  that,  by  analogy, 
describes  at  once  the  impermanence  of  much  art  from  the  20 
h 
century  art,  and  its 
origins  in  the  crude,  meaningless  world  of  disorder. 
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The  transition  from  the  'possible'  to  the  'actual'  takes  place  during  the  act  of  observation. 
If  we  want  to  describe  what  happens  in  an  atomic  event,  we  have  to  realize  that  the  word 
'happens'  can  apply  only  to  the  observation. 
WERNER  HEISENBERG,  Physics  and  Philosophy 
In  a  series  of  lectures  delivered  in  1955  and  1956,  the  physicist  Werner  Heisenberg 
delivered  a  simple  and  eloquent  view  of  the  world  that  encapsulated  the  revolutionary 
reassessment  of  matter,  motion  and  objectivity  that  had  developed  in  the  scientific  world 
view  over  the  previous  half-century  or  so.  The  world,  he  explained,  was  comprised  of  an 
infinite  number  of  quanta,  of  indivisible  atomic  particles,  whose  properties  we  could 
only  determine  somewhat  arbitrarily,  it  seemed,  by  specific  observations  and  at  a  definite 
time.  That  is  to  say,  the  new  science  of  the  physical  world  suggested  that  our 
understanding  of  physical  reality  is  delivered  by  a  sensory  'freezing'  of  a  constantly 
variable  and  indeterminate  underlying  motion.  Experience  creates  or  makes  a'picture'  of 
the  phenomenal  world  from  a  kind  of  snapshot  that  realises  some  aspect  of  this  quantum 
world  -  although  the  variable  motion  of  these  atoms  that  compose  the  whole,  the 
indivisible  particulars,  remain  unseen;  the  world  we  describe  thus  metaphorically  masks 
the  imperceptible,  and  this  mask  fits,  indeed  it  is  all  there  is.  In  the  quantum  picture  no 
phenomena  are  real  until  these  are  observed  phenomena,  which  is  to  say  until  we  make  it 
an  object  ofexperience.  ' 
The  significant  feature  of  this  understanding  of  the  physical  world  is  not  just  that 
experience  resolves  particular  elements  into  a  'picture,  '  but  that  this  will  differ  from 
(  picture'  to  'picture.  '  In  other  words,  there  is  no  once  and  for  all  good  fit  that  unifies 
observation  and  quantum  phenomena  in  an  immutable  reality. 
'  Pagels,  Heinz  R.  (1982)  The  Cosmic  Code:  Quantum  Physics  as  the  Language  ofNature,  New  York:  Chapter  five. 
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Knowledge  and  Language 
Whilst  one  should  hesitate  to  suggest  that  the  language  of  theoretical  physics  could  be 
clumsily  transferred,  wholesale,  to  another  kind  of  discourse,  to  our  understanding  of 
aspects  of  human  action,  there  is  nonetheless  a  compelling  analogy.  In  fact,  because 
language,  by  which  I  mean  concepts  and  ideas  as  well  as  the  spoken  word,  is  the 
mediator  that  delivers  -  that  makes  communicable  -  all  knowledge,  we  must 
acknowledge  the  fact  that  scientific  views  of  the  nature  of  physical  reality,  and  the 
language  through  which  we  have  understood  this,  have  always  reflected  philosophical 
notions  of  humanity  as  occupying  a  particular  position  as  regards  some  physical  orderi'ng 
of  the  universe!  Indeed  the  world  as  described  by  quantum  mechanics  is  only 
understood  to  be  determined  as  the  result  of  human  'interfering.  ' 
Like  the  Berkelian  denial  of  the  external  'reality'  of  the  world,  which  brought 
attention  back  to  the  perceiving  subject,  Werner  Heisenberg's  elaboration  of  the 
conditions  of  the  quantum  universe  works,  by  separating  mind  from  matter,  by 
refocusing  our  attention  on  the  subject  as  well,  and  thus  specifically  'locates'  the 
contingency  of  our  knowledge  of  the  world  on  the  conditions  of  the  apprehension  of 
reality,  on  the  fact  that  that  the  human  subject  (as  autonomous  reason)  is  what  actually 
connects  the  two  -  mind  and  world  -  and  in  such  a  mediating  role  establishes  the 
identity  that  is  realised  in  the  varieties  of  autonomous  action.  '  This  is  a  radical 
reformulation  of  a  logocentric  way  of  looking  at  the  world,  which  has  been  carried 
through  Western  philosophical,  theological  and  aesthetic  traditions.  ' 
Logocentrism  insists  on  the  existence  of  a  separate  and  coherent  reality  that  is 
apprehended  by  reason.  The  full  extent  of  the  coherence  of  this  reality  is  only  attained 
by  reason  overcoming  obstacles  to  understanding,  in  rectifying  conceptual  flaws,  or  by 
'  Cf,  Alexander  Koyre  0  957)  From  the  Closed  World  to  the  Infinite  Universe,  Baltimore.  Koyr6  gives  an  account 
of  the  replacement  of  a  world  view  that  saw  ma-n  as  a  spectator  of  nature  (derived  from  the  Aristotelian  conception  of 
space  which  viewed  the  world  as  a  hierarchy  of  perfection)  being  replaced  by  a  new  world view  that  stressed  man  as 
owner  and  master  of  nature.  See  also  Thomas  Kuhn's  (1962)  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions  (Chicago),  which 
also  explores  the  relationship  between  conceptions  of  reality  and  the  place  of  humanity  in  the  cosmos. 
'  Berkeley  did  not  deny  that  the  world  exists,  of  course,  just  that  it  does  not  exist  as  we  picture  it  without  any 
activity  on  our  part.  See  George  Berkeley  (1980)  Philosophical  Works,  London.  Even  if  one  denies  such  idealist 
notions,  it  seems  impossible  to  bridge  the  Cartesian  gap  between  mind  and  matter,  or  subject  and  object,  in  any  kind 
of  identification  that  does  not,  as  I  discuss  below  with  reference  to  Donald  Davidson,  rest  on  particular  statements;  on 
the  nature  of  language  as  the  obstacle  that  creates  this  gulf.  Having  said  that,  I  don't  regard  this  as  a  problem  -  rather 
we  sidestep  the  problematic  historical  nature  of  this,  which  has  characterised  philosophy  ever  since  Descartes,  by 
accepting  that  singular  statements  of  identity,  or  what  philosophers  of  language  examine  as  'descriptions'  hold  true 
either  because  they  are  acceptable  within  a  discourse  that  finds  accord  within  a  community  (such  as  the  language  of 
science  that  Thomas  Kuhn,  ibid,  discusses),  or  because  in  operational  terms  these  'descriptions'  work  in  practically 
allowing  us  to  find  our  way  through  life;  they  permit  action,  in  other  words. 
j  Scanlan  2001  103 Indivisible  Particulars 
attaining  the  correct  method  to  produce  such  a  revelation  of  the  true.  The  seventeenth 
century  English  philosopher  John  Locke  expressed  the  role  of  such  a  method  in  a  very 
basic  and  interesting  way.  In  an  'epistle'  to  the  general  reader  of  his  Essay  Concerning 
Human  Understanding  of  1690  he  suggested  that  reason  was  analogous  to  a  pathway  that 
takes  us  forward  from  someplace  familiar  to  somewhere  perhaps  yet  to  be  discovered, 
but  the  problem  for  the  human  understanding  was  that  the  pathway  of  reason  was 
littered  with  obstacles  to  the  desired  destination  of  understanding.  The  obstacles  to 
knowledge  were,  thus,  in  his  words  'rubbish';  and  so  it  is  that  by  clearing  away  these 
disconnected  fragments  of  speculative  reason,  by  removing  that  which  cannot  be 
subsumed  under  a  current  understanding,  that  we  find  the  way.  ' 
A  proper  method  would  therefore  bring  an  order  to  things;  it  would  establish  the 
categories  of  understanding  that  could  then  allow  us  to  discern  a  regularity  in 
phenomena.  Furthermore,  regularity  necessitated,  it  seemed,  not  just  the  removal  of 
rubbish  but  also  of  the  fearful  natural  wonders  that  were  found  as  exceptions  to  what 
was  believed  to  be  the  inherent  determinism  of  nature.  6  This  view  of  nature  as  an 
independently  existing  'true  channel  of  Naturall  Causes  and  Effects'  [sic]  was  until  the 
quantum  revolution,  the  basis  of  most  ordinary  knowledge  of  the  natural  world. 
The  Copenhagen  interpretation  of  quantum  mechanics,  which  Heisenberg  was 
instrumental  in  delivering  and  which  finally  saw  the  new  scientific  view  gain  acceptance, 
released  the  grip  of  the  classical  view  of  the  physical  world,  the  basis  of  which 
Heisenberg  found  in  what  he  saw  as  becoming  entrenched  in  what  he  called  the 
"Cartesian  partition"  under  which  it  was  stated  that  matter  exists  independently  of  the 
conditions  under  which  it  is  viewed!  The  classical  view  of  an  independent  and 
deterministic  nature  was  thus  changed  from  a  view  of  the  world  "having  the 
See  Mark  C.  Taylor  (1992)  Disfiguring.  -  Art,  Architecture,  and  Religion,  Chicago:  188-89. 
Although  Locke  was  skeptical  of  reason  attaining  the  capacity  to  reveal  knowledge  of  what  he  called  'real 
essences  ,  he  did  believe  that  our  ideas  of  'primary  qualities'  (e.  g.,  size,  shape,  motion,  etc.  )  give  us  an  acceptable 
representation  of  the  world  a-round  us.  He  believed  that  if  our  senses  were  more  acute  we  could  have  knowledge  of  the 
essential  constitution  of  things  (Essay  Il  xxxi  6  and  IV  iii  25),  although  this  knowledge  was  out  of  reach  (Essay  IV  iii 
10-  14),  and  so  we  have  at  best  probability  and  not  knowledge.  Yet  we  have  "an  assurance  that  deserves  the  name  of 
knowledge"  that  there  are  external  objects  (Essay  IV  xi  3),  even  if  our  knowledge  of  them  is  limited. 
6  Stephen  R.  L.  Clark  quotes  an  eminent  man  of  letters,  Thomas  Sprat,  first  historian  of  the  Royal  Society,  who 
summed  up  the  gradual  triumph  of  science  in  the  following  words:  "The  cours  of  things  goes  quietly  along,  in  its  own 
true  channel  of  Natural  Causes  and  Effects.  For  this  we  a-re  beholden  to  Experiments;  which  though  they  have  not  yet 
completed  the  discovery  of  the  true  world,  yet  they  have  already  vanquished  those  wild  inhabitants  of  the  false  world, 
that  us'd  to  astonish  the  minds  of  men.  "  See  Clark  in  A.  Kenny  (1994)  Oxford  Illustrated  History  of  Western 
Philosophy.  London:  7.  On  these  wonders  of  such  a  'false  world'  see  Lorriane  Daston  and  Katherine  Park  (1997) 
Wonders  and  the  order  ofNature,  1150-1750.  New  York. 
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determinism  of  a  clock  to  having  the  contingency  of  a  pinball  machine.  "'  Contingency  is 
thus  a  'property'  of  the  indeterminacy  of  our  knowledge  of  how  the  atomic  particles  of 
this  universe  interact.  We  are  inextricably  ensnared  within  this  quantum  universe,  and 
once  this  is  known  there  is  no  way  to  free  ourselves  from  the  implication  that  the  nature 
of  being  is,  too,  contingent. 
Everything  we  do,  or  think,  or  produce,  becomes  understood  through  a  world  thus 
constituted;  in  other  words  the  world  we  make  is  made  under  the  conditions  of  the  state 
of  our  knowledge  at  any  given  time  and  place,  which  is  to  say  cannot  be  other  than 
variable.  In  his  lectures  Heisenberg  was  giving  a  summary  of  modern  physics  in  the 
preceding  half-century  to  say  something  about  the  bounds  of  knowledge.  From  Max 
Planck's  problem  of  Black  Body  Radiation  -  the  theory  that  objects  were  composed  of 
discrete  moving  subatomic  particles,  to  his  own  Indeterminacy  theory  and  Niels  Bohr's 
principle  of  complementarity  -  that  the  momentum  and  position  of  these  particles 
cannot  both  be  precisely  determined  at  the  same  time,  Heisenberg  was  telling  us  what 
we  could  say  about  the  quantum  world  given  these  developments;  that  we  could  only 
make  a  probabilistic  determination  of  knowledge. 
Atomisation  and  the  Arts  in  the  2e  Century 
By  the  second  or  third  decade  of  the  20,  h  century,  a  revolution  had  overtaken  thinking 
about  the  nature  of  the  visual  arts  that  was  comparable  in  its  consequences.  Since  the 
1  9th  century,  the  objective  or  realist  orthodoxy  in  art  had  been  under  attack.  The 
orthodox  view  in  art  -  representationalism  -  might  be  taken  to  be  similar  to  the  classical 
world  view  of  nature  in  that  the  properties  of  a  world  understood  in  these  terms  was 
deemed  to  be  separate  from  our  perception  of  it;  in  the  20'h  century,  however,  the  world 
that  the  language  of  art  described  was  finally  atomized,  just  as  was  the  case  with  the 
revolution  in  physics. 
Now,  the  eye  of  the  viewer  was  taken  to  be  a  primary  condition  of  the  making  of 
the  object  as  a  work  of  art.  '  The  act  of  'picturing'  was  thus  strangely  akin  to  the  act  in 
which  Heisenberg  said  we  could  describe  an  atomic  event  as  something  that  'happens'  - 
the  event  was  actually  the  consequence  of  the  specific  conditions  of  time,  place  and 
7  Werner  Heisenberg  (1989)  Physics  and  Philosophy,  Harmondsworth:  43.  Philosophical  realism  is,  of  course,  as 
old  as  philosophy  itself. 
'  Heinz  Pagels,  ibid:  85. 
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observer,  and  thus  constituted  in  the  famous  phrase  of  Marcel  Duchamp,  a  kind  of 
rendezvous. 
The  move  away  from  the  representation  of  external  realities,  of  objects  and 
phenomena  within  visual  and  conceptual  grasp,  and  thus  from  an  objective 
apprehension  of  the  world  and  a  collection  of  properties  that  was  at  once  recognisable, 
and  also  meaningful,  that  admitted  of  identification,  was  a  move  towards  the  erosion  of 
any  basis  for  objective  identification.  Antoine  Compagnon  in  The  Five  Paradoxes  of 
Modernity  dates  this  break  to  Manet's  Dejeuner  sur  I'herbe  of  1863,  and  the  impact  of  its 
self-conscious  upsetting  of  conventional  representational  signifiers,  and  particularly  in  its 
use  of  previously  symbolic  forms,  in  this  case  the  nude,  taken  out  of  context.  'O  Jacques 
Derrida  too,  saw  a  similar  disconnection  in  the  work  of  Cezanne,  and  this  he  pointedly 
claims  suggests  that  the  art  object  is  itself  a  speculative  stab  at  being.  "The  phenomena 
,  in'  Cezanne's  paintings  (fruit,  his  wife,  the  Monte  Sainte-Victoire,  and  so  on),  "  do  not 
exist  as  such: 
What  would  traditionally  be  called  'content,  '  and  each  painting  as  a  whole,  are 
re-presentations  of  or  metaphors  for  relationality  itself,  that  is,  for  the  possibility 
that  there  are  no  'things-in-themselves'  but  only  phenomena  constituted  in, 
through  and  as  specific  relations.  " 
From  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century,  then,  the  apparent  retreat  of  art  into 
an  increasingly  radical  subjectivity  on  the  part  of  the  painter  was  accompanied  by  what 
we  might  call  the  indivisibility  of  subjective  perceptions  of  the  work  of  art.  That  is  to 
say,  ranging  from  developments  in  representational  methods  that  utilised  non-realistic 
colouring,  through  the  increasing  development  of  abstraction  to  the  final  arrival  of 
conceptual  art,  the  object,  in  much  the  same  way  as  the  atomic  event,  only  exists,  and 
the  object  is  only  given  the  status  of  being  as  a  condition  of  the  intervention  of  a  viewer, 
because  in  the  strictly  objective  terms  of  realism  many  of  these  objects  appeared  to  be 
devoid  of  meaning. 
'  This  is  discussed  in  more  detail  in  the  following  three  chapters. 
'0  Antoine  Compagnon  (1994)  The  Five  Paradoxes  ofModernity,  New  York:  xiii-xviii. 
"  The  passage  continues:  "And  this  is  to  say  that,  at  the  level  of  specific  marks  themselves,  the  site  or  surface 
where  significance  emerges,  the  'place'  at  which  our  gaze  is  directed,  the  conjunction  of  eyes  and  surface,  is  the  space 
that  is  no  space  between  two  or more  adjacent  marks.  This  absent  space,  the  space  that  we  experience  as  a  gap  while 
knowing  it  always  to  be  a  space  both  created  and  repressed  by  the  very  adjacence  of  the  brushstrokes  themselves,  is  the 
space  through  which  we  are  pulled  toward  the  differing  -  deferring  work  of  the  'trace'  itself  -  'differince'.  "  Derrida, 
Positions,  London:  28.  Quoted  in  Michael  Phillipson  (1985)  Painting,  Language  and  Modernity,  London:  56. 
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The  inevitability  of  this  atornisation  is  found  in  the  fact  that  ordinary  visual 
experience  makes  sense  of  the  world  much  in  the  way  that  classical  physics  understood 
the  natural  world:  we  notice  and  record  regularity,  or  in  other  words  the  constant 
conjunction  of  phenomena  that  marks  appearances,  rather  than  the  experiencing  the 
imperceptible  atomic  structure.  The  exception  to  such  a  viSual  ordering  of  phenomena 
into  a  meaningful  world  is  evident,  for  example,  in  the  non-representational  nature  of 
art  in  the  20,  h  century,  and  this  too  hinted  at  something  imperceptible  in  the  sense  that 
it  was  easy  to  imagine  that  something  was  missing  in  objects  that  had  no  referent  in  the 
(real'  world. 
Artists  had  increasingly,  since  the  previous  century,  abandoned  the  restrictions  of 
visual  realism  to  instead  present  the  viewer  with  an  idea,  or  a  puzzle  that  by  its  own 
ambiguity  hinted  at  the  notion  of  a  discretely  composed  reality.  Where  this  happened 
art  vacated  the  ground  that  reason,  and  the  language  of  empiricism,  had  declared  to  be 
the  foundation  of  all  meaningful  communication.  Instead,  it  was  the  concentration  on 
the  relation  of  viewer  and  object  that  would  permit  the  language  of  subjective  experience 
to  bridge  the  "Cartesian  partition"  as  Heisenberg  called  it.  "  Meaningful  communication 
was  to  become  a  discourse  between  artist  and  viewing  public  with  what  the  artist 
'declared'  in  the  work  -  given  the  obvious  ambiguity  this  could  involve  -  being  the  new 
focus  of  the  work,  rather  than  the  lack  of  such  a  question,  which  might  have  been  the 
standard  response  to  the  more  or  less  unambiguous  objects  of  representationalism. 
In  the 
20,  h 
century  therefore  visual  art  made  a  definitive  move  away  from 
representing  the  world,  to  the  position  where  it  was  overtly  involved  in  making  a  world;  a 
move  that  went  from  basically  saying  what  the  world  was,  to  an  uncertain  discourse  over 
what  we  could  say  about  the  world. 
History,  Rubbish  and  Language 
There  may  be  many  aspects  to  our  understanding  of  the  contingency  of  the  world  we 
represent.  However  the  elaboration  of  an  atomized  world  is  usually  either  historically  or 
conceptually  related  to  various  ways  of  giving  an  account  of  being.  Firstly,  there  is  a 
historicist  view  that  identifies  a  whole  series  of  'historical  contingencies'  as  evidence  of 
the  fallibility  of  reason  and  civilisation;  that  seeks  ultimately  to  understand  human 
"  See  Phillipson,  ibid:  36. 
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history  in  terms  of  a  more  or  less  orderly  procession,  beset  by  frequent  setbacks.  This  is 
one  way  of  creating  a  picture  of  the  world  by  assembling  a  host  of  discrete  elements. 
There  is  also  an  understanding  of  the  contingent  that  would  encompass  this,  and 
which  also  sheds  some  light  on  why  the  elaboration  of  something  as  curiously 
tautologous  as  a  notion  of  'historical  contingency'  that  fails  to  see  in  history  just  a  special 
case  of  knowledge,  and  that  perhaps  sees  it  as  some  autonomous  procession. 
We  can  see  in  notions  of  subjectivity  and  autonomy  the  'atomization'  of  the  social 
as  both  a  condition  and  a  consequence  of  modern  society;  in  subjectivity  we  are 
indivisible  particulars,  whilst  in  autonomy  our  actions  are  recognised  as  particular 
examples  of  a  general  characteristic,  the  rational.  The  'social  atom'  realises  the 
combination  of  these  two  properties,  and  allows  us  to  see  the  development  of  modern 
society  as  a  response  to  the  philosophical  conviction  of  the  irreconcilable  differences  that 
would  likely  beset  a  world  of  such  'indivisible  particulars.  '  The  root  of  this  philosophical 
development,  however,  lies  in  the  difficulty  language  and  understanding  have  in  coping 
with  change  as  anything  but  a  disordering  exception  to  some  'normal'  course  of  events, 
or  a  calamitous  rupture  that  could  only  have  adverse  consequences  for  order,  which  of 
course,  demands  that  things  stop  moving. 
In  the  earliest  modern  attempts  to  give  philosophical  grounds  that  would  account 
for  the  inability  of  reason  to  discern  causes,  or  in  social  terms  to  observe  the  origin  of 
human  movement  -  the  internal  motions  -  as  Hobbes  called  them,  we  find  a  concern  to 
overcome  this  by  the  creation  of  a  world  that  obeys  what  in  all  its  limitations  sense  tells 
us  it  is;  that,  in  other  words,  the  conditions  could  be  created  for  making  what  is 
observable  the  basis  all  knowledge,  and  thus  for  the  understanding  of  social  relations. 
Thus,  whilst  bodies  can  be  observed  in  motion,  we  can  do  no  more  than  assume  that 
what  we  see  is  the  movement  of  a  rational  actor  -  and  hence,  taking  this  to  some  logical 
conclusion  by  elaborating  the  conditions  where  external  constraints  would  solicit  rational 
action,  which  is  also  to  determine  the  conditions  where  action  might  agree  with  some 
real  and  objective  state  of  affairs. 
Hobbes  built  his  entire  social  philosophy  on  this  fact  because  he  was  trying  to  figure 
out  how  humanity  could  be  made  explicable  as  nature  had  been;  how  could  we 
understand  what  the  workings  of  the  human  world  given  these  hidden  internal  motions. 
In  Leviathan,  his  masterpiece  of  165  1,  Thomas  Hobbes  understood  that  one  way  to 
make  known  the  indeterminate  'nature'  of  humanity  was  to  break  it  down  into  pieces 
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and  to  give  these  names  and  from  this  point  would  begin  the  construction  of  the  entire 
edifice  of  society.  It  is  because  the  contingent  must  be  understood  as  an  effect  of  a 
knowledge  so  founded  that  we  are  compelled  to  draw  an  analogy  between  the  quantum 
physics  of  the  20'h  century  and  Hobbes'  more  or  less  nominalistic  making  of  the  world; 
in  History  too  that  world  is  made  no  less  than  it  was  by  philosophers  like  Hobbes,  and  it 
is  made  because  language  needs  a  meaningful  discourse.  " 
Non-Linear  History 
'What  was  undoubtedly  shared  in  the  history  of  modernity  across  these  different 
discourses  was  the  idea  that  both  the  arts  and  the  sciences  could  be  determined  by  the 
belief  that  humanity  would  ultimately  take  control  of  an  unruly  nature  and  bend  it  to 
the  desires  of  the  human  will;  and  this,  as  we  saw,  precisely  because  reason  could  reveal 
the  inner  workings  of  nature,  which  once  discovered  would  then  be  presented  as  the 
relations  between  phenomena  that  are  the  foundation  of  knowledge.  Or  by  extension 
the  relations  between  phenomena  found,  for  example,  represented  on  the  canvas  of  a 
painting. 
However,  this  is  not  to  dismiss  history,  or  the  progress  that  has  surpassed  the  aims 
of  the  Enlightenment.  What  needs  to  be  remembered,  however,  is  that  History  with  a 
capital  'H'  is  not  some  autonomous  procession  that  reason  merely  drops  in  on,  or  that 
we  discern  by  peaking  through  some  curtain  that  is  drawn  across  a  cinemascopic  picture, 
so  as  to  see  'the  past'  -  it  is  rather  that  History  is  an  effect  of  knowledge.  So,  there  are 
things  we  know;  things  that  have  made  a  marked  difference  to  the  way  lives  now  are 
lived  as  compared  to  100,200,  or  300  years  ago. 
History  places  before  us  a  continuous  development  of  reason  that  in  the  relative 
rapidity  of  its  progress  might  explain  why  the  metaphysical  language  we  have  inherited, 
which  is  evident  in  the  way  language  is  forced  to  make  an  object  of  the  world,  and  the 
uneasy  relationship  this  language  has  to  a  present  that  is  continuously  unfolding,  is  still 
the  subject  of  philosophical  disputes  today.  There  is  no  doubt  that  experience 
understands  in  history  a  distance  that  has  been  compressed  by  a  forward  movement,  and 
no  less  by  the  erasure  of  past.  In  little  more  than  300  years,  therefore,  we  have  gone  from 
"  By  which  I  mean  that  the  good  stuff  is just  as  historically  contingent  as  the  bad.  Usually,  however,  the 
contingent  is  seen  as  the  various  departures  from  some  linear  narrative,  which  is  always  striving  for  perception.  This  is 
a  perception  that  is  also  inherited  from  the  logocentric  tradition. 
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the  centrality  of  philosophical  doubt  over  the  existence  of  a  world  external  to  the  mind, 
to  a  refinement  of  knowledge  that  permitted  the  discovery  of  new  worlds.  We  might  put 
this  in  more  prosaic  terms:  with  respect  to  the  application  of  our  understanding  of  the 
nature  of  the  physical  world,  of  space  and  time,  we  have  gone  from  horsepower  to  rocket 
power.  To  illustrate  the  relative  speed  with  which  this  has  taken  place,  and  how  far  the 
metaphysics  of  language  lags  behind,  we  can  still  understand  the  latter  in  terms  of  the 
former,  although  the  relation  does  not  really  work  very  well  in  the  opposite  direction; 
the  number  of  horsepower  required  for  space  flight  makes  the  comparison  somewhat 
superfluous  -  to  say  a  horse  equals  something  like  one  twenty-millionth  of  a  space 
shuttle  sounds  rather  absurd.  " 
But  the  progress  evident  in  subsequent  scientific  and  technological  triumphs  attest 
to  the  massive  advances  made  between  the  seventeenth-century  and  the  twentieth- 
century:  the  growing  circulation  of  knowledge  in  printed  form;  the  industrialization  of 
the  process  of  production,  the  institution  of  education  for  the  masses,  being  just  three 
examples  of  a  progress  that  allowed  reason  to  assume  a  position  of  dominance  over  most 
aspects  of  nature. 
The  effect  of  this  refinement  was  also  found  however  in  the  visible  evidence  of 
C  residual'  social  phenomena  that  contradicted  the  idea  of  a  neat,  smooth,  and  linear 
progress.  So  whilst  reason  attained  the  status  of  the  way  to  truth,  or  to  the  understanding 
and  planning  of  the  'proper'  functioning  of  society,  by  the  mid  nineteenth-century  the 
consequences  of  rational  advancements  in  making  the  world  comprehensible,  in 
scientific  and  social  terms,  were  becoming  apparent  in  conditions  that  stood  as 
exceptions  to  universal  progress.  For  example,  the  social  blight  of  industrial  society  was 
contemporaneous  with  the  development  of  the  first  mass  produced  flushing  toilet;  and 
in  mechanized  warfare  which  was  assisted  by  the  use  of  the  same  trains  that  allowed  the 
compression  of  time  and  space  in  other  circumstances.  The  point  is  that  these  are  not 
Historkal  exceptions,  contingencies,  or  the  product  of  chance.  These  are  the  necessary 
conditions  against  which  a  new  order  can  be  determined,  an  order  that  is  always  comes 
from  the  old,  is  always  overcoming  the  present  state.  However,  in  terms  of  the  view  of 
history  as  some  linear  procession  towards  some  nirvana,  the  irony  is  that  the  standard 
14  'Horsepower'  was  a  measure  that  was  actually  equivalent  to  one  and  one-third  the  actual  power  of  a  horse 
(OED),  i.  e.,  550  foot-pounds  per  second,  something  that  would  have  been  comprehensible  within  recent  memory. 
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bearer  in  this  pageant,  the  autonomous  subject,  stands  as  a  testament  to  the  failure  of 
reason  to  conquer  nature;  this  is  seen  from  the  evidence  of  the  unrestrained  brute  within 
as  represented  by  the  frequent  descent  of  humanity  into  war. 
Contingency  and  Knowledge 
The  elements  of  modern  life  that  signified  exceptions  to  some  rule  reflected  also  the  de- 
centering  of  the  twin  scientific  claims  of  realism  and  objectivity.  A  marked  awareness  of 
the  indeterminacy  of  events,  natural  and  human,  was  matched  by  the  realisation  of  the 
complexity  of  human  nature  -  the  human  psyche,  and  consequently  of  the  multiplicity 
of  subjective  perceptions  and  experiences  which  go  to  make  up  the  new  'reality'.  This 
can  sound  platitudinous,  but  if  we  delve  into  the  philosophical  implications  of  modern 
empirical  science  we  can  see  that  it  is  knowledge  and  language  that  produce  "the 
inevitable"  -  the  contingencies  4  of  history.  However,  as  E.  H.  Carr  said,  "the  facts  are 
really  not  at  all  like  fish  on  a  fishmonger  )s  slab.  They  are  like  fish  swimming  about  in  a 
vast  and  sometimes  inaccessible  ocean.  "  They  only  end  up  there  as  the  result  of  fishing 
in  certain  waters,  and  in  virtue  also  of  the  use  of  a  certain  kind  of  net.  "  The  problem  of 
a  historical  understanding  of  the  contingent,  the  problem  I  seek  to  confront  here  in 
these  pages,  cannot  thus  be  separated  from  the  problem  of  understanding  what 
individuals  get  up  to. 
Donald  Davidson  projects  our  prospects  for  understanding  the  world  of  human 
experience  and  thus  the  procession  of  historical  'events'  in  terms  of  the  way  science 
understands  the  physical  world.  Not  only  can  we  have  no  firm  knowledge  of  the  causes 
of  human  action,  we  cannot  even  say  that  a  certain  attitude  or  a  certain  reason  caused  a 
person  to  act  in  a  certain  way.  We  can  only  describe  what  we  see,  what  we  understand: 
There  is  no  assigning  beliefs  to  a  person  one  by  one  on  the  basis  of  his  verbal 
behaviour,  his  choices  or  other  local  signs  no  matter  how  plain  and  evident,  for 
we  make  sense  of  particular  beliefs  only  as  they  cohere  with  other  beliefs,  with 
preferences,  intentions,  hopes,  fears,  expectations,  and  the  rest.  16 
The  space  shuttle  to  use  another  example  utilises  something  like  20,000,000  horsepower,  which  prompts  the  question 
of  why  we  still  employ  such  practically  meaningless  statements  of  the  identity  of  otherwise  separate  phenomena. 
15  E.  H.  Carr  (196  1)  What  is  History?  Harmondsworth:  23. 
'6Donald  Davidson  (1980)  'Mental  Events,  '  in  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events.  Oxford:  22  1. 
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This  is  where  we  return  to  Heisenberg's  statement  that  the  actual  only  takes  place 
during  observation;  that  what  happened  is  in  the  telling  ultimately.  The  world  that  is 
significant  in  sociological  terms,  in  terms  of  human  social  action  is  explained  by  beliefs 
and  desires,  not  merely  because  the  imperceptible  'atomic'  status  of  these  'internal 
motions'  (beliefs  and  desires)  allow  us  to  make  a  neat  connection  between  the  human 
world  and  the  quantum  view  of  the  physical  world.  It  is  rather  because  the  assumption 
of  autonomy  that  is  characteristic  of  any  speculation  on  the  nature  of  modern  society 
means  that  we  build  a  great  edifice  from  these  very  small  beginnings:  we  assume  that  the 
movements  of  bodies  in  space,  that  social  action  let's  say,  is  not  the  mechanical 
movement  of  undifferentiated  parts  of  a  larger  whole,  that  social  action,  and  that  the 
manifestations  of  societal  trends  are  rationally  comprehensible. 
So  we  can  do  no  other  but  look  at  how  our  everyday  language  deals  with  these  very 
small  beginnings,  the  ontological  bases  of  understanding.  As  we  have  seen  the  discourse  of 
meaning  finds  problems  in  identifying  exceptional  individual  action,  a  problem  we  have 
seen  reflected  in  the  actions  of  the  gambler  being  designated  'disordered.  '  In  what 
follows,  we  can  also  see  that  identity  becomes  a  mask  that  adorns  the  surface  we  created 
to  represent  the  world  in  artistic  terms;  that  objects  of  art,  like  objects  of  knowledge 
about  social  action  reveal  only  particular  acts  of  'picturing'  reality,  and  that  the  infinity 
of  meanings  renders  the  subjective  the  provider  of  an  indivisible  identity. 
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What  we  call  Dada  is  foolery,  foolery  extracted  from  the  emptiness 
in  which  all  the  higher  problems  are  wrapped,  a  gladiator's  gesture,  a  game 
played  with  the  shabby  remnants  ...  a  public  execution  of  false  morality. 
HUGo  BALL 
"If  you  are  alive,  you  are  a  Dadaist,  "  Richard  Huelsenbeck  wrote  in  1920.  Huelsenbeck 
belonged  to  a  group  of  poets,  performers  and  visual  artists,  the  Dadaists,  who  came 
together  in  Zurich  during  1916.  "Human  beings,  "  he  said,  "are  simply  ideologues  if 
they  fall  for  the  swindle  perpetrated  by  their  own  intellects;  that  an  idea,  symbol  of  a 
momentarily  perceived  fact,  has  any  absolute  reality.  "'  Dada  was  not  be  understood,  he 
believed,  but  lived.  It  was  life  as  play  -  immediate  and  obvious  to  the  participant,  but 
perhaps  impenetrable  to  the  observer.  Ideas  and  meanings,  it  declared,  only  had 
purchase  in  specific  places  and  times;  or,  put  another  way,  art  belonged  to  the  space- 
time  continuum. 
The  seemingly  indivisible  nature  of  sense-experience  in  and  with  relation  to  the 
objects  of  much  art  in  the  early  part  of  the  twentieth  century,  created  some  difficulties 
for  notions  of  meaning  and  thus  also  the  thorny  problem  of  identity;  and  this  precisely 
because  the  indivisible  self  stands  in  stark  contrast  to  an  apparently  objective  identity, 
one  which  mediates  aesthetic  experience.  The  latter  form  of  identity,  we  might  say,  is 
concerned  with  correspondences  between  two  or  more  distinct  'objects.  '  In  other  words, 
it  relates  physical  or  conceptual  equivalents.  On  the  other  hand,  identity  of  another 
kind,  as  a  matter  of  subjectivity,  declares  the  self  a  unique  and  indivisible  entity;  that  is 
to  say  the  subject  is  established  not  by  relating  an  equivalent,  but  by  differentiating  self 
from  other.  ' 
Richard  Huelsenbeck  (ed.  )  0  993)  Dada  Almanac,  London:  9-11. 
Cf  Paul  Ricoeur  (1992)  Onese#as  Another.  Chicago. 
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In  the  production  of  art,  representation  and  mimesis  had  been,  for  millennia,  the 
dominant  tradition  in  the  logocentric  thinking  of  the  western  mind,  and  the  question  of 
(  meaning'  was  dealt  with  in  visual  arts,  for  example,  by  reference  to  a  number  of 
painterly  conventions  of  representation.  '  Sometime  in  the  last  150-200  years,  however, 
the  grip  of  these  conventions  upon  artists  became  loosened,  and  eventually,  by  the  time 
of  the  Copenhagen  interpretation  of  the  quantum  world  in  the  1930's,  totally  broken; 
and  like  the  developments  of  the  Copenhagen  physicists,  it  had  produced  a  new  way  of 
coming  to  terms  with  existence.  But  before  we  jump  that  far  forward,  it  is  worth  looking 
more  closely  at  some  artistic  affinities,  that  although  separated  by  the  nature  of  their 
intent,  reflected  a  coming  to  terms  with  the  shifting  grounds  of  experience  and,  thus, 
influenced  a  radical  re-evaluation  of  the  logos. 
The  communicability  of  meaning  had  always  been  problematic  to  an  understanding 
of  the  world  around  us,  but  with  the  increasing  mediation  of  more  aspects  of  the 
experience  of  this  world,  and  with  the  availability  of  contrasts  with  other  ways  of 
thinking  about  such  matters  (anthropology,  for  example,  revealed  the  variability  of 
beliefs  about  the  nature  of  the  physical  world),  the  problem  became  so  overbearing  that 
cultural  and  intellectual  reflexes  directed  the  normally  expansive  curiosity  of  the  Western 
mind  inwards.  '  A  retreat  to  safety,  it  seems,  in  an  attempt  to  keep  a  grip  on  this  problem 
of  meaning. 
In  technical  or  formal  terms  this  was  reflected,  for  instance,  by  the  inward  turn 
taken  by  Anglo-American  analytic  philosophy  in  the  first  half  of  the  twentieth  century. 
Already,  in  fact,  by  the  late  1890's,  following  Gottlob  Frege's  work  on  the  sense  and 
meaning  of  expressions,  the  idea  of  a  tightly-conceived  identity  established  on  the  basis 
of  reference  to  an  external  object  or  item  alone,  came  unstuck.  In  trying  to  make 
philosophy  scientifically  respectable  the  philosophers  of  the  analytic  school  who 
followed  Frege's  lead,  determined  that,  in  language,  every  term  must  be  unambiguous.  It 
must  have  a  reference,  or  put  another  way,  words  had  to  refer  to  one  thing  or  another.  ' 
'  See,  for  example,  E.  H.  Gombrich  (1977)  Art  and  Illusion,  London;  Erich  Auerbach  (1953)  Mimesis:  The 
Representation  of  Reality  in  Western  Literature,  Princeton;  Norman  Bryson  (1983)  Vision  and  Painting:  The  Logic  of  the 
Gazi%  London;  and  Viktor  1.  Stoichita  (19  97)  A  Short  History  ofthe  Shadow,  London. 
'  This  is  not  to  suggest  that  self-reflection  is  unique  to  this  period,  merely,  as  I  say  in  what  follows  that  the 
dominant  philosophy  of  the  analytic  school  dealt  with  the  irreconcilable  problem  of  realism,  by  turning  'inward'  to 
examine  thought  and  language  in  a  more  thoroughgoing  way  than  had  been  seen  before,  in  the  sense  that  this  became 
the  only  viable  role  for  philosophy. 
'  See  Gottlob  Frege,  'On  Sense  and  Reference,  '  in  Peter  Geach  and  Max  Black  (1980)(eds.  )  Translations  From 
the  Philosophical  Writings  of  Gottlob  Frege,  Oxford. 
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Language  problems,  which  therefore  centered  on  problems  of  referentiality  and  identity, 
suppose  an  external  'reality'  to  which  language  use,  and  representations  generally,  be 
they  linguistic  or  material,  should  match  up.  '  Richard  Rorty  explained  the  basis  of  this 
problem  by  suggesting  that  what  the  realist  picture  ultimately  cannot  cope  with  is  the 
idea  that  there  may  be  nothing  below  the  surface,  or  in  other  words,  the  metaphors  that 
form  such  a  large  part  of  the  representational  practices  do  not  have  any  meaning,  and 
this,  of  course,  is  why  the  formalisation  of  language  in  a  system  of  logic  must  dispense 
with  metaphorical  language! 
The  problem  does  not  end  here  however.  Any  consideration  of  meaning  draws  us 
back  into  a  host  of  related,  and  seemingly  insoluble,  problems.  Meaning,  as  a  function 
of  our  capacity  for  identification,  is,  as  we  have  seen,  derived  from,  on  the  one  hand, 
reference  to  some  external  object  or  phenomena  (the  meaning  of  which  may  be  personal 
and  subjective  -a  perspective  that  would  be  deemed  meaningless  by  realist  ontologies), 
and  on  the  other,  an  agreement  between  observers  as  to  what  this  object  or  phenomena 
that  is  external  to  us  actually  is.  This  is  the  same  problem  we  encounter  with  identity, 
which  as  we  have  seen  can  be  shown  in  two  variants  -  identity  by  equivalence,  and 
identity  by  differentiation.  And  so  we  can  see  why  these  difficulties  only  serve  to  bring 
under  scrutiny  the  terms  of  the  language  that  we  use  to  describe  this  other  thing,  and 
that  this  produces  an  apparently  unbridgeable  chasm.  In  short,  language,  as  the  most 
fundamental  mediator,  in  striving  for  identity  creates  the  separation  between  self  and 
world. 
Recognition  and  Disguise 
Whilst  the  response  of  philosophers,  in  their  language  analysis,  was  to  confine  analysis  to 
problems  that  could  be  elaborated  on  the  grounds  of  the  truth  conditions  of  statements 
(that  is,  an  analysis  that  was  restricted  to  unambiguous  statements),  by  the  same  time  the 
arts  grasped  the  problem  of  nature's  novelty  as  revealed  by  the  indeterminacy  of 
language  and  put  it  under  examination.  What  resulted,  by  contrast  with  the 
philosophical  tightening  of  logic  and  language  as  the  grounds  of  analysis,  was  a 
loosening  of  the  word,  a  freeing-up  of  representational  conventions,  notions  of  identity, 
"  CE  Ludwig  Wittgenstein  (1968)  Philosophical  Investigations.  Oxford;  Edmund  Husserl  (1970)  Logical 
Investigations.  London. 
'See  Richard  Rorty  (1989)  Contingency,  Irony,  Solidarity,  New  York:  19 
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and  effectively  a  kind  of  alchemy  of  identity  as  understood  by  logocentric  traditions  as 
part  of  the  unity  and  order  of  nature,  turned  into  a  protean  mask.  What  was  really 
placed  under  scrutiny  here,  as  historical  developments  made  more  apparent  the 
discordance  of  nature,  was  the  alienating  experience  produced  by  this  gulf  between  self 
and  world,  which  had  been  disguised  by  the  recognition  of  meaning  through  the 
Kantian  apparatus. 
At  the  beginning  of  the  twentieth  century  art  sought  to  present  the  mutable  nature 
of  being  and  mediate  it  through  the  relativity  of  space-time.  The  Italian  futurists  - 
impetuous  seekers  of  chaos  -  simply  urged  abandonment  to  the  imperatives  of  a 
mechanized  modern  world.  By  contrast  those  associated  with  Dada,  who  through 
playing  with  chance,  attempted  a  re-engagement  with  what  they  regarded  as  a 
"humiliating  age"  ravaged  by  war  and  materialism!  Dada,  in  some  of  its  forms,  retained 
a  connection  with  artistic  notions  of  responsibility  for  the  presentation  of  the  world;  in 
contrast  to  the  nihilism  of  Italian  futurism,  which  urged  a  quickening  at  the  expense  of 
all  else.  Dada  advocated  a  long  and  hard  look  at  where  the  ideals  of  modernity  had  taken 
humanity;  young  men  marching  off  to  war  with  a  volume  of  Goethe  in  their  knapsacks. 
This,  they  took  to  be  the  ultimate  debasement  of  language  and  art.  For  the  Italian 
futurists  on  the  other  hand,  modern  urban  life  seemed  to  speak  of  the  impossibility  of 
anything  as  fixed  as  meaning  and,  hence,  the  veneration  of  speed  and,  of  course,  the 
consequent  loosening  of  meaning  from  traditionally  fixed  categories. 
Specifically  by  embracing  the  dangerous  possibilities  offered  by  technological 
advancement  futurism  diverged  from  the  path  followed  by  Dada.  The  love  of  speed  was 
a  way  of  hastening  the  destruction  of  the  present,  of  progress  in  space-time  realising  an 
exhilarating  cultural  entropy.  One  thinks  of  Fillipo  Marinetti's  declared  'dread  of 
slowness'  accompanied  as  it  was  by  a  "love  of  speed,  abbreviation,  and  the  summary, 
Quick,  give  me  the  whole  thing  in  two  minutes.  "'  Tradition  was  abhorred,  as  with  the 
Dadaists,  but  by  contrast  there  was  no  suggestion  of  an  alternative:  the  difference 
between  the  two  can  further  be  underlined  by  the  futurist  faith  in  war,  and  that  that  war 
was,  in  fact,  like  the  futurist  impulse  itself,  creative.  It  was  an  element  of  the  immediate 
they  so  longed  for,  the  broom  that  sweeps  away  the  debris  of  history;  it  was  'the  world's 
'  John  Elderfield,  introduction  to  Hugo  Ball  (1996)  Flight  Out  of  Time,  Berkeley:  xxiv. 
9  F.  T.  Marinetti,  'Destruction  of  Syntax.  Imagination  without  S  trings-Words-in-  Freedom'  (the  original 
manifesto  was  published  in  1913)  in  Apollonio  (ed.  )  0  973)  Futurist  Manifestos.  London:  97-98. 
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only  hygiene,  '  and  'futurism  intensified,  '  that  allowed  the  conditions  of  renewal  to 
arise.  'O  For  Hugo  Ball  and  others  associated  with  Dada,  one  of  the  few  things  that  united 
the  half  dozen  or  so  participants  in  the  founding  of  Dada  in  1916  was  disgust  with  the 
war.  "  War  represented  for  Hugo  Ball  nothing  less  than  the  destruction  of  the  Word, 
although  it  produced  the  'shabby  remnants'  from  which  a  new  art,  a  Gesamtkunstwerk 
uniting  all  the  arts,  could  begin.  " 
Nevertheless,  there  were  a  number  of  correspondences  between  the  various 
participants  in  these  radical  new  developments.  What  was  recognized  in  both  cases  was 
that  urban  life  had  begun  to  reveal  the  depth  of  the  gulf  between  the  individual  and  the 
objective  world.  A  new  urban  soundscape,  for  example,  awaited  a  means  of  expression, 
one  that  had  regard  for  the  peculiarities  of  noise  and  speed.  In  a  challenge  to  notions  of 
harmony  and  meaning  the  futurist  Luigi  Russsolo,  in  The  Art  qfNoises  (1913),  exhorts 
his  reader  to  take  note  of  the  dissonance  of  'natural'  sounds,  indeed,  to  act  upon  the 
disclosure  of  this  new,  speedier,  mechanistic  and  impersonal  world.  13  A  world  his  fellow 
futurist  Marinetti  elaborated  by  celebrating  the  cacophony  of  modern  society: 
We  will  sing  of  the  vibrant  nightly  fervour  of  arsenals  and  shipyards  blazing 
with  violent  electric  moons;  greedy  railway  stations  that  devour  smoke-plumed 
serpents;  factories  hung  on  clouds  by  the  crooked  lines  of  their  smoke;  bridges 
that  stride  the  rivers  like  giant  gymnasts,  flashing  in  the  sun  with  a  glitter  of 
knives;  adventurous  steamers  that  sniff  the  horizon;  deep-chested  locomotives 
whose  wheels  paw  the  tracks  like  the  hooves  of  enormous  steel  horses  bridled  by 
tubing;  and  the  sleek  flight  of  planes  whose  propellers  chatter  in  the  wind  like 
banners  and  seem  to  cheer  like  an  enthusiastic  crowd.  " 
This,  to  the  futurists,  was  the  new  artistic  palette.  The  mechanical  symphonies  of 
industrial  society  served  notice  on  the  flabby  conventions  of  traditional  artistic 
presentation,  as  exemplified  by  the  orchestra.  In  registering  the  satisfaction  he  attained 
'0  F.  T.  Maxinetti,  'The  Founding  and  Manifesto  of  Futurism'  (1915);  "We  will  glorify  war  -  the  world's  only 
hygiene  -  militaxism,  patriotism,  the  destructive  gesture  of  freedom-bringers,  beautiful  ideas  worth  dying  for"  in 
Apollonio,  ibid  (22),  and  Maxinetti,  Settinelli  and  Corra,  'The  Futurist  Synthetic  Theatre,  '  (1915);  "War  -  futurism 
intensified  -  obliges  us  to  march  and  not  to  rot.  "  in  Apollonio,  ibid  (183). 
"  Richard  Huelsenbeck  had  said  in  1920,  "none  of  us  had  much  appreciation  of  the  kind  of  courage  it  took  to 
get  shot  for  the  idea  of  a  nation  which  is  at  best  a  cartel  of  pelt  merchants  and  profiteers  in  leather,  at  worst  a  cultural 
association  of  psychopaths  who,  like  the  Germans,  marched  off  to  war  with  a  volume  of  Goethe  in  their  knapsacks,  to 
skewer  Frenchmen  and  Russians  on  their  bayonets.  "  Quoted  in  Greil  Marcus  (19  8  9)  Lipstick  Traces:  A  Secret  History 
oftbe  Twentietb  Century,  Cambridge,  MA:  194-95. 
"  'Gesamtkunstwerk'  Is  the  term  given  to  Ball's  idea  for  a  fusion  of  the  arts,  an  aim  that  was  influenced  by  his 
encounters  with  Wassily  Kandinsky.  See  Hans  Richter  0  997)  Dada.  -  Art  and  Anti-Art,  London:  Pt.  1;  and  Malcolm 
Green's  introduction  to  Richard  Huelsenbeck  (ed.  )  0  993)  Dada  Almanac,  London. 
"  See  Umbro  Apollonio,  ibid:  74-88 
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by  seeking  stimulation  in  'the  combination  of  the  noises  of  trams,  backfiring  motors, 
carriages  and  bawling  crowds'  Luigi  Russolo  was  taking  the  founding  manifesto  of 
Marinetti  further  and  reassessing  the  music  of  once  loved  'great  masters,  '  such  as 
Wagner  and  Beethoven,  who  were  now  declared  an  insignificant  abstraction  from  the 
reality  of  life  in  the  twentieth  century  urban  melee: 
We  cannot  see  that  the  enormous  apparatus  of  force  that  the  modern  orchestra 
represents  without  feeling  the  most  profound  and  total  dissolution  at  the  paltry 
acoustic  results.  Do  you  know  of  any  sight  more  ridiculous  than  that  of  twenty 
men,  furiously  bent  on  redoubling  the  mewing  of  a  violin?  " 
Thundering  locomotives  and  snarling  cars  drowned  out  such  'mewing. 
516  The 
contrast  between  such  apparent  artifice  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  totality  of  modern 
living  in  all  its  sights,  sounds  and  smells  on  the  other,  allowed  the  futurists  to  at  once 
identify  a  discordant  element  between  this  artistic  method  of  representation  and  life 
itself.  It  also  formed  the  basis  of  a  differentiation  between  their  own  experience  of  the 
world  and  the  world  that  art  represented,  which  enabled  the  establishment  of  another 
identity  -  of  the  self  with  something  other  than  this  superficiality:  perhaps  'purity'  or 
immediacy  of  experience,  but  certainly  something  more  valid  than  the  artifice  of  a 
caterwauling  orchestra  trussed  up  in  evening  dress,  or  the  moribund  hierarchies  of  the 
artistic  establishment. 
"Museums:  cemeteries!  "  Marinetti  thundered,  "identical  surely,  in  the  sinister 
proximity  of  so  many  bodies  unknown  to  one  another.  "" 
To  move,  or  be  moved.... 
Italian  futurism  was  an  elaboration  of  something  that  was  there  for  all  to  see,  but  which 
the  masks  of  language  and  meaning  had  obscured.  That  is,  nature  also  exists  as  an  other 
beneath  the  surface,  and  beyond  our  powers  of  comprehension  and  communication. 
The  mechanization  of  movement,  the  full  and  inhumane  extent  of  which  was  revealed 
by  the  military  technology  of  the  twentieth  century,  was  a  force  in  the  development  of 
incongruous  relations  that  began  to  become  apparent  to  the  modern  subject;  the  de- 
"  Ibid:  22 
15 
Ibid:  27 
16  It  is  interesting  to  note  that  the  Futurists'  own  intonamuri  (noise  machines),  sound  by  modern  standards) 
quite  paltry;  they  were  way  ahead  of  time. 
7 7 
Apollonio,  ibid:  22. 
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personalisation  of  the  modern  technological  subject  effectively  introduced  confusion  and 
stripped  the  self  of  its  active  powers.  The  individual,  in  times  of  industrial  war,  was 
merely  a  puppet,  set  into  motion  by  the  authorial  hand  of  the  objective  and  sovereign 
state.  18  Movement  was  all  around,  but  now  more  than  ever  beyond  subjective  control.  In 
the  interdependent,  and  thus  complex  (  organism,  )  that  industrial  society  had  become, 
the  threat  of  personal  immobility  correspondingly  realised  an  objective  power  of  motion; 
a  highly  contingent  set  of  circumstances  that  placed  the  subject  in  a  dangerous  position. 
The  speedy  and  thus  formless  new  environment  rendered  a  sense  of  self,  and  a  sense 
of  the  world  somewhat  out  of  focus.  Whatever  else  this  meant  for  an  understanding  of 
an  objective,  external  reality,  it  said  clearly  that  we  could  not  be  whom  we  are,  or  who 
we  hoped  to  become,  without  accepting  that  the  self  is  in  some  way  dependant  upon  an 
unfamiliar  world,  a  reality  to  which  it  was  difficult  to  be  reconciled.  The  uneasy  truth 
was  the  self  is  established,  not  in  any  self-determining  or  rationally  autonomous  fashion, 
but  in  and  by  relation  to  the  very  otherness  of  nature,  which  seemed  to  include  the 
totality  of  an  external  reality  that  did  not  quite  square  with  the  inherited  notions  of,  for 
example,  Enlightenment  humanism.  " 
Nature  is  what  we  are  and  yet  are  not:  the  modern  subject  emerges  both  because  of, 
and  in  spite  of,  this  otherness.  All  the  trappings  of  the  self,  from  the  'construction'  of 
subjectivity,  and  extending  to  the  foundations  underlying  society  and  morality,  emerge 
as  a  consequence  of  the  positing  of  some  identity;  an  identity,  which  is  primarily 
negative  in  origin.  In  simple  terms  this  is  a  claim  that  to  be  one  thing  is  to  not  be  some 
other  thing.  The  perfect  banality  of  such  an  observation  is  evident  in  the  most 
elementary  of  childlike  assertions  of  categorical  learning,  necessary  though  they  are  to  a 
growing  awareness  of  the  location  of  oneself  in  the  world,  that,  for  example,  'to  be  a 
man  is  to  not  be  an  animal,  '  or  'an  animal  is  not  a  vegetable.  '  This  seeming  conflict  of 
antinomies,  once  again,  serves  as  a  mask  -  below  the  surface  there  are  no  such  categories, 
but  rather  a  continuum  in  which  the  two  poles  oppose,  yet  go  together  like  thumb  and 
forefinger.  The  point  still  needs  to  be  made,  however.  To  be  aperson,  to  be  recognizably 
autonomous  -  this  fixed  character  of  rational  understanding  -  is  to  be  in  a  position 
determinedly  to  order  one's  movements  in  the  world.  In  other  words  autonomy  is 
"  The  war  apparatus  of  the  20'h  century  merely  realises  the  Hobbesian  prescription  for  dealing  with  the  failures 
of  the  rational  mind  to  submit  to  a  limitation  on  motion,  that  is  to  say  'subjects'  are  personated  by  guardians. 
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realised  in  the  act  of  rendering  this  negative  self-origin  positive:  to  be.  All  identity  by 
differentiation  is  thus  autonomous  action  -  it  brings  the  subject  and  object  into  relation. 
Success  in  establishing  such  a  level  of  control,  that  is,  realizing  autonomy, 
corresponds  to  an  eclipse  of  the  contingent;  it  is  active,  which  is  to  say  acting  as  the 
donning  of  the  mask  that  conceals  the  depth  below  the  surface.  If  we  return  to  Dada,  we 
can  see  quite  clearly  the  attempt  to  untie  such  relations  of  identity.  "Silk  stockings  are 
priceless,  "  Walter  Serner  remarks,  reasonably  enough  (although  one  may  disagree);  but 
that's  not  all.  Identity  is  destroyed  in  the  novel  declaration  of  broken  categories;  "A  vice 
queen  IS  an  armchair.  World  views  are  word  mixtures.  A  dog  IS  a  hammock.  L  art  est 
mort.  Viva  Dada!  ))20  In  a  similar  fashion,  Tristan  Tzara,  the  most  volatile  character 
amongst  the  Zurich  Dadaists  declared  that  he  "smashed  drawers,  those  of  the  brain  and 
those  of  social  organisation.  ',  2'  This  is  to  wander  into  the  land  of  negative 
undifferentiated  humanity.  A  mind  lacking  order  also  fails  to  realise  autonomy.  It 
becomes  the  'non-subject,  '  threatened  by  whim,  existing  at  the  mercy  of  caprice.  It  is  the 
disparity  between  the  one  who  is  moved  in  contrast  to  the  mover.  12  The  negative  image 
of  the  self  is  the  other  (which  cannot  be  characterised  in  analytic  terms,  as  the  self  can). 
It  is  possibility,  but  no  more,  in  these  terms.  But  actually  this  other  is  the  basis  of 
everything. 
Might  be,  might  not  be.  Maybe? 
This  other  is  also  the  domain  of  chance.  And  chance  enters  the  picture  here  by 
accident,  as  it  were,  and  in  response  to  the  apprehension  of  the  accidental  as  a  major 
part  of  the  modern  sensorium,  the  ground  of  aesthetic  experience,  if  not  causal 
understanding.  "  Thus,  if  we  note  Luigi  Russolo's  extensive  listing  of  the  various  natural 
sounds,  mechanical  noises,  and  other  phenomena  that  might  appear  to  perception  as  a 
"  I'm  thinking  of  something  like  the  Enlightenment  triumph  of  reason  over  darkness  and  brutality,  an  ideal 
contradicted  in  war  and  industrial  alienation. 
"  Walter  Serner,  'Last  Loosening',  in  Ball,  Huelsenbeck  and  Serner  0  99  5)  Blago  Bung  Blago  Bung  Bosso  Tataka: 
The  First  Texts  of  German  Dada,  Berkeley:  160. 
2'  Tzara,  quoted  in  Hans  Richter  0  997)  Dada:  Art  andAnti-art,  London:  34. 
22  See,  for  example,  Michel  Foucault  (1999)  Madness  and  Civilization,  London.  Here  there  are  several  examples 
of  the  importance  of  movement  to  autonomy.  Foucault  memorably  begins  by  describing  the  'ship  of  fools,  '  the 
madmen  flung  between  ports,  but  detained  at  sea,  in  motion,  but  immobile,  because  of  their  lack  of  autonomous 
control.  In  other  places  he  relates  the  idea  that  cures  for  madness  and  melancholia  rested  on  the  constraining  of 
movement  -  for  example,  as  a  passenger  on  long  sea  voyages  (174);  and,  as  a  passenger  of  an  entirely  different  kind  on 
the  'rotary  machine,  '  a  device  that  sought  to  redistribute  the  bodily  humours  of  the  patient.  (177) 
'  See  McAllester  Jones  (1991)  Gaston  Bachelard.  -  Subversive  Humanist,  Madison:  "The  rational  subject  is  no 
longer  sovereign,  no  longer  autonomous,  identical  and  unchanging,  but  rather  transcended,  upheld,  created  and 
recreated  by  something  other  than  itself,  by  the  'not-self,  '  by  the  discursive,  dialectical,  dynamic  interrelationship 
between  reason  and  reality.  "  (7)  See  also  Slavoj  ý_iýek  (1997)  The  Abyss  ofFreedom.  Ann  Arbor. 
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reminder  of  the  accidental  all  around  us,  we  see,  perhaps  surprisingly  amongst  the 
unexpected  rumblings  of  nature  and  the  audible  ruptures  of  the  living  city,  that  he 
mentions  the  sound  of  the  human  voice,  "the  noises  made  by  wild  and  domestic 
animals,  and  of  all  those  that  can  be  made  by  a  man  without  resorting  to  speaking  or 
singing.  ,  24  He  suggests  that  in  modern  society,  the  world  of  blurring,  distorted  motion 
evokes  in  the  subject  alienation  with  his  own  kind.  Russolo  leaves  no  place  here  in  his 
audible  spectrum  of  noises  for  the  ordinarily  modulated  voice  of  a  human  regardless  of 
whether  it  is  singing  or  speaking;  not  the  voice  of  meaning,  reason  and  intelligibility. 
Rather,  these  sounds,  made  'without  resorting  to  singing  or  speaking,  '  suggest  the 
opposite  of  what  we  ordinarily  expect  to  come  from  a  human  voice  certainly  from  a 
person.  25 
These  sounds  require  a  new  vocabulary  in  order  to  be  understood.  They  are  the 
irrational,  emotional,  'primitive'  sounds  of  pre-civilisation  humanity;  the  retch  which 
produces  fear,  the  crash  that  pricks  up  the  ears  -  these  are  now  the  sounds  of  art.  This 
voice  -  the  non-intelligible  voice  -  carries  with  it  surprise,  fear,  and  the  immanence  of 
the  unexpected.  This  is  the  sound  of  a  guttural  scream  in  the  night  so  infused  with 
otherness  because  it  carries  with  it  an  unknown  significance  beyond  the  sound  itself, 
which  is  merely  the  phenomenal  sound  available  to  sense;  the  origin  is  a  mystery 
precisely  because  the  causal  origin  of  the  sound  is  hidden.  Our  attention  is  called 
precisely  to  this  fact,  and  this  alone  -  whatever  this  sound  signifies  it  is  beyond  our 
power  to  apprehend  the  cause,  because  it  arrives,  as  it  were,  from  the  void.  It  has  no 
meaningful  relation  to  any  C  normal'  sound  that  Precedes  or  follows  it.  To  the 
unexpected  listener,  accidentally  brought  to  sense  by  it,  it  perhaps  only  has  a  relation  to 
vague  ideas  of  fear  and  terror,  which  themselves  rely  on  the  unpredictability  of  the 
signifier;  and  precisely  because  of  the  anomaly  it  represents  to  an  analytically  understood 
world,  this  is  a  sound  that  is  unidentifiable.  It  speaks  of  the  basic  disharmony  of  nature, 
and  of  man  as  part  of  nature,  rather  than  man  taken  apart  from  nature. 
Luigi  Russolo,  'The  Art  of  Noises,  '  in  Apollonio,  ibid:  74-88. 
The  category  of  'person'  has  a  philosophical  status  that  establishes  the  concept  of  'personhood'  firn-dy  within  a 
rational  understanding  of  the  world,  and  has  the  closest  of  affinities  with  notions  of  'agency'  and  'character.  '  Indeed,  it 
is  those  who  we  cannot  understand,  or  have  difficult  recognizing,  that  we  find  it  difficult  to  assign  personhood  to.  See, 
for  example,  John  Locke  (1976)  An  Essay  Concerning  Human  Understanding,  London:  sec  ii.  27,  and  Marcel  Mauss 
(1985)  'A  Category  of  the  Human  Mind:  The  Notion  of  the  Person;  the  Notion  of  the  Self,  '  in  M.  Carrithers,  S. 
Collins  and  S.  Lukes  (eds)  The  Category  of  the  Person:  Anthropology,  Philosophy,  History,  Cambridge,  and  P.  F. 
Strawson  (1959)  Individuals,  London:  Ch-3. 
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Sounds,  such  as  the  dissonant  noise  of  the  urban  environment,  are  only  'spoken'  in 
the  language  of  chance,  in  terms  of  the  uncertain,  both  because  of  their  unpredictability 
and  because  the  causes  of  such  sounds  unseen  will  always  be  outside  of  the  grasp  and 
control  of  the  beholder.  Uncertainty,  therefore,  is  the  gap  in  understanding.  It  spews 
forth  from  the  depths,  of  no  specific  origin.  A  scream,  for  example,  which  forms  part  of 
Russolo's  new  musical  spectrum  -  guttural,  'primitive'  -  it  may  result  in  horrible 
consequences.  Yet,  it  may  have  an  innocuous  outcome,  departing  back  into  the  void 
without  any  further  disturbance.  The  sound  of  distress  may  equally  be  the  sound  of 
ecstasy.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  of  the  disturbance  is  enough  on  its  own  to  remind  us  that 
outside  of  the  self  the  other  is  a  disordered  and  fundamentally  meaningless  vacuum, 
beyond  the  grasp  of  reason. 
Out  of  this  background,  the  challenge  to  the  modern  artist  was,  and  still  is,  more  of 
an  ontological  challenge  than  an  aesthetic  one.  If  we  understand  reason  to  be  construed 
analytically,  that  is  by  resolving  the  constituent  parts  of  some  object  or  phenomena  in 
terms  of  reference  that  permit  identification,  then  the  need  for  a  realignment  of  the 
terms  of  meaning  became  obvious.  What  vexed  and  excited  the  Italian  futurists  was  the 
disorientation  of  the  modern  world;  a  loosening  that  threw  into  sharp  relief  the  role  of 
the  artist  as  giver  of  meaning.  The  'tools'  art  employed  to  understand  the  world  had  to 
be  carefully  assessed,  and  those  now  useless  barometers  of  meaning  had,  if  necessary,  to 
be  consigned  to  the  dustbin. 
A  Magical  Bishop 
With  Dada,  as  with  Italian  futurism,  it  was  difficult  to  know  how  seriously  the 
intentions  of  the  participants  were.  Of  course,  a  lack  of  levity  itself  can  have  a  deflating 
tendency;  yet,  the  purpose  of  such  playfulness  may  remain  hidden  in  the  gesture  itself. 
Richard  Huelsenbeck,  one  of  the  founders  of  the  Cabaret  Voltaire  in  Zurich,  the  club 
formed  by  the  original  Dada  group,  suggested  that  Dada  was  established  in  opposition 
to  what  we  might  recognise  as  the  dualistic  modes  of  conventional  thinking,  of  the 
categorization  of  concepts  and  objects  in  oppositional  terms,  and  was  instead  proposing 
that  such  easy  means  of  differentiation  were  obsolete.  Dada,  he  said,  "blusters  because  it 
knows  how  to  be  quiet;  it  agitates  because  it  is  at  peace.  "  And  just  at  the  point  where 
one  can  see  a  glimpse  of  sense  emerging  from  the  wordplay  he  adds  a  coda  which 
resonates  to  hollow  laughter;  Dada  "has  war  and  peace  under  its  toga,  but  decides  in 
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favour  of  the  cherry  brandy  flip.  ""  And  this  was  his  attempt  to  convey  the  significance 
of  Dada. 
Yet  such  apparent  explanations  of  the  Dada  impulse  were  as  of  nothing  compared  to 
the  serious  assault  they  launched  on  language,  meaning,  and  any  faith  in  the  idea  of  a 
logocentric  understanding  of  the  world.  In  the  varied  responses  of  the  members  of  the 
group  in  Zurich  between  1915  and  1919  we  are  able  to  plot  the  dissolution  of  Dada  as 
27 
anything  resembling  a  coherent  movement.  Hugo  Ball,  the  principal  founder  of  the 
Zurich  Dada  group,  would  have  no  truck  with  the  issuing  of  manifestos,  or  with 
propagandist  work,  which  seemed  to  emulate  the  activities  of  futurism,  and  this  was 
eventually  taken  up  by  others,  such  as  Tristan  Tzara,  and  then  exported  to  a  variety  of 
other  European  cities.  28 
One  thing  that  did  bind  the  Zurich  group  together  was  the  idea  that  language  had 
to  follow  painting  in  re-ordering  the  world,  in  making  the  sensible  human  image  that 
language  portrays  equally  as  fragmentary  as  the  abstract  and  cubist  paintings  of  the 
time  . 
2913all 
had  wrote  in  1916  that: 
The  image  of  human  form  is  gradually  disappearing  from  the  painting  of  these 
times  and  all  objects  appear  only  in  fragments.  This  is  one  more  proof  of  how 
ugly  and  worn  the  human  countenance  has  become,  and  of  how  all  the  objects 
of  our  environment  have  become  repulsive  to  us.  The  next  step  is  for  poetry  to 
decide  to  do  away  with  language  for  similar  reasons.  30 
The  power  behind  the  Dada  reinvention  of  language  was  found  in  the  belief  that 
language  and  literature  had  been  turned  to  nefarious  uses;  in  patriotic  declarations  of 
support  for  the  war,  and  in  the  use  of  literature  in  providing  moral  sustenance  for 
soldiers  at  the  front.  The  point  was  that  language  had  become  debased  to  the  extent  that 
it  was  rendered  useless;  what  use  were  words  when  they  could  support  butchery?  Like 
the  Italian  futurists,  they  sought  to  situate  language  within  the  audible  dissonance  of  the 
"  Richard  Huelsenbeck  (1993)  ibid:  10. 
27  The  fact  that  Dada  can't  really  be  considered  as  a  cohesive  movement  is  of  minor  importance  to  an 
understanding  of  the  role  some  of  its  participants  played  in  challenging  the  bounds  of  accepted  sense,  and  thus 
dabbling  with  chance  as  a  crucial  element  in  their  endeavours. 
'8  See  Hugo  Ball  (1996)  ibid.  Entry  for  24.  V.  1916:  "we  are  never  in  complete  or  simultaneous  agreement"  (63); 
and  Richard  Huelsenbeck  0  993)  ibid:  "Whoever  turns  'freedom'  or  'relativity'  including  the  insight  that  the  contours 
of  everything  shift,  that  nothing  is  stable,  into  a  'firm  creed'  is  just  another  ideologue,  like  the  nihilists  who  are  almost 
always  the  most  incredible,  narrow-minded  dogmatists.  Dada  is  far  removed  from  all  that.  "  (11) 
"'  jean  Arp  called  cubo-futurism  "zigzag  naturalism.  "  See  his  essay  'Dadaland'  in  (1972)  Arp  on  Arp:  Poems, 
Fssays,  Memories:  234.  Walter  Serner  was  less  kind,  declaring  Cubists  and  Futurist  works  "thoroughly  ultra-violet 
failures  of  paint  brush  charges.  "  Serner,  in  Ball,  Huelsenbeck  and  Serner  (1995)  ibid:  158. 
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times;  but  more  than  this  was  the  aim  to  create,  as  Malcolm  Green  has  said,  "a  field  of 
words  that  bypassed  the  authors  own  associations  and  triggered  new  ones  in  the 
listener.  ""  In  other  words,  the  aim  was  to  leave  the  meaning  to  chance.  The  other 
important  thing  that  Dada  had  picked  up  from  Italian  futurism  was  the  idea  that  art  was 
created  in  the  spatio-temporal  dimension,  rather  than  being  produced  merely  in  time,  or 
in  space;  Einstein's  theories  of  relativity  had  fused  the  two  in  a  new  experiential 
dimension.  The  printed  word,  on  the  other  hand,  was  staid  and  fixed.  It  existed,  and 
remained  so  through  the  passage  of  time  and  unchanged  by  the  motion  of  bodies  in 
space.  The  printed  word,  in  books  and  newspapers,  was  seen  to  abstract  language  from 
its  real  context,  the  context  within  which  life  takes  place,  and  what  Ball  and  the  others 
sought  to  achieve  at  the  Cabaret  Voltaire  in  1916,  was  a  synthesis  of  the  arts  that  would 
surpass  the  mimetic  and  representational  limitations  of  traditional  artistic  practice. 
The  problem  for  performance  was  that  words  and  gestures,  the  'language'  of  the 
stage,  represented  not  reality,  but  conventions  which  became  the  mediating  experience 
itself;  acting  was  a  mask  -a  truth  so  obvious  that  it  had  become  invisible.  In  the  Cabaret 
Voltaire  performances  words  were  transformed,  they  became  'vocables';  not  really  words 
at  all,  but  concretized  combinations  of  sounds  produced  from  the  voicing  of  apparently 
randomly  jumbled  letters  of  the  alphabet,  and  these  then  delivered  without  any  regard  to 
meaning.  "  This  corresponded  in  some  small  way  to  Luigi  Russolo's  new  idea  of  the 
human  voice,  the  characteristics  of  which  he  listed  as  one  of  six  "families  of  noise  of  the 
Futurist  orchestra,  "  under  the  heading  Voices  ofAnimals  and  Men.  "  These  he  listed  as, 
"Shouts,  Screams,  Groans,  Shrieks,  Howls,  Laughs,  Wheezes,  Sobs,  "  and  the  corollary 
between  the  two  divergent  movements  with  regard  to  the  place  of  meaningless  sound  in 
art  is  shown  if  we  compare  the  Dadaist  Jean  Arp's  remarks  about  "automatic  poetry,  " 
which  "springs  directly  from  the  poet's  bowels  or  other  organs,  which  have  stored  up 
reserves  of  usable  material.  The  poet  crows,  curses,  sighs,  stutters,  yodels,  as  he  pleases. 
His  poems  are  like  Nature.  ""  Of  course,  this  ideal  could  only  be  realised  in 
performance,  and  it  is  in  this  respect  that  Hugo  Ball,  the  main  founder  of  Dada,  seems 
'0  See  Hugo  Ball  (1996)  ibid,  entry  for  5"  March  1916:  5  5. 
See  Malcolm  Green's  Introduction  to  Huelsenbeck  (ed)  0  993)  Dada  Almanan  v. 
Tzara  took  this  principle  from  performance  into  the  printed  word,  and  created  the  'cut-up'.  According  to 
Hans  Richter  (1997)  ibid:  "he  cut  newspaper  articles  up  into  tiny  pieces,  none  of  them  any  longer  than  a  word,  put 
the  words  in  a  bag,  shook  them  well,  and  allowed  them  to  flutter  onto  a  table.  The  arrangement  (or  lack  of  it)  in 
which  they  fell  constituted  a'poem"'  (54) 
13 
See  Apollonio  (ed.  ),  ibid:  86. 
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to  have  diverged  from  the  others.  In  his  introduction  to  Ball's  diaries,  translated  as  Flight 
Out  of  Time,  John  Elderfield  writes  that: 
Ball  had  found  that  the  act  of  recitation  itself  tested  a  poem's  quality  and 
determined  its  impact.  Basic  to  his  interpretation  of  poetry  was  his  conviction 
that  it  had  far  more  aspects  to  it  than  its  written  words.  " 
Not  at  all  incidental  to  Ball's  view  that  performance  should  converge  upon  new 
possibilities,  was  the  uses  of  masks  and  costumes  in  the  Cabaret,  and  these,  it  turned 
out,  were  to  become  an  essential  component  in  transcending  the  limitations  of  the  word, 
bringing  Hugo  Ball,  in  particular,  to  a  startling  realisation  of  the  possibility  of  renewing 
the  word,  that  is  logos,  through  the  sound-poem,  which  would  be  the  route  to  the  truth 
below  the  surface.  The  accidental  nature  of  this  discovery  reveals  the  serious  point 
behind  the  use  of  masks,  which  seems  only  to  have  been  realised  after  Marcel  Janco  had 
prepared  the  costumes  and  the  participants  in  the  Cabaret  had  taken  up  'character' 
under  the  influence  of  these  new  appearances.  The  masks,  in  fact,  only  highlighted  the 
protean  nature  of  expression;  the  elusiveness,  the  naked  strangeness  of  the  sound  and 
motion  of  performance.  Hugo  Ball  wrote  that  a  transformation  had  overtaken  the 
performers.  The  mask,  he  observed,  "demanded  a  quite  definite,  passionate  gesture, 
bordering  on  madness.  ""  The  masks  revealed  to  Ball  the  deceitful  phenomenal  world, 
the  misleading  world  of  appearances,  of  word  and  gesture,  that  provide  the  stage  for 
meaningful  life,  and  suggested  the  possibility  that  the  only  way  to  come  to  terms  with 
the  illusion  was  through  the  deceptive  power  of  a  kind  of  play;  a  hide-and-seek: 
Although  we  could  not  have  imagined  it  five  minutes  earlier,  we  were  walking 
around  with  the  most  bizarre  movements,  festooned  and  draped  with 
impossible  objects  [ 
... 
I  the  motive  power  of  these  masks  was  irresistibly 
conveyed  to  us.  All  at  once  we  realized  the  significance  of  such  a  mask  [ 
... 
]  they 
represent  not  human  character  and  passions,  but  character  and  passions  that  are 
higher  than  life.  The  horror  of  our  time,  the  paralyzing  background  of  events,  is 
made  visible.  " 
Play  is  understood  by  the  categorical  mind,  not  as  the  route  to  truth,  but  in  its  frivolity 
and  sensuousness,  as  rather  the  way  of  error.  In  archaic  societies,  by  contrast,  it  is  taken 
"  Cited  in  Hans  Richter  0  997)  ibid:  30. 
John  Elderfield,  in  Ball  (1996)  ibid:  xxviii. 
Ball  (1996)  ibid:  64. 
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as  the  return  of  an  arbitrary  cosmos  to  the  divine  lottery  of  Zeus  -  in  other  words,  as  an 
earlier  way  to  divine  truth.  "  The  donning  of  masks  and  costumes  upsets  the  cosy 
familiarity  of  the  world,  and  in  the  liquidity  of  the  performance  of  bizarre  movements 
and  ecstatic  recitation,  language,  in  the  mutable  form  of  the  Dadaist  vocables,  emerges 
correspondingly  draped  in  the  unrecognizable  garb  of  meaninglessness.  "We  have  now 
driven  the  plasticity  of  the  word  to  the  point  where  it  can  scarcely  be  equalled,  "  Ball 
remarked: 
We  have  loaded  the  word  with  strengths  and  energies  that  helped  us  to 
rediscover  the  evangelical  concept  of  the  word  (logos)  as  a  magical  complex 
image  [ 
... 
]  touching  lightly  on  a  hundred  ideas  at  the  same  time  without 
naming  them,  this  sentence  made  it  possible  to  hear  the  innately  playful,  but 
hidden  irrational  character  of  the  listener.  " 
To  return  to  the  problem  of  identity,  what  is  crucial  to  our  understanding  is  that 
these  performances  dramatized  the  problem  of  appearance  within  the  context  of  change. 
Change  is  realised  in  plasticity,  but  identity,  as  a  kind  of  tautological  redescription-of- 
the-same,  only  pertains  in  a  state  of  changelessness.  "  But,  as  we  know,  things  do  change; 
being  is  becoming  -  thus,  the  possibility  that  the  world,  or  nature,  may  be  ambiguous  is 
rehearsed  through  the  disguises  of  performance.  Of  all  the  Zurich  Dada  group,  Hugo 
Ball  experienced  the  most  profound  change  as  a  result  of  the  experiments  at  the  Cabaret 
Voltaire. 
In  June  1916,  barely  a  year  after  arriving  in  Zurich,  Ball  split  from  his  colleagues 
after  a  particularly  harrowing  performance,  which  enacted  a  transformation  on  the 
performer  himself.  In  his  diaries  he  describes  giving  a  reading  of  some  of  his  sound- 
poems  (it  would  be  his  last  performance  at  the  Cabaret)  in  a  costume  specially  made  for 
the  event  (Plate  11).  The  costume  was  so  confining  as  to  require  on  the  spot  adjustments 
to  the  performance,  and  so  it  determined  his  movements  in  a  particular  way,  and  this  in 
turn  influenced  his  readings.  So,  having  been  carried  on  stage  due  to  his  immobility, 
Ibid. 
See  Miha-i  Spariousu  (1989)  Dionysus  Reborn.  Ithaca. 
'9  Ball  (1996)  ibid:  67-68. 
"  The  alternative  view,  that  identity  is  the  'thing',  the  relation  that  establishes  the  'object'  that  remains 
throughout  spatio-temporal  changes,  is  open  to  the  cha-rge  of  essentialism.  Cf.  David  Wiggins  (1980)  Sameness  and 
Substance,  Oxford.  This  view  of  identity  is  elaborated  in  an  examination  of  Leibniz's  Indiscernibi-lity  of  Identicals.  My 
point  is  not  quite  this,  however.  I  do  not  argue  that  there  is  some  underlying  'harmony,  '  'soul,  '  or  'God,  '  but  rather 
that  there  is  only  contingency  -  in  material  terms  this  contingency  is  found  in  the  undifferentiated  matter  of  nature, 
in  the  formless,  etc. 
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Ball  was  left  with  only  his  arms  free;  the  rest  of  his  body,  wrapped  in  a  tightly  fitting 
cylinder,  was  stiff.  Nevertheless,  with  arms  free  he  found,  he  was  able  to  "give  the 
impression  of  winglike  movement  by  raising  and  lowering  [the]  elbows,  "  which  he  duly 
did  by  flapping  them  energetically  between  readings,  at  the  same  time  furtively  trying  to 
work  out  how  this  thing  might  end: 
I  noticed  that  my  voice  had  no  choice  but  to  take  on  the  ancient  cadence  of 
priestly  lamentation  [ 
... 
]  for  a  moment  it  seemed  as  if  there  were  a  pale, 
bewildered  face  in  my  cubist  mask,  that  half-frightened,  half-curious  face  of  a 
ten-year-old  boy,  trembling  and  hanging  avidly  on  the  priest's  words  in  the 
requiems  and  high  masses  in  his  home  parish.  Then  the  lights  went  out,  as  I 
had  ordered,  and  bathed  in  sweat,  I  was  carried  from  down  off  the  stage  like  a 
magical  bishop.  " 
Ball's  description  is  somewhat  reminiscent  of  the  near  catastrophic  experience  of  the 
wager,  which  is  itself  an  experience  of  the  world  as  a  magico-religious  sensorium. 
Delving  deeply  into  the  unknown  he  becomes  caught  in  the  vertigo  of  the  playful  forces 
of  denial  and  affirmation.  He  chose  the  stage,  but  now  he  loses  dominion  over  it.  The 
audience  on  this  occasion  was  alarmed;  it  'exploded,  '  and  Ball  succumbed  to  chance, 
emerging  after  what  seems  like  an  out  of  body  experience.  Hans  Richter  notes,  in  his 
history  of  Dada,  that  after  this  date  Hugo  Ball  "progressively  disengaged  himself  from 
Dada.  "  Tristan  Tzara  had  begun  to  take  a  more  prominent  role  in  the  group,  nudging 
things  in  a  more  propagandist,  pamphleteering,  and  confrontational  direction.  I  have 
examined  myself  carefully,  "  Ball  said,  "and  I  could  never  bid  chaos  welcome.  ""  The 
truth  was  that  he  already  had,  and  it  proved  disconcerting  enough  to  draw  him  back 
from  the  abyss. 
With  Ball's  departure  the  moment  had  passed.  The  significance  of  Dada  rests  with 
the  original  Zurich  group,  and  the  founding  of  the  Cabaret  Voltaire.  What  followed  was 
a  continuation,  if  not  repetition,  of  an  ever  more  provocative  tomfoolery.  With  a  barely 
concealed  hint  of  nihilism,  Walter  Serner,  a  latecomer  to  the  Zurich  Dadaists,  took  the 
radical  nominalism  of  Dada  rhetoric  to  an  extremity  of  meaningless  and  disintegration 
in  his  Last  Loosening  (1918).  "  This  riposte  to  good  taste,  executed  to  hilarious  effect  in 
41 
Ball  (ibid)  ibid:  70-71. 
42 
Quoted  in  Richter  0  997)  ibid:  43. 
4'  Huelsenbeck  (1993)  in  the  Dada  Almanac  describes  him  thus:  "Dr.  Walter  Serner 
...  extreme  adventurer, 
nihilist  and  venereologist  ... 
The  epitome  of  the  'gentleman  burglar'  (Arp),  he  was  later  the  author  of  numerous  sleazy 
crime  stories.  "  (92) 
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PLATE  11.  HUGO  BALL  PERFORMING  K4R,  4WAXE,  1916.  Performances  at  the  Cabaret  Voltaire 
in  1916  combined  two  distinctive  elements.  On  the  one  hand  there  were  what  John  Elderfield  called  the 
"energy-loaded  sound  poems"  of  Ball  and  others  (a  typographical  representation  of  one,  Karawane, 
appears  above),  and  also  Marcel  Janco's  masks  and  costumes  which,  Hugo  Ball  noted  in  his  diary,  called 
for  a  "quite  definite,  passionate  gesture,  bordering  on  madness.  "  See  John  Elderfield's  introduction  to 
Hugo  Ball,  1996,  Flight  Out  of  Time:  A  Dada  Diary  p.  xxxiii,  and  Ball's  entry  for  24'  May  1916. 
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barely  a  dozen  pages,  displayed  a  keen  sense  of  the  ultimate  profanity  of  things,  of  the 
cosmetic  re-ordering  of  the  face  mask  that  lays  a  basis  for  identity  and  meaning. 
Although  it  is  not  clear  whether  he  included  his  fellow  Dadaists  in  his  disparaging 
appraisal  of  the  artistic  objective  of  appropriating  the  world  (but  a  good  guess  would 
suggest  it  is  likely),  it  is  evident  that  he  was  reaching  for  the  chaos  that  Hugo  Ball 
recoiled  from.  "It  is  generally  known  that  a  dog  is  not  a  hammock;  less  so  that  failing  to 
accept  this  tender  hypothesis  would  cause  the  painter's  daubing  fists  to  slump  at  their 
sides.  ""  Ergo,  painting  is  hamstrung  by  problems  of  identity  and  representation.  He 
goes  further,  and  who  can  say  how  serious  he  took  this,  suggesting  that  the  artistic 
impulse  derives  from  an  embarrassment  at  the  thought  of  doing  nothing,  compounded 
by  an  inability  to  constrain  oneself,  of  seemingly  not  knowing  how  to  be  lazy.  And  all 
this  in  the  face  of  the  gratuitousness  of  existence: 
It's  all  just  the  same  [ 
... 
I  the  desire  to  escape  one's  embarrassment  by  giving  it 
(stylistic,  ogodogodo)  form.  Dreadful  word!  Which  is  to  say:  to  make 
something  that  is  profitable  out  of  life,  which  is  improbable  to  the  tips  of  its 
toes!  To  clap  a  redeeming  heaven  over  this  filth  and  enigma!  To  perfume  and 
order  this  pile  of  human  excrement! 
In  short,  the  arts  were  evidence  of  the  inability  to  get  to  grips  with  being,  to  refrain  from 
fixing  things.  "All  in  all,  my  dearest,  "  he  writes,  "art  was  just  a  teething  problem.  ))45 
"  Walter  Serner,  'Last  Loosening,  '  in  Ball,  Huelsenbeck  and  Serner  (199  5)  Blago  Bung  Blago  Bung  Bosso  Fataka! 
London:  155. 
"  Ibid:  156 
j  Scanlan  2001  129 Devil  in  Disguise 
Precision  Oculism.  Rrose  S61avy.  New  York-Paris. 
Complete  Line  of  Whiskers  and  Kicks. 
Calling  cardfor  RRoSE  S  IýLAVY 
In  Homo  Ludens,  his  study  of  the  play  element  in  culture,  originally  published  in  1938, 
Johan  Huizinga  drew  a  sharp  distinction  between  poetry,  music  and  dance  on  the  one 
hand,  and  the  plastic  arts  -  painting  and  sculpture  -  on  the  other.  Huizinga  observed 
that  the  dependence  of  the  plastic  arts  on  matter  -  clay,  paint,  canvas  -  accounted  for 
the  difficulty  in  identifying  this  sphere  of  artistic  activity  with  what  he  called  'free  play,  ' 
meaning  an  activity  that  was  without  any  external  goal,  or  that  was  not  limited  by  any 
external  or  material  constraints.  Painters  and  sculptors,  he  believed,  were  denied  lasting 
access  to  the  play  impulse  because,  unlike  the  poet  and  musician,  these  other  artists  were 
required  by  their  medium: 
To  fix  a  certain  aesthetic  impulse  in  matter  by  means  of  diligent  and 
painstaking  labour  [ 
...  the  artist's]  inspiration  may  be  free  and  vehement  when 
he  'conceives,  '  but  in  its  execution,  it  is  always  subjected  to  the  skill  and 
proficiency  of  the  forming  hand.  ' 
The  point  Huizinga  was  making  was  that  once  the  object  is  fixed,  made  'concrete,  ' 
it  is  effectively  frozen  in  time  and  space,  purely  as  a  consequence  of  its  materiality,  and 
so  fully  present  to  the  senses  and  incapable  of  realizing  the  fluidity  of  motion  found  in 
the  other  arts,  because  "where  there  is  no  visible  action"  -  as  with  the  finished  painting, 
for  example  -  "there  can  be  no  play.  "'  The  object  of  plastic  creation  therefore  spells  an 
'  Johan  Hulzinga  (1955)  Homo  Ludens:  A  Study  ofthe  Play  Element  in  Culture,  Boston:  166. 
2 
Huizinga,  ibid:  166.  Huizinga  seems  to  share  a  preference  for  music  and  poetry  as  the  higher,  or  purer  art 
forms  with  a  German  philosophical  tradition.  See  Martin  Jay  0  993)  Downcast  Eyes,  Berkeley.  This  tradition  viewed 
these  arts  as  the  quintessential  art  forms  because  their  "non-representational  quality  insulated  [these  forms]  against  too 
natural  a  mimesis  of  the  given  world.  "  (265) 
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end  to  this  action,  because  its  existence  is  the  end  of  the  indeterminate  motion  of  play 
that  is  found  in  artistic  creation. 
We  can  note  that  Play,  on  Huizinga's  account  at  least,  is  characteristically  boundless 
in  the  sense  that  the  oscillatory  movement  that  is  inescapably  bound  up  with  play  forces 
a  continual  re-alignment  of  expectations!  More  generally,  to  the  subject  at  play,  there  is 
no  knowing  when  the  play  motion  will  end,  or  where  it  will  go  -  it  could  be  cancelled 
by  the  interference  of  the  world  'outside',  that  is  to  say,  by  a  sensory  intrusion; 
something  innocuous  and  unexpected,  a  sight  or  a  sound,  perhaps.  This  is  also  reflected 
in  a  corresponding  objective  meaninglessness,  as  the  slippery  movement  of  a  world  that 
eludes  categories. 
As  observers,  play  challenges  our  capacity  for  definition,  and  makes  it  difficult  to 
identify  what  is  happening,  because  it  cannot  be  viewed  or  understood  in  terms  of 
objective  intentions,  although  we  are  usually  able  to  recognize  it  just  as  this  thing  'play,  ' 
the  generalization  of  which  merely  suggests  the  incipient  disorder  of  a  non-specific 
categorisation.  And  so  fittingly,  play  to  order  is,  as  Huizinga  noted,  no  longer  play,  but 
instead  becomes  a  rule-bound  game;  we  learn  to  'play'  musical  instruments,  for  example, 
by  observing  the  rules  of  musical  theory. 
The  curious  thing  about  these  perceptions  of  play,  and  of  the  role  of  play  in  the 
plastic  arts,  and  the  explanation  of  why  these  constitute  my  point  of  departure  here,  is 
that  this  view  was  still  expressed  towards  the  middle  of  the  twentieth  century.  By  the 
time  Homo  Ludens  was  published  it  had  largely  been  forgotten  that  over  twenty  years 
before,  in  the  period  just  before  the  outbreak  of  the  Great  War,  a  revolution  in  the 
plastic  arts  had  taken  place,  one  I  am  suggesting  that  forces  a  reconsideration  of  this  idea 
of  the  absence  of  the  play  element  in  'plastic  art'  -a  term  that  would  come  to 
encompass,  I  argue,  a  non-material  element  that  was  absent  in  Huizinga's  definition  of 
the  term.  4 
'  There  is  also  a  philosophical  distinction  to  be  drawn  between  what  we  see  on  the  surface  -  let  us  call  this 
physical  movement  -  and  what  we  cannot  see,  which  is  the  intention  that  may,  or  may  not,  be  moving  the  body. 
Thus  some  philosophers  have  made  a  distinction  between  action  and  motion.  The  point  here  is  that  play  may  not 
always  look  like  we  expect  it  to,  that  is  to  say,  may  not  be  observable  in  physical  movements,  or  in  verbal  play,  and  so 
on.  However,  for  the  sake  of  simplicity  we  may  infer  that  when  Huizinga  speaks  of  'visible  action'  that  this  is 
understood  as  the  movement  of  a  body,  or  bodies.  An  ontology  of  action  tells  us  that  action  can  also  be  motionless, 
and  that  motion  can  be  free  of  action.  See,  for  example,  Lawrence  Davis  (1979)  Theory  ofAction.  Englewood  Cliffs, 
NJ. 
'  For  a  larger  historical  perspective  on  play  and  modernity,  see  Hans-Georg  Gadamer  0  99  5)  Truth  and  Method, 
New  York. 
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Of  course  the  history  of  modernism  is  also  a  history  of  revolutions,  a  history  of  the 
self-critical  appraisal  of  the  medium  of  painting  itself,  from  the  abandonment  of  classical 
imitation  -  the  picturing  of  an  ideal,  separate,  reality  -  to  the  rediscovery  of  the 
corporeality  of  human  vision  in  the  nineteenth  century.  '  By  the  1940's  the  latest 
development  in  this  continual  renewal  had  resulted  in  American  action  field  painting, 
and  pure  abstract  expressionism,  found  in  the  work  of  artists  like  Jackson  Pollock, 
Willem  de  Kooning,  and  Mark Rothko,  for  example. 
Painting  and  'Framing' 
We  should  make  no  mistake:  what  was  happening  in  this  latest  manifestation  of 
modernism  was  new.  Nevertheless,  it  was  also  a  development  that  that  remained  within 
the  formalist  constraints  of  painting,  which  was  what  allowed  Huizinga  to  suggest  that 
such  work  (had  he  viewed  it)  could  not  be  free  play.  As  for  the  more  or  less 
undetermined  motion  of  play,  we  may  see,  for  example,  elements  of  chance  in  some  of 
this  painting.  In  the  paint-drip  technique  employed  by  Jackson  Pollock,  some  saw 
evidence  of  an  element  of  the  accidental,  although  the  artist  disagreed  with  this, 
distancing  himself  from  the  idea  that  he  indulged  disorder  by  remarking  in  1950  that 
CC  with  experience  it  seems  to  be  possible  to  control  the  flow  of  the  paint  to  a  great  extent, 
and  ... 
I  don't  use  the  accidental  -'cause  I  deny  the  accident.  "' 
Other  members  of  this  school  whose  work  looked  less  like  the  accidental  Played  a 
part  in  the  conception  or  execution  of  the  paintings  were  no  less  diligent  than  Pollock  in 
emphasizing  the  practice  of  their  art,  revealing  in  actual  fact,  the  great  pains  it  took  to  be 
creative.  Of  William  de  Kooning,  for  example,  one  of  the  central  figures  in  the  abstract 
expressionist  movement,  it  was  said  that  here  was: 
An  artist  whose  purity  of  purpose  and  commitment  to  the  painterly  process 
became  a  model  for  the  generation  of  the  fifties  [ 
...  and  that]  these  artists  faced 
the  canvas  with  the  Self  ..  the  only  control  was  that  of  truth,  intuitively  felt.  If  it 
wasn't  true  to  our  feeling,  according  to  protocol  it  had  to  be  rubbed  out.  In 
fact,  painters  boasted  of  their  paintings  as  a  tangible  record  of  a  series  of  errors.  ' 
'  On  the  importance  of  the  eye  as  understood  through  the  'unstable  physiology  and  temporality'  of  the  human 
body,  see  Martin  Jay,  ibid,  chapter  three. 
See  Daniel  Belgrad  (1998)  The  Culture  ofSpontaneity,  Chicago:  168. 
'  Quoted  in  B.  Altshuler  (1994)  The  Avant-Garde  in  Exhibition,  Berkeley:  161-62. 
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What  we  can  take  from  this  is  that  aside  from  the  obvious  materiality  of  the  Abstract 
Expressionists'  near  exclusive  use  of  paint  and  canvas  -a  form  that  limits  the 
continuation  of  play  -  there  is  also  obviously  this  idea  of  adherence  to  a  particular 
school  of  thinking  about  what  the  purpose  of  painting  should  be  (not  unusual  in  itself, 
as  modernism  is  also  a  graveyard  of  'isms'),  or  to  the  'purity'  of  abstraction,  to  painterly 
(protocols,  '  or  concerns  over  the  control  of  materials,  and  so  on.  All  this  suggests  that 
Huizinga  was  quite  accurate  in  his  refusal  to  admit  plastic  creation  -  'subjected  to  the 
skill  and  proficiency  of  the  forming  hand'  -  into  the  realm  of  the  truly  playful.  ' 
Less  obviously  painterly  than  Abstract  Expressionism,  techniques  of  collage  had 
already  altered  the  scope  of  expression  and  were  common  since  Cubism,  which  is  to  say 
for  40  years  or  more  -  in  the  use  of  found  elements  of  text  and  matter,  which  broke  the 
two-dimensional  flatness  of  the  canvas  -  but  clearly  painting  was  still  the  predominant 
mode  of  expression,  and  at  this  time  abstract  expressionism  saw  New  York  take  over 
from  Paris  as  the  capital  of  modern  art.  ' 
Lost  amongst  all  this,  largely  obscured  by  the  influence  of  these  artists,  was  much  in 
the  way  of  memory  of  the  real  revolution  in  twentieth  century  art,  began  in  1912  when 
Marcel  Duchamp,  a  painter  of  notoriety  if  not  a  painter  of  note,  abandoned  painting, 
and  in  moving  beyond  the  confines  of  material  and  form,  he  was  able  to  engage  in  a 
ceaseless  play.  Duchamp  had  already  moved  through  a  variety  of  styles  between  the  start 
of  the  century  and  this  moment  in  1912,  and  perhaps  reflecting  his  lack  of  impact  as  a 
conventional  painter  as  much  as  his  unease  with  its  limitations,  he  made  the  crucial 
decision  to  look  for  other  means  of  exploring  his  ideas.  "Marcel,  "  he  wrote  in  a  note  to 
himself  in  1912,  "no  more  painting.  ""  Duchamp's  'shipwrecked'  artist  as  an  individual 
-  no  schools,  and  no  social  or  personal  limits  -  was  in  stark  contrast  to  all  that  went 
'  Edward  Lucie-Smith  (2001)  observed,  "Uackson]  Pollock  and  [Franz]  Mine  seem  to  have  had  perfect  faith  in 
ca-nvas  and  paint  as  a  viable  means  of  communicating  something.  "  See,  Movements  in  Art  Since  1945,  London:  36. 
'  It  has  been  suggested  by  Mark  C.  Taylor  (1992)  that  Duchamp's  implicit  question  to  the  art  world  -  does  a 
work  of  art  need  to  be  'created'  to  be  art  -  was  already  implicit  in  cubist  collage.  In  Disfiguring.  -  Art,  Architecture  and 
Religion,  Taylor  notes,  "the  techniques  of  collage  and  papiers  coll6s  employ  everyday  objects  to  interrupt  the  purity 
and  homogeneity  of  the  painted  surface.  "  With  the  use  of  everyday  objects  he  says,  the  separation  of  the  realm  of  art 
and  the  realm  of  things  is  destroyed.  See  163-64. 
"  The  quote  is  from  Sanouillet  and  Peterson  (1973)  (eds)  Selected  Writings  of  Marcel  Duchamp,  London:  133. 
Duchamp  never  really  earned  a  living  from  his  own  art  for  the  rest  of  his  life.  For  a  time  he  was  a  librarian;  later  he 
would  be  a  French  language  teacher,  and  an  art  dealer.  His  abandonment  of  the  profession  of  artist  did  not,  however, 
reflect  a  desire  to  give  up  being  an  artist.  It  was  to  enable  him  to  become  'completely  freelance'.  "The  artist  should  be 
alone,  "  he  said  in  1912.  "Everyone  for  himself,  as  in  a  shipwreck.  "  See  Calvin  Tomkins  (1998)  Duchamp:  A 
Biography,  London:  84. 
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before  him;  in  other  words,  the  history  of  'isms'  that  constitute  the  development  of 
modernism. 
In  the  light  of  his  relative  obscurity  at  the  time,  it  is  remarkable  that  within  the 
space  of  ten  years,  Duchamp  would  have  produced  the  work  that  turned  the  art  world 
upside  down  -  although  this  was  very  much  a  delayed  effect  -  leaving  a  body  of  work 
that  contradicted  and  shocked  the  expectations  of  the  art  world,  and  that  would  see  him 
cajole  twentieth-century  art  into  the  realm  of  play,  that  Huizinga,  writing  in  1938, 
believed  it  could  not  inhabit.  "Play  only  becomes  possible,  thinkable  and 
understandable,  "  Huizinga  had  said,  "when  an  influx  of  mind  breaks  down  the  absolute 
determinism  of  the  cosmos.  ""  That  is  to  say,  play  is  not  matter,  it  cannot  be  realised  in 
painting,  in  material  objectivity  generally,  because  in  its  fluidity  it  "bursts  the  bounds  of 
the  physically  existent,  "  and  so  only  has  significance  as  an  interlude  from  what  we  might 
call  the  determinate  motion  of  life,  which  is  to  say,  the  meeting  of  needs,  and  the 
undertaking  of  work  for  definite,  usually  rational,  ends  -  such  as  applying  paint  to 
12  canvas  to  create  art. 
For  Marcel  Duchamp  the  aspect  of  play  in  his  work  after  1912  was  allowed  to 
ascend  to  the  heights  of  free  play,  of  chance,  by  forgetting  the  demands  of  painting,  and 
to  be  precise,  by  overcoming  the  resistance  of  the  medium  by  abolishing  its  validity 
where  others  before  had  submitted  to  it. 
Duchamp's  playfulness  has  an  element  of  child's  play  about  it,  this  is  clear,  although 
his  playfulness  also  takes  on  a  more  serious  tone  when  seen  through  the  historical  lens.  I 
want  to  suggest  that  Duchamp  consciously  employed  disguise  because  he  saw  the 
pretence  of  masking  his  identity  as  analogical  to  a  double-dealing  art  world,  and  that  the 
means  of  coming  to  terms  with  this  duplicity  was  through  selective  strategies  of  masking 
and  unmasking.  By  playing  hide  and  seek  with  the  art  world,  he  was  able  to  show  how 
seriously  entrenched  tradition  was.  The  consequence  of  this  was  a  re-evaluation,  through 
his  readymades,  of  the  determinate  means  of  painting  as  a  medium,  and  this  extended 
generally  to  a  doubting  of  the  idea  that  an  artist  working  in  the  visual  field  had  to 
employ  plastic  means. 
These,  then,  were  his  ideas,  which  all  boil  down  to  one  statement  -  that  being  an 
artist  is  not  about  painting,  about  the  medium,  but  about  choosing,  or  differentiating 
''  Huizinga,  ibid:  3. 
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some  object  and  bringing  it  to  some  place  where  it  may  be  considered  in  a  new  way. 
This  was  the  influx  of  mind,  which  -  to  restate  Huizinga's  active  condition  of  play  - 
fundamentally  upset  the  artistic  cosmos. 
13 
In  the  readymades  -  everyday  objects  that  were  taken  out  of  context  and  declared  to 
be  'art'  -a  crucial  component  of  the  play  was  that  Duchamp  was  allowed  to  suspend 
meaning.  Between  possibility  and  actuality,  something  and  nothing,  these  items,  found 
already  made,  were  only  realised  as  'a  readymade,  '  according  to  Duchamp,  as  a  condition 
of  their  contingency  both  in  and  as  a  kind  of  'rendezvous.  '  In  the  former  case,  this  was  as 
a  meeting  of  the  idea  of  the  readymade  and  the  designated  object  -  that  is,  in 
finding/choosing  the  object,  and  in  the  latter  case  as  "being  subject  to  all  kinds  of 
delays"  -  which  is  the  delay  that  intervenes  after  Duchamp's  choice  and  prior  to  the 
determination  of  the  objective  meaning  of  the  item  to,  say,  a  viewer,  as  Duchamp  noted 
in  a  well-known  'specification'  for  the  readymade: 
Specificationsfor  "Readymades" 
by  planning  for  a  moment  to  come  (on  such  a  day,  such  a  date  such  a  minute), 
to  "to  inscribe  a  readymade  -  The  ready  made  can  later  be  looked  for.  -  (with 
all  kinds  of  delays).  The  important  thing  then  is  just  this  matter  of  timing,  this 
snapshot  effect  [ 
... 
]  It  is  a  kind  of  rendezvous.  14 
A  highly  contentious  and  disagreeable  aspect  of  this  way  of  making  or  creating  art  was  in 
the  role  it  gave  to  a  public.  In  an  interview  with  Pierre  Cabanne,  Duchamp  explained: 
The  artist  makes  something,  then  one  day,  he  is  recognized  by  the  intervention 
of  the  public,  of  the  spectator  [ 
... 
I  you  can't  stop  that,  because  in  brief  it's  the 
product  of  two  poles  -  there's  the  one  pole  of  the  one  who  makes  the  work,  and 
the  pole  of  the  one  who  looks  at  it.  I  give  the  latter  as  much  importance  as  the 
one  who  makes  it.  " 
Duchamp's  'delays'  can  also  be  understood  in  terms  of  the  time  it  takes  for  these 
two  poles  to  meet,  the  unknown  arrival  of  the  viewing  eye  leaving  an  essential  tension 
hanging  over  the  question  of  meaning.  This  tension  might  not  be  evident  in  the  'visible 
action'  of  some  phenomena,  but  the  anxiety  produced  by  these  readymades  was  enough, 
Ibid:  4-5. 
Huizinga,  lbid:  8,  observes  that  the  "consciousness  of  play  being  'only  a  pretend'  does  not  by  any  means 
prevent  it  from  proceeding  with  utmost  seriousness.  " 
"  These  specifications  are  in  the  notes  collected  as  'The  Green  Box,  '  reproduced  in  Sanouillet  and  Peterson 
(1973)  ibid:  32. 
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as  we  shall  see,  to  prevent  the  establishment  of  a  fixed,  or  stable  meaning.  As  Octavio 
Paz  has  said,  the  readymades  saw  Duchamp  'juggling  with  knives,  '  and  succeeding,  he 
believes: 
Because,  in  the  end,  the  gesture  is  a  philosophical  or,  rather  dialectical  game 
more  than  an  artistic  operation:  it  is  a  negation  which,  through  humour, 
becomes  affirmation.  Suspended  by  irony,  in  a  state  of  perpetual  oscillation,  this 
affirmation  is  always  provisional.  " 
The  effect  of  the  readymade  was  to  remove  the  frame  -  the  frame  of  reference,  as  well  as 
the  actual  physical  boundaries  of  a  frame  that  separates  a  canvas  from  the  context  in 
which  it  hangs,  a  separation  that  sees  the  playfulness  of  artistic  creativity  terminate  with 
the  object  itself,  bound  and  finitely  given  within  space  and  time.  17  As  Thierry  de  Duve 
has  said,  "in  front  of  a  readymade  there  is  no  longer  any  technical  difference  between 
making  art  and  appreciating  it.  ""  This,  once  permitted,  became  the  condition  for  the 
readymade.  However,  by  the  time  Homo  Ludens  was  published,  Duchamp  was  largely 
forgotten  as  an  artist,  apparently  more  determined  to  become  a  chess  champion  than  to 
remain  an  artist.  "  As  the  consequence  of  another  delay,  however,  by  the  end  of  the 
twentieth  century,  his  status  as  the  father  of  conceptual  art  would  be  sealed,  along  with 
his  reputation  as  the  master  prankster  of  modern  art,  its  devil  in  disguise,  a  reputation 
that  derives,  chiefly,  from  one  particularly  impenetrable  object.  " 
A  Familiar  Article  of  Bathroom  Furniture 
For  a  long  time,  modernist  and  avant-garde  art  had  been  visiting  new  territory,  and  it  is 
not  denied  that  sometimes  this  was  shocking  and  iconoclastic  in  its  innovation.  In  large 
part  this  derived  from  presenting  something  familiar  within  a  new  context,  or  in  a  new 
form.  Antoine  Compagnon,  for  example,  notes  the  outrage  that  surrounded  Manet's 
two  most  infamous  paintings,  Dej*euner  sur  Pherbe  and  Olympia,  which  were  greeted  with 
"  Ibid:  70. 
'60ctavio  Paz  (1970)  Marcel  Duchamp,  Or  the  Castle  ofPurity,  London:  17 
"  On  the  'paragonal'  effect  of  painting  traditions,  cf  Viktor  1.  Stoichita  (1997)  A  Short  History  of  the  Shadow. 
London. 
See  Thierry  de  Duve  (1996)  Kant  After  Duchamp,  Cambridge,  MA:  290. 
By  the  mid-1940's  Duchamp's  influence  was  eclipsed  by  the  Abstract  Expressionists,  a  school  he  was 
unimpressed  by  as  being  too  retinal.  For  their  own  part,  the  Abstract  Expressionists  did  not  rate  Duchamp,  and  his 
reputation  in  this  Period  suffered  accordingly;  John  Cage,  Robert  Rauschenberg  and  jasper  Johns  would  later  be 
involved  in  reviving  Duchamp's  reputation.  See  Calvin  Tomkins  (1998)  ibid. 
"  Chapter  ten  of  this  work  explores  some  aspects  of  the  arts  that  have  taken  forward  Duchamp's  questioning  of 
identity  and  meaning. 
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disapproval  partly  because  of  the  decontextualising  of  archetypes,  in  these  two  cases  the 
female  nude,  and  perhaps,  as  Martin  Jay  suggests,  because  of  the  shocking  return  of  the 
viewer's  gaze  from  the  figures  Manet  had  depicted,  a  painterly  device  to  draw  the  viewer 
in  that  had  largely  been  abandoned  by  this  time.  " 
The  nude  carried  with  it  a  history  of  depiction  that  regulated  the  aesthetic 
conditions  for  understanding  the  form  of  the  nude.  Manet  not  only  re-evaluated  this 
particular  context,  but  by  his  method  of  'framing'  his  paintings  -  of  masking  off  the 
boundary  that  separated  viewer  and  painting,  by  use  of  brush  and  paint,  he  had 
developed  a  new  concentration  on  the  picture  itself,  that  the  use  of  skill  to  remove  the 
perspective  that  would  have  provided  an  illusion  of  depth  in  the  scene,  forced  a 
concentration  on  the  artist's  hand  and  the  scepticism  of  external  reality  that  this 
betrayed.  " 
One  familiar  object,  taken  out  of  its  normal  context,  took  the  capacity  of 
modernism  to  shock  several  steps  further  than  this.  In  1917  Marcel  Duchamp  unveiled 
a  work  known  as  Fountain,  one  of  his  readymades.  We  say  this  now  with  all  the 
authority  of  fact,  but  actually,  Duchamp  did  not  unveil  it;  he  sent  it  to  an  exhibition 
under  an  assumed  name  -  but  more  of  that  later.  This  'sculpture,  '  as  it  was  sometimes 
referred  to  at  the  time,  was  not  actually  a  fountain,  but  rather  an  upturned  urinal  -a 
mass-produced  piece  of  bathroom  equipment.  It  was  neither  sculpture  nor  painting. 
The  significance  of  this  de-contextualised  urinal  was  in  the  impact  it  made  on 
questions  of  representation,  of  the  contextual  limits  on  the  meaning  of  a  work  of  art. 
This  becomes  so  pronounced  that  identification  between  a  work  of  art  and  the  world 
needn't  now  bother  an  artist  at  all.  Contrast  this  with  the  situation  prior  to  Marcel 
Duchamp's  readymade,  to  other  modernist  innovations  such  as  impressionism,  fauvism, 
or  cubism,  which  Jerrold  Seigel  suggests  "had  been  undertaken  for  some  aesthetic 
21  See  Martin  Jay  (1993)  ibid:  chapter  three.  One  thing  that  I  want  to  insist  on  is  that  the  chance  element  is  in 
the  perception  of  these  works  of  'art'  and  that  locates  them  within  the  realm  of  play,  rendering  any  notions  of  meaning 
and  identity  quite  contingent.  It  is  thus  within  the  context  of  play  that  I  am  here  identifying  such  modern  work  as 
radically  contingent.  T.  J.  Clark  suggests  a  much  earlier,  and  irreversible,  contingent  character  in  the  history  of  modern 
painting,  dating  from  David's  painting  of  Marat,  of  1793,  that  is  found  in  this  work's  "spatial  and  human  closeness,  " 
its  "immediacy.  "  See  T.  J  Clark  (1999)  Farewell  to  an  Idea:  Episodesfrom  a  History  ofModernism,  New  Haven:  chapter 
two.  To  be  clear  on  the  difference  of  my  position:  I  am  locating  contingency  in  the  transformation  of  objects  from 
something  recognisable  into  something  confusing.  This,  in  a  sense,  leaves  the  work  unfinished.  Furthermore,  the 
necessity  of  this  effect  derives  from  the  removal  of  painterly  constraints,  and  so  makes  the  contingent  element  a  matter 
of  our  (viewer  and  artist)  relation  to  objects.  My  point  is  that  the  source  of  contingency  with  regard  to  the  element  of 
play  rests  on  the  objects  being  particular  kinds  of  objects.  This  neither  contradicts  nor  disagrees  with  the  point  Clark 
makes  about  contingency. 
22  See  Antoine  Compagnon  (1994)  Five  Paradoxes  ofModernity,  New  York:  chapter  one. 
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purpose,  to  expand  art's  subject  matter,  extend  its  expressive  range,  or  heighten  its 
perceptual  power. 
))23 
Duchamp  saw  artistic  conventions  as  almost  a  succession  of  disguises,  as  the 
empirically  given  surface  of  which  perception  would  conceal  the  fact  that  there  was  no 
depth  on  the  surface.  He  almost  regarded  modernism  as  evidence  of  this  essential  lack  of 
depth.  Other  'schools'  were  concerned  with  developing  modern  self-criticism,  but 
Duchamp  could  not  fit  into  this.  He  saw  himself,  in  his  own  words,  'shipwrecked,  '  left 
on  his  own  -  he  was  no  longer  interested  in  expanding  the  form  of  painting,  but  having 
been  a  painter  he  was  concerned  with  what  he  regarded  to  be  the  limitations  imposed  by 
stylistic  conventions,  and  even  personal  habits,  which  was  one  reason  he  gave  up 
painting.  Another  was  that  he  considered  artistic  freedom  in  radical  terms,  as  absolute 
freedom  from  any  social  or  personal  demands  -  of  the  absolute  artistic  isolation  of 
apostasy,  and  therefore  sought  to  realise  this  by  developing  a  kind  of  indifference  to  the 
art  world  around  him,  to  not  have  to  make  art  out  of  any  professional  duty,  or  even 
aesthetic  impulse,  and  this  also  explains  why  for  the  majority  of  his  life  he  earned  his 
living  through  a  variety  of  occupations  and  endeavours,  but  not  through  his  art.  "There 
are  two  kinds  of  artists,  "  he  said.  "The  artist  that  deals  with  society,  is  integrated  into 
society;  and  the  other  artist,  the  completely  freelance  artist,  who  has  no  obligations.  )324 
He  sought,  in  other  words  the  freedom  of  pure  play,  rather  than  the  rational  limits  of 
Kantian  freedom,  which  is  the  freedom  of  man  as  a  social  being,  freedom  consequent  on 
plurality  in  being  rather  than  singularity. 
Another  important  aspect  of  the  development  of  the  play  element  was  in  the  use  he 
began  to  make  of  the  accidental.  The  various  'rendezvous'  that  brought  the  readymades 
into  being  seemed  to  result  from  whim,  if  we  accept  Duchamp's  'specification  for  the 
readymade,  '  although  the  impossibility  of  destroying  the  link  between  the  eye  that  sees 
and  one's  memory  of  likes  and  dislikes  seems  obvious,  and  mitigates  the  chance  element 
in  creation,  this  is  not  where  the  readymades  truly  realise  a  radical  contingency".  With 
each  readymade,  Duchamp  effectively  wagering  on  their  reception  by  posterity,  and  one 
"  Jerrold  Seigel  (1995)  The  Private  Worlds  ofMarcelDuchamp,  Berkeley:  115. 
Sanouillet  and  Peterson,  ibid:  133. 
25  They  are  radically  contingent  because  as  previously  'known'  objects  they  set  up  a  host  of  expectations  related 
to  use  and  context.  Similarly,  the  artist  to  contributes  to  the  radically  contingent  character  of  such  work  because 
contingency  as  the  residue  of  knowledge  is  manifested  in  the  figure  of  the  modern  artist  as  a  category  breaker.  Thus,  it 
is  necessary  that  the  artist  be  an  insider  -  in  other  words,  the  work  is  also  radically  contingent  because  it  is  rooted  in 
the  modern  artistic  temperament. 
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reason  he  avoided  taking  up  painting  as  a  profession  was  that  he  knew  that  the 
resolution  of  this  wager  was  unforeseeable,  or  up  to  chance: 
The  danger  is  in  pleasing  an  immediate  public,  the  immediate  public  that 
comes  around  you  and  takes  you  in  and  accepts  you  and  gives  you  success  and 
everything.  Instead  of  that,  you  should  wait  fifty  or  a  hundred  years  for  your 
true  public.  "' 
The  unearthing  of  Duchamp's  intentions  through  the  evidence  left  behind  in  interviews 
and  notes  suggest  that  many  of  the  readymades  appear  to  have  been  created  far  from 
accidentally.  Nevertheless,  the  importance  of  the  second,  delayed,  rendezvous  marks 
these  out  as  no  ordinary  artworks;  they  realised  no  real  craft,  no  expression  of  self,  and 
lacking  this  creative  identity  they  became  meaningful  only  in  the  act  of  observation,  like 
the  atoms  of  the  quantum  world,  and  thus  only  meaningful  by  chance.  " 
For  his  part  of  this  wager,  Duchamp  reveals  in  his  recollection  of  his  choice  of  the 
earliest  readymades  that  the  most  important  component  of  his  choosing  was  given  by 
making  the  merest  alteration  to  the  item,  one  that  created  an  ambiguous  object: 
In  1913  1  had  the  happy  idea  to  fasten  a  bicycle  wheel  to  a  kitchen  stool  and 
watch  it  turn.  A  few  months  later  I  bought  a  cheap  reproduction  of  a  winter 
evening  landscape,  which  I  called  'Pharmacy'  after  adding  two  small  dots,  a  red 
one  and  a  yellow  one,  in  the  horizon.  In  New  York  in  1915  1  bought  at  a 
hardware  store  a  snow  shovel  on  which  I  wrote  'In  Advance  of  the  Broken 
.,  1.  rm.  A 
)28 
And  thus  was  born  an  idea  that  would  revolutionize  art  in  the  twentieth  century:  the 
idea  that  the  artist  would  respect  no  limitations  of  form,  matter,  or  mediation.  "  This 
first  readymade  also  went  beyond,  for  example,  the  attempt  in  futurist  painting  to 
incorporate  motion  in  the  fact  that  it  was  a  'moving  sculpture,  '  although  this  was  a 
motion  which  had  no  point,  no  goal,  as  the  circular  motion  of  the  upturned  wheel 
26 
Ibid:  133. 
27  It  is  argued  that  some  readymades  can  be  shown  to  have  involved  a  high  degree  of  design,  or  a  great 
involvement  in  the  manipulation  of  the  circumstances  surrounding  their  reception.  I  would  not  disagree.  In  fact  this 
just  emphasizes  again  the  play  aspect,  which  Duchamp  was  indulging  all  the  time.  On  the  apparent  'manufacture'  of 
Fountain,  see  for  example,  William  Carnfield,  'Duchamp's  Fountain:  Aesthetic  Object,  Icon,  or  Anti-Art?  '  in  Thierry 
De  Duve  (199  1)  (ed)  The  Definitively  Unfinished  Marcel  Duchamp,  Cambridge,  MA:  133-79. 
21  Quoted  in  Duchamp's  'Apropos  of  Readymades,  '  Sanouillet  and  Peterson,  ibid:  141-42.  Commentators  have 
dated  the  readymade  to  variously  1912  -  when  Duchamp  first  had  the  idea  for  a  readymade,  and  1917  and  the  first 
public  showing  of  a  readymade  -  the  infamous  Fountain. 
"  See  Thierry  De  Duve  (1998)  ibid.  This  is  his  thesis.  I  come  to  this  view  from  the  perspective  of  identity.  That 
is,  objects,  and  objectivity  are  bound  up  with  notions  of  completeness  and  order.  The  disorder  of  expectations  is 
manifested  in  the  denial  of  rational  categories  of  identification. 
j  Scanian  2001  139 Devil  In  Disguise 
prevented  the  possibility  of  the  linear  progression  of  rational  movement  (Plate  12).  It  is 
motion  suspended,  or  in  other  words,  the  directionless  motion  of  play.  'O 
From  our  point  of  view,  the  most  notable  aspect  of  the  readymade  is  that  it  presents 
Duchamp  at  the  beginning  of  a  history  of  fascination  with  disguise,  with  games  of  hide 
and  seek,  which  culminate  with  his  final  work,  Rant  Donnes  (Given),  which  is  barely 
glimpsed  by  the  observer  through  a  peep  hole.  There  is,  in  Duchamp's  work,  an 
indulgence  of  chance  that  takes  the  artist  and  audience  below  the  surface  of  the 
perceptible  to  the  fluidity  of  ideas,  a  journey  that  was  not  possible  to  the  same  extent 
with  painting.  For  Duchamp,  the  problem  with  painting  was  partially  that  the  necessity 
of  working  with  certain  accepted  materials  itself  imposed  a  limitation,  in  that  the  artist 
standing  with  brush  in  hand  would  find  it  difficult  to  avoid  self-expression.  The 
medium  of  expression,  then,  was  blocking  the  realisation  of  ideas.  I  considered  painting 
as  a  means  of  expression,  "  Duchamp  said  in  1956: 
One  means  of  expression  among  others,  and  not  a  complete  end  for  life  at  all; 
in  the  same  way  I  consider  that  color  is  only  a  means  of  expression  In  painting 
and  not  an  end.  In  other  words,  painting  should  not  be  exclusively  retinal  or 
visual;  it  should  have  to  do  with  the  gray  matter.  " 
The  connection  between  the  acceptability  of  means  of  expression,  the  use  of  medium, 
and  autonomy,  was  at  the  root  of  the  problem  for  Duchamp.  The  autonomous  artist, 
like  the  autonomous  subject  in  general,  was  thought  to  be  'transparent,  '  and  this  was 
reflected  in  the  assumption  that  art,  particularly  realist  art,  was  comprehensible  -  that  is 
to  say  susceptible  to  understanding  on  the  basis  of  what  is  seen;  the  rational  mind 
assumes  that  what  is  on  the  surface  is  representative  of  something  deeper,  something 
genuine  and  fixed,  rather  than  something  fleeting  or  elusive. 
We  might  suggest  that  Duchamp's  problem  with  painting  could  be  stated  thus:  the 
painting,  relying  on  its  bounded,  finite  form,  as  the  prima  facie  evidence  of  plastic 
activity,  presents  the  artist  as  someone  who  attempts  to  connect  with  some  truth,  but 
instead  of  accepting  the  empirical  evidence  of  surfaces,  that  the  flat  plane  of  the  canvas 
could  present  anything  more  than  an  opinion,  Duchamp  preferred  to  say,  so  it  seems, 
'0  A  point  made  by  Jerrold  Seigel,  Ibid:  122.  See  also  Ades,  Cox  and  Hopkins  (1999)  Duchamp,  London:  47. 
The  authors  suggest  that  Bicycle  Wheel  can  be  seen  as  "a  direct  or  half-satirical  response  to  the  demands  of  Futurist 
manifestos,  and  in  particular  of  Umberto  Boccioni's  'Technical  Manifesto  of  Futurist  Sculpture'  of  1912. 
"  See  Sanouillet  and  Peterson,  ibid:  135-36. 
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PLATE  12.  READYMADES,  Marcel  Duchamp,  1913-1917.  The  readymades  were  ambiguous  gestures  - 
-  questions  that  asked  what  plastic  creation  was.  See  Octavio  Paz  (1990)  Appearance  Stripped  Bare,  New 
York.  Duchamp,  for  his  part  saw  the  gesture  as  only  the  initiation  of  a  process  of  continual  creation  that 
was  taken  up  by  unknown  and  unknowing  future  viewers:  "In  the  last  analysis,  the  artist  may  shout  from 
all  the  rooftops  that  he  is  a  genius:  he  will  have  to  wait  for  the  verdict  of  the  spectator  in  order  that  his 
declarations  take  a  social  value  and  that,  finally  posterity  includes  him  in  the  primers  of  Art  History.  " 
Quoted  in  M.  Sanouillet  and  E.  Peterson  (1973)  The  Essential  Writings  ofMarcel  Duchamp,  London:  138- 
39. 
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that  the  surface  presentation  of  the  world,  of  the  artist's  view  of  reality,  was  contingent. 
It  was  really  no  more  than  an  hypothesis,  but  this  fact  was  concealed  by  questions  of 
form  and  medium,  and  that  therefore  this  surface  could  like,  a  mask,  be  pulled  off  to 
reveal  that  all  such  'hypotheses'  were  really  no  more  than  a  series  of  'Just  suppose  ) 
expressions.  Duchamp's  delays  were  also  a  perhaps,  but  they  didn't  pretend  to  be 
otherwise;  they  gloried  in  their  ambiguity.  Where  painting  was  a  safe  bet,  Duchamp 
now  proposed  to  wager  wildly. 
In  the  conflation  of  circumstances  that  provide  the  background  to  Duchamp 
'inscribing'  these  objects,  the  readymades,  and  in  creating  conditions  where  these  objects 
might  be  appropriated,  by  eschewing  traditional  plastic  creation,  they  were  delivered  to 
the  artistic  sphere,  and  given  aesthetic  status,  by  chance,  not  by  intentionally  adhering  to 
conditions  of  artistic  acceptance,  which  was  normally  construe  as  a  component  of 
autonomy,  as  seen  for  example  in  works  of  self-expression  or  mimesis.  " 
Once  situated  within  the  artistic  realm  the  ambiguous  objects  become  secluded 
from  their  own  functional  domain,  and  in  this  sense  they  are  unlike  any  other  objects  of 
art,  in  so  far  as  they  turn  the  space  of  art  into  a  playground.  However,  this  is  not  in 
virtue  of  the  objects  taking  on  the  appearance  of  toys;  the  readymades  are  disruptive 
because  they  are  denials  of  a  contextual  understanding.  And  as  playful  creations  that  are 
only  fully  realised  by  the  observer  engaging  in  the  play  they  remain  forever  suspended, 
existing  only  as  a  'perhaps,  '  or  as  a  Duchampian  'delay.  '  The  implication  of  the  delay 
consists  in  the  fact  that  it  brings  us  face  to  face  with  the  ambiguity  of  appearances,  the 
fact  that  things  might  not  always  be  what  they  appear  to  be.  Perhaps  it  is  only  by  an  act 
of  cunning,  of  devious  intent  that  they  are  only  what  someone  calls  them. 
These  objects,  prior  to  the  transforming  'inscription'  merely  had  some  rational 
purpose.  Duchamp's  first  readymade  was  a  bottle  dryer  that  he  purchased  in  1914  (Plate 
12).  It  remained  a  bottle  dryer  until  1915  when  he  wrote  to  his  sister  in  Paris,  explaining 
the  significance  of  the  object,  and  asked  her  then  to  paint  an  inscription  on  the  bottom, 
and  then  sign  it  '[after]  Marcel  Duchamp.  '  By  this  act,  it  was  decontextualised, 
"  There  have  been  recent  claims  that  Duchamp's  readymades  were  actually  the  product  of  a  highly  developed 
and  conscious  design.  For  example,  it  has  been  claimed  that  I.  H.  0.  Q  Q,  a  modification  of  a  Mona  Lisa  postcard  in 
fact  bears  the  image  of  Duchamp  himself  merged  with  the  original  work.  See,  'Taking  Jokes  by  Duchamp  to  Another 
Level  of  Art'  by  Sarah  Boxer  in  The  New  York  Times  of  March  20"  1999;  'Did  Duchamp  Deceive  Us?  '  by  Leslie 
Camhi  in  ARTnews  of  February  1999;  and  'Mona  Lisa:  Who  is  Hidden  Behind  the  Woman  with  the  Moustache'  in 
Panorama  magazine  of  February  4h  1999. 
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differentiated,  and  given  a  unique  status,  by  contrast  with  which  their  functional 
purpose  consigned  then  to  a  lowly,  banal  and  utilitarian  place  in  the  world. 
Of  all  Duchamp's  readymades,  Fountain  (1917),  a  mass  produced  urinal,  turned 
upside  down  and  finished  off  again  with  the  signature  of  the  artist,  is  the  most  notorious 
(Plate  13).  As  the  first  readymade  to  be  brought  to  public  attention  this  is  the  item 
which  more  than  any  other,  changed  the  artistic  landscape  of  the  20  `  century.  In 
contrast  to  some  of  the  other  readymades  history  suggests  that  there  was  a  high  level  of 
planning  involved  in  the  public  unveiling,  and  eventual  reception  of  this  object.  And  it 
is  the  play  of  the  public  appearance/  non-appearance  of  this  readymade  that  eventually 
unveils  its  shattering  proclamation  that  one  need  not  paint  to  be  an  artist,  that  anything 
goes.  In  order  to  achieve  this  effect  Duchamp  not  only  presented  an  object,  under 
disguise,  as  it  were,  but  he  had  to  go  to  elaborate  lengths  to  disguise  his  own  identity  as 
the  artist  behind  Fountain  -  it  bore  the  signature  of  a  mysterious  'R.  Mutt',  later 
'identified'  as  Richard  Mutt. 
The  first  public  display  of  Fountain  was  intended  to  be  the  exhibition  of  the 
American  Society  of  Independent  Artists  in  New  York  in  1917,  and  although  Duchamp 
was  actually  chairman  of  the  hanging  committee,  not  to  mention  being  the  juror  behind 
two  important  decisions  that  affect  how  we  understand  the  unveiling  of  Fountain,  in  the 
end  it  remained  hidden  -  like  Duchamp's  identity  as  the  real  artist  -  veiled  by  a  curtain 
and  secluded,  for  the  time  being,  from  public  view  because  the  Society  did  not  know 
what  to  make  of  it.  "  The  duplicity  of  Duchamp's  role  in  the  whole  affair  is  reinforced 
by  the  decisions  he  took  as  leader  of  the  hanging  committee  for  the  exhibition. 
Firstly,  he  decided  that  the  works  -  and  these  numbered  thousands  -  should  be 
displayed  in  alphabetical  order,  thus  eschewing  conventional  'contextual'  hanging 
practices,  for  example  by  chronology  or  by  artistic  school.  The  second  important 
decision  of  the  Society  of  Independents  for  this  exhibition,  one  that  Duchamp  was  also 
behind,  was  that  there  would  be  'no  Jury,  no  prizes.  '  In  the  end,  however,  as  Fountain 
was  denied  a  place  in  the  exhibition  by  the  decision  of  what  can  only  be  described  as  a 
J.  ury,  we  are  led  to  conclude  that  this  may  have  been  just  what  Duchamp  had  hoped  for. 
"  See  essays  by  William  Camfield  and  Thierry  De  Duve  in  De  Duve  (ed)  (1991)  The  Definitively  Unfinished 
MarcelDuchamp.  Cambridge,  MA. 
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THE  BLIND  MAN 
The  Richard  Mutt  Case 
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PLATE  13.  THE  FJCHARD  MUTT  CASE,  1917.  This  was  a  defence  of  Fountain  and  its  'creator'  R- 
Mutt.  The  object  had  been  denied  a  place  in  the  American  Society  of  Independents  exhibition  in  1917 
because  it  was  not  art.  The  open  letter  to  the  Society  -  published  as  'Buddha  of  the  Bathroom'  -  was 
anonymously  authored  (although  it  is  thought  to  be  by  Duchamp  himselO  and  published  as  an  editorial 
in  The  Blind  Man.  Near  the  end  of  his  life  Duchamp  told  Pierre  Cabanne  that  he  had  written  the  name 
'R.  Mutt'  on  the  urinal  to  "avoid  connection  with  the  personal"  and  that  the  scandal  was  intensified 
because  the  organisers,  through  gossip,  suspected  he  had  sent  the  object,  although  circumstances  decreed 
that  this  was  something  he  could  not  confirm.  See  Pierre  Cabanne,  1971,  Dialogues  with  Marcel 
Duchamp:  p.  55. 
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By  presenting  an  object  that  was  unidentifiable  within  an  art  context,  Duchamp 
revealed  that  the  idea  of  the  jury  is  merely  the  social  manifestation  of  a  subjective 
inability  to  remain  indifferent  as  observers,  and  of  our  tendency  to  stick  with  what  we 
know,  that  which  can  be  assigned  a  place  in  some  order.  The  ambiguity  of  Fountain 
could  not  be  allowed  to  dwell  over  the  exhibition,  the  jury  decided,  and  so  it  was 
excluded  and  with  it,  the  difficult  questions  over  the  Society's  openness  to  new  art. 
Nevertheless,  the  excluded  object  did  overtake  events  as  Duchamp,  again  anonymously, 
published  a  defence  of  the  readymade  in  an  issue  of  a  magazine  called  The  Blind  Man 
(Plate  13). 
As  well  as  sending  in  the  object  under  the  name  of  Richard  Mutt,  Duchamp  took 
the  ruse  to  extreme  lengths  by  fooling  friends  who  were  fellow  members  of  the  Society 
of  Independents,  and  others  such  as  the  influential  gallery  owner  and  dealer  Alfred 
Steiglitz,  who  took  the  famous  photograph  of  Fountain,  believing  it  to  be  the  work  of  R. 
Mutt.  Duchamp  even  withheld  his  true  role  in  the  affair  from  his  own  sister  Suzanne,  to 
whom  he  wrote,  "One  of  my  female  friends  under  a  masculine  pseudonym,  Richard 
Mutt,  sent  in  a  porcelain  urinal  as  a  sculpture.  ""  As  Thierry  de  Duve  has  shown,  the 
entire  scandal  of  the  American  Independents  show,  and  the  case  of  Richard  Mutt,  was 
an  elaborate  set-up  by  Duchamp,  a  test  to  see  how  accurate  was  the  claim  of  the 
Independents  that  any  artist  who  paid  the  fee  of  six  dollars  could  display  their  work. 
Ostensibly,  this  democratic  condition  removed  aesthetic  hierarchies,  although  as 
Duchamp  was  to  discover,  this  attitude  was  simply  a  front.  In  effect,  the  members  of  the 
American  Society  of  Independents  had  a  well-formed  idea  of  what  could  be  shown  in  an 
art  context,  and  this  did  not  include  the  profane  Fountain.  " 
The  readymade  and  the  ambiguity  over  its  role  and  meaning,  effectively  throws  our 
attention  onto  something  else  in  order  to  try  and  grasp  meaning,  to  answer  the 
unavoidable  'what  is  it'  question  it  seems  to  provoke.  It  is impossible  to  explore  this 
without  confronting  the  question  of  identity.  The  ontological  status  of  identity  as  both  a 
principle  of  correspondence  and  individuation,  an  apparent  duality  that  conceals  that,  in 
See  Thierry  De  Duve  (1998)  ibid:  104. 
See  William  Carnfield,  'Duchamp's  Fountain:  Aesthetic  Object,  Icon,  or  Anti-Art?  '  in  De  Duve  (1991):  133- 
84.  Camfield  recounts  the  controversy  surrounding  this  show,  and  the  object  in  question.  Fountain  was  signed  'R. 
Mutt'  and  submitted  a-nonymously.  Duchamp,  scenting  controversy  over  the  item,  was  able  to  retain  his  detached 
position  on  the  Board  of  Directors  of  the  exhibition,  whilst  observing  the  fate  of  his  'sculpture'.  It  was  excluded  on 
the  grounds  that  it  was  'not  art'  after  a  vote  by  the  Board.  This  despite  the  protestations  of  Walter  Arensberg,  another 
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actual  fact,  identification  by  one  means  is  at  the  same  time  the  negative  performance  of 
the  other.  The  readymade  object  itself,  therefore,  still  raises  important  questions  about 
the  objective  identity  that  art  is  presumed  to  establish  between  the  artist  and  the  work 
on  the  one  hand,  and  something  that  produces  the  creative  impulse  on  the  other  -  the 
identity  that  presumably  brings  together,  and  unifies  discrete  phenomena.  36  It  is  worth 
pursuing  another  aspect  of  identity  before  that,  and  that  is  the  one  that  arises  specifically 
as  a  result  of  the  medium  of  artistic  creation,  resulting  from  Duchamp's  abandonment 
of  painting.  His  break  with  the  past  might  be  understood  in  another  way,  and  I  would 
suggest  it  provided  Duchamp  an  opportunity  to  explore  identity  -  even  being  -  by 
hiding  behind  a  variety  of  disguises,  and  that  this  was  a  matter  of  interest  to  him  for  a 
long  time  before  and  after  1912. 
Etcetry  etcetry... 
Duchamp  adopted  at  least  two  significant  disguises  in  the  pursuit  of  his  art  (but  many 
more  on  various  occasions  throughout  his  life).  He  was  'Rrose  Selavy,  '  supplier  of 
C  whiskers  and  kicks,  '  of  puns  and  pranks  (Plate  14).  As  we  have  seen  he  was  also, 
notoriously,  'R.  Mutt,  '  the  'R'  of  which,  Richard,  it  has  been  suggested  can  be  read  as 
(  moneybags'  from  the  French  richard.  Nutt,  '  the  other  part  of  the  name  suggests  an 
equally  devious  play  on  expectations,  it  being  associated  with  practical  jokes  as  the  name 
of  the  one  half  of  a  well-known  cartoon  duo,  'Mutt  and  Jeff.  "'  In  fact  some  members  of 
the  Society  of  Independents  had  a  problem  with  Fountain  merely  because  of  the  name  of 
the  'artist'  -  R.  Mutt.  Given  Duchamp's  predilection  for  punning,  which  he  expressed 
in  the  titles  of  many  of  the  readymades,  it  is  not  surprising  that  there  is  an  insatiable 
search  for  hidden  meaning  in  all  his  sayings  and  doings,  and  this  is  part  of  the  play  that 
still  continues,  Huizinga's  'visible  action'  that  surrounds  all  his  creations. 
Duchamp's  recourse  to  disguise  marks  a  significant  divergence  in  the  modern 
tradition,  which  was  built  on  the  self-critical  autonomy  of  the  artist.  In  the  case  of 
Fountain  it  took  a  disguise  to  reveal  the  mask  of  the  art  world,  of  reality,  but  also,  as  we 
have  seen  the  readymade  challenged  the  idea  of  artistic  autonomy.  No  matter  the  uneasy 
Board  member,  "A  lovely  form  has  been  created,  freed  from  its  functional  purpose,  therefore  a  man  has  clearly  made 
an  aesthetic  contribution.  " 
`  Identity  in  this  sense  is  further  explored  in  chapter  10,  below. 
37  See  Jerrold  Seigel  0  995)  ibid:  136.  See  also  Thierry  de  Duve  (1998)  ibid:  chapter  two. 
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PLATE  14.  MARCEL  DUCHAMP  AS  RROSE  StLAVY,  Man  Ray,  1921.  Employing  disguise, 
Duchamp  was  taking  questions  of  identity  explored  through  the  readymade  and  placing  a  question  mark 
over  everything  created  by  the  Rrose  Selavy  penona  -  for  example,  if  the  work  was  intended  to  be 
authentic  why  would  he  not  add  his  real  name  to  it?  As  with  the  Richard  Mutt  disguise  in  1917,  the 
ambiguity  of  the  disguise  serves  only  to  confuse,  although  we  may  suggest  that  Duchamp  was  not  merely 
playing  around  here.  As  A.  David  Napier  notes:  "ambiguity  remains  fundamental  to  change  despite  any 
claims  we  might  make  about  inferred,  innate,  or  even  empirically  perceived  identity,  and  disguise  is,  in 
our  ontological  experience,  the  primary  way  of  expressing  this  ambiguity.  The  use  of  disguise  is  thus 
conducive  both  to  make-believe  and  to  changes  of  state  that  are  imputed  to  be  real.  "  See  A.  David  Napier, 
1986,  Maský,  Transfomzatian  and  Paraeý=-  p.  3. 
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developments  in  painting  since  the  19'  century,  it  was  still  definable  by  the  autonomy 
and  objectivity  of  artistic  control  (expression)  and  a  re-presentation,  or  re-arranging  of 
the  world  (mimesis).  However,  as  much  as  these  painters  posed  a  threat  to  tradition  and 
to  confining  notions  of  taste  (characterised  by  a  demand  for  pictorial  representation  on 
the  part  of  the  art  world),  there  still  remained  the  inevitable  materialization  of  the 
aesthetic  impulse,  the  painting  or  sculpture  (the  matter  that  is  the  precise  limitation  on 
play  as  given  in  Huizinga's  definition),  as  the  only  means  of  expression.  " 
The  most  shattering  revolution  in  the  history  of  modern  art  was  the  declaration  that 
the  reality  that  works  of  art  represented,  or  signified,  was  merely  a  world  re-arranged, 
effectively  masked,  to  reflect  a  variety  of  ideal  worlds.  The  readymade  introduced  the 
uneasy  truth  that  it  is  we  who  objectify  the  world.  Antoine  Compagnon  observed  that 
by  decontextualising  the  object  and  giving  it  a  title  Duchamp  had: 
Carried  to  its  highest  point  pictorial  nominalism,  that  is,  the  substitution  of  the 
linguistic  for  the  plastic  in  art,  or  of  the  discourse  on  art  for  the  art  object,  ever 
silent  in  its  revolt  and  therefore  subject  to  appropriation.  " 
The  art  object,  established  by  naming,  that  is  to  say,  contingently,  could  take  on  an 
infinite  number  of  meanings.  Not  only  did  it  not  exist  within  a  frame;  in  its 
boundlessness  it  couldn't  be  contained  by  the  logic  of  an  ordering  mind,  slotted  into  a 
neat  box,  as  the  product  of  yet  another  of  modernism's  'isms.  '  Within  the  plastic 
tradition  of  modernism,  form  and  stylistic  considerations  still  betrayed  the  legacy  of 
conventions.  While  Cubism,  for  example,  in  its  broken  representation  of  the 
phenomenal  world  certainly  revealed  consciousness  of  a  world  lacking  fixity,  a  chancy 
world  where  partial  perspectives  became  the  only  way  of  now  representing  the 
fragmentary  nature  of  social  life,  not  to  mention  the  'life'  of  the  mind,  it  was  still 
mediated  using  the  same  tools,  and  threw-up  the  same  expectations  of  'picturing'  that 
painting  was  unable  to  escape. 
After  dabbling  with  Cubism,  Duchamp,  by  contrast,  had  felt  the  need  to  move 
beyond  painting  to  make  his  own  revolutionary  break  with  the  past.  "  Indeed,  apparently 
"'  I  recognise  that  painting  too  went  beyond  these  physical  boundaries  of  the  frame,  for  example  in  Jackson 
Pollock's  departure  from  the  stretched  canvas  and  easel  painting.  Clement  Greenberg  may  have  something  to  say  on 
this.  Pollock  probably  wasn't  the  first  in  this  regard,  either. 
'9  See  Compagnon  (1994)  ibid:  101. 
'0  Duchamp's  most  famous  painting,  'Nude  Descending  a  Staircase  No.  2,  '  achieved  notoriety  after  his 
abandonment  of  painting,  but  was  of  course,  completed  before  the  first  readymade.  it  has  been  noted  that  this 
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not  content  with  anything  less  than  the  destruction  of  taste,  he  identified  painting  itself 
as  an  obstacle  to  freeing  the  artistic  desire  for  self-expression,  and  declared  it  finished, 
'washed  up'.  " 
The  unacceptability  of  Fountain  demonstrated  that  the  norms  that  held  the  art 
world  together  could  prevent  anything  not  recognisably  identifiable  in  the  terms  of  'art' 
from  being  brought  before  the  public.  In  the  case  of  the  readymades,  this  is  not  to 
suggest  sinister  motives,  nor  even  that  there  was  some  'priesthood'  protecting  the  truth 
(although  this  latter  is  perhaps  closer  to  the  mark).  It  is  rather  that  the  ambiguity  of  the 
readymade  object,  and  this  is  particularly  true  with  regard  to  Fountain,  made  it  as 
shocking,  as  unexpected,  as  a  turd  on  Wedgewood  china  -  the  refusal  of  this  object  was 
the  vindication  of  Duchamp's  ruse.  Having  created  the  conditions  to  test  the  bounds  of 
the  artistic  with  his  negative  rule  of  'no  jury,  no  prizes'  Duchamp  then  tested  this  with 
the  upturned  urinal,  and  discovered  that  the  art  establishment  could  not  cope  with  the 
apparent  meaninglessness  of  such  an  object.  In  fact  one  member  of  the  Independent's 
committee,  surely  not  realizing  how  prophetic  his  views  would  be,  was  reported  to  have 
declared  that  if  Fountain  was  accepted,  anything  would  go,  right  down  to  a  heap  of 
dung  on  canvas.  42 
History  shows  that  these  fears  were  only  too  real.  One  thinks  of  the  scandals  that 
still  erupt  over  contemporary  works  like  Andres  Serrano's  Piss  Christ  (1987),  an  image  of 
Christ  on  the  cross,  made  by  photographing  a  crucifix  in  a  glass  of  urine,  or  Chris  Ofili's 
equally  blasphemous  The  Holy  Virgin  Mary  (1999)  a  figure  of  the  virgin  created  with 
elephant  dung.  Art  was  supposed  to  connect  with  something  eternal  or  sacred,  not  the 
profanity  of  corporeality.  The  obscenity  of  works  like  this,  works  that  are  more 
pictorially  conventional,  rely  on  the  same  Duchampian  principle  of  mixing  forbidden 
contexts  to  allow  the  fullest  level  of  contingency  in  meaning. 
painting  is  probably  the  first  expression  of  Duchamp's  nominalism.  See,  for  example  Antoine  Compagnon  (1994) 
ibid:  99,  and  Thierry  de  Duve  (1996)  Pictorial  Nominalism,  Minneapolis.  The  author  suggests  that  the  refusal  of  the 
Pa-ris  Independents,  and  specifically  the  Cubists,  to  accept  Nude  Descending  a  Staircase  in  1912  because  of  it's  title, 
was  what  pushed  Duchamp  toward  abandoning  painting  later  that  year.  See  also  Calvin  Tomkins  (1998)  ibid:  75-84: 
11  a  Cubist  nude  that  is  also  a  machine  clanking  down  an  abstract  flight  of  stairs  proved  to  be  altogether  too  much  for 
the  Puteaux  Cubists,  in  whose  theoretical  deliberations  -  as  Duchamp  must  have  known  --  there  was  not  much  room 
for  eroticism  or  for  humor.  " 
"  On  seeing  an  airplane  propeller  at  an  Aviation  show  Duchamp  remarked  to  the  sculptor  Constantin  Brancusi: 
"Painting's  washed  up.  Who'll  do  anything  better  than  that  propeller?  Tell  me,  can  you  do  that?  "  Sanouillet  and 
Peterson,  ibid:  160. 
"  This  is  retold  in  Ades,  et  al  (1999)  ibid:  128. 
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Fountain  had  introduced  the  notion  of  disguise  on  a  number  of  levels.  Firstly  the 
question  of  authenticity  arises  because  it  was  not  the  plastic  creation  of  the  artist;  in  its 
normal  context  it  is  merely  a  copy,  one  amongst  many  -  it  was  a  mass-produced 
industrial  object,  a  urinal.  Secondly,  the  title  was  deliberately  disjunctive  in  that  it  did 
not  designate  or  signify  a  proper  referent  -  it  functioned  in  the  objective  world  as  a 
urinal;  that  is  to  say,  a  urinal  is  a  receptacle  that  receives  liquid,  whilst  the  normal 
interpretation  of  the  word  that  gives  the  object  its  title  suggests  that  with  the  object  itself 
the  direction  of  the  flow  is  reversed  -a  fountain  projects  liquid.  "  Of  course,  it 
functioned  in  neither  of  these  ways,  and  so  the  title  was  another  instance  of  Duchamp's 
nominalism. 
Finally,  with  this  particular  readymade  the  artist  not  only  does  not  create  the  object, 
but  he  employs  a  pseudonym  to  present  it  to  the  public.  Implicitly,  this  move  denies 
conventional  creative  responsibility  for  the  object.  Which  could  be  interpreted  -  were  it 
not  for  the  elements  of  disguise  -  as  demonstrating  an  honesty  about  the  creation  of  this 
particular  work,  in  so  far  as  it  is  a  fabricated  item  rather  than  the  result  of  plastic 
creation,  one  of  many  more  similar  'mass'  objects,  made  anonymous  by  their  ubiquity. 
So,  by  employing  a  disguise  to  conceal  his  identity  as  the  creator  of  the  object, 
Duchamp  not  only  cloaks  himself,  but  by  doing  so  gives  the  object  a  new  characteristic 
because  his  disguise  was  his  licence  to  break  taboos,  and  where  as  a  mere  functional 
object  it  would  have  been  impossible  to  differentiate  it  from  the  numerous  other  urinals. 
The  principle  of  taking  a  mass-produced  object  and  performing  some  alteration  was 
repeated  with  Duchamp's  equally  notorious  re-contextualising  of  Leonardo's  Mona  Lisa. 
In  this  case  the  transformation  was  achieved  by  taking  a  cheap  postcard  reproduction  of 
the  Mona  Lisa,  readily  available  in  1919  as  this  was  the  four  hundredth  anniversary  of 
the  Leonardo's  death,  to  which  a  moustache  and  goatee  beard  were  added,  along  with  an 
enigmatic  acronym  written  in  beneath  the  image,  spelling  out  L.  H.  O.  O.  Q  (Plate  15). 
This  was  the  title  by  which  this  curiosity  was  known,  another  pun  that  continued 
Duchamp's  practice  of  upsetting  of  various  representational  expectations  -  to  be  precise, 
image,  word  and  sound  resemblances.  If  the  letters  are  spoken  in  French  the  effect  is  to 
"  See  Ades,  et  al  (1999)  ibid.  And  Jerrold  Seigel,  ibid,  who  suggests  that  when  "extracted  from  its  context  and 
turned  so  that  it  cannot  be  used  as  intended,  the  urinal  has  become  a  female  presence  forever  removed  from  the  male 
action  that  would  bring  it  into  the  world.  "  (120) 
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PLATE  15.  L.  H.  O.  Q.  Q.,  Marcel  Duchamp,  1919.  This  was  what  Duchamp  would  cal-I  a  'readymade- 
aided'  -  an  object  found  and  then  slightly  altered.  This  postcard  was  modified  by  the  addition  of  a  few 
pen  marks  to  the  face,  making  ambiguous  the  gender  of  the  subject,  and  the  equally  confusing  legend 
'L.  H.  O.  Q.  Q.  '  The  impact  of  this  item  has  been  out  of  all  proportion  to  Duchamp's  almost  throwaway 
gesture  (it  was  recovered  from  a  box  in  Duchamp's  apartment  by  Andr6  Breton,  who  then  published  it). 
As  far  as  posterity  is  concerned,  however,  the  gesture  is  not,  as  Octavio  Paz  said  "plastic  but  critical  or 
philosophical  [ 
...  the  readymades]  are  not  creations  but  signs,  questioning  or  negating  the  act  of  creation.  " 
See  Octavio  Paz,  1990,  Marcel  Ducharnp:  Appearance  Stripped  Bare.  p.  22 
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produce  the  sound  of  an  expression  something  like  'elle  a  chaud  au  cul',  which,  in 
English  means  'she  has  a  hot  ass.  '  Thus,  by  first  adding  the  beard  and  moustache 
Duchamp  seemed  to  redefine  the  gender  of  Leonardo's  Gioconda,  yet  the  play  on  word 
sounds  given  in  the  title  threw  this  revised  expectation  back  in  the  face  of  the  observer 
by  saying  that  this  figure  looked  like  it  might  be  a  man,  but  'she  had  a  hot  ass.  ' 
But  this  'assisted  readymade,  '  by  taking  the  found  object  and  making  a  slight 
alteration  to  it,  also,  like  Fountain  before  it,  hides  something  else  -  the  artistic  or 
aesthetic  intention,  a  mask  that  as  Jerrold  Seigel  suggests  covers  the  considerable  depth 
of  Duchamp's  'inner  world.  "'  This  'inner  world'  is  a  fluid  world  of  imagination  and 
play,  the  home  of  a  mind  that  could  not  remain  at  rest,  that  constantly  slid  back  and 
forth  between  one  potential  meaning  of  a  sign  and  another,  giving  birth  to  "multiple 
significations  where  conventional  expectations  did  not  suggest  any.  )345 
Again,  with  these  objects,  their  titles,  and  in  Duchamp  )s  own  role,  there  are  layers 
upon  layers  of  masks  and  hidden  meanings,  the  contingency  of  which  is  displaced  by  the 
continual  veiling  and  unveiling,  only  to  be  redoubled  or  inflated  beyond  calculation  by  a 
play  of  identities  that  actually  destroys  the  very  possibility  of  identity. 
Duchamp  took  this  to  a  further  extreme  by  creating  a  female  alter  ego,  Rrose  Selavy 
in  1920,  publishing  many  puns,  and  indulging  in  visual  trickery,  in  the  production  of 
fake  consumer  products  for  example,  objects  like  his  altered  Mona  Lisa  that  were 
C  assisted  readymades.  '  These  were  objects  that  realised  a  further  elaboration  of  the 
masking  that  had  begun  with  the  disjunction  between  object  and  title  found  in  the 
earlier  readymades,  and  under  the  Rrose  Selavy  persona  the  prima  facie  veracity  of  our 
powers  of  discrimination  are  challenged  by  objects  that  were  dressed  up  in  elaborate 
packages  with  punning  titles  that  look,  on  the  face  of  it,  like  genuine  products.  'Belle 
Haleine,  Eau  du  Voilette'  one  reads,  leading  us  once  again  into  the  play  (Plate  16). 
Bearing  the  image  of  Rrose  Selavy,  the  object  looks  like  it  could  be  a  bottle  of  expensive 
perfume,  but  the  ambiguity  of  the  label  suggests  all  is  now  what  it  seems.  It  may  be 
translated  as  'beautiful  breath,  veil  water.  '  'Water  disguised'?  Or  perhaps,  'vile  water  for 
beautiful  breath'  ?  46  No  matter,  the  play  could  continue  endlessly  without  agreement. 
Seigel,  ibid:  140. 
Seigel,  ibid:  120. 
Some  suggest  that  this,  taken  with  the  de-feminising  of  the  Mona  Lisa  reveals  something  like  an  inherent 
a-ndrogyny  in  Duchamp.  See  Ades,  et  al  0  999)  ibid:  134. 
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PLATE  16.  BELLE  HALEINE,  EAU  du  VOILETTE,  Rrose  S61avy/Marcel  Duchamp,  1921.  Here, 
again,  is  another  example  of  the  ambiguity  of  the  object.  Given  the  evident  care  that  has  went  into  the 
making  of  this  object  it  is  not  too  difficult  to  see  that  it  could  be  taken  for  the  genuine  article,  although 
the  punning  description  of  this  'product'  is  the  giveaway  (befie  haleine,  eau  du  voilette  -  translates  as 
'beautifal  breath,  veil  water').  It  is  Interesting  as  well  that  Duchamp  should  fake  aa  ance,  we  fir  gr  because  as 
know,  such  perfumes  also  conceal  the  natural  odor  or  the  human  body.  Which  is  to  say,  in  other  words, 
that  he  has  disguised  a  form  of  the  product  that  manifests  the  most  elementary  modern  disguise. 
c'1, 
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The  crucial  aspect  of  the  revolutionary  impact  of  the  readymades  is  in  the  way  in 
which  Duchamp,  like  no  one  else,  takes  art  into  the  realm  of  play.  Modern  painters 
before  and  after  Duchamp  still  operated  from  an  aesthetic  of  se6r-expression.  There  is  still 
the  idea  that  physical  contact  with  the  materials  of  painting  is  what  makes  a  true  artist. 
Duchamp  and  some  notable  successors  sought,  in  a  way,  to  undermine  the  rational 
autonomy  of  the  artist  with  play  and  irony,  reaching  for  some  depth  below  the 
apparently  honest  face  of  the  art  world,  a  depth  that  compromised  the  skin-deep  surface, 
itself  a  mask  created  by  a  prima  facie  'maybe,  '  by  certain  framed  or  masked  relations;  in 
other  words  by  an  rearrangement  of  the  object  world. 
The  readymade  initiated  a  radical  missorting  of  the  world,  the  artistic  cosmos.  "If  the 
centre  is  in  a  state  of  permanent  schism,  if  the  ancient  notions  of  solid  matter  and  clear 
and  distinct  reason  disappear,  "  Octavio  Paz  wrote.  "The  result  is  general  disorientation, 
Duchamp's  intention  is  to  get  rid  forever  of  'the  possibility  of  recognizing  any  two 
things  as  being  like  each  other.  ,,  47  But  maybe  more  crucially  than  the  destructive 
intention  of  Duchamp's  'statements'  this  art  gloried  in  a  subjective  indifference  to  the 
world;  it  said  that  we  should  just  forget  about  meaning  in  art  having  anything  to  do 
with  the  artist.  Like  the  weather  it  rather  has  something  more  to  do  with  chance.  Of  all 
his  Work,  this  attitude  was  most  evident  in  the  readymades,  which  almost  single- 
handedly  removed  the  elevation  of  skill  and  of  the  concern  with  form  as  the  basis  of  a 
self-critical  modernism,  indeed  the  removal  of  the  creative  act  as  it  had  come  to  be 
understood. 
Instead,  the  role  of  creativity  was  pushed  onto  the  beholder;  and  the  'creative  acts'  - 
that  is,  onto  the  interpretive  act,  which  is  constantly  renewed  -  became  as  myriad,  as 
unpredictable,  and  as  indivisible  as  the  quanta  of  the  physical  world.  "  Certainly  by 
redefining  and  legitimizing  a  new  kind  of  artistic  'creativity'  the  readymades  uncovered  a 
world  of  seemingly  discrete  objects,  pulled  together,  framed,  by  chance  identifications.  It 
is  with  the  use  of  the  decontextualised  object  that  we  find  a  move  away  from  plasticity 
and  towards  the  accidental  forms  of  natural,  and  particularly,  man-made  functional 
objects.  Chance,  here,  operates  at  the  level  of  creation,  but  as  Duchamp  said,  the  object 
is  only  truly  created  by  overcoming  the  delay  that  separates  the  two  poles  that  resolve  its 
See  Octavio  Paz  (1970)  ibid:  10. 
Compagnon  (1994)  ibid:  102,  also  makes  this  point. 
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S2,000  REWAR 
For  information  !  eading 
W  Welch.  alias  Bull. 
to  the  arrest  -D+l 
George 
alias  Pickens  etcetry. 
Shop  in  New  York  under 
CINOUER  Height  about 
about  180  oounds,  Com- 
etcetry,  Operated  Bucket 
name  HOOKE,  LYON  and 
5  feet  9  inches,  Weight 
plexion  medium,  eyes  same 
me  RROSE  SýLAVY 
Known  aiso  under  na- 
PLATE  17.  WANTED/$2000  REWARD.  Marcel  Ducha-inp,  1923.  According  to  Victor  1.  Stoichita, 
Duchamp  masks  the  conventional  dialogue  of  the  mug-shot,  which  is  given  by  having  the  side  view  look 
towards  the  frontal  view  as  if  "the  person's  identity  were  thought  to  be  engaged  in  the  stimulating 
conversation  of  a  schize  [ 
... 
]  Duchamp  unveils  the  illusion:  what  we  see  is  a  disrupted  representation,  a 
representation  where  the  mould  of  the  double  mug-shot  introduces  a  concealed  but  significant  breach,  a 
representation  that  does  not  promote  an  affirmation  of  identity  but  of  false  identity.  "  See  Victor  1. 
Stoichita,  1997,  A  Short  History  ofthe  Shadow.  p.  226-27. 
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objective  ambiguity. 
The  denial  of  expression  through  painting  was  taken  up  more  frequently  In  the  20,  h 
century,  with  artists  such  as  Robert  Rauschenberg  drawing  together  materials  from 
seemingly  incompatible  contexts  to  form  something  new.  In  Rauschenberg's  case  his 
combines  utilised  'accidental'  materials  and  objects.  " 
Whilst  we  know  of  Duchamp's  adoption  of  disguise  mostly  with  regard  to  R.  Mutt 
and  Rrose  Selavy,  the  fascinating  thing  about  Duchamp  is  that  these  were  not  isolated 
moments,  but  that  after  1912  and  with  his  abandonment  of  painting,  disguises  came  to 
characterise  most  of  the  rest  of  his  life  as  an  artist.  As  Thierry  de  Duve  explains,  he  was 
also  "Marcel  Douxami,  Marsilavy,  and  SýIatz,  not  to  mention  the  ersatz  names  he  was 
given  by  others:  Victor  andTotor  by  Henri-Pierre  Roche,  Marchand  A  sel  by  Robert 
Desnos,  Pierre  Delaire  by  Henri  Waste.  ""  A  final  act  in  this  unstable  existence  is  found 
in  the  Wanted  poster  of  1923  (Plate  17),  an  imitation  of  a  police  circular  featuring 
Duchamp  posing  as  a  criminal,  'George  W.  Welch'  alias  'Bull'  alias  'Pickens'  etcetry 
etcetry,  it  goes  on.  The  police  mugshot,  with  its  depiction  of  the  full  face  and  side  profile 
was  supposed  to  supply  the  final  means  of  identification  -  whilst  the  name  might  change 
the  physiognomic  features  remained  relatively  recognisable.  Perhaps  the  truth  is  - 
although  to  speak  of  truth  here  is  presumptuous  -  that  once  Duchamp  gave  up  painting, 
and  thus  the  kind  of  self-expression  that  could  be  understood,  recognised,  he  no  longer 
knew,  or  cared  who  he  was.  When  asked  once  to  find  a  way  of  conveying  what  his  work 
meant,  Duchamp  said  that  the  only  word  he  could  find  to  describe  his  work  was 
'metaphysical.  '  His  work,  he  said,  was: 
Pushing  the  idea  of  doubt  [found]  in  Descartes  ...  to  a  much  further  point  than 
they  ever  did  in  the  school  of  Cartesianism:  doubt  in  myself,  doubt  in 
everything  ...  in  the  end  it  comes  to  doubt  the  verb  'to  be"' 
The  verb  that  identifies  through  equivalence,  that  designates  also  exclusion,  the  'what  is 
not'  of  belonging,  the  '=',  the  'is'  that  relates  the  contingent  relation  of  its  own  identity, 
because  'to  be'  is  also  to  not  yet  be 
...  something  else. 
"  This  is  not  to  downplay  the  role  of  Cubism  in  establishing  the  framework  in  which  the  assemblage  of 
incongruous  elements,  objects,  etc.,  allowing  the  later  move  away  from  'retinal  an'  as  Duchamp  called  all  art  (with 
some  exceptions)  to  conceptual  art.  Ha-rriet  Ann  Watts  (1980),  gives  a  good  overview  of  the  importance  of  Cubism  in 
challenging  conventional  aesthetics. 
50 
Thierry  De  Duve  (1998)  ibid:  399-400. 
51 
See  Ades,  et  al  0  999)  ibid:  61 
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Minimal  incoherent  fragments: 
the  opposite  of  History,  creator  of  ruins, 
out  of  your  ruins  you  have  made  creations. 
OCTAVIO  PAZ,  Objects  andApparitions 
'Spiders  and  salamanders'  sit  next  to  the  obscurely  labelled  'mouse  materials,  '  'old  fish 
marbles,  '  and  'love  letters:  Jennifer  Jones.,  A  snapshot  of  the  shelves  in  Joseph  Cornell's 
workshop  taken  by  Hans  Namuth  in  1969  reveals  something  of  the  curiosity  that  drove 
the  artist  to  amass  a  vast  storehouse  of  the  banal  and  kitsch,  items  connected  only  in  his 
imaginary  world.  These  were  collected  and  brought  together  in  his  unusual  and 
fascinating  wooden  box  constructions,  which  housed  the  final  order  he  would  bring  to 
the  seemingly  random  assortment  of  items  recovered  from  the  shelves  of  his  workshop: 
the  labels  on  other  boxes  do  little  to  satisfy  the  interest  of  the  viewer  -  'Caravaggio,  etc.  ' 
'pegs'  and  'best  white  boxes'  -  and  only  partially  unveil  the  world  of  this  enigmatic, 
perhaps  reluctant,  artist.  '  (Plate  18) 
In  his  box  constructions  Joseph  Cornell  takes  the  apparently  random  -  objects  that 
bear  no  association  except  within  the  context  in  which  they  are  presented  -  and  brings 
them  together  portraying  a  form  of  some  imaginary  world.  In  doing  this  he  is  arguably 
doing  no  more  that  extending  a  centuries  old  tradition  of  framing  a  world,  or  a  portion 
of  the  world!  That  is  to  say  that  in  tradition  the  painting,  as  well,  merely  frames  a 
world,  although  perhaps  traditionally  less  often  with  such  conceptually  or  spatially 
unconnected  objects  brought  within  the  bounded  space  of  a  single  'representation.  '  The 
'  See  Dore  Ashton  (1974)  A  Joseph  Cornell  Album,  New  York:  "As  early  as  1936  he  responded  unabashedly  to 
the  Museum  of  Modern  Art's  biographical  inquiry:  EDUCATION  -  Went  to  Andover.  No  art  instruction.  Natural 
talent  [ 
... 
]  Twenty-four  years  later  he  was  saying,  'I  never  called  myself  an  artist.  On  voter  registration  I  call  myself  a 
designer.  "'  (4) 
'  On  the  history  of  three-dimensional  boxes  see  Alex  Mogelan  and  Norman  Lallberte  (1974)  Art  in  Boxes,  New 
York.  Cf  also  the  tradition  of  collecting  in  early  modernity.  For  example,  Paula  Findlen  (1994)  Possessing  Nature. 
Museums,  Collecting  and  Scientific  Culture  in  Early  Modern  Europe.  Berkeley 
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PLATE  18.  JOSEPH  CORNELL'S  WORKSHOP,  Hans  Namuth,  1969.  According  to  Kynaston 
McShine,  Cornell  treated  the  "ephemeral  object  as  if  it  were  the  rarest  heirloom  of  a  legendary  prince  or 
princess  [ 
... 
]a  necklace  from  Woolworth's  had  as  much  value  as  one  from  Faberge.  "  See  K.  McShine  (ed), 
1980,  Joseph  Cornefl.  pp.  10-11.  Cornell  categorised  and  labeled  this  material  in  162  dossiers,  some  of 
which  ran  to  1,000  pages,  others  to  only  a  few.  "The  Dossiers,  "  Lindsay  Blair  writes,  "reveal  an  almost 
bewildering  eclecticism  and  rampant  associationism,  so  personal  and  complicated  was  the  nature  of  the 
connections  [he]  made.  "  See  Lindsay  Blair,  1998,  Joseph  Cornell's  Vision  ofSpiritual  Order.  p.  26. 
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mystery  deepens  because  unlike  Surrealism,  with  which  Cornell  has  been  associated,  he 
did  not  deal  with  images  of  distorted  perception,  or  with  'objects'  that  were  not  readily 
identifiable  as  something  we  might  experience  in  the  course  of  the  everyday.  '  The  point 
was  that  Cornell's  objects  were  the  everyday  -  often  the  crushingly  boring  objects  that 
form  the  small  and  overlooked  aspects  of,  for  example,  lost  childhood;  he  gathers 
together  the  kind  of  objects  that  are,  through  the  course  of  a  life,  either  packed  away  or 
thrown  away;  these,  in  other  words,  are  useless  mementos  belonging  to  a  distant  past. 
These  items  are  all,  nevertheless,  things  we  can  usually  recognise  when  taken  on  their 
own  -a  child's  marble,  a  jar,  a  seashell,  the  building  blocks  of  a  learning  game  - 
although  the  presentation  of  these  items  in  the  final  object  lose  any  association  they  may 
have  had  individually  (Plate  19),  and  become  overwhelmed  by  the  association  that  arises 
in  the  mind  of  the  viewer.  This  untitled  box,  completed  over  several  years  in  the  mid- 
1950's,  resonates  to  the  muted  sound  of  loss,  the  thought  of  persons  missing. 
One  particularly  unusual  aspect  of  Cornell's  boxes  of  these  apparently  abandoned 
objects  is  that  the  once  individuated  items  that  make  up  the  whole  do  not  appear  to 
belong  together  -a  map  of  the  moon  forms  the  backdrop  of  a  box  that  contains  a  clay 
pipe,  the  disembodied  head  of  a  child  figure,  a  glass  containing  an  egg,  a  representation 
of  the  Tower  of  Pisa  with  Saturn  hovering  over  (Untitled  Soap  Bubble  Set,  1936)  -  there 
are  many  more  similarly  enigmatic  creations.  The  objects  in  combination  here  occur 
neither  rationally  nor  naturally,  the  collections  presented  do  not,  therefore,  represent 
anything  one  would  expect  to  encounter  in  the  course  of  the  everyday.  Artists  had  since 
the  Renaissance  until  around  the  end  of  the  nineteenth  century  created  objects  that 
appeared  'orderly,  '  appeared  to  mimic  nature,  yet  that  were  revealed  to  be  manifestations 
of  an  arbitrary  order  as  reason  discovered  an  unruly  and  indeterminate  nature  that  was 
not  at  all  as  necessary  or  uniform  as  conventional  artistic  representation  might  have  led 
one  to  believe.  What  Cornell  reveals  to  the  world  in  these  boxes  is,  by  contrast,  a  self- 
created  order,  and  thus  the  coincidence  of  the  disconnected  objects  belonging  together 
inside  one  of  these  boxes  is  only  finally  established  as  a  consequence  of  the  presence  of  a 
beholding  eye. 
'  Cf  Rosalind  Krauss  (1980)  'Joseph  Cornell's  Transcendental  Surrealism'  in  McShine,  Kynaston  (ed)  (1980) 
Joseph  Cornell.  New  York. 
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PLATE  19.  UNTITLED,  Joseph  Cornell,  mid-1950's.  One  of  Joseph  Cornell's  many  "poetic 
enactments"  as  Dore  Ashton  calls  them:  "the  visible  issue  of  this  palace  of  dreams  and  associations  [ 
... 
]  his 
mind,  like  a  shell  spiraled  to  infinity.  "  See  Dore  Ashton,  1974,  A  Joseph  Cornell  Album:  pp.  1-2.  The  date 
on  this,  and  many  other  boxes,  remained  indeterminate  because  Cornell  would  tinker  with  them  for  years. 
Deborah  Solomon  noted  that:  "It  is  often  said  of  artists  that  they  live  in  fear  of  being  misunderstood, 
Cornell,  by  contrast,  lived  in  fear  of  being  understood.  "  (Quoted  in  Lindsay  Blair,  1998,  Joseph  Cornell's 
Vision  of  Spiritual  Order  p.  20)  Dawn  Ades,  on  the  other  hand,  suggests  that  Cornell's  anxiety  over  his 
boxes  lay  in  his  feeling  that  the  "ramifications  of  the  subjects  of  his  boxes"  could  not  be  expressed,  adding 
that  the  difficulty  of  translation  lies  in  the  radical  subjectivity  of  his  work.  "all  his  boxes  are  perhaps 
sailor's  chests,  containing  his  souvenirs  of  an  imaginary  voyage.  "  See  Dawn  Ades,  'The  Transcendental 
Surrealism  of  Joseph  Cornell'  in  K-  McShine  (ed),  1980,  Joseph  Cornell:  p-39- 
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For  Cornell  these  were  far  from  accidental  creations.  Over  many  years  he  would 
collect  these  knick-knacks,  which  were  organised  and  recorded  according  to  a 
staggeringly  detailed,  yet  mysterious,  working  method  that  has  since  been  recovered 
from  the  many  'dossiers'  he  left  behind!  With  the  peculiar  precision  of  his  working 
methods  on  the  one  hand,  and  the  apparently  arbitrary  or  'unnatural'  ordering  of 
phenomena  within  the  boxes  (to  the  viewer)  on  the  other,  a  gap  opens  up  in  our 
understanding;  between  the  perception  of  a  seemingly  coincidental  assortment  of  items, 
and  the  subjective,  cognitive  power  of  artistic  association. 
In  this  latter  sense,  Cornell's  work  follows  closely  the  tradition  of  Duchamp  - 
particularly  in  stripping  objects  of  any  prior  value  (the  value  may  have  been  negative, 
considering  the  objects  used  were  usually  cheap),  and  also  in  the  use  of  more  or  less 
recognisable  objects  in  unusual  contexts.  Presumably,  he  imagined  the  gaze  of  the  viewer 
in  meeting  the  object  might  realise  some  Duchampian  rendezvous.  'And  this  also  allows 
one  to  view  Cornell  within  a  larger  post-Duchamp  tradition  (or  anti-tradition  if  you 
like)  in  the  twentieth  century  that  produces  works  that  were,  in  a  sense,  gratuitous,  or 
arbitrary,  but  crucially  this  latter  quality  only  applies  to  the  viewer.  And  so,  to  the 
beholder  of,  for  example,  a  Joseph  Cornell  box  construction  a  gap  is  opened  that 
separates  art  object  and  reality,  artist  and  world.  And  it  is  into  this  gap  that  the  artist 
moves  in  making  the  object  public,  and  into  which  the  viewer  must  move  in  order  to 
make  a  connection. 
The  Doubtful  Coincidence 
Cornell  offers  one  example  of  a  balance  many  artists  in  the  twentieth  century 
maintained  between  order  and  disorder,  moving  to  and  fro  between  the  two  conditions 
because  of  the  necessity  that  the  artist  -  in  creating  this  gap  between  object  and  reality  - 
to  a  significant  extent  loses  power  over  the  work  of  art.  To  find  a  public  (something  that 
Cornell  at  times  gambled  on  only  reluctantly)'  is,  in  other  words,  to  relinquish  the 
meaning  of  a  painting,  and  thus  to  accept  that  the  work  as  presented  to  posterity,  in  its 
actual  existence,  does  not  represent  some  timeless  truth,  but  is  instead  a  partial  and 
'  See  Lindsay  Blair  (1998)  Joseph  Cornellý  Vision  of  Spiritual  Order,  London.  Blair  gives  a  selection  of  the  labels 
Cornell  pasted  on  his  dossiers:  "Journey  Album;  Museum  Without  Walls;  Metaphysique  dEphemera;  Portrait 
Encasement;  Center  ofa  Labyrinth;  Childhood  Regained,  "  and  so  on  (26-27). 
'  Cf  previous  chapter. 
6  Cf.  Lindsay  Blair,  ibid. 
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fragmentary  act  of  creation.  Plastic  creation  does  not,  then,  enact  a  'Peeling  back'  of 
some  veil  of  perception  to  reveal,  in  the  object,  a  reality  that  has  been  there  all  along. 
What  is  more  like  the  case  is  that  the  requirement  of  a  viewer  becomes  a  mark  of  the 
artist's  residence  in,  finally,  a  world  of  contingency.  This  need,  when  indulged,  must  be 
interpreted  as  the  acceptance  that  something  fundamentally  unfinished  is  released  to 
posterity. 
Yet  the  history  of  modern  art  is  a  history  of  self-denial,  not  a  history  of  acceptance. 
On  the  contrary,  it  is  characterised  by  revolutions  that  overturn  the  warm  embrace  of 
the  acceptable  gestures  that  are  then  set  against  the  viewer  as  a  challenge.  Marcel 
Duchamp's  Fountain  of  1917,  as  well  as  being  the  point  of  departure  for  the  art  under 
consideration  here,  also  provides  a  good  example  of  how  a  public  is  eventually  brought 
round  to  something  close  to  accepting  an  object  that  had  initially  stood  in  a  relationship 
of  contradiction  to  the  ordering  that  facilitates  acceptance. 
This  particular  object  -  in  being  far  from  given  -  can  thus  also  be  seen  to  have 
evolved  to  the  position  it  now  occupies  through  a  series  of  improbable  coincidences  - 
through  initial  discovery  (the  scandal  of  1917),  then  loss  (almost  forgotten  after  the  rise 
of  Abstract  Expressionism),  and  discovery  again  (adoption  of  Duchamp  as  an  influence 
by  'Neo-Dada'  in  the  1950's  and  1960's).  7  In  other  words  this  object  had  (and  has)  a 
'life'  way  beyond  its  initial  public  unveiling,  one  that  extends  beyond  what  the 
temporally  located,  embodied  eye,  can  see.  Yet,  even  as  one  recognises  the  contemporary 
acceptance  of  Fountain  it  still  remains  axiomatic  that  in  spite  of  its  iconic  status  no  one 
can  actually  agree  on  something  as  apparently  basic  as  what  it  means  or  what  it  IS.  ' 
Observing  that  a  work  of  art  is  the  product  of  two  defining  'poles'  Duchamp  had 
accepted  that  this  response  would  await  Fountain.  One  pole  is  the  artist,  the  maker  of 
the  material  object  and  the  other  the  beholder  who  at  some  time  and  place  unspecified 
looks  at  it,  and  thus  in  an  act  of  almost  Berkelian  perceptiveness,  confirms  its  existence! 
In  therefore  assaulting  the  traditional  subject-object  'picture'  version  of  realism,  in  which 
7 
See  chapter  eight,  above. 
'  This  is  because,  as  Octavio  Paz  observed,  the  status  of  this  object  is  in  its  ftinction  as  a  question  mark 
suspended  permanently  over  the  notion  of  creation  itself,  and  thus  not  without  coincidence,  how  the  beholder  of  such 
4  creations'  identifies,  or  draws  meaning  from  the  object  world.  See  Octavio  Paz  (1990)  Marcel  Duchamp:  Appearance 
Stripped  Bare,  New  York. 
9  See  Pierre  Cabanne  (197  1)  Dialogues  With  Marcel  Duchamp,  London:  70.  Speaking  to  Cabanne  in  the  1960's, 
Duchamp  still  believed  that  no  artist  would  accept  this  view  that  art  was  made  ultimately,  somehow,  by  an  absurdly 
democratic  sleight  of  hand.  But  the  history  of  art,  by  contrast,  he  saw  as  'pruning'  reality  to  create  the  great  canon  of 
art.  "To  talk  about  truth  and  real,  absolute  judgement  -I  don't  believe  in  it  at  all.  " 
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truth  is  apparently  given,  or  unveiled,  Duchamp  suggested  that  these  poles  constitute  a 
more  or  less  indeterminate  whole,  that  truth  arises  in  the  non-place  of  the  gap  in 
between  these  two  poles,  with  the  consequent  meaning  being  entirely  contingent,  and 
not  at  all  given.  "  The  two  poles,  he  believed,  were  separated  by  the  'delay'  that 
interrupts  the  eventual,  defining,  rendezvous  of  viewer  meeting  object.  Which  is  to  say 
that  the  viewer  has  a  significant  collaborative  role  to  play;  that  the  object  is  'finished'  by 
the  viewer,  thus  creating  a  somewhat  fleeting  and  insubstantial  object  that  becomes, 
conceptually  reminiscent  of  a  Leibnizian  monad-  possessed  of  "no  parts  [it]  can  neither 
be  formed  nor  destroyed.  [It]  can  neither  begin  nor  end  naturally,  and  consequently  [it 
will]  last  as  long  as  the  universe.  ""  However,  unlike  monads,  these  objects  'die  away' 
with  each  new  viewer,  although  this  is  also  the  condition  of  the  eternal  and 
indeterminate  existence  of  the  object-in-waiting.  The  physical  object  itself  is  thus  merely 
a  sign  that  has  no  real  referent  beyond  what  it  is  to  the  viewer  -  it  is,  objectively,  a  sign 
of  a  sign,  if  you  like.  " 
This  characterisation  of  the  making  of  art  as  the  result  of  the  coincidental  meeting  of 
object  and  viewer  is  nevertheless  a  defiant,  if  apparently  self-negating,  trait  of  the 
modern  artist.  Art  objects  that  follow  after  Duchamp's  readymades  are  often  embodied 
as  incomplete,  non-representational,  objects,  which  can  have  no  other  fate  than  to  be 
renewed  against  their  own  partial  being  by  the  participation  of  the  viewer,  thus  the 
gesture  of  the  artist  is  always  suspended,  awaiting  the  doubtful  coincidence. 
The  imaginative  'core'  of  such  art  then  also  emerges  from  a  poetics  of  coincidence, 
by  which  I  mean  that  loose  'arrangement'  of  unlikely  or  unforeseeable  convergences  that 
amount  to  the  'life'  of  the  art  object  is  the  background  against  which  the  artist  -  by 
contrast  -  determinedly  produces  his  creations  before  they  are  lost  to  the  world.  The 
kind  of  objects  that  find  a  place  within  the  ordered  procession  of  Art  History  (within 
"  Duchamp's  final  work  was  titled  Given  1.  The  Waterfall,  2.  The  Illuminating  Gas  (Etant  donnis  10  la  chute,  20 
le  gaz  d'Mairage),  1946-66,  although  it  is  not  at  A  clear  what  is  given  -  because  what  is  'there'  is  determined  in  the 
end  only  by  the  viewer.  This  work,  from  the  title  to  the  conditions  under  which  one  views  it,  is  thus,  a  puzzle  that  the 
viewer  has  to  work  out  (it  is  viewed  behind  a  large  wooden  door,  through  a  'peep'  hole).  See  Eric  Cameron  (1991) 
'Given'  in  Thierry  De  Duve  (199  Med)  The  Definitively  Unfinished  Marcel  Duchamp,  Cambridge,  MA:  1-29. 
"  G.  W.  Leibniz  (1989)  Philosophical  Essays,  Indianapolis.  Cf.  A.  N.  Whitehead:  "To  be  abstract  is  to  transcend 
the  particular  occasion  of  actual  happening.  But  to  transcend  an  actual  occasion  does  not  mean  being  disconnected 
from  it.  On  the  contrary,  I  hold  that  each  eternal  object  has  its  own  proper  connection  with  each  such  occasion  which 
I  term  its  mode  of  ingression  into  that  occasion.  Thus  the  metaphysical  status  of  an  eternal  object  is  that  of  a 
possibility  for  an  actuality.  "  Quoted  in  M.  Thompson  0  979)  Rubbish  Theory:  the  Creation  and  Destruction  of  Value, 
Oxford:  72. 
"  Cf  Mark  C.  Taylor  (1992)  Disfiguring:  Art,  Architecture,  Religion,  Chicago:  chapter  6,  discussion  on  the 
difference  between  the  logocentrism  and  the  logo-centric. 
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this  discussion,  no  less),  are  only  there  as  products  of  a  succession  of  rendezvous  that 
close  the  gap  that  the  artist  opens  when  plastic  creation  is  assumed  to  end  (with  the 
production  of  the  object),  but  which  creation  actually  continues  throughout  the  life  of 
the  object.  " 
The  life  history  of  these  'unfinished'  objects  is  defined  in  a  series  of  these 
coincidental  meetings,  which  see  the  subject-as-viewer  aiming,  more  or  less,  to 
consolidate,  that  is  to  bring  what  is  present  to  the  senses  to  a  fixed  point  in  perceptual 
understanding.  The  viewer  thus  recognises  similarities  or  differences  in  the  object  when 
compared  with  other  objects,  forms  associations  between  the  object  and  fixed  ideas  or 
passing  thoughts,  and  so  on.  The  act  of  looking  thus  secures  an  identity  between  subject 
and  art  object. 
Questions  of  what  is  being  looked  at  are  therefore  caught  up  in  establishing  reliable 
signifiers,  or  of  finding  fixed  relations,  or  properties,  within  and  between  things:  objects 
presented  within  a  frame,  the  perspectival  arrangement  of  space,  and  ultimately  the 
relation  of  the  arrangement  to  reality.  These  are  all  reactions  that  arise  on  the  basis  of 
the  viewer's  personal  orientation  to  the  world.  The  artist,  by  contrast,  often  stands  apart 
from  both  the  reliable  and  the  significant,  and  is  always  wagering  against  a  world  thus 
made,  declaring  in  each  new  creation  that  maybe  things  could  really  be  this  other  way  as 
well.  "  Still,  no  matter  how  self-critical,  how  innovative  painters  have  tried  to  be,  the 
defiance  of  the  gesture  that  produced  apparently  meaningless  objects  that  negate  realism 
is  itself  appropriated  and  objectified  by  the  subjective  beholder,  who  'determines'  the 
nature  of  the  gesture.  " 
"I  discuss  the  limits  of  plasticity  in  Duchamp's  work  in  the  previous  chapter.  Another  thing  is  that  this  art  is 
thus  rendered  'real'  only  by  an  extreme  nominalism,  an  outright  rejection  of  realism,  which  is  to  say  meaning,  or 
identity,  is  only  given  by  an  act  of  'naming'  that  unites  subject  and  object  in  terms  that  supply  only  a  contingent 
identity.  In  other  words,  there  is  no  identity  between  the  two  things,  when  taken  apart  from  the  naming  conventions. 
Some  prominent  advocates  of  a  nominalist  rather  than  a  realist  understanding  of  the  world are  Richard  Rorty  (1989) 
Contingency,  Irony  and  Solidarity,  Cambridge;  Nelson  Goodman  (1978)  Ways  of  Worldmaking,  Indianapolis;  and 
Nelson  Goodman  0  976)  Languages  ofArt.  -  an  Approach  to  a  Theory  ofSymbols,  Indianapolis. 
"  Cf  Robert  Rauschenberg's  statement  that:  "If  I  see  any  superficial  subconscious  relationship  that  I'm  familiar 
with  -  clich6s  of  association  -I  change  the  picture.  "  In  W.  Hopps  and  S.  Davidson  (1997)  Rauschenberg.  -  A 
Retrqective,  NewYork:  220. 
Cf,  The  British  artist  Cornelia  Parker's  reaction  to  this  appropriation:  "I  once  heard  a  critic  giving  a  gallery 
tour  of  my  work,  she  was  talking  about  it  from  a  formal  point  of  view,  about  my  choice  of  making  miniature 
monuments  in  lead  and  hanging  them  upside  down  being  the  opposite  of  the  bronze  sculpture  on  a  pedestal.  That's 
not  part  of  my  thinking  at  all  [ 
... 
]  the  motivation  for  my  work  is  not  formal  issues  like  that.  "  In  Cornelia  Parker 
(2000)  Cornelia  Parkerl  Institute  of  Contemporary  Art  Boston,  Boston. 
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The  Work  ofArt  and  the  Gaze 
The  doubt  of  the  viewing  subject  is  like  a  ghost  that  permanently  inhabits  meaning,  yet 
meaning  seeks  to  devise  an  arrangement  of  the  objective  world  that  conceals  this  absence. 
of  certainty:  overcoming  and  assimilating  the  trace  of  the  unwelcome  visitor,  always 
putting  on  a  new  coat  of  paint,  moving  the  'furniture'  of  the  world  around.  Like  the 
physical  constructions,  the  museums  and  galleries,  that  in  their  own  way  edify  the 
aesthetic  realm,  perceptual  discrimination  in  meeting  doubt  affirms  the  self-conscious 
autonomy  of  the  subject  -  consciousness  is  always  consciousness  of  some  thing  to  the 
subject;  discrimination  is  unavoidable,  and  one's  presence  in  front  of  a  painting  is  itself  a 
statement  of  autonomy. 
To  stand  in  front  of  the  reconfigured  world  'contained'  within  the  frame  that 
separates  the  canvas  from  its  surroundings  is  a  statement  of  openness,  an  allowance  that 
the  coincidental  determines  the  outcome  of  this  act.  Given  this,  any  relationship  thus 
established  between  individuated  subject  and  world  -  any  identity  serves  to  unify  or 
reconcile  two  apparently  discrete  entities.  Put  another  way,  to  look  is  not  a  passive  act. 
Looking,  in  being  directed  by  the  critical  faculties,  identifies,  and  this,  if  not  a  direct 
connection  that  reallses  meaning  (or  something  like  meaning),  is  an  act  that  strives  to 
justify  the  looking,  to  at  least  give  grounds  for  meaning,  to  make  sense  of  why  the  gaze  is 
turned  to  a  specific  place.  Meaning  is  then  the  offspring  of  the  autonomous  reflection  of 
a  subjectivity  engaged  with  a  world  of  objects.  So  the  viewer  does  not  engage  passively  as 
if  transported  through  the  world  by  an  external  power. 
The  gaze  is  either  fully  intentional,  or  as  Merleau-Ponty  said,  a  response  to  some 
kind  of  'summons';  perhaps  to  a  swift  movement  on  the  periphery  of  the  visual  field  that 
draws  our  attention,  or  to  a  object  that  is  thrown  into  relief  by  its  exceptional  difference 
from  the  background  of  the  world  that  now  becomes  the  world  around.  This  summons, 
according  to  Merleau-Ponty,  ends  with  the  eye  "anchored  in  the  object.  "  16  The  eye  is, 
therefore,  always  on  permanent  critical  alert  as  one  of  the  'sensors'  that  are  directed  by 
the  mind,  and  as  Nelson  Goodman  wrote,  the  eye  in  particular  is  difficult  to  dissociate 
from  the  rational  faculty  in  general.  It  is  a  part  of  it  that  "selects,  rejects,  organizes, 
discriminates,  associates,  classifies,  analyses,  constructs.  ))17 
16  See  Maurice  Merleau-Ponty  (1962)  Phenomenologv  of  Perception,  London:  67.  Cf  Norman  Bryson  (1983) 
Vision  and  Painting.  -  The  Logic  ofthe  Gaze,  London,  and  Martin  Jay  (1993)  Downcast  Eyes,  Berkeley. 
"  Nelson  Goodman  0  976)  ibid:  9. 
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The  critical  apprehension  of  these  apparently  'unfinished'  art  objects  (that  is, 
(  critical'  in  the  philosophical  sense  of  looking)  -  objects  such  as  Joseph  Cornell's  Untitled 
box  (Plate  19,  above)  -  arises  at  the  subjective  level  because  of  the  apparently  disordered 
state  they  present;  the  objects  demand  to  be  understood  on  falling  under  the  gaze,  which 
is  to  say  that  one  may  come  across  any  object  accidentally,  or  be  drawn  to  an  object 
unwillingly,  but  no  one  looks  at  art  objects  by  accident  because  they  are  normally  held  in 
places  that  are  set  apart  from  the  everyday  objects  we  encounter.  In  other  words,  the 
circumstances  of  art,  its  social  'production'  and  significance,  which  includes  the  loose 
rules  that  determine  where  art  is  held  and  viewed,  of  itself  cannot  but  demand  a 
discriminatory  response  on  the  part  of  the  subject.  And  even  if  one  accepts,  as  I  argue, 
that  it  is  the  observer,  in  looking,  that  brings  to  some  conclusion  a  disconnection  in 
meaning,  who  retrieves  the  object  from  some  non-place,  the  object  can  nevertheless  have 
no  other  existence  if  the  institutional  and  cultural  context  is  stripped  away;  this  is  not  in 
question.  I' 
The  art  world  constitutes  almost  a  supergaze,  in  the  form  of  an  architectural  vision 
of  an  all-seeing  consciousness,  whilst  the  artist,  by  contrast,  always  seeks  an  open 
conceptual  space  on  which  to  build  a  world.  The  artist,  then,  pursues  a  continual 
renewal  by  breaching  the  bounds  of  an  inwardly-directed  meaning,  by  looking  outwards 
to  reinvent  the  world  in  an  act  that  engages  with  the  contingent;  not  only  in  terms  of 
modernist  self-criticism  but  actually  in  pushing  such  subjective  demands  several  steps 
forward  and  across  a  liminal  boundary  into  an  uncertain  place,  which  is  necessarily  at 
the  expense  of  some  previously  known  'existence,  )  or  life  as  it  has  been  understood  up 
until  this  point.  The  dramatic  movement  essential  to  such  an  act  is  a  play  with  chance. 
Creation  and  Void 
The  performance  of  artistic  creation  begins  within  a  conceptual  void  -  with  loose 
associations,  fragmentary  ideas,  the  speculation  of  the  curious  -  it  starts,  in  other  words 
with  nothing  whole,  fixed,  or  identifiable.  And  importantly,  art,  like  play,  is  at  this  stage 
of  creation  for  nothing  but  itself,  and  it  is  from  this  void  that  the  artist  emerges  with 
"  My  concern  is  with  how  the  subject  reconciles  the  apparently  disordered  appearance  of  these  'post- 
Duchampian'  creations.  The  question  of  the  institutional  and  cultural  context  of  object  and  viewer  moves  away  from 
this  concern,  although  this  is  a  question  that  demands  serious  attention  in  a  manner  I  cannot  consider  here.  However, 
see,  for  example  Pierre  Bourdieu  0  979)  Distinction:  A  Social  Critique  oftheJudgement  of  Taste,  Cambridge,  M.  A. 
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something.  '9  However,  the  void  is  not  just  some  detached  and  empty  otherness  (say,  the 
(  non-artistic'  realm  or  the  everyday),  and  against  which  the  subject  is  determined,  but 
rather  more  specifically,  as  Hegel  said,  the  void  in  this  sense  is  actually  'an  absolute 
otherness'  in  which  consciousness  permanently  dwells:  it  is  the  negating  power  of  self, 
originating  within  the  subject.  The  Hegelian  void  might  then  be  manifested  in  self- 
conscious  acts  of  forgetting,  in  the  cognitive  power  that  dissolves  known  relations  that 
connected  the  subject  to  the  world  in  some  previous  identification.  'O  It  is  from  this  void 
that  truth  emerges  as  the  self-negating  aspect  of  subjectivity.  "  The  artist,  in  vacating  the 
ground  of  a  previous  identity,  removes  all  categories  in  a  transcendental  reduction  that 
temporarily  excludes  the  world.  "  Between  reason  and  unreason,  order  and  disorder,  and 
ultimately  between  identity  as  similarity  and  identity  as  differentiation,  it  is  only  finally 
an  act  of  differentiation  -a  break  with  past  -  that  ends  the  suspense,  inaugurating  the 
new. 
The  autonomous  artist  ultimately  operates  outside,  or  is  always  implicitly  striving  to 
move  beyond  the  limit  of  the  gaze,  especially  the  supergaze  of  the  art  world,  as  this  is 
what  objectifies  the  space  that  to  the  artist  must  remain  his  entitlement.  The  creative  act 
is  thus  much  more  an  act  of  self-making  than  merely  plastic  creation,  but  this  is 
something  easily  overlooked  because  all  the  viewer  sees  is  the  product  of  creation,  which 
in  purely  empirical  terms,  in  terms  of  what  sense  perceives,  is  the  object  that  is  of  course 
external  to  the  artist  as  subject,  whilst  creation  is  principally  found  in  the  activity  of 
unseen  consciousness.  "  The  art  object  is  ultimately  only  a  sign  of  what  cannot  be  seen, 
of  the  artist  having  experienced  a  psychological  realignment  between  meaning  and 
reality,  although  it  becomes  something  else  to  the  viewer. 
The  gaze  as  the  interpreter  of  symbols  relies  on  the  resolution  of  complex  objects 
that  are  present  to  the  senses,  and  is  eventually  concerned  with  establishing  some 
identity,  by  taking  this  sensory  object  and  referring  it  back  to  some  content  of  mind;  it  is 
Phillipson,  Ibid:  11. 
20  G.  W.  F.  Hegel  (1977)  Phenomenoloýy  ofSpirit,  Oxford:  14. 
21  In  terms  of  creativity  the  void  does  not  become  equivalent  to  a  nihilistic  tendency  -  the  void  is  the  source  of 
edification,  not  destruction.  What  should  be  noted  as  different  is  that  things  that  a-re  destroyed  are  also  made  void;  the 
point  being  that  all  things,  all  objects,  begin  from  nothing  and  eventually  return  to  nothing.  Cf.  Simon  Critchley 
0  997)  Very  Little 
... 
Almost  Nothing.  -  Death,  Philosophy,  Literature.  London.  The  ultimate  negation  of  self  is  death,  and 
the  subject  -  in  differentiating  itself  from  the  world  -  makes  the  power  of  death  real,  as  Dollimore  notes:  "death  holds 
out  the  promise  of  a  release  from  the  very  individuality  whose  formation  would  have  been  unthinkable  without  it.  "  J. 
Dollimore  (1998)  Death,  Desire  and  Loss  in  Western  Culture.  London:  xx-xxi. 
"  See  Edmund  Husserl  (1970)  Logical  Investigations,  London. 
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an  inwardly-directed  and  reductionist  appropriation  of  what  is  perceived.  The  object,  as 
Nelson  Goodman  has  said,  "does  not  sit  as  a  docile  model  with  its  attributes  neatly 
thrust  out  for  us  to  admire  and  portray.  ""  Rather  its  signifying  power  is  the  result  of  our 
labelling  and  classificatory  procedures,  and  nothing  else.  "  The  aesthetic  gaze  declares 
that  the  way  we  take  from  the  world  is  thus  the  way  we  make  it.  Nevertheless,  there  is  a 
paradox  in  this  state  of  affairs;  both  parties  in  the  artist-viewer  relationship  may  act  in  a 
manner  that  frustrates  the  other,  but  they  are  really  co-dependents,  the  parents  of  the 
object.  The  effect  of  the  whole  edifice  of  art  is  to  frustrate  the  artist  (by  the 
establishment  of  more  or  less  regulative  institutions),  and  yet  it  prompts  the  defiant 
forward  movement  that  disorders  what  is  valued  -  this  is  the  source  of  radical 
contingency.  It  is  no  surprise  then  the  legitimacy  of  accepted  ways  of  looking  becomes 
the  target  of  the  artist,  that  art  of  the  twentieth  century  itself  becomes  the  denial 
through  plasticity. 
The  point  is  also  that  our  use  of  this  term  'modern'  itself  only  makes  sense  as  a 
16 
category  breaker,  when  it  is  put  up  against  what  is  already  accepted,  against  tradition  . 
Modernism  is  an  oppositional  tendency  that  destroys  the  past,  and  it  just  so  happens 
that  with  painting  we  have  one  strain  of  modernism  that  outpaces  others  because  the 
tradition  of  representationalism  has  a  more  obvious  relationship  to  questions  of 
philosophical  realism.  This  relation  proves  difficult  to  break  -  the  canvas  and  the  frame 
make  what  we  know  to  be  a  'picture'  and  a  picture  is  supposed  to  resemble  something 
else  in  the  world.  In  objects  like  Joseph  Cornell's  box  constructions,  the  total  effect  is  to 
negate  resemblance.  Instead  the  frame  is  appropriated  and  declared  the  space  for  an 
order  that  the  artist  produces  unseen,  and  that  is  only  fully  realised  coincidentally  by 
some  poetic  enactment  that  involves  both  artist  and  viewer.  Many  of  Cornell's  objects 
are  constructed  on  a  grid,  which  in  modern  society  we  are  given  to  associate  with  order, 
but  which  within  modern  art,  as  Rosalind  Krauss  says,  "is  a  way  of  abrogating  the  claim 
of  natural  objects  to  have  an  order  peculiar  to  themselves.  "27  The  viewer,  in  converging 
with  the  object,  likewise  disorders  the  world  of  objects  as  known. 
"  On  the  indeterminacy  of  our  language  of  action,  and  the  'depth'  of  the  origin  of  acts  in  the  'untranslatable' 
location  of  the  mental,  see  Donald  Davidson  (1980)  Essays  on  Actions  and  Events,  Oxford. 
"  See  Goodman  (1976)  ibid:  32. 
25  On  labeling  and  classification  cf.  Michel  Foucault  (1970)  The  Order  of  Things:  an  Archaeologv  of  Human 
Knowledge,  New  York,  and  Stuart  Hampshire  (1959)  Thought  andAction,  London. 
"  See  Hans  Blumenberg  (1983)  The  Legitimacy  ofthe  Modern  Age.  Cambridge,  MA. 
27  Rosalind  Krauss  (1979)  'Grids,  '  in  October,  9:  50-64. 
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One  of  the  questions  I  remember  the  answer  to  was, 
"What  is  your  greatest  fear?  "  and  I  said,  "That  I  might  run  out  of  world.  " 
ROBERT  RAusCHENBERG 
Resurrection  seems  to  be  a  common  theme  in  much  of  the  art  of  the  20'  century  that 
follows  Duchamp,  whether  this  follows  in  the  same  spirit,  or  appears  merely 
chronologically  in  the  wake  of  Duchamp.  The  reanimation  of  dead  matter  occurs  as  the 
consequence  of  a  world  of  increasing  specificity,  a  world  of  refinement,  in  which  we  see  a 
necessary  residue  in  the  matter  which  is  'shaved'  from  the  surface  of  the  objective  world 
in  the  determinate  act  of  making.  Cast  aside  like  the  lacquer  that  would  accrue 
formlessly  as  a  byproduct  of  the  marvellous  technology  that  once  etched  a  world  of 
sound  into  the  grooves  of  a  piece  of  plastic,  creating  the  aural  document  of  some  reality. 
We  can  only  wonder  what  form  this  material  now  takes. 
Ever  since  Duchamp,  the  swar(of  life  and  the  useless  remains  of  objective  value  have 
been  rescued  by  artists,  brought  back  from  the  death  sentence  bestowed  upon  them  by 
modern  society  -  but  only  to  half-life,  to  the  characterless  suspense  of  the  Duchampian 
delay. 
The  residual  materials  in  question  are  normally  taken  to  be  totally  devoid  of  value; 
they  represent  only  the  matter  that  never  disappears.  It  is  matter  that,  on  the  contrary, 
temporarily  vanishes  as  a  condition  of  a  process  that  seeks  in  its  refinement,  to  define 
what  belongs  and  what  must  be  trashed.  This  is  the  destructive,  negative  end  of  making, 
a  reminder  that  all  things  made  are  eventually  reduced  to  the  same;  that  in  'death' 
identity  becomes  absolute. 
In  1997  the  British  artist  Cornelia  Parker,  by  happy  coincidence,  found  herself  in 
San  Antonio,  Texas,  when  she  heard  one  day  that  a  church  had  been  struck  by 
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lightning,  and  thence  transformed  by  fire  to  a  heap  of  charcoal.  After  recovering 
leftovers  from  the  scene  of  this  natural  destruction,  she  then  created  a  fragmentary  'cube' 
consisting  of  the  now  charred  pieces  of  wood,  which  were  suspended  by  wire  to  create 
the  form.  Large  fragments  in  the  middle  of  the  'cube'  give  way  to  the  smallest  of  visible 
pieces  around  the  edgeless  parameter  of  the  object,  which  dissolves,  like  the  fragments  of 
an  explosion,  into  the  surrounding  atmosphere,  in  an  echo  of  the  accidental  origin  of 
this  material.  The  piece  is  called  Mass  (Colder  Darker  Matter)  in  reference  to,  and 
perhaps  in  commemoration  of,  the  sacred  house  of  God  that  once  was  the  place  of  the 
Mass,  the  place  in  which  the  committed  would  receive  the  Word  (Plate  20).  Now  it  was 
just  cold  dark  matter,  mass  of  an  entirely  different  order;  the  relic  of  an  object  hanging 
together  in  a  new  form  -  this  is  the  vulgar  matter  of  life,  now  colder  and  darker  because 
some  natural  intervention  had  profaned  its  once  sacred  function.  ' 
Fragments  of  matter,  and  matter  transformed  -  crushed,  melted,  stretched,  or 
recovered  -  appear  throughout  the  work  of  Cornelia  Parker.  In  another  installation, 
Avoided  Object  (1995),  buried  objects  were  located  by  a  metal  detector,  then  resurrected 
from  beneath  the  ground  of  Dusseldorf  in  Germany,  to  be  suspended  in  the  finished 
form  above  the  ground  at  a  height  corresponding  to  the  depth  at  which  they  had  been 
fortuitously  discovered.  This  literal  and  metaphorical  raising  of  dead  matter,  in  the 
particularity  of  the  form  we  are  presented  with,  takes  a  trend  of  the  previous  fifty  or  sixty 
years,  and  adds  a  degree  of  refinement  that  makes  clear  that  where  once  the  discarded 
objects  of  the  modern  world  served  the  artist  as  the  kind  of  device  that  would  permit  an 
escape  from  self-expression,  now  any  object,  whether  destroyed  by  humanity  or  by 
nature,  could  serve  the  artist  as  a  means  of  expressing  something. 
The  history  of 
20,  h 
century  art  had  seen  painting  so  long  removed  from  the 
centrality  of  the  oil  and  canvas  as  the  principle  media  that  a  generation  of  artists,  such  as 
Cornelia  Parker,  did  not  need  to  find  ways  of  escaping  painting  as  traditionally 
understood;  rather  they  had  already  developed  in  the  anti-painting  tradition  that  was 
still,  nevertheless,  a  development  of  painting.  In  this  respect,  the  found  objects  of 
someone  like  Robert  Rauschenberg,  or  the  garbage  containers  of  the  French  artist 
Arman,  precede  the  more  formal  compositions  of  Cornelia  Parker,  but  establish  the 
'See  Cornelia  Parker  (2000)  Cornelia  ParkerlInstitute  of  Contemporary  Art  Boston.  London:  Art  Data.  Parker  also 
used  the  residue  from  the  record  mastering  process  to  create  a  work  called  'The  Negatives  of  Sound.  '  The  swarf  was 
placed  between  two  pieces  of  glass. 
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PLATE  20.  MASS  (COLDER  DARKER  MATTER),  Cornelia  Parker,  1997.  The  transformation  of 
remainders  is  a  distinguishing  feature  of  the  work  of  Cornelia  Parker.  This  'cube'  of  fragments  originated 
with  accidental  material  (charred  wood  from  a  building  struck  by  lightning),  others  -  Hanging  Fire, 
1999  (suspected  arson),  and  Cold  Dark  Matter:  An  Explo&d  View,  1991  (a  controlled  explosion)  -  the 
result  of  human  agency  (see  Cornelia  Parker/Institute  of  Contemporary  Art,  Boston,  2000.  )  "1  am 
concerned  with  ambivalence,  with  opposites,  with  inhaling  and  exhaling,  with  things  falling  apart  and 
coming  back  together  again,  "  she  has  said.  "With  killing  things  off,  as  if  they  existed  in  cartoon  comics 
and  then  resurrecting  them,  so  that  one  set  of  references  is  negated  as  a  new  one  takes  its  place.  "  Quoted 
in  Paid  Crowther,  1997,  The  Language  of  Twentieth  Century  Art-  p.  209. 
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continuity  between  someone  like  Parker,  or  another  of  her  predecessors,  Tony  Cragg, 
and  Marcel  Duchamp  in  the  idea  that  the  frame  was  now  banished,  that  there  were  no 
limits  to  the  objects  that  might  provide  material  for  the  artist. 
Metamor  phosis  of  the  Object 
To  think  of  objects  is  usually  to  think  of  particular  kinds  of  object,  and  this  usually 
brings  to  mind  something  physical,  material,  and  perhaps  useful.  '  The  object,  in  a 
material  sense,  is  not  only  something  that  has  a  corporeality,  a  mass  and  form  that  is 
perhaps  determined  by  its  association  with  some  function,  it  may  be 
- 
like  rock,  dirt  and 
other  'dead'  or  formless  matter  -a  primary  substance  that  is  utilised  in  the  creation  of 
objects  of  use;  as  sand,  for  example,  is  used  in  the  making  of  glass. 
Nevertheless,  the  metamorphosis  in  question  begins  to  take  its  current  form  with 
the  objects  cast-off  by  modern  society.  These  were  the  objects  that  interested  Robert 
Rauschenberg  -  the  used  up  remnants  of  an  urban  civilization  that  was  always 
discarding  the  old  in  the  development  of  a  more  refined,  more  functionally  responsive 
and  efficient  world. 
What  Rauschenberg  saw  was  that  once  an  object  was  deprived  of  the  'character'  that 
is  bestowed  by  functionality,  then  it  becomes  a  more  fluid  item,  difficult  to  fix  in 
meaning,  capable  of  occupying  a  number  of  different  'roles.  '  The  novelty  of  what 
Rauschenberg  was  doing  is  caught  in  a  photograph  of  the  artist  in  a  derelict  New  York 
lot  taken  by  Fred  McDarrah  in  1961  when  the  artist  was  at  the  height  of  his  early  fame 
(Plate  21).  '  We  see  a  dapper  looking  young  man  wearing  polished  shoes,  and  a  smart, 
sensible  overcoat.  Rather  incongruously  given  his  surroundings,  he  is  reading  a 
newspaper  as  he  sits  in  a  scene  of  apparent  destruction.  Here  we  see  the  'objects'  of 
Rauschenberg's  art:  rubble,  dirt,  pieces  of  wood,  a  broken  sink,  discarded  oil  cans, 
perhaps  a  broken  gas  lamp.  The  mismatch  between  his  appearance  and  the  appearance 
of  the  surroundings  was  reflected  in  the  contextual  reversal  that  he  completed  by  taking 
these  objects  of  destruction  into  the  civilized  spaces  of  modern  society. 
'  Objects  are  not  only  physical  things  identified,  for  example,  by  Lockean  primary  qualities,  but  include  ideas, 
concepts,  words,  cultures,  etc.  Cf  Ian  Hacking  (1999)  The  Social  Construction  of  What? 
'This  picture  can  be  found  J.  Fineberg  (1995)  Art  Since  1940:  Strategies  ofBeing.  London  and  New  York,  176. 
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PLATE  2  1.  ROBERT  RAUSCHENBERG  IN  A  DERELICT  LOT,  Fred  W.  Mc  Darrah,  196  1.  Whilst 
many  of  his  combines  looked  like  random  associations  of  garbage,  Rauschenberg  was  nonetheless  directed 
in  his  selection  of  objects  by  a  heightened  awareness  of  the  possible  meanings  of  items.  For  example:  "We 
have  certain  ideas  about  bricks.  A  brick  isn't  just  a  physical  mass  of  a  certain  dimension  that  one  builds 
houses  or  chimneys  with.  The  whole  world  of  associations,  all  the  information  that  we  have  -  the  fact 
that  it  is  made  of  dirt,  that  its  been  through  a  kiln,  romantic  ideas  about  little  brick  cottages,  deal  with  as 
many  of  the  things  you  know  about.  Because  if  you  don't,  I  think  you  start  working  more  like  an 
eccentric,  or  primitive.  "  Quoted  in  W.  Hopps  and  S.  Davidson,  1997,  Rauschenberg.  -  A  Retrospective.  p. 
29. 
- 
4.. 
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Rauschenberg  shared  the  conviction  of  his  friend  and  sometime  collaborator  John 
Cage,  that  "no  value  judgements  are  possible  because  nothing  is  better  than  anything 
else,  "  and  he  saw  the  taming  of  the  artistic  ego  as  a  fundamental  part  of  his  desire  to  be 
an  artist  making  art  that  reflected  the  world  he  lived  in.  Whilst  conventional  aesthetic 
refinement  was  therefore  avoided,  Rauschenberg  was  nevertheless  aware  that  finally  he 
would  have  to  choose  certain  objects  over  others.  In  denying  the  hierarchical  value  of 
objects  he  merely  wanted  to,  as  he  said,  "throw  enough  obstacles  in  the  way  of 
personal  taste.  "4 
The  fact  that  Rauschenberg  made  such  an  impact  at  this  time  is  unusual  given  that 
Marcel  Duchamp  had  been  living  in  New  York  on  and  off  for  nearly  30  years.  But  this 
is  made  clearer  when  we  discover  that  when  Rauschenberg  started  out  he  had  never  seen 
any  of  Marcel  Duchamp's  readymades  -  this  was  true  certainly  prior  to  his  own 
notoriety.  And  the  fact  that  he  did  not  know  Duchamp  reflected  also  the  fact  that 
Duchamp's  reputation  in  the  1950's  had  been  eclipsed  by  the  emergence  of  Abstract 
Expressionism  as  the  dominant  school  of  painting  in  the  United  States,  and  particularly 
in  New  York.  Thus,  many  artists  would  have  never  seen  Duchamp's  work  before  the 
1960's,  except,  perhaps,  in  photographic  reproductions.  ' 
The  principal  creative  and  aesthetic  aims  of  the  school  of  action  painters  that  were 
associated  with  abstract  expressionism  was  to  permit  the  unconscious  creative  will  to 
flow  freely,  somehow  spontaneously,  in  order  to  realise  a  connection  with  some 
unstated,  perhaps  unknown,  source.  '  For  all  that  spontaneity  was  welcomed,  however, 
abstract  Expressionism  did  not  entertain  an  idea  that  chance  was  a  part  of  the  process  of 
creation,  insofar  as  the  painters  placed  great  importance  on  the  technical  mechanics  of 
painting,  and  on  the  attainment  of  immediacy  being  a  condition  of  a  rigorous 
preparation  and  mastery  of  the  tools  and  technique  of  painting.  There  was  a  sense, 
therefore,  in  which  some,  like  Jackson  Pollock,  believed  their  role  was  as  a  medium;  a 
receptor  for  the  kind  of  truth  that  is  received  as  what  we  might  call  the  logos.  Thus,  the 
Calvin  Tomkins  0  965)  The  Bride  and  the  Bachelors,  232. 
Despite  his  reputation  now  it  is  easy  to  forget  how  long  it  took  for  Ducharnp  to  be  accepted.  For  instance  he 
never  had  a  single  solo  exhibition  until  1964  in  Pasadena,  California,  and  many  of  his  works  remained  in  private 
ownership. 
"  See  for  example  Daniel  Belgrad  (1998)  The  Culture  of  Spontaneity.  Chicago.  For  a  defence  of  Abstract 
Expressionism,  see  T.  J.  Clark  (1999)  Farewell  to  An  Idea:  Episodes  From  a  History  of  Modernism.  New  Haven  and 
London.  Chapter  7. 
Cf.  Mark  C.  Taylor  (1992)  Disfiguring:  Art,  Architecture  and  Religion. 
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artist  here  is  in  some  sense  really  unaware  of  what  is  taking  place  in  the  'act'  of  painting 
so  total  was  the  immersion. 
Jackson  Pollock  had  admitted  as  much  when  he  suggested  that  his  work  was  almost 
gifted  to  him,  and  that  the  painting  therefore  "has  a  life  of  its  own.  I  try  to  let  it  come 
through.  It  is  only  when  I  lose  contact  with  the  painting  that  the  result  is  a  mess.  "'  The 
urge  to  mine  some  foundational  source  in  the  self-expression  of  the  action  painters, 
Rauschenberg  felt,  interfered  with  the  limitless  possibilities  of  artistic  creation  because 
whilst  the  activity  of  painting  seemed  spontaneous,  the  labours  that  prepared  one  to 
attain  this  mediumistic  condition  involved  an  excess  of  thought  and  preparation. 
This  was  not  principally  a  limitation  that  was  given  by  certain  materials  employed 
in  Rauschenberg's  view  -  he  did  work  with  the  more  traditional  materials  of  paint  and 
canvas  himself,  although  this  largely  ceased  to  be  the  case  from  the  early  1950's  onwards. 
At  those  times  when  Rauschenberg  did  utilise  the  flat  plane  of  the  canvas,  he  would  also 
incorporate  found  items  into  a  kind  of  collage,  which  he  called  'combine  painting' 
because  it  was  neither  painting  nor  sculpture  but  had  elements  of  both.  9  Again,  like 
Duchamp,  a  painter  schooled  in  traditional  techniques,  he  was  interested  in  escaping 
from  what  he  had  learned  about  what  an  artist  should  be,  and  this  entailed  also  the 
abandonment  of  the  notion  that  there  were  only  certain  materials  it  was  legitimate  for 
an  artist  to  use. 
From  the  randomness  of  buying  unlabelled  cans  of  paint,  a  way  of  removing  the 
aesthetic  consideration  of  colour,  to  throwing  'obstacles'  in  the  way  of  self-expression  - 
for  example,  in  the  use  of  found  objects  to  create  larger  combines  that  broke  the  flat 
plane  of  the  canvas  and  occupied  three-dimensional  space,  Rauschenberg  was  also 
seeking  the  removal  of  the  frame  as  a  limiting  and  obstructive  crutch.  What  he  wanted 
to  do  was  to  open  his  window  to  the  world,  to  find  a  way  of  putting  the  world  into  his 
work  rather  than  his  mind  into  it,  and  in  this  regard  he  differs  significantly  from 
Duchamp. 
Rauschenberg  had  gotten  very  close  to  the  objects  that  would  soon  come  to 
dominate  his  work,  the  discarded  matter  of  the  urban  environment,  whilst  working  for  a 
'  Belgrad,  ibid.,  23 
'  This  modification  of  collage  techniques  was  the  continuation  of  a  trend  that  is  associated  with  modern 
painting  of  the  early  20"  century,  but  which  seems  to  have  origins  prior  to  modernism.  As  Eddie  Wolfram  notes:  "In 
the  curio  cabinets  of  wealthy  collectors  of  the  seventeenth  century  strange  objects  made  from  the  most  bizarre 
materials  might  be  found:  Mosaic  pictures  constructed  from  beetles,  corn  kernels,  coffee  beans  and  fruit  stones.  "  See 
E.  Wolfram  0  975)  A  History  of  Collage,  London.  8. 
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construction  company  in  the  early  1950's,  and  it  did  not  take  long  for  this  acquaintance 
to  bear  fruit.  'O  As  Calvin  Tomkins  explains,  by  1953  Rauschenberg's  first  moves  away 
from  canvas  saw  him  fascinated  by  the  richness  of  the  material  garbage  that  was  lying 
around  New  York  City,  and  he  was  using  materials  such  as: 
[R]  ocks  dug  up  on  his  block  by  Consolidated  Edison  workmen,  pieces  of 
lumber,  scrap  metal.  In  his  bottomless  curiosity  to  see  'what  is  a  picture  and 
what  isn't',  he  even  tried  making  pictures  out  of  dirt,  which  he  packed  into 
boxlike  frames.  " 
Like  Joseph  Cornell,  another  unusual  artist,  Rauschenberg  collected  a  vast  storehouse  of 
the  random  and  banal,  although  in  contrast  to  Cornell  who  was  a  meticulous  sorter  and 
chronicler,  Rauschenberg  had  amassed  these  items  through,  as  Walter  Hopps  says,  "an 
ecumenical  passion  for  collecting,  "  which  became  his  means  of  reordering  experience. 
Rauschenberg  allowed  for  the  intrusion  of  accidents  in  other  ways  as  well,  particularly  as 
part  of  a  silk  screening  process  that  involved  a  potential  for  disordering  any  intentions  he 
might  have  had  in  that  the  medium  itself  entailed  relinquishing  a  degree  of  control  in 
the  technical  preparation  of  the  screens,  and  in  the  way  the  effects  of  this  method  could 
be  difficult  to  foresee.  " 
But  it  was  in  the  combines  of  the  late  1950's  that  Rauschenberg  more  fully 
developed  a  way  to  frustrate  the  development  of  personal  stylistic  foundations  -  these 
pieces  were  formally  ambiguous  in  the  realisation  of  some  kind  of  mutant  combination 
of  painting  and  sculpture.  He  took  and  used  many  items  and  materials  in  the  making  of 
these:  wood,  glass,  tin  cans,  stuffed  chickens,  a  stuffed  goat,  broken  furniture,  splattered 
paint,  pieces  of  concrete,  buckets  of  cement,  iron  spikes,  wire  -  the  list  could  be  endless 
because  there  was  nothing  he  would  not  use. 
Between  1955  and  1959,  Rauschenberg  resurrected  such  discarded  objects  and 
incorporated  them  into  more  than  sixty  combines,  of  which  the  most  well-known  are 
'0  See  Mary  Lynn  Kotz  (1962)  Rauschenberg.  -  Art  and  Life,  78-79. 
Tomkins,  1965,  ibid.,  209 
See  Walter  Hopps,  'Rauschenberg's  Art  of  Fusion'  in  Walter  Hopps  and  Susan  Davidson  (1998)  Robert 
Rauschenberg.  -  A  Retrospective,  22.  On  Joseph  Cornell,  see  Lindsay  Blair  (1998)  Joseph  Cornell's  Vision  of  Spiritual 
Order.  London. 
"  See  Tomkins,  1965,233.  Rauschenberg  said:  "When  I  get  the  silk  screens  back  from  the  manufacturer  the 
images  on  them  look  different  from  the  way  they  did  in  the  original  photographs,  because  of  the  change  in  scale,  so 
that's  one  surprise  right  there.  Then,  they  look  different  again  when  I  transfer  them  to  canvas,  so  there's  another 
surprise.  And  they  keep  on  suggesting  different  things  when  they're  juxtaposed  with  other  images  on  the  canvas,  so 
there's  the  same  kind  of  interaction  that  goes  on  in  the  combines  and  the  same  possibilities  of  collaboration  and 
discovery.  " 
j  Scanlan  2001  176 The  Visible  Remainder 
Bed  (1955),  a  bedspread  and  pillows  splattered  with  paint,  which  has  been  nailed  to  a 
rectangular  surface  and  then  hung,  just  like  a  traditionally  framed  canvas;  Monogram 
(1955-59),  which  may  be  Rauschenberg's  most  famous  combine,  a  stuffed  goat 
purchased  from  a  junk  shop,  smeared  with  paint  and  dirt  and  finished  off  with  a  car  tyre 
placed  around  the  body  of  the  goat,  which  was  then  positioned  atop  a  collage;  and 
Odalisk  (1958),  which  features  a  white  rooster  on  top  of  a  wooden  box-like  structure 
covered  with  childlike  paint  strokes  and  images  of  women  torn  from  books  and 
magazines.  Other  combines  also  included  found  objects,  from  the  streets  of  New  York 
mainly  (but  anywhere  would  do);  boards,  bricks,  chairs,  ladders,  bottles,  and  so  on 
(Plate  22).  14 
For  Robert  Rauschenberg  junk  became  an  easier  material  to  use  because  these  'dead' 
objects  of  refuse  had  no  meaning  apart  from  the  negative  undifferentiated  one  that 
declared  their  lack  of  worth,  the  total  absence  of  distinction,  and  making  use  of  such 
garbage  avoided  the  difficult  question  of  defining  an  identity  through  stylistic 
conventions  or  through  representationalism.  He  had  found  that  the  position  of  modern 
painting,  summed  up  by  the  fact  that  the  art  had  itself  become  about  form  and  material 
-  about  the  paint  and  the  canvas,  and  what  could  be  achieved  within  the  flat  surface. 
This  was  excessively  self-conscious  and  directed,  he  believed.  He  recalled  that  Josef 
Albers,  one  of  his  teachers,  tried  to  convince  him  that  one  color  was  no  better  than 
another,  but  the  liberation  was  still  incomplete  -  the  question  of  colour  still  remained  a 
potentially  disabling  one  because  it  implied  the  need  for  a  choice;  he  "couldn't  decide  to 
use  one  color  instead  of  another,  because  I  really  wasn't  interested  in  taste.  "  15 
Rauschenberg  took  what  Duchamp  did  with  the  useful  everyday  object  of  rational 
society  in  the  readymades  and  made  a  comparable  transformation  with  useless  objects  - 
that  is  to  say  he  removed  them  from  a  familiar  context.  It  is  a  curious  historical  fact  that 
"  Bed  came  about  because  of  Rauschenberg's  inability  to  afford  expensive  canvases.  Other  combines  were 
created,  and  discarded  on  a  whim.  According  to  Kotz,  1990,  pp.  78-79,  "He  made  strange  boxes,  somewhat  like  those 
that  Joseph  Cornell  was  showing  at  the  Egan  Gallery,  but  much  more  primitive  and  fetishistic,  Red  with  stones, 
nails,  feathers,  bits  and  pieces  of  glass  ... 
He  took  the  boxes  to  the  Galleria  dell'Obleisco  [in  Italy],  the  only  Roman 
gallery  to  show  contemporary  abstract  art.  Thinking  them  outrageously  funny,  the  owner  exhibited  the  objects  as  the 
latest  'modern  art.  '  To  Rauschenberg's  amazement  and  the  gallery  owner's  amusement  some  were  sold.  They  called 
them  'Scatole:  contemplative  e  feticci  personlai'  (Thought  Pieces  and  Personal  Fetishes).  In  Florence,  the  Galleria 
d'Arte  Contemporanea  showed  the  work.  A  local  critic  wrote  that  the  art  was  a  'psychological  mess'  and  should  be 
thrown  into  the  Arno.  Rauschenberg,  who  was  about  to  leave  for  home  obliged.  'It  solved  the  packing  problem,  '  he 
observed  later.  " 
"  Quoted  in  Calvin  Tomkins  (1965)  The  Bride  and  the  Bachelors,  200. 
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PLATE  22.  COCA  COLA  PLAN,  Robert  Rauschenberg,  1954.  This  box  construction  is  reminiscent  of 
Joseph  Cornell's  collections  of  ephemera.  Rauschenberg  was  aware  of  the  ostensible  similarity,  but  was 
keen  to  insist  on  a  distinction:  "A  big  difference  in  our  attitudes  is  that  I  dragged  ordinary  materials  into 
the  art  world  for  a  direct  confrontation,  and  I  felt  Cornell  incorporated  highly  select  materials  to  celebrate 
their  rarification  [sic].  I  love  his  work  but  I  think  that  we  live  in  diffýrent  worlds.  "  Quoted  in  Walter 
Hopps  and  Susan  Davidson,  1997,  Rauschenberg.  -  A  Retrospective:  p.  29. 
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the  respective  origins  of  the  objects  -  as  junk,  and  as  objects  of  value  -  in  both  cases 
follows  through  an  initial  transformation  into  'art'  in  slightly  different  ways.  Thus,  the 
readymades  are  objects  that,  through  passage  of  time,  begin  the  more  one  observes  them 
to  look  sleek  and  unusually  elegant.  Rauschenberg's  combines,  by  contrast,  unfix  our 
relationship  to  the  object  world  in  a  subtly  different  manner;  the  gesture  looks  the  same 
as  Duchamp's,  but  by  taking  and  re-contextualising  once  useless  remains,  rather  than 
utilitarian  objects,  we  are  still  allowed  to  see  the  resemblance  to  junk.  In  fact,  there  is  no 
doubt  as  to  this  relation  -  garbage  is  unmistakably  recognisable  as  forever  forez*gn;  these 
objects,  in  the  alien  forms  of  the  uselessness  of  the  parts  constitute  the  entirety  of  their 
16  uniqueness. 
A  Detour  of  Object  Functionality 
In  a  previous  chapter  I  looked  at  the  destruction  of  identity  in  the  work  of  Marcel 
Duchamp,  particularly  as  a  result  of  his  use  of  disguise  to  frustrate  the  reasonable 
expectations  that  a  work  of  art  represents  something  understandable,  or  meaningful,  but 
identity  is  put  into  question  in  another  sense  also  in  Duchamp's  work,  and  one  that  is 
important  to  our  understanding  of  the  profane  nature  of  the  materials  artists  like  Robert 
Rauschenberg  used. 
If  the  utility  of  objects  signified  the  extent  to  which  industrial  society  had  attempted 
to  make  the  material  world  more  responsive  to  need,  to  make  the  stuff  of  the  world  more 
functional  or  efficient,  Duchamp  theoretically  inverted  the  relation. 
With  the  readymade,  any  evaluative  -  and  thus  aesthetic  -  context  was  denied  not 
only  because  the  objects  were  'non-aesthetic,  '  but  also  because  the  object  was  often 
removed  from  any  intrinsically  given  reference  points,  which  is  to  say  from  the 
associations  of  time  and  place  that  give  objects  a  functional  definition,  from  any  cultural 
or  social  context,  which  would  make  the  object  recog-nisable.  This  finally  leaves  us 
without  any  indication  of  what  this  context  might  be.  The  onus  was  on  the  viewer  to 
figure  out  the  significance  of  these  objects,  and  this  was  a  puzzle  that  could  only  be 
"  The  idea  of  appropriation  that  was  one  of  the  principal  feature  of  Ducharrip's  readymades  was  also  continued 
in  a  slightly  different,  less  material,  vein  by  artists  such  as  those  belonging  to  the  Fluxus  groups,  who  were  less 
concerned  with  the  appropriation  of  objects.  On  this  point  see  Daniel  Spoerri  (ed.  )  (1962)  An  Anecdoted  Topography 
of  Chance.  London:  Atlas  Press.  Other  post-Duchamp  trends  in  20"  century  art  are  examined  in,  for  example,  Lucy  R. 
Lippard  (1997)  Six  Years:  The  Dematerialization  of  the  Art  Object  From  1966  to  1972;  and  Yve-Alain  Bois,  and 
Rosalind  Krauss  (1997)  FormLess:  A  User  ý  Guide.  New  York:  Zone 
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resolved  within  the  context  of  questions  of  meaning;  questions,  as  we  saw,  that  can  only 
be  answered  in  analytical  or  tautological  terms.  " 
The  transformations  of  the  object  we  see  in  the  readymade  were  a  prime  example  of 
this.  Mimetic  forms  of  expression  -  landscapes,  the  still  life,  portraits  -  for  instance, 
might  have  been  said  to  apply  a  rather  Lockean  empirical  spin  on  existence.  The  portrait 
represented  the  internalisation  and  re-presentation  of  a  supposedly  objective  external 
reality.  Yet  portrait  painting  may  be  at  the  extreme  end  of  the  limitations  imposed  by 
representationalism,  leaving  out  much  of  the  reality  that  was  apparent  beyond  the  frame 
of  the  canvas,  and  evident  through  other  means.  "  It  might  be  argued  that  in 
conventional  representational  terms,  some  painting  which  passed  as  art  was  valued  to  the 
extent  that  it  preserved  a  likeness  to  some  objectively  given  phenomena,  scenario,  or 
person,  with  portraiture  being  the  most  obvious  example  of  such  a  value. 
On  reflection,  however,  the  portrait  is  more  akin  to  the  camera-taken  family 
snapshot  we  know  today,  than  it  is  to  the  modernist  artistic  impulse,  as  we  now 
understand  that.  It  is  an  act  of  identification  that  declares  the  objective  and  social  value 
placed  on  more  ofthe  same.  " 
But  if  this  kind  of  representation  did  not  speak  of  the  fragmentary  nature  of  modern 
life,  art  moved  in  the  twentieth  century  towards  the  dissolution  of  the  object,  when 
taken  as  an  ideal  or  represented  form.  And  so,  the  days  of  art  being  accepted  and 
understood  principally  as  some  kind  of  adornment,  or  as  an  entertaining  diversion  for 
the  viewer  were  now  over.  In  general,  modern  art  in  the  twentieth  century  dispensed 
with  resemblances  for  a  variety  of  historical  and  intellectual  reasons,  but  Marcel 
Duchamp  in  particular  wanted  to  explore  the  seeming  impossibility  of  identification 
when  'objective  reality'  was  perceived  to  deny  the  singularity  of  the  individual 
experience;  to  get  rid  forever  of  "the  possibility  of  recognising  or  identifying  any  two 
"I  discuss  the  'analyticity'  of  the  aesthetic  in  the  previous  chapter.  On  works  of  art  as  'analytical  propositions' 
see  chapter  8  of  Paul  Crowther  (1997)  The  Language  of  Twentieth  Century  Art.  -  A  Conceptual  History.  New  Haven: 
Yale. 
See  Hillel  Schwartz  (1996),  The  Culture  of  the  Copy,  92.  He  quotes  Erasmus  on  this  matter:  "What  an 
enormous  a-mount  of  a  real  person  is  missing  from  the  portrait!  ...  Where  are  the  brain,  the  flesh,  the  veins,  the  sinews 
and  the  bone,  the  bowels,  blood,  breath,  humours?  Where  a-re  life,  movement,  feeling,  voice  and  speech?  Where 
finally  are  man's  special  characteristics,  mind,  intelligence,  memory  and  understanding?  " 
"'  Schwartz,  lbid,  92:  "Ruth  Henshaw  Brown,  who  painted  one  hundred  portraits  a  year  and  drew  over  a 
thousand  profiles  of  New  Englanders  from  1828  to  1846,  was  directed  to  add  new  glasses  to  the  face  of  Rev.  Timothy 
Rogers,  whose  portrait  she  had  done  less  than  a  year  before.  During  a  period  of  six  years  she  was  called  upon  several 
times  to  update  the  hair  and  dress  of  her  painting  of  Lydia  Burr.  A  losing  battle,  this  finicky  correctness,  but  it  was 
strenuously  fought,  to  the  profit  of  artists  who  did  fifty  silhouettes  or  a  dozen  portraits  a  day.  " 
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things  as  being  like  each  other.  ""  Where  the  contents  of  the  world,  in  other  words, 
could  not  be  ordered  according  to  the  concepts  of  reason,  nor  of  reasonable  values  or 
expectations. 
The  repetitive  production  of  artefacts  could  be  seen  to  stand  in  contrast  to  the  fast- 
changing  nature  of  life  in  modern  society,  a  world  in  which  resemblances  could  now  no 
longer  be  relied  upon  to  reveal  objective  truth  -  and  this  extends  to  the  most  basic 
manifestations  of  'taste,  '  which  is  to  say  it  no  longer  takes  very  long  for  us  to  become 
convinced  that  we  require  something  new  -  mainly  because  things  become  old  very  fast 
within  the  context  of  ceaseless  production.  And  so,  the  popular  craving  for  simulation  is 
like  a  desire  for  recently  outmoded,  yet  'ancient'  products  -  it  denies  the  value  of 
innovation.  The  entire  problem  for  the  creative  instinct  is  to  escape  this  cosiness,  as 
Picasso,  for  example  observed:  "No,  painting  is  not  for  decorating  apartments,  "  he  said. 
"It  is  an  instrument  of  war  for  attack  and  defence  against  the  enemy.  "" 
The  enemy  was  the  complacent  acceptance  of  what  was  easily  digested,  pretty  or 
decorative;  in  other  words,  it  was  acquiescence  in  the  easy  and  uncomplicated 
objectification  given  by  popular  acceptance.  Perhaps  the  excesses  of  life  -  resulting  from 
the  mass  production  of  goods  -  were  making  civilisation  lazy  and  flabby.  Adornments 
spoke  of  decadence.  Confection  had  replaced  substance.  The  absence  of  novelty  is  now 
made  equivalent  to  a  hell  on  earth,  or  as  Hillel  Schwartz  said,  "a  waiting  room  with 
kitsch  reproductions  and  no  exits.  A  prison  cell  with  loops  of  Muzak.  A  closed  ward.  "" 
Hell,  or  not,  the  experience  of  modern  life  nevertheless  engenders  a  sense  of  being 
that  produces  the  expectation  of  a  reality  that  can  be  relied  upon;  we  expect  to  find  the 
same  content  in  experience  over  and  over.  Why  else  would  we  willingly  enter  the 
hurtling  piece  of  metal  and  machinery  that  is  an  airplane  if  we  did  not  accept  that, 
usually,  it  hurtles  toward  its  destination  quite  safely? 
The  point  is  that  the  experience  of  sameness,  along  with  technological  progress  has 
made  it  possible  to  rely  upon  consistency.  Everyday  objects  we  use  can  now  be  found  the 
world  over  exactly  the  same.  This  'shrinking'  of  the  world,  in  terms  of  possible 
'0  Quoted  by  Octavio  Paz  (1970)  Marcel  Duchamp,  Or  the  Castle  ofPurity.  London:  10.  This  essay  was  reprinted 
as  chapter  one  of  Octavio  Paz  (1990)  Marcel  Duchamp:  Appearance  Stripped  Bare.  New  York.  The  quotation  can  be 
found  on  page  16.  See  also  Harriet  Ann  Watts  (1980)  Chance.  -  A  Perspective  on  Dada.  Ann  Arbor:  33. 
"  Quoted  in  Tomkins,  1988,  Post-to-Neo:  The  Art  World  ofthe  1980.  New  York:  52 
22  Quoted  in  Schwartz,  ibid:  317. 
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experiences,  has  thus  made  surprises  more  exceptional.  Yet,  at  the  same  time,  in  a  subtle 
way,  experience  produces  the  grounds  for  the  awareness  of  surprise. 
Novelty  items  -  again,  like  most  consumer  objects,  universal,  found  in  gift  shops 
the  world  over  -  are  just  so  because  they  are  deceptive,  or  playful  in  appearance.  And  so 
we  can  see,  "saltshakers  in  the  shape  of  lightbulbs,  skillets  converted  into  picture  frames 
or  clocks,  ice  tongs  made  to  serve  as  paper  towel  holders.  "  But  'kitsch'  is  also  junk  -  the 
word  in  its  German  origin  was  initially  employed  to  designate  degraded  value.  "  The  list 
of  kitsch  items  could  thus  be  endless,  and  it  reveals  the  attractiveness  of  even  the 
slightest,  subtlest  surprise. 
When  we  take  the  everyday  implements  of  modern  living  within  their  proper 
context  they  realise  both  a  rational  desire  for  order  and  control  over  life,  and  a 
functional  'transparency'  -  the  appearance  gives  no  lie.  There  is  a  limitless  supply  of 
these  objects  and,  not  surprisingly,  our  ordinary  language  use  settles  their  utilitarian 
basis,  thus  identifying  the  expectations  that  come  from  the  names;  ladders,  refrigerators, 
vacuum  cleaners,  cutlery,  shovels,  hat  racks,  and  so  on,  have  a  definite,  not  to  say, 
objectively  useful,  purpose  in  helping  us  to  organise  our  movements  meaningfully,  and 
in  aiding  our  progress  through  the  obstacles  we  face  daily. 
Functional  objects  will  also  normally  be  timesaving  devices;  for  example,  shovels 
and  refrigerators,  in  an  important  sense  rationallse  work  to  allow  time  for  leisure.  Yet, 
we  forget  the  technological  genius  that  has  gone  into  the  creation  of  even  the  simplest  of 
these  everyday  objects.  A  shovel,  for  instance,  is  a  marvel  of  rational  creation.  What 
could  be  simpler  than  an  implement  for  gathering  up  and  removing  the  various  obstacles 
we  find  -  snow,  dirt,  or  gravel?  Think  of  the  time  saving  capabilities  -  of  the  genius  of 
ergonomic  design.  These  objects  represent  progress. 
The  objects  of  modern  society  stand  in  a  relation  of  identity  to  their  function,  can 
be  understood  usually  by  the  explanatory  method  par  excellence  of  modern  society, 
analysis,  which  is  to  say  that  by  breaking  down  their  meaning  in  terms  of  this 
functionality: 
"  George  Basalla  (1982),  'Transformed  Utilitarian  Objects,  '  189.  On  kitsch,  see  also  Celeste  Olalquiaga  (1999) 
The  Artificial  Kingdom.  London:  38-39,  fn.  8,  who  explains  the  etymology  of  'kitsch'  includes  "verkitschen,  to  make 
cheap,  and  kitschen,  to  collect  junk  from  the  street.  " 
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Chilling  food  =  refrigeration 
Removing  creases  =  ironing 
Lifting  dirt  from  a  carpet  =  vacuuming 
A  clue  to  the  significance  of  such  functional  objects  to  modern  living  is  given  in  the  ease 
with  which  they  soon  come  to  be  taken  for  granted.  Thisforgetting,  too,  is  a  function  of 
our  individual  and  collective  orientation  toward  the  world.  The  questions  that  occupy 
the  thoughts  of  a  child,  for  example,  are  banished  by  experience,  or  as  David  Hume  said 
by  the  recognition  of  the  constant  conjunction  of  contiguous  phenomena,  which  then, 
eventually,  becomes  an  unconscious  acceptance  of  the  'transparency'  of  appearances. 
And  so  our  faith  in  the  very  reliability  of  objects  and  functional  performance  tames  the 
inquisitive  mind,  which,  in  childlike  fashion  sees  curiosity  in  everything. 
Duchamp  was  aware  that  in  removing  everyday  functional  objects  from  their 
intended  use,  he  was,  in  the  first  place,  mocking  the  rationalisation  of  modern  life, 
including,  as  we  saw,  the  ordering  tendencies  of  the  aesthetic.  "  During  his  life  most  of 
these  transformed  objects  were  never  shown  in  galleries  or  museums,  and  were  known 
for  a  time  only  to  Duchamp's  friends.  Many  of  the  original  Readymades,  for  example, 
were  also  lost,  and  most  of  them  -  at  one  time  or  another  -  were  only  to  be  found,  after 
his  rediscovery  by  the  so-called  Neo-Dadaists,  in  his  New  York  apartment. 
This  apartment  itself  was  a  testament  to  idleness,  to  the  unworthiness  of  work,  from 
the  first  obvious  sign  to  the  visitor  -  given  by  the  sight  of  a  rope  seen  on  entering 
through  the  front  door.  This  extended  to  a  chair  where  Duchamp  would  sit  and  play 
chess,  saving  film  from  rising  to  greet  his  visitors. 
Post-war  America,  by  contrast,  was  renowned  for  its  creation  of  a  multitude  of 
objects  to  keep  the  modern  home  a  clean  and  efficient  living  space.  "  Duchamp's 
contempt  for  such  a  reasonable  ordering  of  one's  life  was  evident  in  the  absence  of  shiny, 
white  and  chrome  surfaces,  not  to  mention  in  the  confusing  'organisation'  of  objects.  " 
"  "When  I  discovered  the  Readymades  I  thought  to  discourage  aesthetics.  In  Neo-Dada  they  have  taken  my 
readymades  and  found  aesthetic  beauty  in  them.  I  threw  the  bottle-rack  and  urinal  into  their  faces  as  a  challenge  and 
now  they  admire  them  for  their  aesthetic  beauty.  "  Marcel  Duchamp  quoted  in  DeDuve,  1991,  The  Definitively 
Unfinished  Marcel  Duchamp,  164.  The  same  article  raises  questions  over  the  attribution  of  this  statement  to 
Duchamp,  although  it  seems  to  fall  within  the  context  of  everything  else  he  said  and  wrote. 
"  Cf.  Ellen  Lupton  (1992)  The  Bathroom,  the  Kitchen,  and  the  Aesthetics  of  Waste:  a  Process  ofElimination.  New 
York. 
26  One  interesting  outcome  of  this  lack  of  housework  was  Man  Ray's  well  known  picture  Dust  Breeding,  taken  in 
Duchamp's  apartment,  and  featuring  a  section  from  Duchamp's  Large  GLass,  which  the  photograph  shows  to  have 
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This  disordered  space  represented  something  of  an  obstacle  course  to  anyone  but 
Duchamp,  for  whom  it  attained  some  curious  order;  it  was  the  exact  opposite  of  what  a 
modern  home  should  exemplify  -  comfort  and  ease  of  use  -  instead  it  was  a 
disorientating  funhouse  full  of  randomly  distributed  objects  that,  to  the  uninformed  eye, 
were  simply  junk.  Here,  the  readymades  were  not  installed  for  the  aesthetic  pleasure  of 
guests,  but  were,  rather,  randomly  distributed  throughout  the  apartment  without  much 
sensible  purpose,  as  Helen  Molesworth  notes  in  the  following  description  of  an 
photograph  of  this  scene: 
A  coatrack  nailed  to  the  floor  in  front  of  a  bicycle  wheel  atop  a  kitchen  stool. 
There  is  a  photograph  in  the  background  of  which  we  spy  the  urinal  suspended 
from  a  doorjamb;  in  the  foreground  a  shovel  dangles  from  the  ceiling.  " 
One  can  imagine  that  Duchamp's  frequent  visitors  would  have  to  be  extremely  careful 
to  avoid  accidents,  because  little  in  this  apartment  met  conventional  expectations.  If  it 
was  not  clear  what  Duchamp  was  doing  with  the  readymades  at  the  time  of  their 
'production'  his  apartment  may  have  provided  some  insight  in  the  evidence  of  an 
unusual  conception  of  Turniture,  '  not  to  say  an  odd  way  of  ordering  his  living  space. 
The  transformation  of  everyday  functional  objects,  to  the  extent  that  they  cease  to 
be  functional  any  longer,  subverts  the  reasonable  expectations  of  the  unquestioning 
mind;  it  negates  Humean  constant  conjunction  as  the  basis  of  knowledge,  which  we 
remember  Hume  himself  saw  as  merely  our  perception  of  the  patterns  objects  or 
relations  fall  into,  rather  than  what  constitutes  a  pattern.  The  readymade  gesture  thus 
casts  doubt  upon  an  unreflective  assumption  that  the  meaning  of  objects  is  only  to  be 
found  in  their  everyday,  or  intended,  use. 
The  Physical  Poverty  of  the  Object 
This  transformation  was  one  means  of  giving  a  new  life  to  objects,  of  reconfiguring  the 
context  of  meaning,  a  renewed  context  that  then  mediates  the  perception  of  the  object  as 
art.  The  element  of  the  contingent  found  in  the  signifying  power  of  these  gestures  lies  in 
the  implication  that  meaning  is  constituted  by  a  continual  recycling  of  matter,  in  the 
been  colonized  by  dirt.  The  resulting  object,  as  pictured,  can  only  be  described  as  artistic  by  accident,  though 
ignorance  of  its  origin  would  conceal  this.  The  image  is  reproduced  in  many  places,  but  see  Dawn  Ades  et  al  (1999) 
Duchamp.  London:  91. 
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resurrection  and  re-ordering  of  the  material  objects  that  furnish  the  physical  'being-ness  5 
of  existence. 
This  was  rooted  in  a  belief  that  time  and  change  could  be  incorporated  as  a  feature 
in  the  execution  of  a  radically  redefined  plasticity  that  would  then  'extend'  from  the 
object  to  the  observer  in  recognition  that  there  was  no  longer  a  privileged  objective 
perspective  which  could  determine  a  final  set  of  properties  for  the  object;  it  was,  as 
Martin  Jay  has  said,  a  denial  of  the  "transcendental  atemporal  viewing  subject.  3)28  But  the 
capacity  for  transformation  also  suggested  that  ideas  of  existence  and  non-existence 
provided  the  language  for  the  art  of  the  transformed  object,  when  language  was 
understood  as  the  artificial  system  of  signs  and  symbols  that  allowed  intelligible 
communication. 
The  fragmentary  nature  of  experience  in  modern  society  is  thus  reflected  in  the 
incorporation  of  discrete  and  randomly  associated  objects  in  the  works  of  assemblage 
and  installation  artists.  There  is  a  literal  filling  up  of  empty  space,  a  void,  with 
reconstituted  remains  of  once  distinct  objects,  and  the  question  for  the  artist  moves,  in 
the  mid-to-late  twentieth  century,  from  one  of  how  to  utilise  the  flat  surface  of  the 
canvas  -a  surface  that  is  bound  in  three  dimensional  space  by  a  frame  that  literally 
masks  offthe  contents  and  sets  the  object  apart  from  its  environment  -  to  one  of  how  the 
language  of  art  can  be  articulated  within  the  language  of  everyday  use;  a  question  that 
has  always  been  implicit  in  modernism,  and  that  was  found  in  the  making  of  a  reality 
that  is  itself  not  'real'  in  anything  but  terms  that  demand  the  suspension  of  rational 
expectations. 
Where  artists  like  Robert  Rauschenberg,  Joseph  Cornell,  and  Arman  had  pushed 
such  a  possible  discourse  to  the  fore  by  bringing  found  items  within  a  more  or  less 
conventional  frame  -  within  boxes,  projecting  from  the  canvas,  and  so  on  -  and  thus 
into  the  actual  space  where  art  is  still  recognisable  enough  to  be  presented  to  the  world, 
that  is  into  a  space  that  by  definition  objectified  and  also  legitimised  it,  it  took  an 
extreme  development  of  the  idea  to  really  bring  home  the  fundamentally  alien  aspect  of 
27  See  Helen  Molesworth,  1996,  'Work  Avoidance:  The  everyday  Life  of  Marcel  Duchamp's  Readymades,  '  in 
ArtjournaZ  500):  5  1,  The  photograph  is  found  alongside  this  article. 
"  See  Martin  Jay,  Downcast  Eyes,  p.  152. 
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these  objects.  It  was  the  French  artist  Arman  who  took  this  to  its  logical  end  by  actually 
21  filling  up  a  gallery  with  garbage  he  found  in  the  street  (Plate  23)  . 
The  force  of  garbage  as  an  intrusive  element  in  art  thus  exhausted  by  the  totality  of 
Arman's  garbage  invasion,  artists  began  to  employ  discarded  objects,  and  fragments  of 
objects  in  a  new  way  to  realise  aform  rather  than  to  simply  illustrate  the  degraded  value 
in  the  object,  the  actual  poverty  of  the  objects. 
We  can  see  something  of  this  development  in  765  Paper  Balls,  an  installation  from 
1969  by  British  artist  John  Hilliard,  who  can  be  taken  to  precede  Cornelia  Parker  in  the 
implicit  suggestion  that  the  matter  of  the  world  is  eventually  resolved  into  smaller 
elements,  into  garbage,  which  we  see  is  just  the  same  basic  material  in  an  unformed 
state,  devoid  of  conventional  objective  properties.  And  garbage  here  just  signifies  the 
absence  of  language  to  describe  what  is  present  to  sense,  a  way  of  giving  a  name  to  the 
nameless. 
Hilliard's  material  takes  the  temporary  form  of  small  scrunched-up  ball-like  shapes 
that  dangle  with  an  eloquent  lack  of  cohesion  within  the  space  of  an  empty  room  (Plate 
24).  Before  he  resurrected  this  material,  it  had,  In  a  previous  life,  another  form  when  it 
was  constituted  from  pulp  into  a  newspaper;  a  peculiarly  poetic  choice  of  material  given 
that  the  newspaper  delivers  the  facts  of  daily  life  before  these  too  become  overtaken  by 
yet  newer  news.  The  newspaper,  in  a  sense,  signifies  the  ultimate  recyclable  material  in 
its  reference  to  the  constant  flux  of  events  which  can  only  be  glimpsed  momentarily  as 
the  new,  events  that  are  thus  only  worthy  of  a  fleeting  existence  in  reconstituted  pulp.  It 
all  ends  as  rubbish,  in  other  words. 
And  the  point  is  that  these  material  fragments,  like  used-up  and  discarded  objects, 
are  no  longer  identifiable  with  any  useful  purpose,  but  it  is  nevertheless  the  case  that 
they  do  not  disappear  from  this  earth  -  they  disappear  only  from  collective  memory.  In 
truth  'dead'  matter  is  always  taking  another  form,  being  'reborn'  as  something  else. 
"  This  particular  exhibition  entitled  Full-Up,  was  in  response  to  a  previous  exhibition  by  Yves  Klein,  Le  Vide 
(The  Void),  in  which  the  Iris  Clert  gallery  in  Paris  had  been  cleansed  of  all  objects,  of  all  art,  and  then  painted  white. 
Some  time  later  Arman  filled  up  this  void  with  garbage.  Another  notable  aspect  of  this  was  found  in  the  public 
announcement  of  the  exhibition,  with  30,000  invitations  sent  out  that  were  in  the  form  of  a  sardine  can  filled  with 
garbage,  and  inside  which  there  was  also  a  formal  statement  of  intent:  "Iris  Clert  asks  you  to  come  contemplate  in  'the 
Ul'  the  total  force  of  the  real  condensed  into  a  critical  mass.  "  See  Bruce  Altshuler,  The  Avant-Garde  in  Exhibition, 
chapter  11. 
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PLATE  23.  LARGE  BOURGEOIS  REFUSE.  Arman,  1960.  In  the  same  year  as  Arman  produced  this 
memorial  to  the  banished  remains  of  modern  living  he  took  the  principle  of  accumulating  such  'things' 
within  glass  boxes  to  the  extreme.  The  exhibition  Le  Plein  ("FuXup)  took  the  empty  space  of  the  Galerie 
Iris  Clert  in  Paris,  which  had  been  left  after  empty  as  the  result  of  the  just  finished  Yves  Mein  exhibition 
Le  Vide  ("  The  Void).  As  Bruce  Altshuler  notes,  the  space  was  filled  with  any  garbage  Arman  could  get  his 
hands  on.  For  example:  "6  oyster  shells,  3  cubic  yards  of  used  bulbs, 
...  200  pounds  of  old  records,  48 
walking  canes,  7  coffee  mills,  ..  .5 
bidets,  6  slices  of  bread,  3  flower  pots,  180  bird  cages,  ...  10  old  hats,  12 
pairs  of  shoes,  I  ice  bucket, 
..  .  70  pounds  of  curtains,  5  hula  hoops,  I  ashtray  With  ashes,  ...  I  cubic  yard 
of  metal  shavings.  "  In  the  end  of  course  such  distinctions  are  meaningless,  as  the  items  become  simply 
garbage.  See  Bruce  Altshuler,  1994,  The  Avant-Garde  in  Exhibition,  Berkeley:  Ch.  II 
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PLATE  24.765  PAPER  BALLS,  John  Hilliard  1969.  Pieces  of  newspaper,  and  other  torn  scraps  hang 
from  the  ceiling  of  an  otherwise  empty  room.  In  terms  of  the  work  itself,  taken  as  an  object  it  exists  only 
in  the  photograph  that  shows  a  partial  view  of  the  room  that  holds  it.  As  well  as  being  constituted  of 
garbage  the  piece  is  therefore  also  transitory;  matter  takes  a  temporary  form,  Ue  the  material  here  utilised 
did  when  it  was  constituted,  for  example,  as  a  newspaper.  Eventually  it  ends  in  garbage.  The  photograph 
is  from  the  catalog  of  an  exhibition  at  Kettle's  Yard  Gallery,  Cambridge,  1984,1965  to  1972  -  When 
Amtudes  Became  Form. 
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In  the  garbage  sculpture  of  Tony  Cragg,  for  example,  we  are  asked  to  consider  that 
he  is  really  doing  little  more  than  what  painting  and  sculpture  has  always  done,  which  is 
to  fashion  some  form  from  naturally  occurring  materials.  The  difference  with  the 
materials  Cragg  uses  when  compared  with  traditional  sculpture  is  that  when  taken  as 
individual  pieces  the  materials  can  be  seen  as  parts  of  something  else,  yet  composed  as  a 
whole  they  seem  to  have  a  shape  and  form  that  is  assimilated  within  the  finished  form. 
And  so  what  we  see  depends  on  how  we  observe  the  object,  on  what  we  look  for,  or 
expect  to  see.  Thus  we  may  describe  what  we  see  in  ways  that  diverge  from  the  viewing 
experience  of  others.  As  objects  of  utility  the  pieces  of  Cragg's  various  works  would  have 
been  recognisable  to  us  all  as  the  implements  of  modern  living  -  pieces  of  machinery, 
kitchen  utensils,  toys  -  yet  as  pieces  of  rubbish  that  he  has  collected  they  had  been 
declared  dead,  worthless,  and  in  a  sense  rendered  formless  because  at  the  level  of  the 
perception  of  everyday  use,  the  form  itself,  whatever  it  was,  no  longer  fitted  the 
function.  Is  this  not  always  the  case  however?  Only  if  a  functional  object  carries  out  its 
function  does  it'work.  ' 
In  some  of  his  works  these  broken  shards  are  more  difficult  to  identify  than  in 
others.  For  example  in  African  Culture  Myth  (1984)  we  see  the  silhouette  of  an  African 
male  -  the  form  and  line  of  the  head  is  exquisitely  but  improbably  realised  by  the 
positioning  of  )agged  pieces  of  what  we  can  see  are  broken  pieces  of  plastic,  metal  or 
clay;  a  plate,  part  of  what  is  perhaps  a  tennis  racket  that  looks  as  if  it  has  had  a  few  bites 
taken  out  of  it,  and  so  on  (Plate  25).  Elsewhere  in  the  figure  you  might  make  out  a 
mudflap  (that  usually  covers  the  wheel  of  vehicle),  a  tube,  some  rubber  or  plastic  washers 
-  but  this  all  fades  to  be  replaced  in  perception  by  the  figure  which  merges  in  a 
completeness  that  seems  impossible,  a  conceit  that  is  only  possible  with  the  assistance  of 
the  viewer. 
Like  art  that  has  employed  found  objects  before,  Cragg  allows  the  question  of  the 
identity  of  objects  to  linger  before  the  gaze.  The  fragmented  figure  perplexes  because  of 
its  power  as  the  fragment  of  a  value  that  has  been  ripped  of  its  properties;  and  the 
paradox  is  in  the  fact  that  we  only  realise  an  identity  with  objects  in  our  consumption  of 
them,  which  of  course  is  exactly  what  produces  the  shabby  remains  we  throw  away.  "We 
consume,  populating  our  environment  with  more  and  more  objects,  "  Cragg  has  said. 
"With  no  chance  of  understanding  the  making  processes  because  we  specialize;  specialize 
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PLATE  25.  AFRICAN  CULTURE  MYTH,  Tony  Cragg,  1984.  Cragg  uses  mainly  the  materials  that  are 
thrown  away  in  modern  society.  Placed  together  without  any  form  -  say,  in  a  heap  -  these  items  would 
simply  be  a  heap  of  rubbish.  The  form,  however,  allows  for  identification,  and  transforms  -  resurrects  - 
the  garbage  into  something  of  value,  yet  the  form  does  not  overpower  the  material  that  is  utilised  in  its 
construction.  Cragg  said  he  was  "looking  for  associations,  images  and  symbols  which  could  enlarge  my 
vocabulary  of  responses  to  the  world.  "  See  Cragg/  Societe  des  Expositions  du  Palais  des  Beaux-Arts,  1985, 
Tony  CraN.  p.  32. 
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in  the  production,  but  not  in  the  consumption.  ""  And  the  failure  to  understand  the 
making  process  is  a  kind  of  alienation  from  the  life  and  death  of  matter,  matter  that  is 
made  object  by  the  animating  force  of  ideas  and  language  and  this,  in  turn,  determining 
the  production  of  functional  objects. 
The  forms  that  Cragg  presents  are  ways  of  appropriating  the  object  world  and 
giving  it  some  new  form  that  is  wholly  animated  through  the  necessity  of  describing  it  in 
terms  of  ideas  and  language  already  known,  that  we  recognise  in  terms  of  its  physical 
properties,  for  instance,  in  terms  of  shape  and  dimension  -a  large  cube  composed  of 
broken  pieces  of  rock,  wood,  carpet,  books,  newspapers  -  Stack,  1983  (Plate  26);  a 
constellation  of  decapitated  steeples  made  from  what  looks  like  old  car  parts  - 
Minster,  1987  (Plate  27),  and  so  on.  What  does  this  say?  Language  says  'cube'  and 
'steeple'  but  the  objects  signify  the  poverty  of  the  language  of  forms  -  of  what  Locke 
called  'primary  qualities'  of  figure,  dimension,  and  mass.  And  language  may  seem  to  fail 
us  here  because  of  the  lack  of  purity  or  transparency  in  these  particular  instances  of  the 
forms  described;  that  is  to  say  in  the  terms  of  the  degraded  nature  of  the  material  itself  - 
but  to  look  at  it  this  way  would  be  mistaken. 
The  poverty  is in  our  language  because  what  are  'cubes'?  What  are  'steeples'?  They 
are  nothing  but  names  that  have  no  content  without  particular  referents. 
The  visible  remainders  that  here  comprise  the  body  of  the  objects  direct  us  also  to 
the  continual  renewal  of  objects,  and  to  the  indeterminate  meaning  of  Cragg's  curious 
sculptures  themselves,  which  speculate  on  a  resolution  within  the  mind  of  the  beholder, 
and  this  is  a  kind  of  wager  that  is  only  resolved  by  overcoming  the  Duchampian  delay  of 
suggestion.  "I'm  simply  proposing  things,  "  he  has  said: 
I  can  be  fascinated  by  a  material  or  a  new  type  of  image  in  the  same  naYve  way  a 
child  can  be.  It  is  better  not  to  know  anything  than  to  make  the  stupid  pretence 
of  knowing  everything.  " 
And  taking  this  'lack  of  knowing'  into  the  creative  process  allows  for  the  subversion  of 
the  world  of  objects  as  currently  understood.  That  is  to  say  the  world  as  named.  Tony 
Cragg  summed  up  the  universe  of  possibility  that  then  becomes  available  in  terms  of  a 
See  Tony  Cragg  /Societe  des  Expositions  du  Palais  des  Beaux-Arts  (1985)  Tony  Cragg.  16. 
Cragg,  Ibid.  31. 
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PLATE  26.  STACK.  Tony  Cragg,  1983.  This  cube  form  is  significantly  more  imposing  than  the  evidence 
of  this  image  may  suggest:  2mx2m2m.  The  artist,  Tony  Cragg,  had  created  similar  large  objects  made 
from  equally  worthless  material  before  this  particular  example.  Norbert  Lynton  notes  that  a  dominant 
theme  in  the  work  of  Cragg  is  of  "knowledge  as  the  product  of  chance  plus  ordering.  "  See  his  introduction 
to  Tony  Craggl  Fifth  Triennale,  India  1982  (The  British  Council,  1982).  Cragg  takes  a  form  that  is  at  once 
recognizable  as  a  Lockean  prinzary  quality  and  yet  by  explicitly  revealing  the  constitutive  elements  that 
make  the  form  allows  the  mind  of  the  viewer  to  consider  that  what  we  see  on  the  surface  of  life  perhaps 
only  corresponds  to  a  name  that  identifies  only  this  primary  quality;  the  point  being  that  the  object  is 
obviously  more  than  this. 
n  Adn  I 
192 The  Visible  Remainder 
modus  operandi  that  leaves  the  field  of  meaning  boundless,  the  potential  sources  of 
inspiration  limitless: 
Simple  processes  -  with  materials  no  one  else  wants  -  ideas  that  interest  me  -  images  I  like  -  made  where  people  let  me  make  them  -  rooms,  walls,  floors;  the 
physical  frame  -  emotional  responses,  intellectual  responses  -  elegant  works, 
ugly  works,  humorous  works,  beautiful  works,  decorative  works  -  works  in 
which  I  learnt  from  the  materials  -  works  like  pictures  -  meanings  I  intended  - 
meanings  which  surprise  me  -  personal  references,  political  references,  cultural 
references,  no  references  -  as  straightforward  as  I  can  make  it.  " 
In  Four  Plates  from  1976,  for  example,  we  see  four  dinner  plates  placed  in  a  line 
beginning  with  one  plate  in  the  manufactured  form,  which  is  then  succeeded  as  the 
image  progressively  expands  to  the  fore  by  more  fragmented  plates,  or  rather  the 
smashed  pieces  because  they  have  ceased  to  be  plates,  until  we  reach  the  point  where  if 
the  final  plate  were  not  identified  by  its  physical  relation  to  the  complete  plate  within 
the  frame  of  the  picture,  we  would  have  no  idea  what  it  was.  " 
Cragg  here  highlights  the  character  of  identity  in  conventional  perception  as  one 
principally  of  resemblance,  of  the  constant  conjunction  of  contiguous  phenomena  -  we 
only  know  what  a  plate  is  by  comparing  it  to  an  item  of  visual  memory  -  and  also,  once 
again,  directs  us  to  another  perspective  on  the  matter,  which  is  to  say  on  matter  itself  as 
the  resolution  of  a  whole  into  'atoms'  that  appears  to  point  to  the  atomic  flux  that 
persists  beyond  the  mask  of  the  empirical  givenness  of  objects.  And  this  is  also  the 
significant  area  he  shares  with  the  objects  and  installations  of  the  chronologically  later 
Cornelia  Parker,  in  whose  work  'dead'  matter  is  resurrected  into  beguiling  new  forms. 
The  transformation  of  matter  in  Parker's  work  is  not  restricted  to  giving  new  life  to 
unwanted  objects,  but  is  also  found,  for  example,  in  taking  and  re-contextualising 
fragments,  presenting  partial  perspectives,  or  bending  and  stretching  'matter'  until  it  is 
unrecognisable  under  the  terms  of  a  previous  identity.  "As  a  child,  "  she  explains,  I  used 
to  crush  coins  on  a  railway  track.  You  couldn't  spend  your  pocket  money  afterwards  but 
you  kept  the  metal  slivers  for  their  own  sake,  as  an  imaginary  currency  and  as  physical 
In  Tony  Cragg.  -  Fifth  Trien  nake  India,  15"  March  -; 
"  Ap  riZ  1982.2. 
"  Pictured  in  Cragg,  ibid:  4. 
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PLATE  27.  MINSTER.  Tony  Cragg,  1987.  These  discarded  car  parts  stand  as  monuments  to  a 
contemporary  consumer  culture  that  thrives  on  obsolescence.  Whilst  the  presentation  of  utilitarian  objects 
in  new  combinations  a-nd  out  of  context  is  as  old  as  the  readymade,  it  is  the  selection  of  spent  objects,  and 
specifically  the  intnision  of  garbage  into  an  aesthetic  'sphere'  that  suggests  the  inversion  of  usefulness  is 
here  secondary  to  the  idea  that  what  is  noteworthy  about  the  objects  is  what  it  says  about  the 
indestructibility  of  the  debris  produced  in  modern  society. 
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PLATE  28.  MATTER  AND  WHAT  IT  MEANS,  Cornelia  Parker,  1989.  Two  figures,  two  'bodies' 
suspended  by  wire.  The  nearest  of  the  two  appears  to  hover  over  the  ground,  underneath  a  layer  of 
material  -  crushed  coins  -  that  looks  both  like  the  shadow  of  the  hovering  form,  and  the  beginning  of  a 
partially  completed  transformation  that  will  see  the  matter  returned  to  earth:  nothing  disappears  -  all 
matter  is  resolved  into  elemental  parts  and  becomes  something  else. 
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proof  of  the  destructive  powers  of  the  world.  ""  In  works  like  Matter  and  What  it  Means 
(Plate  28)  she  presents  an  object  of  recognisable  form,  a  human  body  form,  although  it 
is  devoid  of  humanity  itself  -  we  see  two  'bodies'  hover  over  the  ground;  the  forms  are 
constituted  by  arranging  a  mass  of  crushed  coins  which  are  suspended  from  a  ceiling, 
whilst  on  the  ground  itself  a  layer  of  coins  is  positioned  to  resemble  perhaps  the  shadow 
of  a  body,  or  maybe  even  to  suggest  the  further  disintegration  of  bodies,  or  objects,  as 
the  matter  can  be  seen  to  fragment  further  into  the  elemental  matter  of  nature;  the 
object  as  the  body  returned  to  earth. 
The  relationship  between  garbage  and  self  is  brought  to  the  fore  in  Tony  Cragg's 
1980  self-portrait  Harvest,  in  which  the  figure  of  Cragg,  a  kind  of  garbage-shadow  on 
the  wall  -  the  physical  form  once  again  created  by  scraps  of  discarded  plastic,  is  bent 
over  a  pile  of  rubbish  on  the  gallery  floor,  collecting  not  the  fruit  of  the  earth  as  in  any 
standard  understanding  of  the  significance  of  the  harvest,  but  rather  the  visible  remains 
of  the  consumption  of  the  'fruits'  of  matter.  "  Identifying  the  human  and  the  material  as 
of  the  same  source,  the  relationship  a  mutually  sustaining  one. 
In  Parker,  Cornelia/Boston  Institute  of  Contemporary  Arts  (2000)  Cornelia  Parker.  Boston:  14.  In  homage  to 
her  childhood  passion,  the  coins  were  run  over  by  a  train  before  being  suspended  into  the  form. 
3'  Pictured  in  Cragg,  ibid:  2. 
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THREE 
GARBAGE 
Some  of  the  ancients  conceived  the  void  as  the  principle  of  motion,  for  they  rightly  saw  the  moving 
principle  as  the  negative,  though  they  did  not  yet  grasp  that  the  negative  is  the  self 
G.  W.  F  HEGEL 
Phenomenologv  of  Spirit 
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The  world  is  an  accumulation  of  Sorts,  into  which  we  arrange  'things';  objects,  both 
material  and  conceptual,  which  we  have  systematized  into  types,  classes,  and  other  such 
hierarchies  and  taxonomies.  These  are  strategies  for  Sorting  out  the  things  of  the  world, 
and  constitute  a  fundamental  and  necessary  aspect  of  society;  and  as  such,  society  can  be 
understood  in  terms  of  organization.  Society  as  a  non-natural  object  is  a  world  Sorted. 
An  absence  of  organization,  on  the  other  hand  is  illustrative  of  a  failure  to  reach  a 
settlement,  and  it  is  thus  also  representative  of  a  dissatisfaction  further  summed  up  by 
the  contemporary  difficulty  often  found  in  identifying  with  the  multi-faceted  universe  of 
objects.  Our  ability  to  sort  and  order,  and  the  continual  effort  of  doing  so,  is  a  necessary 
part  of  meeting  an  ever-changing  reality,  and  of  first  providing  and  then  sustaining  the 
fabric  of  society  through  careful  'groorning.  '  It  is  by  attaching  value  to  some  things  and 
not  to  other  things  that  establishes  this  society.  That  is  to  say,  society  is  about 
differentiation. 
But,  the  self-conscious  affirmation  of  what  we  might  deem  to  be  reasonable  values  is 
also  a  negation.  Inclusion  is  at  the  same  time  exclusion.  And  as  life  is  all  motion,  as  we 
have  seen,  there  remains  a  difficulty  in  sorting  the  world  into  sensible  categories  that  can 
ever  remain  stable,  that  ever  become  a  durable  Sort.  And  this  difficulty  becomes  clear 
when  we  see  that  what  modern  society  has  actually  established  in  the  differentiation  of 
things,  '  of  matter  and  ideas,  is  a  hidden  disorder  of  Sorts. 
In  beginning  to  describe  this  attempt  to  control  movement  by  acts  of  discrimination 
and  identification  we  will  find  it  difficult  to  assign  to  reason  a  self-conscious  desire  for 
destruction.  Yet,  everywhere  in  modern  society,  if  only  we  looked,  we  would  see  ruin 
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and  waste,  and  more  specifically  in  mass  consumer  society,  garbage.  In  the  most  basic 
and  practical  terms  'garbage'  is  the  production,  through  consumption,  of  an  external 
item.  It  also  represents  a  transformation  in  value,  a  transvaluation,  established  by  taking 
something  that  is  desired,  or  useful,  and  exhausting  whatever  possibilities  it  is  perceived 
to  contain. 
That  civilization  and  garbage  turn  out  to  be  so  inseparable  is  necessary  in  the  sense 
that  order  assumes  a  lack  of  order  once  evident  but  now  overcome  in  the  present  (although 
it  is  never  finally  overcome).  The  position  garbage  takes  on  in  experience  despite  this 
necessity,  however,  arises  more  by  chance  than  by  any  conscious  effort  of  will.  In  fact 
garbage  presents  itself  in  contradiction  to  our  willful  projects.  Which  is  to  say  that  it 
belongs  to  an  expanding  category  of  'accidents'  and  exceptions  that  inevitably 
accompany  the  autonomous  projects  of  the  self-determining  modern  subject. 
Conceptually,  'garbage'  is  the  byproduct  of  everything  meaningful  that  takes  on  an 
accidental  configuration  in  modernity,  in  that  it  embodies  a  hidden  potential;  it  conceals 
the  possible  transvaluation  of  objects.  So,  as  we  confront  and  expand  the  various  Sorts 
found  in  modern  society  we  do  so  by  spatially  and  conceptually  arranging  all  kinds  of 
'things,  '  beliefs  and  phenomena  into  a  meaningful  order,  one  that  gives  sense  and 
purpose  to  life.  Modern  life  is  thus  also  a  continual  process  of  identification  with  the 
world  of  objects;  such  conceptual  and  experiential  identities  offer  the  prospect  of 
stability.  Nevertheless,  amongst  all  this  excellent  'furniture,  '  which  provides  the  housing 
for  our  Sorts,  is  a  hidden  repository  that  reveals,  if  we  can  see  it,  how  contingent  our 
Sorts  really  are. 
Contained  within  this  expanding  yet  largely  hidden  repository  are  two  types  of 
Unsort.  On  the  one  hand  the  arbitrariness  of  any  sort  is  given  by  the  awareness  of 
profane  matter  such  as  bilge  and  scum,  or  filth  and  boak,  and  this  is  encountered  as 
natural  and  necessary.  But  society  in  its  sorting  by  exception  also  contains  a  barely 
concealed  'sphere'  of  the  unsorted  where  past  identifications  now  undifferentiated,  and 
indistinguishable,  are  deposited.  Here  the  used  up  remains  of  past  value  are  placed. 
Made  void. 
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our/  equations  will  make  any  world  we  wish  anywhere/ 
we  go:  we'll  take  nothing  away  from  here  but/ 
the  equations,  cool,  lofty,  eternal,  that  were/ 
nowhere  here  to  be  found  when  we  came 
A.  R.  AmMONS,  Garbage. 
The  truth  is  that  this  'making  void'  is  only  an  act  of  imagination.  Nothing  ever 
disappears.  The  edifice  of  society  is  fashioned  over  against  disorder;  and  what  our 
imagined  present  conceals  is  that  the  accidents  and  exceptions  that  constitute  an 
expansion  of  chance,  and  designate  a  place  of  banishment  for  devalued  objects 
nevertheless  infringe  upon  another  significant  Sort. 
There  is  a  ceaseless  desire  to  continually  derive  an  order  out  of  the  multitude  of 
identifications  that  characterize  the  relations  between  subject,  on  one  side,  and  the 
object  world,  on  the  other;  and  as  we  shall  see,  the  infinity  of  possible  identifications 
that  in  modern  society  provides  the  basis  for  a  host  of  fleeting  identifications  creates  a 
(  non-space'  or  inbetweeness,  that  is  neither  subject  nor  object,  but  at  times  may  take  on 
characteristics  of  both.  '  Which  is  to  say  that  the  origin  of  what  we  might  call  the  Unsort 
is  with  the  subject,  and  so  to  maintain  society  in  the  face  of  what  we  may  suggest  are 
subjective  'disagreements,  '  or,  as  we  have  seen,  against  indeterminate  motion,  becomes  a 
matter  demanding  a  high  degree  of  attention.  By  implication,  subjectivity  itself 
undermines  such  attempts  to  hold  back  chance  precisely  because  any  category  of  'the 
accidental'  in  social  relations  can  only  arise  because  of  a  failure  of  the  individuated 
subject  to  reach  agreement  with  an  external  ideal,  an  agreement  which  is  paradoxically 
the  demand  of  reason  and  society.  '  So,  we  might  suggest  that  the  character  of 
I  See,  for  example  Marc  Aug6  (1995)  Non-Places:  Introduction  to  an  Anthropology  ofSupermodernity.  London  and 
New  York. 
'  See  Robert  Pippin,  Modernism  as  a  Philosophical  ProbLem,  chapter  two.  He  suggests  that  this  problem  originates 
with  Descartes,  and  asks  after  the  world  is  put  in  doubt,  "on  what  basis  can  the  human  subject  re-establish  a 
connection  with  the  actual  world?  " 
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modernity,  rather  than  presenting  a  familiar  and  comforting  face,  one  that  we  can 
equate  with  reliability  and  predictability,  actually  conceals  a  multitude  of  unknown 
qualities.  The  edifice  of  society  is  thus  a  mask  of  games,  beneath  which  relations  become 
fluid,  where  identities  mutate  outside  of  any  objective  controlling  forces.  '  This  mask 
covers  not  only  a  potentially  divergent  history,  but  also  a  precarious  accommodation  of 
the  present  combined  in  experience  (subject)  and  reason  (object).  ' 
The  lack  of  stability  in  identity  relations  is  reflected  in  a  transvaluation  of  objects 
and  so  the  disorder  of  Sorts  is  ineluctable.  In  the  modern  world  speed  and  movement 
show  a  reluctance  to  observe  the  laws  of  gravity,  never  mind  subjective  expectations  or 
social  norms  of  stability.  'The  fundamental  nature  of  movement  to  modern  experience  Is 
subjectively  manifested  in  a  continual  need  to  break  free  from  the  past,  which  is  itself  a 
defining  feature  of  the  modern  world,  and  one  that  teaches  us  the  inevitability  of 
change.  The  accumulation  of  accidents,  exceptions  and  contingencies  that  are  concealed 
by  the  accumulated  Sorts,  by  this  mask  of  games,  nevertheless  provide  the  surface  on 
which  we  paint  the  objectively  desirable  features  of  modern  society.  Below  this  surface  is 
history.  History  gives  life  to  the  present,  but  with  the  intervention  of  memory  it  also 
becomes  just  one  product  of  causal  necessity,  one  amongst  many  possible  (but  never 
realized)  histories.  As  much  as  objective  order  and  necessity,  what  defines  modern 
experience  is  our  ability  to  sort  the  past  and  present:  in  other  words  modernity  aims  at 
the  perfection  of  means  to  remove  the  rubbish  that  clogs  up  the  way  ahead.  ' 
'  On  the  characterization  of  modernity  as  a  set  of  fluid  relations,  see  Haxvie  Ferguson  (2000)  'Deception  and 
Despair:  Notes  on  Ironic  Self-Identity  in  Modernity,  '  and  Zygmunt  Bauman  (2000)  Liquid  Modernity.  On  modern 
society  as  a  game,  see  Norton  E.  Long  (1958)  'The  local  community  as  an  Ecology  of  Games,  '  American  Journal  of 
Sociology,  64  (3):  251-261,  and  Erving  Goffman  (1959)  The  Presentation  ofSeff'in  EverydayLife.  New  York. 
'  On  the  relation  of  'masks'  to  personhood,  see  Marcel  Mauss  (1985)  'A  Category  of  the  Human  Mind:  the 
Notion  of  the  Person;  the  notion  of  the  Self.  '  in  Carrithers,  M.,  Collins,  S.  and  S.  Lukes  (eds.  )  The  Category  of  the 
Person:  Anthropology,  Philosophy,  History.  Masks  are  associated  not  with  reason,  but  with  play.  See  also  A.  David 
Napier  (1986)  Masks,  Transformation  and  Paradox.  Berkeley. 
'  Although,  because  no  matter  ever  disappears,  the  laws  of  gravity  always  win  out  when  it  comes  to  the  eventual 
destination  of  physical  objects,  and  garbage,  of  course,  provides  an  excellent  demonstration  of  this.  For  instance  a 
recent  newspaper  report  revealed,  "US  Space  Command  is  now  tracking  more  than  8,000  pieces  of  human-made 
space  junk  in  orbit  around  earth.  That  doesn't  mean  that  there  are  only  8,000:  it's  just  that  the  organisation's  radars 
can't  Pick  out  anything  smaller.  There  are  an  estimated  70,000-150,000  garbage  tiddlers,  between  one  and  10cm, 
swirling  through  the  space  lanes,  and  millions  of  dust-sized  particles  generated  by  the  daily  grind  of  human 
spacework.  "  The  Guardian  May  3"d,  2000. 
'  For  an  understanding  of  the  place  of  language  in  this  Sorting,  see  Richard  Rorty  (1989)  Contingency,  Irony, 
Solidarity,  New  York  and  Cambridge.  The  role  of  memory  is  explored  in  Pierre  Nora  (ed)  (1996-98)  Realms  of 
Memog,  New  York.  The  characterization  of  modernity  as  a  distinctive  set  of  relations  between  subject  and  object 
world  is  explored  in  Robert  Pippin  (1999)  Modernity  as  a  Philosophical  Problem,  Ch.  1-3;  Hans  Blumenberg  (1983) 
The  Legitimacy  of  the  Modern  Age,  Cambridge,  MA.,  suggests  that  there  are  a  number  of  continuities  between  the  pre- 
modern  and  modern  ages.  The  problem  of  asserting  a  claim  for  a  distinctive  modern  age  is  that  history  can  never  start 
anew  (116).  The  establishment  of  historical  epochs  is  thus  a  matter  of  Sorting. 
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Here  our  willful  efforts  confront  a  reality  that  is  fateful.  In  creating  such  an 
accumulation  of  Sorts,  predictability,  if  not  certainty,  seems  within  grasp.  Yet,  the 
transvaluation  of  our  identifications  with  the  object  world  uncovers  a  doubt;  if  we  stop 
to  think  about  it,  we  are  forced  to  admit  that  underlying  our  ordered  expectations  is  a 
universe  of  chance,  and  this  becomes  evident  with  the  creation  of  garbage.  Once  within 
sight,  chance  pokes  through  a  consciousness  that  is  ordered  to  overlook  it.  It  emerges 
like  a  weed  that  grows  between  paving  stones,  if  we  should  happen  to  allow  our  gaze  to 
pass  over  it.  And  so,  with  the  transvaluation  of  objects  that  have  ceased  to  be  identified 
with  self,  the  foreign  element  hints  at  disorder,  and  so  we  realise  that  with  any  change  in 
Sorts  the  certain  can  easily  become  doubtful,  and  order  become  disordered.  Taken  as  a 
reversal  of  expectations,  this  particular  'dis'  might  be  associated  with  all  kinds  of 
negation,  but  the  disorder  of  causal  expectations  goes  to  the  core  of  meaningful 
experience;  it  is  a  slow  reversal  that  can  be  debilitating  or  shocking  for  the  lingering 
quality  of  the  disappointment  it  brings  forth.  This  finds  analogy  in  the  'not-quite- 
nothing,  '  but  'nothing-definable'  of  degeneration,  characteristic  of  unformed  matter  and 
useless  knowledge,  sloughed-off  mind  and  body,  and  just  there. 
There  is,  then,  a  necessary  degeneration  of  'objective'  knowledge,  and  this  is  a 
degeneration  that  is  evident  in  the  history  of  ideas  as  it  is  in  objective  physical  matter. 
Furthermore,  it  is  clear  that  these  two  cannot  be  separated!  Doubt  over  the  possibility 
of  truth  through  knowledge  built  on  an  underlying  contingent  element  can  produce  also 
a  sense  of  loss,  because  disorder  in  knowledge  and  experience  is  a  moment  of 
disconnection  -  between  experience  and  expectation;  between  the  self  and  the  world; 
and  between  subjective  and  objective.  In  no  uncertain  terms  the  immanent  possibility  of 
disorder,  which  is  the  suppressed  experience  of  modern  life,  represents  the  potential  for  a 
radical  shaking  of  belief.  ' 
In  self-identity,  then,  as  in  the  history  of  objective  identification  on  which 
knowledge  rests,  reason  proves  to  be  fallible  and  alienating  (although  always  overcoming 
doubt).  More  radically  still,  an  immanent  disorder,  whether  or  not  it  is  realized,  serves  as 
a  reminder  that  reason  may  ultimately  be  denied;  which  of  course  it  always  is  in  its  lack 
'  See,  for  example,  Thomas  S.  Kuhn  (1962)  The  Structure  of  Scientific  Revolutions,  Chicago;  and  Paul 
Feyerabend  (1993)  Against  Method,  London. 
"  See  Slavoj  Zizek  (1997)  The  Ahyss  of  Freedom,  Ann  Arbor.  On  the  proximity  of  order  and  degeneracy,  see 
Dollimore  (1998)  Death,  Desire  and  Loss  in  Western  Culture,  London.  For  example:  "progress  itself  is  responsible  [for 
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of  power  over  finality;  reason  is  always  the  instrumental  means  of  having  the  evidence  of 
the  past  Sorted,  so  as  to  guide  us  through  the  present.  But  death  as  the  end  point  of 
reason  is  the  vital  disconnection  between  self  and  world,  subject  and  object,  and  the 
final  change  undergone.  Death  is  thus,  in  one  sense,  the  most  obvious  evidence  of  the 
contingency  of  life. 
But  death  is  also  as  paradoxical  as  reason.  It  is  at  once  the  least  contingent  aspect  of 
a  life,  and  so  the  most  necessary  -  no  one  gets  out  alive  -  yet,  we  remain  absolutely 
uncertain  about  the  arrival  of  the  end,  so  it  remains  a  necessary  contingent.  Notions  of 
order,  by  contrast,  are  represented  in  language  and  in  everyday  life  by  a  diligent  Sorting 
as  the  best  means  of  fending  off  death.  '  And  that  is  why  in  reason  the  active,  realized  in 
our  Sorts,  must  banish  the  eventful,  which  is  found  in  the  mutation  of  sorts;  it  is  the 
broom  that  clears  historical  debris. 
"The  world  is  groaning,  choking  with  a  multitude  of  creations,  "  the  narrator  of  Ivan 
Klima's  Love  and  Garbage  observes.  "It  is  buried  by  objects  and  strangled  by  ideas,  which 
all  pretend  to  be  necessary,  useful  or  beautiful  and  therefore  lay  claim  to  perpetual 
endurance.  ))10  Modern  society  is  built  on  the  production  of  these  objects,  on  the 
production  of  novelty,  which  itself  demands  obsolescence,  and  therefore  a  transvaluation 
of  identities  realised  in  garbage.  The  identification  of  subject  with  variegated  consumer 
products  can  be  understood  as  a  necessary  outcome  of  rational  autonomy,  which  as  we 
shall  see  is  only  allowed  to  develop  to  such  an  extent  by  the  ever  more  fine-grained 
sorting  of  our  relations  with  the  material  world.  "  This  is  at  once  the  root  of  a  paradox:  it 
is  both  cause  and  effect  unified  in  a  hope  of  overcoming  the  discontinuities  between  self 
and  world.  The  "social  promise  of  modernity,  "  as  Robert  Pippin  terms  it,  aims  to 
accommodate  what  appears  to  be  the  destructive  cycle  resulting  from  progress;  to 
guarantee  autonomy  when  doing  so  elaborates  the  contingent  ground  of  modern  life. 
This  seems  particularly  apparent  with  respect  to  garbage;  the  collective  rationality  of 
modern  society  produces  more  objects  as  a  result  of  dividing  the  field  of  production,  and 
the  degenerate]  in  that  degeneracy  is  produced  not  only  by  a  falling  away  from  the  higher,  but  by  the  very  effort  of 
reaching  toward  it.  "  (141-42). 
'  And  of  course,  order  is  the  best  way  of  fending  off  the  inevitability  of  degeneration;  people  in  modern  society 
live  longer  lives  than  at  any  other  time.  The  point  is  that  the  success  of  reason  allows  us  to  forget  the  degeneration  of 
everything,  and  as  we  all  know,  the  odds  on  dying  are  perfect.  No  one  has  ever  succeeded  in  not  dying. 
"  Iva-n  Klima  (1990)  Love  and  Garbage,  Harmondsworth:  105. 
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this,  it  transpires,  has  an  accelerating  effect  on  the  consumption  of  objects,  which  is  then 
further  manifested  as  a  realization  of  individual  autonomy.  The  'social  promise  of 
modernity'  reaches  breaking  point  because  the  production  of  garbage  through  the  latter 
is  constantly  pushing  back  the  capacity  of  the  former  to  Sort,  which  is  to  say  that 
individual  autonomy  challenges  collective  rationality. 
This  'social  promise  of  modernity'  faces  potential  erosion  as  a  consequence  of  its 
two  components  continually  clashing.  "  But  even  more  than  the  paradoxes  of  freedom, 
our  consciousness  of  a  fundamental  and  ontological  indeterminacy  is  communicated  via 
the  ceaseless  motion  of  degeneration  and  decomposition  that  attends  life  in  all  its  forms. 
For  what  chance  have  our  various  Sorts  against  death?  Death  unsorts  all  eventually,  and 
so  progress  on  the  'stairway  of  life'  is  always  followed  by  a  descent  that  is  degenerative.  " 
The  modern  concern  with  self-determination  and  self-creation  forces  us  to  consider 
practical  contingencies,  such  as  garbage,  not  only  as  a  negation  of  self-determination  but 
also,  in  the  end,  as  an  obstacle  to  composition,  or  social  order.  These  potential  subject- 
object  collisions  occur  within  a  phenomenal  'sphere'  that  is  understood  as  the 
experiential  condition,  yet  sublimated  reality,  of  these  relations;  the  all-pervasive  nature 
of  garbage,  which  is  forgotten,  sees  it  as  both  the  medium  for  sorting  consumption  in 
terms  of  what  we  value,  and  thus  also  the  medium  that  sorts  the  disordered  -  that  which 
we  no  longer  value  -  into  garbage.  Garbage  thus  attacks  the  modern  world  on  three 
fronts:  practically  (in  the  necessity  of  disposing  of  it),  psychologically  (in  its  effect  on 
self-creation),  and  spiritually  (as  the  ultimate  reminder  of  death).  " 
This  urge  to  breach  the  bounds  of  accepted  sense  is,  of  course,  a  constitutive 
element  of  freedom  in  a  world  of  motion,  and  is  tied  up  with  social  and  cultural  forms 
that  thrive  on  renewal,  which  is  to  say,  on  destruction.  The  meaninglessness  of  modern 
art,  especially  post-Duchampian  conceptual  art,  and  the  discordant  eruptions  of  modern 
music  of  the  twentieth  century  are  two  aspects  of  a  trend  that  self-consciously  pushes 
back  the  boundaries  of  modern  experience,  risking  the  charge  of  'rubbish,  '  no  less.  But 
of  equal  importance,  and  not  to  be  overlooked,  the  creeping  and  oozing  possibility  of 
"  See  also  Section  One  of  this  work;  on  the  sorting  of  the  microcosmic  world,  and  specifically  European 
civilization's  occupation  and  control  of  more  space  and  more  things,  see  Joseph  A.  Amato  (1999)  Dust:  A  History  of 
the  Small  and  the  InvisibLe,  Berkeley. 
Robert  B.  Pippin  (199  1)  Modernity  as  a  Philosophical  Problem,  Oxford.  Chs.  3-4. 
S  ee  Mid  as  D  ekke  rs  (2  00  0)  The  Way  ofA  11  Flesh:  A  CeLeb  ratio  n  of  Decay,  Lo  ndon. 
A  different  logic  prevails  in  pre-modern  sorting:  the  carnival  celebrated  garbage  as  life.  Cf.  Mikhail  Bakhtin 
(1984)  Rabelais  and  his  World,  Bloomington. 
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decomposition  in  modern  society  is  also  apparent  on  another  plane  apart  from  these 
cultural  regions  where,  in  a  sense,  we  permit  and  come  to  accept  the  exploration  of  the 
contingencies  of  existence  as  a  means  of  slowly  coming  to  terms  with  change.  "  There  is 
something  else  beyond  rational  meaning,  beyond  our  Sorts  that  is  purely  disorder,  and  it 
is  found  in  the  very  materiality  of  modern  living,  in  the  physical  objects  we  consume; 
meaning  in  the  garbage  we  produce.  "  By  definition  garbage  is  something  essentially 
uncategorical  in  terms  of  rational  and  critical  understanding,  but  something  that  is 
brought  within  grasp  of  experience  in  the  act  of  consumption,  a  destructive  act,  and 
present  to  experience  thereafter  as  an  indeterminate  or  questionable  object.  In  other 
words,  garbage  comes  to  signify  a  void  of  meaning  in  modern  life,  and  in  recent  decades 
has  been  employed  as  a  way  of  understanding  modern  life.  As  we  have  seen,  there  has 
been  significant  movement  amongst  successive  generations  of  artists  to  embrace 
accidents,  to  find  sources  of  inspiration  in  discarded  objects.  17  But,  just  as  revolutions  in 
science  reordered  the  world  according  to  a  new  way  of  conceptualizing  it,  we,  that  is,  the 
artist  and  the  viewer,  have  sorted  this  kind  of  'garbage'  and  thus  removed  it  from  the 
void,  and  as  such  we  have  assigned  a  meaningful  identity;  the  artist,  as  Barnett  Newman 
observed,  attempts  "to  wrest  truth  from  the  void,  "  and  this  is  literally  the  case  with  art 
that  utilizes  debris.  " 
Having  said  that,  'garbage  art'  must  be  taken  as  a  misnomer  because  it  realizes  yet 
another  objectification,  and  so  does  not  refer  at  all  to  garbage.  Nevertheless,  the  fact  is 
that  we  could  not  have  such  a  classifiable  item  as  the  objet  trouve,  nor  would  the  objects 
gathered  under  such  a  description  generate  any  'life'  of  their  own  without  our  first 
having  garbage  itself  as  the  source  material.  So,  here  as  well,  in  terms  of  cultural 
production  garbage  can  be  seen  as  a  primary  ground  of  creation.  The  only  difference  in 
the  artistic  sphere  is  that  'garbage  art'  makes  the  relationship  between  void  and  meaning 
explicit,  and  given  this  transformation  garbage  remains  excluded  by  'garbage  art,  '  and  is 
still  to  be  found  in  the  hidden  repository  of  the  random,  the  indeterminate  and  the 
15  Thus,  many  people  now  expect  modern  art  and  music  to  be  difficult  or  challenging  where  previously  it  would 
simply  have  been  called  nonsense. 
"  Cf.  Zizek/Schelling  0  997)  The  Abyss  of  FreedomlAges  of  the  World,  Ann  Arbor.  Disorder  is  conceived  as 
substance  rather  than  simply  relation:  As  the  'ground'  of  all  order  this  substance  is,  of  course,  'unreal'  (order  is  the  real, 
the  known). 
"  This  begins  with  the  utilisation  of  'transformed  utilitarian  objects',  i.  e.,  objects  that  were  still  useful  (e.  g. 
Marcel  Duchamp's  readymades),  and  is  further  realised  in  techniques  of  collage  that  utilised  physical  debris  (e.  g.,  the 
early  collages  of  Kurt  Schwitters).  This  is  explored  in  Section  Three,  above. 
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meaningless;  it  only  becomes  susceptible  to  classification  once  it  is  brought  under  some 
method  of  ordering  experience  and  hence  it  is  no  longer  simply  garbage,  but  'art.  ' 
Garbage  is  perplexing,  and  we  should  perhaps  not  let  a  reflexive  tendency  to  try  and 
define  it,  to  Sort  it,  fool  us  into  believing  that  we  can,  by  doing  this,  understand  it: 
because  one  thing  about  garbage  is  that  it  does  not  obey  the  limiting  bounds  of 
meaning.  Historically,  the  term  'garbage'  originated  in  the  15  h  century  and  designated 
physical  waste,  the  parts  of  a  slaughtered  or  dead  animal  -  the  offal  that  was  beyond 
use.  "  However,  by  the  16"  century,  it  had  come  to  take  on  its  modern  meaning,  as 
'refuse  in  general,  '  as  signifying  all  kinds  of  filth,  now  understood  as  every  kind  of 
externalized  object  that  has  passed  its  useful  life.  Garbage  threatens  identity,  and  in  its 
excess,  as  illustrative  of  commercial  gluttony,  makes  another  ideal,  that  of  moderation, 
look  like  a  hollow  shibboleth,  and  it  reveals  the  fragile  bounds  of  normality.  Garbage,  in 
short,  threatens  to  engulf  us  by  the  mere  fact  that  it  never  ends.  It  returns,  in  a  sense, 
eternally,  as  attendant  upon  life  as  life  is  upon  nourishment.  Garbage  is  understood  at 
once  as  a  metaphor  for  all  those  accidents,  wayward  experiences,  and  'things'  that 
happen  to  us  all  -  all  the  'crap',  we  might  say  -  defiant  in  the  face  of  expectation,  and 
resistant  to  explanation.  Furthermore,  garbage  extends  beyond  the  material,  beyond 
physical  objects,  and  ends  up  directing  language  and  belief.  'O 
Undertaking  a  consideration  of  garbage  reveals  a  gap  in  our  categorical  treatment  of 
experience.  It  does  not  belong  to  our  Sorts,  except  as  a  negatively  construed  category, 
and  as  such  it  eludes  categories,  appearing  in  unexpected  places  and  creating  a  disorder 
of  Sorts.  So,  like  chance,  garbage  issues  a  defiant  challenge  to  will,  and  in  fact  the 
language  of  garbage  becomes,  in  modern  society,  coextensive  with  the  language  of 
"  Barnett  Newman  quoted  in  Phillipson,  198  5,  p.  11.  Scientific  revolutions  are  discussed  more  fully  in  Section 
One,  above. 
'9  See,  for  example  Stephen  Mennell  (1985)  AllManners  ofFood.  -  Eating  and  Taste  in  England  andFranceftom 
the  Middle  Ages  to  the  Present,  Oxford:  310-16.  The  word  'offal'  referred  to  both  meat  unfit  for  consumption  (putrid 
flesh  or  carrion),  and  to  assorted  offcuts  (head,  tail,  kidneys,  heart,  tongue,  liver,  etc.  )  that  were  still  consumed.  On 
the  consumption  of  offal  in  medieval  times  see  Maguelonne  Toussaint-Samat  (1992)  A  History  ofFood.  Trans.  Anthea 
Bell,  Oxford.  The  original  sense  of  garbage  obviously  derives  from  the  former  meaning  of  'offal.  '  See  also  Deborah 
Lupton  (1996)  Food,  the  Body  and  the  Seý,  London. 
21  See  for  example,  Dominique  Laporte  (2000)  History  of  Shit,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  which  draws  an  analogy 
between  public  sanitation  ordinances,  which  urged  the  expulsion  of  rubbish  from  public  places,  and  the  expulsion  of 
foreign,  mainly  Latin,  forms  from  official  French  language.  In  Don  DeLillo  (1997)  Underworld,  London,  garbage  is 
seen  as  the  cause  of  civilization:  "See,  we  have  everything  backwards.  Civilization  did  not  rise  and  flourish  as  men 
hammered  out  hunting  scenes  on  bronze  gates  and  whispered  philosophy  under  the  stars,  with  garbage  as  a  noisome 
offshoot,  swept  away  and  forgotten.  No,  garbage  rose  first,  inciting  people  to  build  a  civilization  in  response,  in  self- 
defense.  We  had  to  find  ways  to  discard  our  waste,  to  use  what  we  couldn't  discard,  to  reprocess  what  we  couldn't  use. 
Garbage  pushed  back.  It  mounted  and  spread":  287.  This  point  is  also  made  by  Rathje  and  Murphy  (1992)  Rubbish: 
The  Archeology  of  Garbage,  New  York,  based  on  historical  evidence. 
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chance.  To  put  it  bluntly,  chance  is  the  plastic  shopping  bag  thrown  onto  your  face  by 
an  unkind,  uncivil  wind.  Chance  is  the  dogshit  you  never  saw  because  you  failed  to  look 
where  you  were  moving,  now  stuck  on  the  sole  of  your  shoe.  Chance  is  when  the  world 
stops  making  sense;  when  disorder  and  degeneration  assume  prominence.  Finally,  and 
not  to  be  forgotten,  chance  is  in  the  inevitability  of  death,  the  certainty  of  our  own 
'garbaging,  '  a  potential  comfort  destroyed  by  the  uncertainty  of  its  arrival. 
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spring  brings  thaw  and  thaw  brings  the  counterforce/ 
of  planted  ashes  which  may  not  rise  again/ 
not  as  anything  as  what  they  leach/ 
away  from:  oh,  yes,  yes,  the  matter  goes  on 
A.  R.  AmmONS,  Garbage. 
Very  early  every  morning  -  and  often  the  middle  of  the  night  -  there  commences 
another  battle  in  an  interminable  but  barely  noticeable  war.  The  combatants,  mostly 
men,  deal  not  with  a  foreign  nor  human  enemy,  but  rather  are  taken  up  with  a  foe  that 
is  only  too  well  known  to  the  participants  in  this  curious  war.  This  persistent  'threat' 
they  fight  has  no  face,  it  utters  no  violent  words,  yet  it  keeps  coming.  Like  the  tides  it 
never  disappears  for  long.  It  is  our  garbage.  Safe  behind  closed  doors,  we  who  sleep  are 
rarely  reminded  that  the  foot  soldier  of  civilization  -  the  garbageman  -  has  spared  us, 
yet  again,  the  knowledge  of  how  endless  the  garbage  war  is. 
On  the  other  hand,  think  of  this:  the  presence  of  this  garbageman,  what  he 
represents,  is  a  collective  consciousness  of  this  human  material  waste  that  threatens  - 
simply  in  terms  of  its  never  ceasing  flow  -  to  overwhelm  us.  But  also,  and  perhaps 
paradoxically,  this  figure  is  the  human  form  of  our  collective  amnesia  when  it  comes  to 
the  matter  of  consumption,  permission  for  us  to  forget.  '  We  are  excused,  thanks  to 
arrangements  that  place  the  garbageman,  in  a  sense,  at  our  disposal,  the  worry  of  exactly 
how  to  dispose  of  our  garbage.  Our  removal  from  the  fullness  of  the  waste  process 
produces  another  effect  that  has  long-range  implications,  however.  It  separates  us  also 
from  the  disgust  that  might  be  induced  were  this  stinking  matter  not  in  the  hands  of  the 
authorities,  and  this  too  has  its  own  knock-on  effect  in  making  us  more  sensitive  to  the 
presence  of  garbage.  What  we  don't  witness,  the  very  drudgery  of  the  garbageman's 
'  As  I  go  on  to  discuss  below,  we  are  neglectful  of  the  processes  that  place  commodities  before  us  because  of  the 
commodity  form  of  production  itself  It  may  also  be  the  case  that  garbage,  and  I  discuss  this  below  as  well,  is  simply 
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never-ending  return  conceals  something  of  the  significance  of  garbage.  Most  people, 
garbagemen  aside,  would  probably  consider  clearing  garbage  as  a  mindless  activity.  In  a 
poetic  sense  this  is  fitting.  For  there  is  such  an  accumulation  of  garbage  that  it  is  no 
longer  identifiably  anything,  least  of  all  anything  that  we  think  is,  or  was,  ours.  By  this 
point  it  has  become  other.  In  Ivan  Klima's  novel  Love  and  Garbage,  the  narrator  is  a 
writer  turned  street  sweeper,  forced  by  his  employers  to  wear  "some  garishly  coloured 
jacket  to  make  sure  everyone  recognised  me  from  afar  and  gave  me  a  wide  berth.  "'  This, 
as  well  as  the  brush  he  pushes,  makes  him  out  to  be  part  of  the  world  of  human  refuse. 
These  accoutrements  are  symbols,  like  traffic  signals  that  regulate  our  movements,  they 
gradually  sink  so  far  back  into  the  consciousness  of  an  onlooker  that  they  begin  to 
become  invisible  by  their  familiarity.  Once,  as  a  child,  the  narrator  recalls,  he  was  so 
impressed  on  observing  a  Prague  street  sweeper  at  work,  he  had  imagined  that  the  duties 
of  the  role  must  have  constituted  "one  of  the  most  important  jobs  a  man  can  have,  "  but 
now  he  knew  that  this  was  not  so;  the  street  sweepers  were  people  of  no  importance.  '  He 
himself  was  now  also  a  nobody:  "simply  a  person  who  swept  the  streets,  a  person  hardly 
noticed.  "' 
It  is  difficult  to  be  mindful  of  garbage,  at  all  -  who  wants  to  remember  crap?  That 
the  more  or  less  'automatic'  daily  removal  of  garbage  hardly  disturbs  us  acts  as  an  aid  to 
our  forgetfulness.  The  'invisibility'  of  people  cleaning  the  streets,  we  will  see,  leads  to  the 
return  of  garbage  in  a  more  unwelcome  guise,  because  once  our  trash  is  out  there, 
bagged,  binned  and  finally  consumed  itself  (though  never  destroyed)  by  the  hungry  jaws 
of  the  garbage  truck,  it  becomes  simply  part  of  an  indistinguishable  mass  of  rubbish, 
chewed  up  and  eventually  ready  to  be  spat  out,  and  to  most  of  us  it  thus  becomes 
foreign,  something  to  be  avoided  once  disposed  of.  '  And,  the  symbolism  of 
obliterated  from  consciousness  as  far  as  possible  because  it  is  disgusting  and  must  be  avoided.  See,  e.  g.  Franz  Steiner 
09  56)  Taboo,  London,  and  William  Miller  0  997)  The  Anatomy  ofDisgust,  Cambridge,  MA. 
Ivan  Klfma  (1990)  Love  and  Garbage,  Harmondsworth:  77. 
Ibid.:  5 
4 
Ibid.  p.  2 
'  The  vision  of  garbage  as  a  foreign  element  that  threatens  to  engulf  us  may  be  summed  up,  in  all  its  stupidity 
and  paranoia,  by  the  story  of  the  Mobro  4000.  The  Mobro  4000  was  a  garbage  barge  which  set  out  from  Long  Island, 
New  York  in  March  1987,  and  spent  the  next  fifty-five  days  under  the  watchftil  eye  of  the  media  as  it  sailed  from  port 
to  port  in  search  of  somewhere  to  deposit  its  3168  tons  of  cargo.  The  sight  of  this  never-disappearing  garbage, 
magnified  out  of  all  proportion  by  the  media,  induced  a  subsequent,  and  it  has  been  argued,  damaging  garbage 
paranoia  amongst  Americans.  It  turns  out  that  waste-disposal  regulations  won  by  the  environmental  lobby,  based  on 
the  misplaced  belief  that  there  was  no  more  room  for  garbage  in  landfills,  were  the  cause  of  the  Mobro  4000's 
difficulty  in  finding  a  home  for  the  garbage.  The  Long  Island  landfill  site  had  filled  up,  and  regulations  established  to 
protect  the  environment  did  not  permit  the  creation  of  new  landfills.  However,  as  subsequent  studies  have  suggested, 
garbage  paranoia  is  both  misplaced  and  dangerous.  Misplaced  because  calculations  suggest  that  if  Americans  continue 
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disconnected,  unclaimed  objects  has  a  haunting  effect,  suggesting  a  corresponding 
absence  of  a  human  once  connected  to  these  unsorted  objects:  "To  resonance  comes 
death/  like  a  shoe  without  a  foot,  like  a  suit  without  a  man.  ))6 
It  is  no  accident  that  our  discards  are  already  removed,  psychologically,  from  the 
subjectively  imagined  Self.  What  we  dispose  of  is  just  a  material  representation  of  what 
used  to  be;  garbage  is  our  'leavings,  '  a  sign  of  life  having  moved  on,  it  is  life  past, 
representing  a  death  sentence  upon  the  object!  As  garbage,  these  'things'  are  no  longer 
who  we  now  are,  and  so  symbolically,  eventually  physically,  placed  'outside'  our  orderly 
lives.  And  in  a  world  in  which  we  learn  to  crave  order  as  a  basis  of  autonomy,  as  a  way  of 
sorting  objects  and  phenomena  into  discrete,  easily  understandable  categories,  a  world  of 
therapy  (itself  a  psychological  sorting),  of  soul  bearing  and  twelve-step  programmes,  the 
tendency  to  spot  weaknesses  in  ourselves  a  failure  to  be  suitably  ordered  has  even  led  to 
the  characterisation  of  junk-accumulation  as  one  manifestation  of  a  self-debilitating 
neurosis.  So,  we  are  to  understand,  the  maintenance  of  the  Self  actually  depends  on  not 
allowing  the  Other  to  overcome  its  proper  bounds.  Thus,  the  figure  of  the  garbageman 
may  be  taken  to  represent  an  element  of  the  ideal,  healthy  and  ordered  subjective 
conscience  -  in  other  words;  we  should  all  be  our  own  'psychic  garbagemen,  '  removing 
mental  rubbish  once  past  its  useful  life. 
The  presentation  of  'harmful'  effects  as  a  consequence  of  object-accumulation  is  an 
interesting  development  in  modern  consumer  society,  signalling  perhaps  that  changes  in 
fashion,  and  'schizophrenic'  consumption  -  that  is,  consumption  as  a  means  of  re- 
making  the  self  -  also  makes  available  more  objects  than  one  can  at  any  time  identify 
with,  and  tends,  ultimately,  toward  a  gradual  unbinding  of  the  Self  should  this 
accumulation  get  out  of  control!  Psychologically  this  is  presented  as  a  battle  of 
organization  against  lazy  dissolution.  The  kind  of  Sorting  induced  by  work  in  making 
necessary  the  prioritisation  of  time,  for  example,  fills  life  with  meaning,  and  as  such 
generating  garbage  at  current  rates  for  1,000  years,  and  if  all  their  garbage  is  put  in  a  landfill  100  yards  deep,  by  the 
year  3000  this  national  garbage  heap  will  fdl  a  square  piece  of  land  35  miles  on  each  side.  See  Rathje  and  Murphy 
(1992)  Rubbish!  The  Archaeologv  of  Garbage  (London),  and  J.  Tierney  'Recycling  is  Garbage,  '  New  York  Times,  June 
h 
30'  ,  1996.  Clark  Wiseman,  an  economist  at  Gonzaga  University  in  Spokane,  Washington  made  the  35  square  mile  of 
garbaýe  calculation  -  see,  'Dumping  Less  Wasteful  than  Recycling,  '  Wall  StreetjournaZ  July  18  h  1991. 
Pablo  Neruda  (1973)  'Only  Death'  in  Residence  on  Earth,  New  York. 
7  Neruda's  poem  portrays  death  as  the  cleanser:  "But  death  also  goes  through  the  world  dressed  as  a  broom,  she 
licks  the  ground  looking  for  corpses.  " 
'  This  kind  of  fleeting  identification  is  also  found  in  the  transient  nature  of  the  self  as  'drifting'  or  of  oneself 
being  'drugged'  -  which  is  to  say,  under  the  influence  of  mind-altering  substances,  which,  like  fashion,  institute  a 
temporary  sorting  of  existence  on  the  condition  that  this  is  only  temporary,  and  does  not  take  over  -  unsort  -  the  self 
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meaning  is  established  against  a  void  of  laziness!  Any  further  movement  in  this 
direction  and  the  failure  to  throw  out  junk  will  itself  be  deemed  an  illness,  although 
bringing  object  accumulation  within  the  scope  of  pathology  means  objectively  ascribing 
value  to  certain  objects,  and  that,  as  we  shall  see,  presents  a  problem.  'O  Leaving  aside  the 
problem  of  value,  this  suggests  that  it  is  simply  the  volume  of  objects  that  creates  a 
problem  for  healthy  living.  That  is  to  say,  the  over-abundance  of  material  objects  in 
modern  society  is  met,  at  a  psychological  level,  by  a  corresponding  erosion  of  the  power 
of  discrimination.  Thus  we  are  ruled  by  clothes  we  no  longer  wear,  and  so  objects  that 
we  no  longer  use,  it  is  said,  clutter  up  our  lives,  becoming  a  source  of  that  most  modern 
of  ailments,  stress.  11 
Garbage,  then,  affects  our  lifestyle  choices  and  our  personal  development,  and,  the 
lifestyle  psychologists  assert  that  the  remedy  to  this  obstacle  to  movement  is  to  de-Junk. 
We  reach  this  state  of  affairs,  as  Odo  Marquard  suggests,  because  of  a  key  modern 
phenomenon,  what  he  calls  'the  meaning  deficit.  '  In  other  words,  a  lack  of  meaning  in 
modern  life  is  met  with  a  mentality  of  demandi  that  leads,  inevitably,  to  an  over 
accumulation  of  supposedly  'transforming'  objects,  exactly  because  the  life  one  lives  in 
modern  society  "is  empty,  "  Marquard  says.  Therefore,  we  need  to  prevent  the  creation 
of  a  void. 
One  needs  it  [life],  and  everything  in  it,  at  least  twice  over:  the  second 
television,  the  second  automobile,  the  second  home,  the  second  PhD,  the 
second  wife  or  the  second  husband,  the  second  life  (in  the  form,  for  example,  of 
vacation).  12 
9  We  can  see  in  Ivan  KJfma's  novel  that  the  narrator  is  drawn  to  a  life  as  a  street  sweeper  as  a  means  of  doing 
something,  rather  than  doing  nothing  -  because  he  is  unable  to  write,  and  indeed  he  admits  to  being  "frightened  by  the 
void  of  laziness.  "  (101)  More  than  this  was  the  idea  that  in  writing  he  was  reconstituting  and  giving  meaning  to  life, 
and  writing  was  thus  like  sorting  rubbish:  "it  was  a  different  kind  of  remembrance,  one  which  lifted  the  incinerated 
from  the  ashes  and  tried  to  raise  them  up  to  new  life.  "  (34) 
'0  This  movement  is  summed  up  by  the  belief  that  psychological  health  ultimately  depends  on  'de-junking'  our 
lives.  In  other  words  we  should  leave  aside  other  self-improvement  plans  and  first  get  to  grips  with  our  garbage.  The 
point  being  that  taking  out  that  trash,  organizing  objects  so  they  don't  'control'  you,  leaves  little  time  to  reach  for  that 
bottle,  or  those  pills!  To  paraphrase  John  Locke,  clear  thinking  and  good  living  follow  from  our  ability  to  clear  the 
rubbish  from  the  pathways  of  the  mind.  For  'de-junking'  literature  see  Michelle  Passoff  (2000)  Lighten  Up!  Free 
Yourse#'From  Clutter,  Harper  Perennial;  Janet  Luhrs  (1997)  The  Simple  Living  Guide,  Broadway  Books;  Don  Aslett 
(1984)  Clutters  Last  Stand.  -  It's  Time  To  Diýunk  Your  Life,  Marsh  Creek.  Also  Eve  Kosofsky  Sedgwick's  'Epidemics  of 
the  Will.  '  in  Zone  6. 
"  Cf.  Christof  Asendorf  (1993)  Batteries  ofLife,  Berkeley;  and  Arjun  Apparurai  (1986)  The  Social  Life  of  Things, 
Cambridge. 
"  See  Odo  Marquard  (1991)  In  Defence  ofthe  AccidentaZ  Oxford:  35-36. 
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The  disappearance  of  meaning  in  modern  life  is  covered  up  by  a  preoccupation  with 
'things'  that  become  the  true  carrier  of  meaning,  and  instead  of  substantially  replacing 
the  loss  instead  add  'weight'  or  clutter  to  life.  "  The  strategy  of  the  lifestyle  psychologist 
as  promoter  of  dejunking  is,  therefore,  to  sort  this  immanent  disorder.  By  rationalising 
our  'space'  we  can  take  steps  toward  improved  mental  health.  The  ultimate  result  of  this 
external-internal,  psychophysical  organization  and  exclusion  is  to  actually  throw  away, 
to  have  fewer  things  and  not  just  to  be  better  organized. 
What  is  taking  place  in  dejunking  is  a  re-evaluation  of  objects,  and  a  bringing  to  the 
fore  of  questions  of  need  and  utility.  Ultimately,  good  health  is  equated  with  a  kind  of 
asceticism;  it  suggests  that  there  can  be  nothing  of  value  in  a  space  adorned  with  objects 
if  these  serve  no  purpose.  And  so,  the  Dejunkers  say,  if  you  do  not  use  an  object  for,  say, 
six  months,  it  is  clearly  useless  and  must  be  thrown  out.  At  this  point  we  should  clearly 
establish  some  distinction  between  the  hoarding  of  objects,  on  one  hand,  and  collecting 
objects,  on  the  other. 
For  instance,  to  collect  objects  of  fascination  and  affection  is  at  once  to  fulfil  some 
desire,  indulge  our  capacities  for  self-expression,  and  also  to  impose  an  order.  It  is  to 
Sort.  Collectors  like  Sorts  of  things:  cards  from  decades-old  cigarette  packets;  motor 
cars;  pieces  of  music;  model  figures  -  of  'things'  like  men,  tanks,  and  trains;  or  also 
living  things  like  butterflies  or  goldfish;  indeed  consumable  items  like  wine,  or  Cuban 
cigars,  and  so  on.  Items  collected  are  all  objects  of  value;  that  is  to  say  in  some  sense  they 
are  use-worthy,  or  also  exchangeable.  However,  the  junk  of  the  Dejunkers  is  equated 
with  debilitation.  Useless  junk,  then,  is  value  transvalued  into  matter  indeterminate.  The 
neglect  of  imposing  an  order  on  one's  life,  in  hoarding  junk,  is  considered  to  be 
indicative  of  a  general  dissoluteness  that  can  extend  into  a  tendency  to  neglect  other 
important  parts  of  life.  It  is  rather  like  not  paying  attention  to  the  consequences  of  what 
you  are  doing,  whereas  being  in  control  demands  a  constant  mindfulness  of  the  future. 
Thus,  the  deteriorating  relationship  between  the  narrator  of  Love  and  Garbage  and  his 
wife  is  equated  with  a  kind  of  blind  acceptance  that  things  would  continue  without 
requiring  any  work: 
"  Cf  Daniel  Miller  (1996)  Acknowledging  Consumption,  London. 
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She  tried  to  convince  me  that  what  people,  including  we  two,  were  lacking  was 
ritual.  For  years  we  hadn't  courted  one  another  very  much,  and  as  a  result,  a 
mundane  element  had  invaded  our  relationship.  " 
The  eternal  return  of  garbage,  therefore,  tells  us  about  our  tendencies  toward 
inclusion  and  exclusion,  about  the  possibility  of  self-creation  through  our  relationship  to 
the  world  of  objects,  whether  these  are  inanimate  material  objects,  or  people,  who  we 
also  objectify.  On  the  other  hand,  if  we  think  once  again  of  the  garbageman,  we  may  see 
that  in  addition  to  our  own  attempts  at  psychological  tidying  (efforts  which  we  may  not 
connect  to  those  of  garbage  as  a  social  problem),  this  barely  noticeable  figure  conceals  a 
problem  that  becomes  ever  more  apparent  in  modern  society;  and,  that  is,  whilst 
individual  autonomy  would  seem  to  rest  on  an  easily  removable  past,  garbage  remains  a 
fundamental  problem,  both  practically  and  metaphorically,  that  we  find  increasingly 
difficult  to  resolve,  and  which  prompts  much  ordering  of  objects  and  beliefs. 
Garbage  only  becomes  a  problem  as  an  object  of  consciousness.  In  other  words, 
whether  it  is  visible  or  invisible  to  us  is  important.  For  example,  'clutter,  '  or  household 
disorganization,  is  easier  to  see  than  garbage,  but  that  is  because  clutter  isn't  yet  garbage 
(Plate  29).  Because  garbage  is  a  social  problem,  a  consequence  of  the  rationalisation  of 
consumption  and  disposal,  our  susceptibility  to  it  relies  to  a  great  extent  on  our 
consciousness  of  the  destructive  tendencies  of  others  and  ourselves.  And  such  knowledge 
is  compromised  by  the  ease  with  which  modern  society  has  ensured  we  can  forget 
garbage.  If  we  lack  proximity  to  garbage,  or  debris  of  any  sort,  to  the  leftovers  of  living, 
then  we  do  not  have  a  perspective  on  our  destructive  capabilities.  So,  garbage  becomes 
part  of  an  expanding  sphere  of  contingency  because  of  the  very  difficulty  we  find  in 
being  mindful  of  it,  given  the  way  modern  society  has  rationalized  it  out  of  our  lives. 
The  irony  is  that  garbage  once  rationalized  remains  a  problem  for  the  subject,  for 
autonomy,  because  of  the  very  success  of  modern  society  in  dealing  with  it  objectively. 
No  matter  how  much  we  may  remain  blind  to  garbage,  it  is  interesting  that  we 
perceive  the  taint  of  garbage  on  those  who  are  close  to  it.  Our  closeness  to  dirt  and 
garbage  of  one  sort  or  another  carries  significance  -  in  the  modern  west  -  for  how  we  see 
ourselves  and  how  we  are  perceived  in  the  eyes  of  others,  and  we  are  well  enough  aware 
of  garbage  to  want  to  avoid  it.  This  often  comes  across  in  our  attitudes  towards  certain 
"  Ivan  Klfma  (1990)  Love  and  Garbage,  Harmondsworth:  98. 
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PLATE  29.  THE  LAST  JEWS  IN  POLAND,  Tomasz  Tomaszewski,  1993.  In  recent  years  there  has 
emerged  a  lifestyle  psychology  that  promotes  'dejunking.  '  This  aims  to  convince  us  that  our  present  and 
future  'wellness'  (as  opposed  to  illness)  rests  on  removing  the  clutter  that  clogs  up  our  lives  and  chains  us 
to  the  past.  Thus,  if  you  are  unable  to  choose  which  dress  to  wear  to  that  dinner  party,  you  not  only  have 
too  many  objects,  but  your  indecision  is  itself  Junk,  an  inability  to  'sort.  '  The  gentleman  pictured  above, 
from  the  perspective  of  dejunking  or  Feng  Shui  (another  variant  of  the  same  thing),  would  be  considered 
disorganized  to  the  point  of  dissolution.  The  preponderance  of  unordered  objects  is  a  hindrance  to 
movement,  and  to  'efficient'  living.  The  fact  that  he  may  value  all  these  objects  would  not  matter.  The 
principal  point  of  dejunking  is  to  remove  objects  that  control  you  because  you  have  failed  to  control  them. 
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kinds  of  occupations.  For  instance,  there  are  a  large  number  of  occupations  that  are 
commonly  perceived  to  be  dirty;  the  jobs  we  cannot  face  to  do  ourselves,  or  that  we 
delegate  to  others  because  they  are  in  some  way  messy,  although  this  does  not  entail  that 
material  filth  is  actually  dealt  with. 
Still,  the  symbolic  power  of  'dirt'  as  a  property  of  cast-offs  is  revealed  in  the  ease 
with  which  we  attach  it  to  those  things,  to  beliefs,  and  people  that  we  want  to  keep  away 
from.  "Those  who  cleansed  the  world  of  garbage  or  rats  were  never  shown  any  respect,  " 
says  the  narrator  of  Love  and  Garbage: 
A  few  days  ago  I  read  about  a  jilted  stucco  worker  who,  exactly  two  hundred 
years  ago,  in  St.  Georges  church,  had  slashed  the  face,  mouth  and  shoulders  of 
his  lover,  for  which  he  was  gaoled,  and  taken  to  the  place  of  executing,  but  was 
reprieved  and  instead  sentenced  to  clean  the  streets  of  Prague  for  three  years.  " 
And  so,  as  modern  society  has  rationalised  our  methods  of  handling  the  unwanted  it 
has  also  introduced  a  boundary,  which  might  be  characterised  as  a  basic  mi*nz'mum  of 
civility,  which  allows  the  separation  of  the  acceptable  from  the  unwanted  and  the 
negligible.  "  Our  proximity  to  garbage  and  to  all  kinds  of  dirt  and  waste  helps  to  locate 
us  socially  and  signifies  also  attitudes  to  self  and  to  health.  "As  a  general  matter  it  is  the 
low,  the  contemptible,  that  are  contaminating,  "  William  Miller  suggests  in  his  Anatomy 
ofDisgust- 
It  is  inferiority  itself  that  tends  to  disgust  no  matter  whether  it  be  the  inferior 
position  in  a  classification  system  of  plants  or  animals  or  in  our  own  social  and 
moral  hierarchies.  17 
The  first  step  in  our  removal  from  garbage  is  therefore  to  classify  and  order  various 
kinds  of  matter  and  people,  in  the  latter  case  principally  those  we  equate  with  disgust- 
inducing  matter,  a  designation  that  rests  on  the  'untouchable'  perception  of  the  lowly.  " 
A  recent  investigation  into  the  increasingly  visible  social  category  of  'white  trash'  in 
the  United  States  suggested  that  this  name  designates  "a  singular,  shameful  condition" 
found  not  amongst  homogenous  groups  of  such  'trash',  but  instead  identifies  features 
Ivan  Klima,  ibid:  5. 
CE  Norbert  Elias  (2000)  The  Civilizing  Process,  Oxford. 
17  William  I.  Miller  (1997)  The  Anatomy  ofDisgust:  43. 
"  Mary  Douglas  (1966)  would  say  'pollution'  here,  but  it  is  about  the  exclusion  of  social  inferiors.  See  Purity 
and  Danger:  An  Analysis  of  Concepts  ofPollution  and  Taboo.  London. 
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characteristic  of  solitary  families  and  individuals  who  exist  as  exceptions  to  community 
norms.  In  particular  it  is  a  term  of  disapprobation  directed  at  'grotesques.  '  "In  one 
holler"  John  Hartigan  says: 
People  continually  asked  me  if  I  had  visited  the  W  family,  a  brood  of 
about  eleven  parentless  teenage  and  pre-adolescent  children,  most  reputed  to  be 
'retarded'  -  living  in  a  sprawling  shack  surrounded  by  half-cannibalised  car  bodies  with  their  indigestible  innards  chaotically  strewn  about.  " 
These  people  are  'trash'  not  in  virtue  of  some  lowly  occupation  that  ensures  a  proximity 
to  garbage,  but  rather  simply  in  terms  of  not  meeting  a  level  of  socially  acceptable  living, 
of  attaining  a  basic  minimum  of  civility,  that  might  include  not  having  large  numbers  of 
parentless  children,  nor  junk  materials  strewn  across  what  should  be  a  well-maintained 
lawn.  20 
The  stigma  attached  to  occupationally  bound  social  lowness  is  altogether  stranger. 
Garbage  removal,  a  primary  measure  against  the  spread  of  disease,  would  seem  to  be  of 
fundamental  importance  to  the  maintenance  of  civilisation,  and  is  arguably  a  prior 
condition  of  civilisation,  nevertheless  our  garbage  myopia  has  the  consequence  of 
placing  the  men  and  women  who  remove  garbage,  who  clean  offices  and  toilets,  right  at 
the  bottom  of  the  occupational,  if  not  the  social  scale,  unwelcome  in  'polite  society.  ' 
Like  the  dirt  and  rubbish  they  daily  battle  against,  these  social  'menials'  become  almost 
invisible,  occupying  the  hazy  world  of  the  half-seen  that  lingers,  temporarily,  as  dusk 
becomes  dawn,  where  what  is  seen  and  unseen  easily  becomes  negligible,  unworthy  of 
notice.  " 
Unlike  the  'white  trash,  '  who  are  perceived  as  a  threat  because  they  look  out  of 
control  -  too  many  children,  absent  parents,  junk  lying  everywhere  -  these  people  are 
largely  compliant  with  the  established  hierarchy.  In  other  words,  they  are  'sorted'  and  so 
long  as  that  remains  the  case  the  rest  of  us,  in  turn,  are  saved  the  trouble  of  confronting 
'9  John  Hartigan  (1997)  'Unpopular  Culture:  The  Case  of  White  Trash',  Cultural  Studies  1](2),  p.  318. 
20  William  Miller,  ibid:  42,  discusses  the  difficulty  often  found  in  dealing  with  uncontrollable  numbers  of  'lowly' 
things,  or  people. 
21  William  1.  Miller  0  997)  also  speaks  of  'moral  menials.  '  See  his  Anatom  ofDisgust-  18  5:  "Moral  menials  deal  Y 
with  moral  dirt,  or  they  have  to  get  morally  dirty  to  do  what  the  polity  needs  them  to  do 
... 
Moral  meniality  inverts 
the  reward  system  of  social  meniality.  Garbagemen  make  paltry  sums  compared  to  doctors,  although  it  is  hardly  clear 
who  contributes  the  most  to  public  health.  But  moral  menials  tend  to  be  nicely  remunerated,  often  in  direct 
proportion  to  the  extent  to  which  they  make  those  moral  compromises  which  so  often  disgust  the  impartial  observer 
or  the  seeker  of  justice.  "  The  metaphor  of  dirty  hands  is  irresistible  in  relation  to  lawyers  and  politicians  especially 
(think  of  Machiavelli). 
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the  ceaseless  return  of  garbage.  Thus,  it  is  not  a  matter  of  accident  that  the  garbage 
collection  is  partially  hidden  by  darkness  and  by  the  rational  geography  of  the  city 
planners,  who  have  ensured  that  our  waste,  and  the  mediation  of  waste  is  cast  into  the 
half-hidden  (that  is,  half-existing),  network  of  back  alleys;  unseen  on  street  maps,  but 
known  to  these  barely  visible  figures,  reflecting  their  status  as  a  barely  tolerable  element 
of  society.  "  By  the  time  civilisation  is  beginning  to  awake  to  the  day,  the  garbage  trucks 
are  usually  long  gone,  with  them  the  latest  collection  of  cast  offs  we  never  really 
vanquish,  no  longer  our  problem  (Plate  30). 
That  this  garbage  never  seems  to  come  to  an  end,  that  it  proves  increasingly  difficult 
to  dispose  of,  produces  some  interesting  observations  about  what,  and  why,  we  throw 
away.  As  we  lose  sight  of  not  only  the  garbageman,  but  also  in  all  its  material 
indifference  the  garbage  itself,  we  also  start  to  forget  that  garbage  can  reveal  something 
fundamental  about  our  relationship  to  objects,  and  that  it  may  tell  another  story,  one 
largely  hidden,  about  conditions  of  living  in  modern  society.  To  understand  what 
garbage  means,  to  grasp  the  symbolic  significance  of  it,  we  need  to  see  it  fully  within  the 
context  of  modernity.  Garbage  has  always  been  with  us,  this  is  not  denied,  but  the 
garbage  'problem'  that  we  are  interested  in  here  -  the  progress  of  value  to  garbage  -  has 
become  a  wholly  modern  problem,  and  it  useful  to  make  a  distinction  between  garbage 
and  dirt.  Within  both  pre-modern  and  modern  contexts  dirt  and  waste  are  sorted  to 
establish  an  order:  with  garbage  the  content  of  this  sorting  has  changed  as  a  result  of  the 
material  difference  of  life  in  modern  society. 
With  garbage  we  seem  to  move  beyond  the  realm  of  social  custom  as  the  principal 
regulating  mechanism  where  dirt  is  concerned,  to  subjective  psychosis  over  the  danger 
garbage  presents  to  the  self.  So,  whilst  garbage  is  often  equated  with  the  unclean,  it  is 
more  than  simply  dirt.  Dirt  is  always  everywhere,  always  nothing.  The  point  about 
garbage  is  that  as  the  material  leftovers  of  rational  living,  it  once  was  something,  and  so 
Garbage  illustrates  the  potential  impossibility  of  the  'social  promise  of  modernization,  '  if 
not  the  finiteness  of  reason,  and  by  the  mere  removal  of  the  idea  that  we  have  produced 
"  See  Dominique  Laporte  (2000)  History  of  Shit,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  Chs.  I  and  2  on  the  development  of  a 
sensitivity  to  the  visibility  of  garbage.  He  discusses  at  length  a  legal  edict  of  1539,  handed  down  in  Paris,  which  stated 
(I  we  forbid  all  emptying  or  tossing  out  into  the  streets  and  squares  of  the  aforementioned  city  and  its  surroundings  of 
refuse,  offals,  or  putrefactions  (Article  4).  "  And  "we  enjoin  that  all  manner  of  droppings  and  refuse  be  packed  into 
baskets  or  small  hampers  and  held  within  the  home  until  such  time  as  it  is  carried  outside  the  aforementioned  city  and 
its  premises.  "  (Article  15).  Is  there  anything  else  on  the  history  of  the  garbageman? 
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PLATE  30.  MEN  LITTERING,  Ryoji  Akiyama,  1969.  The  sight  of  such  an  accumulation  of  discards  is 
a  sharp  reminder  that  nothing ever  goes  away,  that  no  matter  vanishes.  The  history  of  the  garbage  dump 
begins  when  towns  and  cities  became  populous  enough  to  make  rubbish  a  highly  visible  threat  to  health. 
For  example,  an  ordinance  of  Florence  Health  Officers  of  4h  May  1622  directed  that  towns  within  the 
state  would  now  be  required  to  remove  all  rubbish  to  a  places  beyond  human  habitation:  "we  order  you 
immediately...  to  command  that  in  all  places  under  your  jurisdiction  everyone  should  remove  and  have 
removed  from  before  their  houses  all  the  filth  and  rubbish  which  are  to  be  found  there  ...  and  all  that 
which  is  in  the  squares  and  other  public  places  should  be  removed  by  the  representatives  of  the 
Communities  and  be  carried  outside  the  Towns  Villages  and  Castelli  to  places  where  they  can  do  no 
harm.  "  See  Carlo  Cippola,  1992,  Miasmas  and  Disease.  -  Public  Health  and  the  Environment  in  the  pre- 
industrial  Age,  p.  8  1. 
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a  rationally  ordered  world,  reintroduces  a  doubt:  that  we  are  not  too  far  removed  from 
living  in  a  radically  uncertain  world. 
The  constant  production  of  garbage,  and  the  very  durability  of  it  -  that  what  we 
'destroy'  in  the  process  of  consumption  turns  out  in  fact  to  be  indestructible  -  provokes 
a  need  to  forget  it  by  placing  it  outside.  Out  of  mind.  Out  of  our  'space'.  Out  of  our 
hands,  and  into  the  hands  of  the  authorities.  The  result  of  this  expurgation  is  that 
garbage  becomes  inseparable  from  processes  of  self-creation:  our  only  means  of  flight  is, 
paradoxically,  to  remain:  specifically  to  remain  inside.  However,  the  ground  of  the 
meaning  we  derive  from  such  exclusion,  rests  on  the  contingency  of  this  object  world. 
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where  the  consummations  gather,  where  the  disposal/ 
flows  out  of  form,  where  the  last  translations/ 
cast  away  their  immutable  bits  and  scraps... 
here  is  the  gateway  to  beginning 
A.  R.  AmMONS,  Garbage. 
It  should  not  be  a  surprise  that  rationalised  garbage  conceals  an  important  truth  about 
our  consumption,  namely  that  it  is  destruction.  In  modern  society  this  truth  is  somehow 
lost.  Yet,  any  history  of  human  society  would  reveal  our  unavoidable  destructive 
capacities,  showing  that  the  inevitable  result  of  living  is  actually  waste,  simply  because  to 
live  is,  in  the  widest  possible  sense,  to  consume.  I 
But  just  as  garbage  is  rationalized,  so  it  is  that  the  consumption  that  produces 
garbage  must  be  thought  of  as  rational,  in  that  this  is  goal-driven,  as  well.  In  other 
words,  the  principal  category  of  garbage  that  raises  the  prospect  of  an  expanding  sphere 
of  chance  in  modern  society  is  the  material  outcome  of  a  rational  destruction;  it  is 
consequent  upon  the  consumption  of  goods  that  ('intend'  to)  realise  the  Self. 
We  can  put  this  in  different  terms  by  suggesting  that  the  byproduct  of  everything 
valuable  may  be  viewed  as  garbage.  At  the  most  basic  level,  specifically  from  the  evidence 
of  physical  excreta,  we  see  that  the  most  basic  and  necessary  kind  of  consumption, 
eating,  for  example,  is  garb  age-pro  ducing.  Yet,  modern  society  ensures  that  many  less 
obvious  human  behaviours  and  practices,  such  as  reading,  dressing,  bathing,  and  so  on, 
are  in  fact  also  ultimately  garbage.  Everything  is  finally  and  undeniably  garbage. 
'  'Rationalised  garbage'  is  distinct  from  pre-modern  means  of  dealing  with  waste,  which  essentially  involved  the 
removal  of  the  person  from  where  garbage  fell.  See  Rathje  and  Murphy  (1992)  Rubbish!.  32.  Although  they  also  note 
that  "there  are  no  ways  of  dealing  with  garbage  that  haven't  been  familiar,  in  essence,  for  thousands  of  years  [ 
... 
I  The 
basic  methods  of  garbage  disposal  are  four:  dumping  it,  burning  it,  turning  it  into  something  new  that  can  be  useful 
(recycling),  and  minimizing  the  volume  of  material  goods  -  future  garbage  -  that  comes  into  existence  in  the  first 
place.  Any  civilization  of  any  complexity  has  used  all  four  procedures  simultaneously  to  one  degree  or another.  "  (33) 
Cf.  Georges  Bataille  (1989)  The  Accursed  Share,  Vol.  1,  New  York. 
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In  modern  times  especially,  consumption  surpasses  the  satisfaction  of  need,  a 
phenomenon  resulting  from  the  historical  fact  that  we  no  longer  produce  the  items 
necessary  for  the  sustenance  of  life,  or  to  meet  our  own  needs.  The  fact  that  we  so 
readily  forget  about  waste  is  a  direct  consequence  of  the  rationalization  of  the 
consumption-waste  process.  Indeed,  this  goes  beyond  consumption  of  'objects.  '  It  is,  in 
more  general  terms,  a  feature  of  modern  society  that  we  individually  'ignore'  tasks  that 
have  become  the  responsibility  of  an  objective  production  process.  In  pre-  and  early- 
modern  times,  by  contrast,  the  consumption  process  was  vastly  different  to  that  which 
we  know  today.  The  existence  of  home  production  and  subsistence  agriculture  arguably 
provided  an  immediacy  of  experience  with  the  consumption  and  disposal  process  and 
also,  and  no  less  significantly  for  our  views  of  garbage,  with  the  life  cycle  itself.  In  these 
times,  and  under  such  conditions,  it  was  evident  that  a  'coming  to  be'  and  a  'ceasing  to 
exist'  attended  all  objects,  all  goods,  and  ultimately  all  living  things.  In  other  words,  we 
would  have  been  aware  of  the  origin  of  goods  we  consumed  simply  because  we  would 
have  produced  them,  and  likewise  would  also  be  aware  of  the  destination  of  the 
associated  waste  byproducts  because  we  would  have  had  to  dispose  of  them  personally! 
This  has  largely  ceased  to  be  the  case.  Modern  society  determines  that,  for  most  of 
the  time,  we  purchase  and  dispose  of  goods  (or,  to  put  it  another  way,  engage  in 
commerce)  with  the  aid  of  a  number  of  mediators.  '  Indeed,  the  immediacy  with  which 
consumer  products  become  available  in  new  transformed  versions  is  astounding.  Where 
progressive  obsolescence  may  have  once  been  restricted  to  the  motorcar,  it  is  now 
evident  on  the  packaging  of  the  most  mundane  objects. 
Before  modernity  had  bequeathed  the  often  overlooked  mechanical  means  of 
transporting  shit,  sewage  and  garbage  to  those  nether  regions  where  it  is  even  less  likely 
to  affect  our  consciousness  or  offend  our  senses,  the  removal  of  the  debris  of  life  - 
whether  it  be  evidenced  by  garbage  or  excreta  -  was  a  practical  problem  that  had  to  be 
met  without  the  benefits  of  the  technological  wonders  we  are  so  familiar  with  today. 
2s.  Ewen  (1988)  All  Consuming  Images,  pp.  236-37.  See  also  Susan  Strasser  (1999)  Waite  and  Want,  New  York, 
on  'the  stewardship  of  objects'  that  she  identifies  as  a  common  feature  of  urban  life  prior  to  mass  consumerism 
(Ch.  1.  ) 
'  Money  has  been  viewed  as  a  'substance'  devoid  of  concrete  properties,  and  this  allows  it  to  get  everywhere:  see 
Alfred  Sohn-Rethel  0  978)  Intellectual  and  Manual  Labour.  -  A  Critique  of  Epistemology,  London:  53-54.  Money  and 
garbage,  thus,  seem  to  share  several  characteristics  that  allow  us  to  suggest  they  are  eternal:  (1)  Timelessness,  (2) 
Formlessness,  and  (3)  Both  are  in  constant  transformation.  On  the  comparison  between  money  and  faeces  see 
Sigmund  Freud  0  953)  'Character  and  Anal  Eroticism'  (orig.  pub.  1908)  in  The  Standard  Edition  of  the  Complete 
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Shit  and  waste  was  carried  out,  or  simply  dumped  from  windows,  remaining  where  it 
fell  until  it  could  no  longer  be  ignored.  ' 
Unless  one  has  a  high  level  of  tolerance  to  the  effects  of  the  disgust  inducing,  the 
removal  of  such  'natural  necessities'  would  indeed  have  been  eventually  unavoidable, 
and  the  pace  of  life  would  in  many  ways  have  been  dictated  by  looming  decay,  even  if 
standards  of  cleanliness  arrived  relatively  late  in  modernity,  after  life  had,  so  to  speak, 
started  to  gather  speed.  '  It  is  arguable  that  the  extent  to  which  dealing  with  excremental 
waste  remains  in  the  21"  century  an  unavoidable  matter  of  daily  living  could  quite 
accurately  be  said  to  illustrate  the  lagging,  or  non-existent,  effects  of  modernity, 
meaning,  on  the  one  hand,  the  absence  of  a  fully  rationalized  waste  disposal  system  that 
is  universally  found  within  a  particular  culture,  and  on  the  other,  the  lack  of  a 
6  convention  of  an  individuated  identity.  This  latter  development  is  important,  and  its 
causal  effect  on  habits  of  cleanliness  in  establishing  a  'privatized'  space  that  separated  one 
body  from  another,  should  nevertheless  not  deflect  us  from  suggesting  that  the 
individuated  identity  of  the  modern  subject  may  actually  have  been  a  consequence  of  the 
overpowering  effects  of  waste  in  medieval  towns  and  cities. 
It  is  crucial  to  understand  here  that  what  we  now  know  as  garbage  can  be  traced  as  a 
social  category  to  the  privatization  of  human  wastes,  meaning  that  evidence  of  its  social 
Psychological  Works,  London:  167-76.  On  circulation,  Georg  Simmel  0  978)  The  Philosophy  of  Money,  London,  and 
Christof  Asendorf  (1993)  ibid. 
'  Cf.  Carlo Cipolla  (1992)  Miasmas  and  Disease,  New  Haven:  8  1,  and  Dominique  Laporte  (2000)  History  of 
Shit,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  chapter  one.  There  is  also  an  interesting  point  to  be  made  here  about  experience  and  time. 
just  as  in  consumption  the  modern  world  allowed  us  to,  in  a  sense,  speed  up,  by  permitting  and  facilitating 
acquisition  in  advance  of  need,  so  mechanical  means  of  waste  disposal  permit  us  to  abolish  the  decaying  effects  of  time 
from  immediate  experience,  this  by  the  mere  fact  that  it  is  done  on  another's  time.  And  as  Dominique  Laporte  (1999) 
tells  in  his  History  ofShit  no  less  a  figure  than  Jeremy  Bentham  had  urged  the  recycling  of  shit:  'We  never  exercise,  or 
at  least  should  never  exercise  a  besoin  [Fr.  =  'need']  as  pure  loss.  It  should  be  put  to  use  as  manure':  119-20 
'  It  depends  what  we  take  as  evidence  of  standards  equivalent  to  'modern  standards.  '  It  seems  that  there  is  a 
gradual  development  in  these  standards.  Thus,  whilst  Lawrence  Wright  (1960)  Clean  and  Decent,  London,  cites 
evidence  that  London's  mediaeval  latrines  were  barely  tolerable  by  the  turn  of  the  14"  century,  we  might  prefer  to 
locate  'a  modern  standard  of  cleanliness'  as  equivalent  with  improvement  in  standards  of  hygiene  brought  about  by 
the  invention  of  the  first  flushing  toilet  in  the  late  16  h  century.  Dominique  Laporte,  ibid,  suggests  that  16"  century 
ordinances  on  the  disposal  of  household  waste  were  an  attempt  to  revive  the  Roman  sewers  in  Paris  (see  Ch.  2), 
although  whether  or not  Romans  had  something  akin  to  the  privy,  or  latrine,  he  says,  is  less  clear  (44-45).  It  is  really 
difficult  to  assess  when  something  like  contemporary  standards  of  cleanliness  became  widespread.  Norbert  Elias,  for 
example,  dates  the  beginning  of  a  'civilizing  process'  that  was  evident  on  several  fronts,  to  the  16  th  century  as  well. 
However,  there  is  no  mention  made  of  either  the  gradual  privatization  of  shit  or  menses.  William  Miller  (1997)  in 
Anatomy  ofDisgust,  argues  that  disgust  conventions  can  guide  us  here.  These,  he  says,  are  clearly  evident  in  the  Middle 
Ages,  suggesting  a  level  of  civility  that  Norbert  Elias  largely  failed  to  see  or  acknowledge.  He  interprets  Elias  as 
illustrating  not  an  increase  in  disgust  that  then  prompted  this  civilizing  process,  but  rather  a  redistribution  of  existing 
disgust,  thus,  "changes  in  the  levels  of  disgust  in  a  culture  can  be  reconceived  as  changes  across  different  cultural 
domains,  as,  say,  from  the  religious  to  the  secular,  from  what  gets  eaten  (as  in  the  taboos  of  ritual  prohibition)  to  how 
things  get  eaten  (as  in  having  proper  table  manners).  "  See  Miller  (1997)  ibid.  143-178,  and  Norbert  Elias,  ibid.  45ff 
'  See,  for  example,  J.  Donzelot  0  980)  The  Policing  of  Families:  Weyare  versus  the  State,  London,  cited  in  H. 
Ferguson  (2000)  Modernity  and  Subjectivity,  Charlottesville:  44-49. 
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status,  for  example,  in  public  ordinances,  suggests  a  corresponding  private  responsibility. 
Indeed  we  can  suggest  that  such  privatization  of  waste,  certainly  in  towns  and  cities, 
predates  modern  philosophical  notions  of  the  individuated  subject  by  several  hundred 
years.  This  makes  it  very  difficult  to  establish  what  is  causing  what:  are  we  more 
disgusted  with  the  waste  of  others  because  we  have  developed  this  individuated  identity, 
or  have  we  seen  the  creation  of  such  an  identity  as  a  response  to  the  conditions  found  in 
suddenly  being  thrown  together  in  towns  and  cities? 
Whatever  the  answer,  there  is  clearly  one  significant  inference  we  could  make,  and 
that  is  to  say  civilization  developed  as  a  response  to  this  alienated  waste,  this  'garbage.  ' 
This  is  a  view  supported  by  the  Garbage  Project  at  the  University  of  Arizona,  based  on 
archeological  evidence!  Taking  an  altogether  different  approach,  Lawrence  Wright,  in 
his  fascinating  history  of  toilets  and  bathrooms,  argues  that  in  medieval  Britain  evidence 
can  be  cited  to  support  the  view  that  the  'privatization'  of  waste  can  be  dated  as  early  as 
the  12'h  century.  "Among  the  lower  orders  there  were  some  private  latrines,  ))  he  says, 
citing: 
Housing  ordinances  of  1189,  requiring  that  garderobe  pits,  if  not  walled  must 
be  at  least  51/2  ft.  from  the  party  line  [i.  e.  the  line  that  defines  ownership  of 
property];  if  walled,  21/2 
ft.  "8 
The  'garderobe'  itself,  was  usually  built  "within  ample  thickness  of  the  walls  [of  the 
house],  each  with  its  own  vertical  shaft  below  a  stone  or  wooden  seat"  often  situated 
above  a  stream  or  moat  below  the  house.  Even  the  name  'garderobe'  hints  at  how  averse 
people  must  have  been  to  bodily  waste,  meaning  something  like  a  'private  room'  (hence, 
(  privy'),  or  'wardrobe.  ' 
This  was  just  one  of  many  euphemisms  used  in  England,  according  to  Wright,  that 
point  to  bodily  waste  taboos,  as  did  other  "coy  evasions"  such  as  'necessariam'  or 
(  necessary  house.  "  Indeed,  the  suggestion  that  some  medieval  people  had  already  seen 
the  beginning  of  a  privatized  waste  process  -  certainly  by  the  13"  century  -  Is  not  only 
attested  to  by  the  existence  of  public  ordinances,  but  also  in  the  apparent  evidence  that 
medieval  people  were  extremely  averse  to  the  sights  and  smells  of  human  waste.  Wright 
also  cites  evidence  of  contractual  documents  that  show  the  men  who  were  employed  to 
'See  William  Rathje  and  Caen  Murphy,  ibid. 
'Lawrence  Wright,  ibid:  50 
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clean  privies  were  extremely  well  paid.  For  example,  he  mentions  an  account  of  work 
carried  out  at  Newgate  jail  in  1281: 
When  thirteen  men  took  five  nights  to  clear  the  'cloaca'  (i.  e.,  sewer),  at  a  total 
cost  of  14-  7s.  8d.  This  was  then  thought  a  high  figure,  but  the  men  were  paid 
three  times  the  normal  rate.  " 
No  doubt  on  account  of  how  unattractive  this  kind  of  work  had  become. 
There  was  still  widespread  use  of  communal  latrines  in  the  12"  and  13"  centuries, 
but  we  might  argue  that  the  conditions  of  many  people  living  together  in  towns  or 
cities,  and  the  fact  that  people  were  relatively  immobile  must  have  increased  a  sensitivity 
to  waste  well  before  philosophical  elaborations  of  an  individuated  identity.  In  medieval 
times,  then,  and  of  importance  to  the  development  of  a  view  of  modern  garbage,  we 
must  locate  the  origins  of  the  noxious  power  of  human  waste  to  the  absence  of 
opportunities  to  simply  go  elsewhere  and  escape  it.  Thus  an  inability  to  remove  oneself 
from  these  wastes  is  evident  in  complaints  made  in  1300  to  the  King  and  Parliament 
about  the  "putrid  exhalations"  of  Fleet  River  in  London,  which  like  many  rivers  at  the 
time,  had  latrines  built  over  it  as  the  most  efficient  means  of  removing  waste.  By  the 
same  time  we  can  see  that  the  deficiencies  of  this  kind  of  arrangement  are  becoming 
both  difficult  to  avoid,  and  difficult  to  live  with;  in  1300  as  well  Sherbourne  Lane,  a 
place  once  remembered  fondly  as,  Wright  tells  us,  a  place  where  one  would  find 
dwellings  adjacent  to  a  "long  bourne  of  sweet  water"  -  an  attractive  place,  in  other 
words  -  had  through  time  came  to  be  known  by  the  designation  that  identified  the 
qualitative  change  in  living  conditions  -  "Shiteburn  Lane.  "" 
In  modern  society  the  private  flushing  toilet,  then,  is  not  a  luxury,  but  rather  an 
indicator  of  minimum  standards  of  civility,  evolved  to  its  current  state  over  nearly  1000 
years  on  these  islands,  and  like  window  panes  and  light  bulbs,  a  pre-condition  of 
'  Ibid:  47 
'0  lbid:  49.  Compare  with  modern  times  where  sewage  workers  are  generally  lower  paid  because  of  their 
association  with  disliked  waste. 
"  Ibid:  5  1.  That  all  this  was  the  result  of  people  having  to  live  in  close  proximity  to  one  another  in  towns  and 
cities  is  clear.  Less  well-known  perhaps,  but  also  cited  in  Wright's  fascinating  book,  is  that  Leonardo  da  Vinci  had  not 
only  invented  a  folding  closet  seat  by  the  15"  century,  but  that  he  had  invented  a  bathroom  door  that,  by  utilizing 
counterweights,  closed  automatically,  thus  keeping  the  room  private.  And  in  a  proposal  for  ten  new  towns,  aimed  to 
fight  the  causes  of  plague  and  death,  he  incorporated  a  drainage  system  that  would  accommodate  "all  private  and 
public  privies,  and  all  garbage  and  street  sweepings  ...  to  be  carried  by  rivers,  "  and  "all  the  stairways  in  the  tenement 
buildings  were  to  be  spiral,  to  prevent  the  insanitary  misuse  of  stair  landings.  "  See  Wright,  ibid:  54-55. 
j  Scanlan  2001  224 Flushing  is  Forgetting 
civilization.  12  We  can  look  at  this  another  way:  the  absence  of  the  magic  handle  that 
produces  the  cleansing,  silver  flush  that  allows  us  to  start  anew  is  really  the  absence  of 
some  advanced  system  of  social  rationalization.  The  flushing  toilet  of  every  modern 
home,  the  height  of  the  privatization  of  human  waste,  signifies  a  triumphant  advance  in 
modern  society.  " 
The  widespread  arrival  of  domestic  plumbing,  in  the  form  of  bathroom  closets 
containing  a  toilet,  bath  and  sink  with  running  hot  water,  is  one  of  the  most  important 
consequences  of  the  ever  more  complex  nature  of  the  separation  and  specialization  of 
productive  work.  It  is  through  the  multiplication  of  various  tasks,  personal  and  non- 
personal,  whether  originally  private  or  communal,  that  modern  society  has  industrialized 
production  processes  by  a  division  of  tasks  and  developed  a  level  of  social  rationalization 
that  has  reached  beyond  the  sphere  of  the  creation  and  consumption  of  mere  necessities 
and  through  which  society  has  'propelled'  itself  forward  into  the  world  of  abundance 
many  of  us  now  know.  This,  there  is  little  doubt,  had  the  necessary  effect  of 
depersonalizing  the  waste  process,  as  one  of  many  essential  processes  now  rationalised, 
(another  obvious  one  being  food  production).  But  the  developmental  process  is  entirely 
complementary  and  depends  on  the  return  of  a  causal  effect  to  its  origin,  thus  ensuring  a 
progression  that  modifies  and  perfects  systematic  anomalies.  So,  the  end  result  is  that 
without  someone  else  to  take  out  the  garbage,  specific  kinds  of  industrial  production 
become  quite  impossible.  Almost  universally,  by  the  late  20,  h  century,  we  are  already  one 
step  removed  from  the  consequences  of  our  own  waste  in  that  we  need  never  see  it. 
Gradually,  in  more  advanced  cultures,  we  have  moved  even  further  to  the  point  where 
progressive  obsolescence  makes  the  old  so  commonplace  that  we  show  no  concern  about 
dispensing  with  it.  But  this  is,  it  seems,  no  cause  for  concern.  Modern  society,  in  the 
form  of  the  division  of  labour,  provides  the  means  of  expulsion,  and  this  is,  of  course, 
found  in  the  person  of  the  garbage  collector.  Which  is  basically  the  same  as  saying  that 
when  you  no  longer  have  to  empty  your  chamber  pot,  or  dig  out  your  privy  personally, 
"  Ralph  Lewin  (1999)  Merde,  London,  however,  quotes  a  sceptic  on  this  matter:  "As  the  missionary  Bibles  once 
spread  the  light  to  savage  hearths  around  the  globe,  the  porcelain  john  will  soon  spread  the  Word  of  Technology  to 
every  home  of  the  Great  Unwashed.  "  (67) 
"  Some  kind  of  flushing  system  is  found  as  early  as  200OBC,  although  this  is  not  mechanized.  The  Palace  of 
Knossos  on  Crete  had  seen  the  introduction  of  an  elaborate  drainage  system  that  allowed  for  passage  of  a  'sewer-man' 
through  wide  drainage  channels,  although  these  were  sometimes  flushed  with  torrential  rainwater.  See  Wright  (1960), 
ibid.  Ch.  1. 
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on  a  regular  basis,  it  is  understandable  that  you  might  not  give  a  second  thought  to  the 
eventual  destination  of  your  shit.  "  Flushing,  after  all,  is  forgetting. 
Not  without  coincidence  the  notion  of  flushing  contains  a  peculiarly  modern 
aspect;  it  throws  up  associations  with  newness  and  motion,  not  to  say  the  very  'fluidity' 
of  modern  life.  As  Zygmunt  Bauman  observes,  there  are  good  reasons  for  considering 
fluidity  and  'liquidity'  as  "fitting  metaphors  when  we  wish  to  grasp  the  nature  of  the 
present.  "  The  past  is  equated  with  'rigidity'  and  'solidity,  '  whilst  'fluids'  are  Iight,  ' 
ctravel  easily'  and  are  associated  with  inconstancy.  "  This  can  be  seen  in  the  matter  we 
flush  away,  which  is  broken  down  by  the  force  of  the  water  that  propels  it  from  our 
lives.  Flushing  then  sums  up  in  one  way  our  present  attitude  to  objects,  and  can  be 
thought  of  as  nothing  less  than  the  removal  of  a  previous  necessity  to  be  mindful. 
Flushing  means  there  is  one  task  less  to  think  about,  and  that  one  is  free  to  concentrate 
on  more  important  matters.  In  fact,  this  gradual  progression  has  reached  the  stage  where 
some  modern  public  toilets  present  themselves  to  the  user  as  if  totally  untouched,  and 
thus  the  question  of  the  regular  function  of  the  equipment  is  not  only  easy  to  forget,  but 
is,  in  some  sense,  denied.  This  all  points  to  an  uneasiness  with  being  reminded  that 
other  people  shit,  and  they  may  have  used  the  same  space  to  do  it  as  we  do.  As  Ralph 
Lewin  describes  it,  this  latest  innovation  is  comprised  of  a  disposable  plastic  covering, 
fresh-sealing  the  toilet,  an  operation  "that  can  be  renewed  automatically  by  pressing  a 
button,  and  [also]  a  device  for  the  irradiation  of  the  toilet  seat  with  ultraviolet  light.  "  16 
These  devices  may  not  be  universally  known,  but  the  point  is  that  they  represent  the 
latest  modification  of  a  necessity  long  banished,  namely  the  need  to  be  personally 
responsible  for  your  own  waste,  and  this  produces  the  crucial  element  of  forgetfulness. 
Just  compare  this  with  "going  out  for  a  walk  with  a  spade"  as  Lewin  says  men  in  the 
trenches  during  wartime  would  do,  indicating  no  less  of  a  sensitivity  to  the  communal 
"  The  first  flushing  toilet  that  resembles  the  modern  object  dates  from  1596.  Wright,  ibid,  describes  a  valve 
water  closet  invented  by  Sir  John  Hartington,  that  had  "a  seat  with  a  pan,  a  cistern  above  (in  which  are  shown  fish 
swimming,  but  only  to  indicate  water),  an  overflow  pipe,  a  flushing  pipe,  a  valve  or  'stopple'  and  a  waste  with  water- 
seal.  "  pp.  71-3.  This  kind  of  arrangement  was  gradually  perfected  and  reached  the  current  form,  known  as  the 
( washdown  closet'  in  1889.  Of  course,  it  took  until  the  mid-20"  century  in  some  British  households  before  such  a 
luxury  was  available  within  every  household  (as  opposed  to  in  a  brick  shed  outside  the  home).  See  also  Ralph  Lewin, 
ibid:  55-64,  and  66-68,  who  notes  that  the  first  patent  for  a  mechanically  flushing  toilet  was  taken  out  in  1775.  Also 
included  here  is  a  short  discussion  of  the  variety  of  cultural  developments  in  this  technology. 
15  Zygmunt  Bauman  (2000)  Liquid  Modernity,  Cambridge:  2-14. 
16  Lewin  ibid:  61.  See  also  Gilles  Lipovetsky  (1994)  The  Empire  of  Fashion:  Dressing  Modern  Democracy, 
Princeton,  for  related  comments  on  fashion,  which  is,  as  we  shall  see  below,  intimately  bound  up  with  disposal:  "No 
economy  of  the  ephemeral  can  exist  without  the  synergistic  action  of  major  cultural  objectives  such  as  comfort, 
aesthetic  quality,  individual  choice,  and  novelty.  (153) 
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effects  of  defecation  suggestive  of  a  privation,  which  itself  entails  that  should  our 
automated  means  of  disposal  ever  break  down,  we  would  soon  be  well  aware  of  it.  " 
Nevertheless,  a  lack  of  mindfulness  is  both  necessary  and  unavoidable  for  the  most 
part.  The  division  of  labour  has  produced  a  major  side  effect,  the  positive  features  of 
which  are  unlikely,  and  this  is  ignorance.  "  There  is  no  paradox  in  this.  To  be  modern, 
after  all,  is  also  to  learn  how  to  forget,  and  in  a  fuller,  more  positive  sense,  to  learn  how 
to  live  without  knowing.  Memory  it  is  easy  to  see  is  both  the  source  of  a  subjective 
doubt,  and  also  the  graveyard  of  progress.  The  past  is  nothing  more  than  the  rubbish  we 
need  to  eject,  and  so  the  expanding  sphere  of  garbage  is  intimately  entwined  with  an 
impulse  to  live  in  the  present.  This,  not  surprisingly,  creates  a  need  for  the  constant 
renewal  of  the  terms  in  which  we  may  identify  with  the  world.  "  So,  the  obverse  of  the 
waste  process,  which  proceeds  historically  to  a  level  of  efficiency  that  allows  more  time 
for  active  consumption  -  as  does  a  minimization  of  any  productive  task  -  is  realised  in 
the  production  of  ever  more  novelties. 
Modern  society,  we  might  say,  has  created  an  economy  of  ignorance.  Strategic 
forgetting  acts  as  a  means  of  negotiating  a  world  of  objects,  and  once  formalized 
becomes  a  kind  of  'rational  ignorance.  '  So,  embracing  the  future  only  makes  sense  if  we 
understand  the  necessity  of  metaphorically  burying  the  past,  like  so  much  rubbish. 
Still,  there  remains  a  difficulty  in  understanding  the  actual  basis  of  this  forgetting,  of 
how  the  conditions  of  modern  living  specifically  reinforce  it.  What  is  clear  is  that  that  if 
choices  are  not  present,  then  action  becomes  rather  a  matter  of  social  reflex,  like  taking 
the  path  most  trodden,  and  this  seems  odd  because  it  tells  us  that  we  trash  the  past  by 
walking  over  its  remains.  Thus  learning  to  forget  is  a  matter  of  social  adaptation. 
The  evidence  of  this  casual  dumping  of  past  is  actually  an  important  part  of  our 
everyday  experience,  conscious  or  not,  and  to  live  in  the  present  becomes  always  the 
same  as  a  gradual  erosion  of  what  went  before,  and  this  is  most  obvious  in  fashion.  The 
present  soon  enough  becomes  past  in  the  face  of  the  new,  and  advertising,  with 
17  Cf.  Jos6  Saramago  (1995)  Blindness,  London.  In  this  story  victims  stricken  with  an  inexplicable  and  infectious 
blindness  are  confined  to  prevent  its  spread.  With  their  separation  from  the  rest  of  society,  and  with  the  loss  of  sight 
comes  the  inevitable  problem  of  not  being  able  to  control  human  waste.  The  author  brilliantly  conveys  the 
devastating  effects  of  the  removal  of  a  once  rationalised  system  of  waste  disposal. 
"'  Cf.  F.  Nietzsche  (1995)  'On  the  Utility  and  Liability  of  History  for  Life,  '  in  Unfashionable  Observations,  Vol. 
2.  Stanford,  CA. 
"  If  modernity  is  the  removal  of  tradition,  and  the  movement  to  constant  renewal,  perhaps  more  dangerous 
aspects  of  memory,  such  as  nationalism,  and  one  of  its  more  destructive  side-effects,  war,  are  just  the  rubbish  of 
memory. 
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seemingly  evangelical  fervour,  begs  us  to  cast  off  the  once  cherished  but  inevitably  faded 
objects  in  a  dream  of  a  glittering  future.  As  one  enthusiastic  observer  notes, 
consumption  of  objects  thrives  on  an  "order  of  'autonomous'  phenomena,  responding 
only  to  the  play  of  human  desires,  whims  and  wishes.  ""  Meaning  that  in  an  age  where 
the  lack  of  objective  meaning  has  created  a  void,  the  only  response  is  to  be  found  in  a 
subjective  identification  with  the  object  world.  The  citizen  of  such  a  world  has  modified 
the  Cartesian  cogito;  now  we  exist  as  we  consume.  The  new  washing  powder  ...  the  new 
car  ...  the  new  kitchen-the  new  yOU!  21  "Fashion,  "  according  to  Mark  C.  Taylor,  is 
C(profound  in  its  superficiality.  "  This  is  because  it  functions  as  the  highest  contemporary 
realization  of  modern  society  as  a  mask  of  games.  And  so,  "the  profundity  of  fashion 
does  not  involve  depth  but  reflects  the  infinite  complexity  of  a  play  of  surfaces  that 
knows  no  end.  ))22 
The  consumption  process  thrives  only  on  the  creation,  and  expectation,  of  a 
demand  -  achieved  by  tapping  into  the  modern  attachment  to  novelty,  itself  created  as 
one  of  the  foundational  institutions  of  modernity.  Once  desire  has  been  awoken,  rarely, 
if  ever,  are  we  prompted  to  consider  one  crucial  aspect  of  the  life  of  the  shimmering 
object  of  desire,  and  that  is  the  necessity  of  its  eventual  demise  in  our  affections.  Walter 
Benjamin  saw  fashion  as  a  CC  provocation  of  death,  "  always  becoming  "something  new, 
something  different"  as  death  closes  in.  "  Such  insights,  however,  escape  the  awareness  of 
the  general  consumer  of  modern  society.  Indeed,  for  the  'machinery'  of  the 
consumption  process  to  make  this  evident  would  be  self-defeating.  Why  draw  attention 
to  the  very  opposite  of  what  the  object  is  intended  for?  The  used  up  object  is  the  object 
devalued,  no  longer  desirable.  The  crucial  point  is  that  the  specific  value  of  the  new 
object  is  contained  in  the  desire  that  craves  it,  and  this  may  have  little  to  do  with  its 
ostensible  function.  And  thus  the  object  is  in  a  sense  also  spiritualised  -  it  assumes  an 
alchemical  power  beyond  its  functionality.  " 
'0  Lipovetsky,  Ibid:  24. 
"  See,  for  example,  Thomas  Hine  (1995)  The  Total  Package,  Boston,  on  the  proliferation  of  unlikely  items  of 
fashion;  cleaning  products,  as  items  that  remain  private,  and  are  not  on  public  display,  are  one  good  example  of  the 
distinctive  nature  of  subject-product  identification.  Hine  notes  that  in  the  mid  20th  century,  Proctor  and  Gamble, 
originally  a  soap  and  candle  maker,  saw  the  limitless  potential  of  detergent  technology.  Thus,  shampoos,  liquid 
detergents,  dishwasher  detergents,  and  household  cleaners  came  to  occupy  whole  aisles  of  a  typical  supermarket, 
products  whose  purposes  were  once  fidfilled  by  soap  (150-5  1). 
22  Mark  C.  Taylor  0  997)  Hiding,  Chicago:  167. 
23  See  Walter  Benjamin  (1999)  The  Arcades  Project,  Harvard:  63. 
2,  The  idea  that  value  is  a  property  of  an  object,  either  in  terms  of  its  use-value,  or  in  terms  of  labour  power 
seems,  in  both  these  senses,  to  be  of  limited  use  here.  The  former  sense  of  value  is  complicated  by  the  junking  of  still 
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At  this  point  consumer  awareness  may  simply  be  restricted  to  the  presumed 
transforming  powers  of  the  object,  and  it  would  be  unusual,  caught  in  this  state  of 
desire,  to  be  simultaneously  concerned  with  the  eventual  uselessness  of  the  object.  The 
day  that  this  happens  on  a  large  scale  will  be  the  day  when  dreams  are  snuffed  out  at 
inception,  when  reason  finally  overcomes  desire,  and  thus,  to  invoke  the  finite  properties 
of  the  object,  or  more  specifically  the  temporality  of  desire,  is  merely  to  raise  the 
perception  of  'ends';  of  decay,  of  age  and  uselessness,  of  exhausted  potential,  and  of  the 
ultimate  impossibility  of  dreams.  Memory  of  the  past,  then,  effectively  destroys  the 
vision  of  the  new  object  that  advertising  has  become  so  successful  at  creating. 
One  consequence  of  the  failure  of  memory  to  intervene  and  bring  desire  back  to 
reality,  down  to  earth,  is  that  apart  from  committed  'neophobiacs',  modern  society 
remains  largely  ignorant,  often  willfully  so,  of  the  inevitable  end  that  the  once  cherished 
and  shiny  new  objects  will  find.  "  The  neophobiac,  in  recognizing  that  progress  is 
accompanied  by  hazardous  side  effects,  sees  degeneration  looming  everywhere,  and  in 
everything.  The  social  amnesia  that  this  produces  rests,  we  can  see,  on  the  objective  and 
rational  means  by  which  we  consume  and  dispose,  and  they  in  turn  rest  on  the 
separation  and  specialization  of  knowledge  and  production,  by  the  division  of 
productive  tasks.  This  rational  process  can  be  summed  up  in  three  words:  forget, 
consume,  and  destroy.  On  examination  we  see  that  these  terms  are  equivalents.  To 
destroy,  then  is  to  consume;  to  forget  is  to  leave  behind,  to  destroy;  and  to  consume  is  to 
banish  need;  also  in  a  sense  to  forget. 
It  seems  that  modern  society  in  some  way  engages  in  a  self-perpetuating  motion 
once  embarked  down  this  particular  road,  and  that  there  is  little  prospect  of  a  return. 
Gilles  Lipovetsky  suggests  that  economic  forces  which  operate  on  the  basis  of  fashion 
follow  directly  from  scientific  progress  and  the  logic  of  competition,  found  in  most 
societies.  "Supply  and  demand  revolve  around  novelty,  "  he  notes.  And: 
useful  objects  (although  we  may  restrict  such  a  general  observation  to  people  born  long  after  the  austerity  measures 
that  cha-racterised  the  inter-war  and  post-WW11  period  of  the  20"  century).  The  notion  of  value  adhering  in  labour 
power  suffers  as  well  where  the  desirability  of  goods  creates  a  value  that  is  entirely  devoid  of  any  relation  to  a  value 
that  could  be  identified  in  the  production  process.  Karl  Marx  describes  this  as  'commodity  fetishism.  '  See  Capital  VoZ 
1.  Ch.  1,  sec.  4.  Gilles  Lipovetsky  (1994),  ibid,  also  suggests  that  desire  will  remain  elusive,  the  product  of  "intimate 
and  existential  motives,  psychological  gratification,  personal  pleasure,  and  product  quality  and  usefulness.  "  (147) 
"  On  the  use  and  context  of  'ignorance'  here  -  'ignorance'  is  the  primitive  'stufF  from  which  knowledge 
separates  itself  Which  is  to  say  that  knowledge  is  the  ordering  of  the  unsorted.  So,  in  this  sense,  ignorance  precedes 
knowledge  as  the  ground  on  which  the  edifice  is  built.  We  can  confuse  ignorance  with  'error'  however,  although  there 
is  a  distinction  to  be  made.  'Error'  occupies  a  different  relation  to  knowledge  than  ignorance,  insofar  as  what  is  in 
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Obsolescence  is  accelerating:  specialists  in  marketing  and  innovation  can  assure 
us  that  within  ten  years  80  percent  to  90  percent  of  our  current  products  will  be 
outmoded;  they  will  appear  in  new  forms  with  new  packaging.  " 
The  accuracy  of  such  forecasts  may  be  questioned,  but  in  the  end  it  is  less  important 
that  the  recognition  of  a  general  trend  in  modern  western  societies  that  sees  the  creation 
of  new  objects  at  an  apparently  unstoppable  pace.  The  concentration  of  time  and  effort 
that  goes  into  the  division  of  productivity,  and  into  such  permanent  innovation  as  this 
kind  of  consumption  demands  (and  which  also  provides  the  multitudinous  objects  of 
desire),  effects  an  acceleration  not  only  of  consumption  itself,  but  in  general  of 
alternative  means  of  self-creation  as  well.  " 
In  other  words,  existing  identities  become  contingent  as  fast  as  they  are  established, 
and  thus  chance  characterizes  our  relationships  to  the  object  world.  There  are  benefits  of 
such  seeming  disorder,  and  they  cannot  easily  be  scoffed  at.  The  rationalization  of 
productivity  has  meant  that  we  now,  more  than  ever  before,  need  spend  less  time  on  the 
necessary  tasks  of  life;  the  things  that  would  drag  us,  so  to  speak,  back  into  the  slime, 
and  have,  hypothetically  at  least,  created  more  time  for  leisure.  Once  again,  it  is  crucial 
to  understand  that  this  is  only  possible  so  long  as  we  voluntarily  give  up  on  the  idea  that 
we  can  know  and  do  everything  for  ourselves,  and  specifically  that  we  should  be 
detained  by  those  tasks  that  have  immediate  consequences  for  our  daily  life.  In  this  sense 
also  (that  of  voluntarily  ceding  control),  we  might  suggest  that  to  be  modern  is  also  of 
necessity  to  be  subjected  to  a  variety  of  social  and  personal  doubts:  in  becoming  experts 
in  certain  fields,  we  risk  incompetence,  and  uncertainty,  in  others.  So,  just  as  garbage  is 
the  byproduct  of  consumption,  we  must  see  that  forgetfulness,  ignorance,  and  finally 
anxiety,  are  the  result  of  industrial  and  technological  specialization,  and  as  such  are 
predicated  upon  the  growth  of  a  modern  kind  of  knowledge  we  might  well  deem  to  be 
ignorance-based-knowledge,  and  which  thus  might  be  best  characterised  as  a  net  social 
increase  (but  absolute  individual  depreciation)  in  expertise,  consequent  upon  the 
abandonment  or  replacement  of  traditional  modes  of  production. 
error  has  already  been  tried  and  discarded.  So,  to  be  clear,  error  is  the  garbage  of  knowledge,  whilst  ignorance  is  the 
undifferentiated  ground  of  knowledge.  In  one  sense  both  a-re  'garbage'  in  that  they  constitute  a  void. 
26 
Lipovetsky,  Ibid:  135. 
-  Again,  it's  worth  quoting  Lipovetsky:  "The  fashion  economy  advances  in  a  forced  march,  as  it  were,  with  the 
indispensable  seduction  of  change,  speed  and  difference.  "  Ibid:  135. 
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This  idea  of  doubt  is  central  to  the  modern  sensibility,  and  is  fully  realised,  in  the 
social  veneration  of  speed  and  efficiency,  which  is  made  material  in  an  ever  more 
baffling  array  of  objects,  which  are  ever  more  confusing  to  the  subject  in  their 
technological  complexity,  demanding  an  ever  increasing  army  of  experts  to  service  them, 
and  so  perhaps  then  ultimately  the  source  of  anxiety  about  one's  own  being. 
In  modern  times,  then,  knowledge  is  not  necessarily  anything  at  all  to  do  with 
wisdom,  or  logos  -  of  being  able  to  apprehend  the  world,  but  rather  an  approach  to  the 
world,  in  other  words,  a  socially  useful  power  of  adaptability  and  expediency,  arising 
because  the  problem  with  too  much  thinking  and  too  much  knowledge  is  that  it  is  too 
rooted  in  the  past.  The  modern  economy,  as  the  apex  of  the  general  utility  of  this 
rational  Sorting  of  the  world,  would  have  difficulty  functioning  without  the 
development  of  such  varied  expertise,  and  without  the  consequent  ignorance  that  it 
entails,  for  better  or  worse.  As  the  historically  realised  consequence  of  an  increasing 
perfectibility  in  mechanized  (efficient)  processes,  and  of  increased  consumption  of  new 
goods  and  services,  this  progress,  far  from  meeting  the  needs  created  by  advertising, 
appears  not  to  satisfy  the  modern  appetite.  Rather  it  provokes  a  greater  demand  for  new 
objects  and  experiences.  And  so  desire  expands,  to  be  filled  up  eventually,  as  the 
Dejunkers  warn,  with  garbage. 
The  end  result  of  this  profane  cycle  is  that  we  have  little  need  for  memory  when  it 
comes  to  the  transvalued  object,  because  it  is  already  Sorted  as  garbage.  Like  all  the 
knowledge,  and  all  the  objects  no  longer  personally  required  in  our  infinitely  complex 
and  technological  world,  it  is  committed  to  the  void;  knowledge  or  meaning  never  really 
born,  never  identified  but  aborted.  The  irony  is  that  where  the  production  of 
'ignorance-based-knowledge'  is  concerned,  my  knowledge  negated  is  someone  else's 
knowledge  affirmed.  But  as  much  as  we  try  to  stick  to  this  unconscious  and  sometimes 
haphazard  arrangement,  experience  may  often  drag  us  back,  and  an  occasional  reminder, 
such  as  the  glaringly  visible  sight  of  accumulated  garbage,  or  the  stench  of  a  blocked 
toilet,  offers  just  enough  of  a  glimpse  of  the  indestructibility  of  garbage  to  make  us  stop, 
and  reflect  on  how  easily  the  whole  edifice  could  collapse. 
Although  given  the  modern  temperament  (described  here  in  admittedly  general 
terms),  this  may  be  reflection  only  for  a  moment.  And  so  it  is,  and  will  apparently 
remain;  from  the  mountains  of  rubbish  and  piles  of  unburied  corpses  that  toppled  the 
British  government  in  1979,  to  the  Mobro  4000  garbage  barge,  homeless  and  lodged  in 
j  Scanlan  2001  231 Flushing  is  Forgetting 
the  minds  of  Americans  for  fifty-five  days  in  1987,  to  the  collapsing  garbage  heap  of 
Manila,  the  previously  unobtrusive  home  to  20,000  scavengers  until  a  landslide  brought 
garbage  down  upon  the  makeshift  shacks  that  served  as  homes,  killing  hundreds;  like 
every  other  garbage  crisis,  these  are  flashed  repeatedly  across  our  television  screens  as  a 
reminder  of  an  unwelcome  truth.  There  is  a  lot  of  garbage  out  there.  Maybe  on  those 
occasions  we  see  our  own  destructiveness,  and  recognise  that  nothing  ever  goes  away, 
but  these  disasters  and  crises  remain  exceptions  to  the  normal  course  of  experience,  not 
to  mention  that  they  become  almost  unnoticeable  to  the  magpie  nature  of  modern 
consciousness,  which  sees  facts  like  conveniences,  to  be  taken  up  or  cast  off  at  Will.  Like 
the  object  that  becomes  garbage,  in  fact. 
In  terms  of  the  'things'  we  come  to  value,  those  objects  of  desire  that  erase  the  past, 
that  promise  transformation,  making  a  contrast  between  the  allure  of  a  glittering  new 
object  and  the  contempt  we  show  towards  what  is  left  of  it  when  it  becomes  old,  when  it 
is  used  up  (or  when  we  are  'fed  up')  is  instructive,  if  not  enough  to  provide  a  revelation 
of  the  creeping  contingency  of  the  world  and  of  the  life  of  objects.  What  such  a  contrast 
reveals  is  that  the  duality  of  our  perception  of  the  object  as  one  thing  that  becomes 
another  thing  is  not  simply  marked  by  a  qualitative  change;  say,  one  that  corresponds  to 
a  change  in  the  material  object  and  that  does  so  over  a  period  of  time.  This  duality  is 
also  intrinsic  to  the  usability  of  the  object  itself.  Which  is  to  say  that  at  an  important 
level  of  consciousness  we  are  well  aware  of  the  eventual  negation  of  desire,  and  this  is  in 
spite  of  the  necessity  of  forgetting  that  itself  marks  the  beginning  of  desire.  And  this,  it 
would  seem,  is  due  in  part  to  the  speed  with  which  disappointment  can  be  banished  by 
fresh  desires,  always  prompted,  of  course,  by  new  objects,  or  the  'need'  for  these.  " 
We  should  remember  then  that  to  consume  is  literally  'to  destroy  or  expend'.  In 
modern  consumption  -  which  we  can  see  tends  to  satisfy  desire  beyond  need  -  there 
seems  to  be  more  expending  of  value  in  terms  of  being  fed  up  or  satiated  with  some 
object,  than  with  the  'wearing  out'  of  use.  The  most  obvious  result  of  this  is  that  we 
dispose  of  'goods'  for  reasons  less  to  do  with  the  'good,  '  or  useful  capacity  (if  that  is  what 
it  is)  having  been  exhausted.  It  is  rather  that  we  dump  such  stuff  because  we  become  sick 
of  the  sight  of  it,  almost  because  we  foresee  that  it  will  become  old  and  worn,  and 
perhaps  suggestive  of  our  own  ageing  processes. 
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The  deterioration  of  the  consumer  object  in  subjective  perception  arises  on  a 
number  of  levels:  in  experience,  in  expectation,  in  advance  of  the  eventual  demise  of  the 
physical  object,  and  if  not  that,  in  advance  of  the  dissipation  of  its  once  magical,  but 
now  waning  powers.  Effectively  this  movement  presents  a  clear  contrast  between  novelty 
and  utility.  As  consumers,  we  obviously  see  ourselves,  in  the  act  of  consumption, 
fulfilling  some  idea  of  who  we  are,  or  who  we  want  to  be.  We  are  buying  the  self,  which 
is  to  say  we  are  buying  yet  another  disguise.  Under  such  circumstances,  we  each,  as 
Gilles  Lipovetsky  so  perceptively  puts  it,  "become  a  permanent  decision-making  center, 
an  open  and  mobile  subject  viewed  through  the  kaleidoscope  of  merchandise.  "" 
The  purchase  of  a  commodity  in  directing  this  motion  itself  therefore  involves 
chance.  Buying  is  the  big  Maybe,  a  gamble.  "  Thus  non-utilitarian  consumption,  that  is, 
fashion,  appears  schizophrenic  in  the  sense  that  it  reveals  both  an  inability  to  settle  one's 
mind  on  some  particular  object,  and  also  a  problem  in  resolving  the  tension  that  gives 
rise  to  desire,  because  it  needs  to  be  continually  renewed.  " 
Where  desire  is  concerned  we  cannot  get  away  from  novelty,  or  from  fascination 
and  the  attraction  of  surprise.  Objects  seen  in  this  light  thus  take  on  an  almost  magical 
or  transforming  power,  representing  the  possibility  (no  matter  how  fleeting  this  may  be) 
of  a  crucial  change  in  self-identity,  an  affirmation  of  being,  and  thus  a  fulfillment  of  the 
autonomous  will  (whether  or  not  the  belief  in  this  will  is  misplaced  under  these 
circumstances  -  given  the  supposed  effect  of  advertising  -  is  another  question).  This  is 
the  realisation  of  some  kind  of  longing  for  an  eternal,  unending  aspect  of  experience,  no 
matter  that  it  cannot  be  sustained  because  we  are  only  ever  temporarily  satisfied.  The 
process  of  expenditure  and  exhaustion  is  self-sustaining,  and  obviously  creates  a  need  for 
replacement.  This  is  the  genius  of  fashion:  contempt  of  the  old  demands  invisibility,  and 
that  always  leaves  space  for  a  replacement. 
Acknowledging  that  the  object  only  ever  represents  newness  for  an  instant  raises  the 
possibility  that  objects  have  a  more  'characteristic'  property  than  what  desire 
'determines.  '  The  undeniable  conclusion  must  be  that  the  object  is  simply  garbage  in 
waiting,  temporarily  refashioned  from  previous  garbage  in  its  current  use,  to  meet  some 
"  See  Mark  C.  Taylor,  Ibid:  167-217.  Modernity,  he  argues,  can  be  summed  up  by  the  obsolescence  of  fashion, 
which  affirms  every  present  as  always  passe. 
2' 
Lipovetsky,  lbid:  148. 
'0  See  Harvie  Ferguson  (1992)  'Watching  the  World  Go  Round':  36,  and  Rodolphe  Gasch6  (1999)  OfMinimal 
things:  Studies  in  the  Notion  ofRelation.  Stanford. 
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idea,  of  which  there  may  be  a  countless  number.  Youth.  Beauty.  Manliness.  Athleticism. 
Sexiness...  Desire  can  never  be  fulfilled  under  these  conditions,  and  that  is  because  the 
want  itself  is  what  'kills'  the  object,  declares  it  useless,  and  makes  void  its  positive 
properties.  To  throw  away  is  to  declare  the  end  not  just  of  usefulness,  or  the  end  of 
'worth',  but  the  end  of  identifying  the  item  with  either  the  capacity  to  fulfill  some  need, 
or  with  one's  idea  of  Self.  This  means  that  the  creation  of  garbage  in  modern  society  is  a 
positive  affirmation  of  an  individuated  identity,  and  correspondingly  that  modernity  is 
inconceivable  without  an  expansion  of  garbage.  As  an  aspect  of  our  relationship  to 
consumption  and  disposal,  we  tend  to  forget  this.  Instead,  we  see  garbage  in  negative 
terms,  almost  as  if  disconnected  from  the  progress  we  enjoy,  as  a  subjective 
preoccupation  with  the  transitory,  as  something  that  must  be  resisted  because  the 
changes  we  make  are  being  made  faster  and  lasting  for  shorter  periods  of  time. 
Once  again,  this  speed,  this  changeability,  and  the  very  ephemerality  of  objects  as 
'products'  of  desire  can  only  be  explained  by  the  fact  that  we  are  so  disconnected  from 
the  process  of  the  production  and  disposal  of  goods.  This  applies  especially  to  items  of 
clothing,  but  also  generally  to  any  object  -  food,  for  example  -  that  might  be  valued  for 
more  than  obviously  practical  reasons,  say,  as  a  matter  of  taste.  In  short  the  ephemerality 
of  modern  society  is  summed  up  by  the  existence  of  these  multifarious  'fashion'  objects, 
determined  by  subjective  identification,  which  makes  the  object  world  infinite.  But  the 
subjective  involvement  becomes  somewhat  complicated  here,  because  modern 
consumption  makes  it  difficult  to  adhere  to  categories  of  'subject'  and  'object.  '  Thus,  as 
consumers  we  are  at  once  what  intervenes  between  the  beginning  and  the  end  of  a 
product,  and  we  provide  at  the  same  time  the  means  of  both  connecting  and  separating 
the  new  and  old  -  but  perhaps  only  in  a  breath  of  experience,  only  immediately.  Which 
is  to  say  that  the  objects  still  have  an  objective  determination,  as  indicated  by  undeniable 
realities,  such  as,  functionality,  price,  and  placement  with  objects  sharing  similar 
qualities.  "  In  objective  terms  we  correspondingly  exemplify  the  possibility  of  a 
disconnection  by  intervening  in  the  ordering  of  goods.  This  is  understood  in  terms  of 
"  See  Georges  Bataille  (1997)  'Chance,  '  The  Batailk  Reader,  Oxford:  37-54. 
32  Of  course,  this  never  deterred  generations  of  adaptable  consumers  from  employing  pudding  bowls  as  hair 
trimming  accessories,  or  butter  knives  as  screwdrivers... 
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the  disconnection  between  the  purpose  of  the  object  and  the  wish  it  fulfills,  which  of 
course  may  have  little  to  do  with  the  ostensible  purpose  of  the  object.  " 
A  confusion  may  arise  in  our  understanding  of  our  relationship  to  the  object  world 
because  modernity  mediates  our  experiences  of  the  object  -  by  advertising  and  through 
the  rituals  of  shopping  (to  name  but  two  out  of  innumerable  possible  mediators),  but  it 
also  permits,  in  the  subjectivity  of  experience,  the  removal  of  mediators.  That  is  to  say, 
modern  society  allows  us  to  make  of  an  object  whatever  we  will,  meaning  that 
conditions  allow  us  to  subject  it,  to  make  it  at  one  with  the  Self,  or  to  put  it  another 
way,  to  risk  identification.  Here  experience  in  consumption  attains  immediacy,  and  is 
akin  to  wagering  the  self;  the  possibilities  of  transformation  appear  to  be  infinite. 
It  is  with  the  idea  of  the  object,  the  form  itself,  or  even  what  it  represents  (and  again 
this  may  be  transitory  and  unquantifiable),  that  we  have  become  engaged.  The 
suddenness  of  experience  as  the  removal  of  mediation  is,  in  this  regard,  fundamental. 
The  fact  that  we  can  buy  food  or  shoes  or  a  new  car  all  whilst  listening  to  the  same 
canned  music,  in  the  same  kind  of  controlled  environment,  subject  to  'the  sales  pitch', 
removes  us  several  steps  from  the  life-process  of  the  object.  Products  are  delivered  up 
and  presented  as  if  by  magic  -a  point  underlined  by  the  fact,  for  example,  that  the 
closest  most  people  who  eat  beef  get  to  a  cow  these  days  is  eating  at  McDonalds. 
Undoubtedly  our  experience  of  the  consumer  object  also  reinforces  the  irony  with 
which  we  encounter  such  transactions;  we  are  engaged  with  the  moment,  rather  than 
with  any  supposed  essential  or  useful  properties  of  an  object.  There  is  nothing  really 
substantial  in  this,  prior  to  the  staking  of  cash;  it  is  a  frictionless  and  fleeting  fascination. 
So  we  buy  beefsteaks  from  Argentina,  silk  dresses  from  the  East,  beer  from  the  Czech 
Republic,  or  perhaps  a  new  car  made  in  Germany  -  and  in  the  background  ABBA,  from 
Sweden,  sing  'Dancing  Queen.  '  This,  it  seems,  constitutes  a  large  part  of  modern  life. 
Whilst  the  stuff  that  is  garbage  that  is  consequent  on  these  transitory  desires  may 
remain  relatiVely  inconspicuous,  our  general  susceptibility  towards  the  ephemeral,  and 
thus  to  obsolescence  becomes  more  apparent,  indeed  it  grows  unbounded.  We  expect  to 
consume  more  new  goods,  and  to  replace  them  at  more  regular  intervals.  "  This  is  the 
"  Because  as  Lipovetsky,  ibid,  tells  us,  these  wishes  are  multifarious;  "Modern  fashion  diversifies  models,  solicits 
differences,  and  opens  up  the  indeterminate  space  of  choice,  preference,  or  random  taste"  (81)  See  especially  his 
introduction  to  The  Empire  ofFashion  and  part  two. 
"  See  Stewart  Ewen  (1988)  All  Consuming  Images,  New  York:  245.  General  motors  would  claim  in  1955  that, 
our  big  job  is  to  hasten  obsolescence.  In  1934  the  average  car  ownership  span  was  5  years;  now  it  is  2  years.  When  it 
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promise  of  the  modern  world;  life  is  nothing  if  not  movement  and  change  and  fashion  is 
one  of  the  most  illuminating  realizations  of  this  restlessness. 
With  the  removal  of  the  need  of  (or  of  any  love  for),  specific  objects,  and  with  their 
extinction,  we  remove  ourselves  from  the  taint  of  decay  with  which  they  will  soon, 
inevitably  be  associated,  and  thus  we  become  removed  from  the  consequences  as  well. 
The  indifference  we  show  towards  the  old  and  used  up,  and  our  haste  in  removing  from 
the  Self  what  we  have  personally  exhausted  invites  us  also  to  at  once  'trash'  the  Idea  that 
we  may  establish  a  substantial  identity  in  the  very  process  of  destroying  these  old  things, 
because  we  are  casting  off  old  identities.  With  so  may  'objects'  to  identify  with  how  can 
we  ever  settle  for  a  limit?  In  what  seems  like  a  bygone  age  of  consumerism,  major 
retailers  would  attempt  a  universal  supply  of  product  lines,  in  the  hope  of  stimulating  a 
loyalty  based  on  the  realization  of  an  ideal;  one  British  retailer  sought  to  provide  such  a 
ready  identity.  'Man  at  C&A,  '  it  suggested,  was  the  man  who  knew  his  own  mind  (all 
retail  identification  strives  to  convince  us  of  our  individuality),  and  this  would  be 
reflected  in  the  products  of  C&A.  The  problem  with  sustaining  such  an  outmoded  idea 
in  an  age  of  obsolescent  fashion  is  that  a  personality  is  a  limit,  a  Sort,  a  name  with  a  class 
of  definable  properties.  Objects,  whilst  Providing  the  stuff  of  our  various  Sorts  also 
exhaust  them,  requiring  new  experiences,  new  engagements  between  Self  and  world,  and 
an  ever-expanding  vista  of  possible  identities.  Desire  is  never  Sorted  for  long.  Garbage, 
and  not  such  Sorts  as  the  'man  at  C&A'  is  the  obvious  material  product  of  fleeting 
identities. 
This  is  motion:  casting  aside  limits,  and  undoing  Sorts,  we  effortlessly  remove  the 
unwanted.  Physically,  and  psychologically  it  goes  outside,  into  a  different  space,  a  space 
of  its  own  outside  of  self-perception,  and  out  of  sight.  Now  we  can  easily  imagine  it 
invisible,  as  devoid  of  meaning;  if  garbage  is  considered  it  is  not  as  the  object  as  it  was 
when  it  was  inside.  Rather,  we  probably  have  a  wholly  negative  conception  of  this  object- 
becomin&garbage  once  it  leaves  the  household,  and  this  negation  is  evident  in  how  we 
come  to  conceptualize  such  objects;  they  lack  something,  something  to  do  with  value  or 
usefulness;  and  an  additional  twist  is  added  in  the  fact  that  these  objects  are  not  our 
is  one  year,  we  will  have  a  perfect  score.  "  Modern  expectations  are  characterized  by  qualitative  leaps  -  we  want  more, 
we  want  it  better,  and  it  has  to  be  delivered  faster. 
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concern  anymore.  Eventually  they  blend  into  the  conceptual  background  as  simply 
another  feature  of  'normality'  (as  long  as  they  remain  outside,  that  is).  " 
The  ideal  consumer  may  very  well  consider  garbage  to  be  more  or  less 
inconsequential.  Indeed,  this  is  the  significant  motive  power  behind  fashion  because 
consumers  with  memory  would  seem  to  be  worthless.  At  best  they  are  collectors,  and 
collecting,  as  Michel  Tournier  says,  is  a  reactionary  force  in  the  age  of  fashion.  Rubbish, 
he  says,  is,  to  the  contrary,  the  real  "storehouse"  of  objects  "multiplied  to  infinity  by 
mass  production.  "  Memory,  by  looking  backwards,  tries  to  deny  the  multiplicity  of 
obsolescence,  whereas  the  consumption  impulse  sees  that  objects  are  preserved  by 
"means  of  controlled  dumping,  "  although  this  garbaging  is  not,  he  excitedly  suggests 
"without  getting  my  own  excitement,  before  their  inhumation,  from  the  repetition  of 
these  mass-produced  objects,  the  copies  of  copies  of  copies  of  copies  of  copies  of  copies 
and  so  on. 
,  36 
Nevertheless  there  are  still  others  for  whom  garbage  represents  more  than 
undifferentiated  junk.  We  must  not  forget  that  garbage  has  been  'created'  as  it  lands  on 
the  pile  of  scraps,  as  a  result  of  its  having  exhausted  some  prior  capacity,  that  it  'arrives' 
at  this  negation  on  the  back  of  a  loss.  In  one  sense  this  entails  that  it  can  no  longer  be 
differentiated  in  terms  of  what  it  is  (was),  nor  placed  within  a  sensible  category.  It  just 
becomes  (is)  junk,  or  shit,  or  crap.  To  the  extent  that  it  is  noticeable,  it  is  displaced 
material,  no  more  than  that.  " 
That  this  negation  is  first  a  subjective  declaration  is  evidenced  by  the  existence  of 
interested  others,  who  see  in  our  rubbish  the  possibility  of  usefulness.  "  Then,  placed 
"  Rathje  and  Murphy  (1992)  Rubbish!.  45.  "Unlike  the  evidence  of  many  another  problem,  be  it  a  social  one, 
such  as  poverty,  or  an  aesthetic  one,  such  as  bad  architecture,  the  evidence  of  specific  pieces  of  household  garbage 
disappea-rs  from  one  day  to  the  next.  People  put  their  garbage  in  the  garbage  can  under  the  sink,  in  the  bathroom,  in 
the  den,  and  then  someone  collects  it  all  and  takes  it  out.  The  garbage  that  is  taken  out  is  eventually  left  at  the  curb  or 
in  the  alley,  and  very  soon  it  is  gone.  All  of  this  garbage  is  quickly  replaced  by  other  garbage.  Garbage  passes  under 
our  eyes  virtually unnoticed,  the  continual  turnover  inhibiting  perception.  " 
36  Michel  Tournier,  quoted  in  Christof  Asendorf  (1993)  Batteries  ofLife,  Berkeley:  49. 
37  See  Mary  Douglas  (1966)  Purity  and  Danger,  London.  Chs.  I  and  2,  "Dirt  is  the  by-product  of  a  systematic 
ordering  and  classification  of  matter,  in  so  far  as  ordering  involves  rejecting  inappropriate  elements"  (36). 
"'  Mary  Douglas,  ibid,  argues  that  subjective  responses  only  follow  from  cultural  norms.  Allowing  for  some 
distinction  between  primitive  and  modern  cultures,  she  sees  dirt  in  modern  cultures  to  have  the  status  it  does  because 
our  knowledge  of  pathogenic  organisms  and  our  concern  with  hygiene  and  aesthetic  order.  See  chapters  I&2. 
However,  garbage  as  considered  here  cannot  easily  be  equated  with  the  dirt  avoidance  that  Douglas  explores  - 
certainly  not  in  all  respects  of  the  'contingencies'  of  garbage,  which  I  would  argue  are  not  wholly  related  to  hygiene 
and  aesthetic  sense.  It  is  arguable  that  garbage  figures  somewhat  differently  in  modern  society  in  the  sense  that  it  has 
the  potential  to  raise  anxieties  over  Selfhood,  largely  because  of  the  involvement  of  others  -  this  is  the  main  thrust  of  my 
argument.  In  contemporary  society  garbage  becomes  ambiguous  and  occupies  the  space  between  the  inside  (selO  and 
the  outside  (other),  when  this  space,  the  'body  image'  as  H.  Ferguson  (ibid:  46)  calls  it,  should,  in  allowing  the 
development  of  an  individuated  identity,  protect  both  subject  and  object  from  each  other. 
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outside  beyond  subjective  control,  it  becomes  understood  as  part  of  a  social  category,  as 
garbage,  the  stuff  that  large  trucks  with  anonymous  men  take  away.  It  must  then  possess 
some  quality  that  is  either  unseen  or  ignored  in  the  act  of  producing  it,  which  means 
that  the  garbage  creator,  the  consumer,  does  not  see  the  s  till-  to-  be-exhausted  potential, 
as  seen  for  instance  by  another  observer.  As  far  as  this  is  the  case,  it  would  suggest  that  as 
we  consume  we  have  little  idea  of  potentiality  in  the  object  that  extends  beyond  the 
satisfaction  of  our  needs;  in  other  words,  we  are  blinded  by  the  fact  that  we  subjectively 
determine  the  properties  of  the  object  in  the  consummation  of  desire.  But  once  the 
limits  the  consumer  unwittingly  places  on  the  object  are  'removed,  '  the  finite  and 
temporal  nature  of  the  object  is  also  destroyed,  and  so  the  contingency  of  garbage  may 
have  several  beneficial  effects,  especially  for  an  enterprising  muckraker. 
Surprisingly  (or  not)  these  fringe  benefits  are  most  often,  in  recent  times,  financial 
or  political  -  although  the  use  to  which  garbage  is  put  is  of  secondary  interest  here. 
What  is  important  is  that  no  matter  how  varied  the  intention  of  a  muckraker,  the  threat 
posed  is  real,  and  it  is  a  particularly  modern  kind  of  threat:  it  is  the  idea  that  we  control 
our  lives,  that  we  banish  the  past  in  a  positive  statement  of  self-determination  that  is 
somehow  compromised  by  the  very  fact  of  our  garbage.  We  placed  it  out  -  but  someone 
else,  in  the  act  of  appropriation,  tries  to  bring  it  back  in,  to  give  it  another  meaning,  or  a 
new  identity  or,  in  other  words,  to  tell  a  different  story.  39 
"  Or,  we  removed  any  vestige  of  meaning  or  significance  in  the  object,  but  someone  else  attempts  to  negate  this 
act.  If  nothing  else,  this  is  chance  at  work. 
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here  is  the  gateway  to  the  beginning,  here  the  portal/ 
of  renewing  change,  the  birdshit,  even,  melding/ 
enrichingly  in  with  debris 
A.  R.  AmMONS,  Garbage 
Until  relatively  recently  the  perception  of  the  muckraker  had  not  changed  much  from 
the  sense  of  'scavenging,  '  'foraging,  '  or  'ragpicking.  '  This  sense  of  the  term  originates  in 
John  Bunyan's  17  h  century  tale  The  Pilgrim's  Progress,  in  which  the  "man  with  the 
Muck-rake"  is  presented  as  an  emblem  of  absorption  in  earthly  pursuits.  '  However  by 
the  late  1  9th  century  this  had  come  to  mean  something  quite  different,  to  refer  to  persons 
who  "fished  around  in  troubled  waters,  "  suggesting  that  there  was  some  value  in  private 
discrepancies,  or  put  another  way,  there  is  value  in  the  disorder  that  results  from  a 
failure  to  maintain  order  over  one's  life  and  private  affairs.  And  it  was  in  1910, 
according  to  the  OED,  the  verb  'to  muck-rake'  was  first  utilised  to  refer  to  the  practice 
of  subjecting  powerful  persons  or  institutions  to  allegations  of  corruption  or  other  illegal 
or  scandalous  behaviour. 
More  recently,  however,  this  term  Cmuckraker')  might  also  take  in  a  number  of 
participants  who  were  specifically  interested  in  various  kinds  of  Sorting:  individuals  and 
institutions  that  were  engaged  in  specific  and  obvious  projects  of  identification  and 
objectivity.  And  so,  from  'garbology'  to  espionage,  not  to  mention  the  spread  of  all 
manner  of  muckraking  between,  sometime  around  the  period  after  the  Second  World 
War,  people  in  modern  societies  began  gradually  developing  a  consciousness  of  the  non- 
material  properties  of  discarded  objects,  and  that  the  rubbish  this  constituted  might 
actually  reveal  another  'truth'  about  how  things  really  were.  This  gradual  awareness  of 
'  The  Pilgrim  ý  Progress,  1900:  11.  See  also  Susan  Strasser  (1999)  Waste  and  Want,  New  York,  for  an  historical 
depiction  of  scavengers,  ragpickers,  and  dumpster  divers. 
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previously  hidden  properties  in  garbage  items  is  also  contemporaneous  with  the 
expansion  of  commodity  production  and  consumption,  and  in  that  regard  with  a 
significant  increase  in  the  leftovers  of  such  obvious  material  progress.  It  also  relates  in  a 
separate  but  similar  way  to  the  bureaucratization  of  knowledge,  which  is  to  say  an 
increase  in  paper  waste  created  by  bureaucratic,  rational  institutions. 
In  other  words  there  would  be  no  garbologists,  no  need  for  paper  shredders  and 
such  similar  devices  unless  we  infer  on  the  part  of  these  modern  muckrakers  an  implicit 
awareness  of  order  being  merely  the  mask  of  disorder.  Unsurprisingly,  then,  such  an 
awareness  itself  points  to  a  looming  disorientation  of  Sorts,  a  blurring  of  the  distinction 
between  the  world  as  we  take  it  to  be,  and  the  world  as  others  see  us  in  it,  or  as  it 
actually  is  if  that  indeed  can  be  determined.  In  short,  garbage,  beginning  some  time  in 
the  early  to  mid-twentieth  century,  provides  a  means  of  recasting  understandings  of  the 
relation  of  Subject  to  Object  in  modern  society. 
For  the  self-styled  'official'  garbologists,  the  researchers  at  the  Garbage  Project, 
established  at  the  University  of  Arizona  in  the  1970's,  the  idea  was  to  apply 
archaeological  method  to  the  investigation  of  all  kinds  of  physical  rubbish.  This  meant 
the  material  remains  of  previously  valued  objects  that  had  been  either  dug  up  from 
landfill  sites,  or  sifted  from  garbage  mountains.  The  intention  was  thus  to  look  at 
human  life  (at  consumption,  in  other  words)  from  what  they  refer  to  as  'the  back  end.  " 
The  metaphor  is  apt,  for  garbage,  like  shit,  is  identifiably  the  product  at  some  point 
before  it  is  placed  outside  of  a  particular  subject,  and  so  what  goes  in  the  'front  end,  '  the 
determinate  object,  must  ultimately  emerge,  transformed  into  matter  of  another  form, 
from  this  back  end,  and  of  course,  we  infer  that  what  usually  emerges  from  this  'back 
end'  will  ultimately  go  unseen  precisely  because  it  has  now  been  stripped  of  its 
determinate  qualities. 
Singular  amongst  the  various  (and  loosely  defined)  muckrakers  who  see  some  kind 
of  value  in  garbage,  the  garbologists  are  distinguished  by  their  adherence  to  scientific 
principles.  They  are  not  merely  muckrakers;  they  have  a  plan  and  a  purpose  and  they  use 
methods  of  prediction  both  in  locating  'data'  and  in  suggesting  the  ways  in  which  this 
'  Rathje  and  Murphy  (1992)  Rubbish!  Ch.  I-  The  term  being  a  tacit  recognition  that  no  matter  ever  disappears, 
but  only  changes  its  form. 
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data  becomes  representative  of  something  else,  of  general  consumptive  behaviour,  for 
example.  ' 
Their  location  within  the  academic  tradition  undoubtedly  directs  their  research 
towards  standard  scientific  practices  of  sorting  and  labeling,  of  quantifying  and 
categorizing,  and  very  much  places  the  Garbage  Project  within  an  identifiable  western 
tradition  of  rational  analysis.  In  doing  so,  however,  the  archaeological  approach  utilised 
here  overlooks  one  of  the  most  interesting  aspects  of  garbage  -  that  it  threatens  our 
capacity  to  keep  the  inside  apart  from  the  outside;  to  maintain  an  individuated  identity. 
This  is  something,  this  capacity  for  individuation,  that  happens,  if  you  like,  'on  the 
surface'  of  life,  meaning  that  it  is  the  garbage  that  remains  unburied  or  unsorted  that  is 
the  main  threat  to  Self;  it  is  a  matter  of  immediate  past  and  present  threatening  to  come 
into  collision,  but  by  digging  deep  in  landfills  for  garbage  the  archaeologist  is  forced  into 
a  less  particular  analysis  of  garbage.  Undoubtedly  a  generalized  scientific  method,  such 
as  the  conversion  of  garbage  into  'analyzable'  data,  demands  this,  although  it 
unfortunately  also  glosses  over  the  fact  that  there  is  no  collective  'back  end,  '  and  to 
suggest  there  is  would  be  to  lose  sight  of  the  origin  and  once  personal  properties  of  what 
becomes  our  garbage.  Once  the  garbage  is  scientifically  ordered  it  loses  some,  although 
not  all,  of  its  power  to  challenge  ideas  of  Self' 
The  fact  that  the  Garbage  Project  has  developed  alternative  methods  of  looking  at, 
and  so  understanding  modern  consumption  means  that  they  do  return  garbage  back  to 
the  Inside,  and  thus  hold  up  our  self  perceptions  to  scrutiny,  revealing,  if  we  permit,  a 
glimpse  of  the  fragility  of  autonomous  self-creation  found  through  consumption. 
Although  the  identification  of  consurnables,  we  need  to  remember,  does  not 
approximate  to  an  identity  with  a  specific  consumer,  but  is  rather  productive  of  general 
trends  of  consumption. 
So,  although  these  results  illustrate  generalities  and  do  not,  strictly  speaking,  explore 
Subject-Object  relations,  they  do  say  something  about  the  ease  with  which  a  rational  re- 
Sorting  of  'data'  can  objectify  a  world.  Unsurprisingly  they  have  found  that  we 
'See  Rathje  and  Murphy,  ibid. 
4  Again  see  Rathje  and  Murphy,  ibid,  ch.  1.  "A  unique  database  has  been  built  up  from  these  cast  offs,  covering 
virtually  every  aspect  of  American  Life:  drinking  habits,  attitudes  toward  red  meat,  trends  in  the  use  of  convenience 
foods,  the  strange  ways  in  which  consumers  respond  to  shortages,  the  use  of  contraceptives,  and  hundreds  of  other 
matters.  "  And  later,  "it  is  almost  always  the  case  that  a  given  personý  garbage  is  at  once  largely  anonymous  and 
unimaginably  humdrum.  Garbage  most  fully  comes  alive  when  it  can  be  viewed  in  the  context  of  broad  patterns,  for  it 
is  mainly  in  patterns  that  the  links  between  artifacts  and  behaviours  can  be  discerned.  "  (My  italics) 
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overwhelmingly  lie  about  consumption,  especially  about  what  we  eat  and  drink,  and 
suggest  that  garbage  can  catch  us  out.  Not  only  does  garbage  not  'lie',  it  tells  a  different 
story  to  the  one  we  tell  to  ourselves.  As  matter  divested  of  subjectively  attached  value, 
garbage  just  is,  and  in  this  sense  the  Garbage  Project's  evidence  makes  interesting 
reading.  One  table  from  the  Garbage  Project's  findings  can  demonstrate  this  very  well. 
Ostensibly  it  provides  a  comparison  of  items  recovered  from  garbage  with  reported  levels 
of  consumption  over  a  variety  of  consumer  goods.  Another  way  of  looking  at  this  is  with 
the  idea  of  the  individuated  subject  in  mind.  In  this  sense  we  can  now  see  two  stories  - 
the  one  memory  tells  Self  (under  reported),  and  the  one  garbage  tells  the  Other  (over 
reported). 
UNDER  REPORTED  (%)  OVER  REPORTED  N 
Sugar  94  Cottage.  Cheese  311 
Chips/Popcorn  81  Liver  200 
Candy  80  Tuna  184 
Bacon  80  Vegetable.  Soup  94 
Ice  Cream  63  Corn  Bread  72 
Ham/lunch  meats  57  Skim  milk  57 
Sausage  56  High-fiber  cereal  55 
Source:  Rathje  and  Murphy  (1992)  Rubbish!  The  Archaeolqy  of  Garbage,  New  York. 
This  is  basically  an  unwelcome  reminder  in  the  face  of  our  tendency  to  forget  the 
past.  The  faltering  memory  illustrated  in  the  over  reporting  of  healthy  foodstuffs 
perhaps  just  demonstrates  a  mild  confusion  over  the  difference  between  what  we  want  to 
be  (or  feel  we  should  be),  and  what  we  are?  Those  things  that  are  objectively  determined 
to  be  'bad'  for  us  -  sugar  and  candy,  ice  cream  -  are  conveniently  banished  from 
memory;  when  desire  kicks  in  to  be  followed  by  a  rush  to  indulge,  the  slowness  of 
movement  required  to  Sort  such  intake  obviously  cannot  be  accommodated,  and  thus 
given  the  passage  of  time  memory  perhaps  finds  it  easy  to  confuse  cottage  cheese  and  ice 
cream.  Cottage  cheese,  and  such  'healthy'  products,  being  the  outcome  of  deliberative 
consumption,  are  undeniably  easier  to  Sort,  especially  since  these  are  often  weighed  and 
measured  anyway,  'as  part  of  a  calorie-controlled  diet,  '  as  the  well-known  saying  would 
have  it.  Ice  cream,  on  the  other  hand  may  be  less  deliberatively  and  more  compulsively 
purchased. 
The  Arizona  garbologists  also  found  that  other  unhealthy  items,  like  alcohol,  were 
significantly  underreported.  Apart  from  the  fact  that  alcohol  is  not  particularly 
conducive  to  rational  calculations,  we  might  also  suggest  that  the  data  reveals  that  people 
in  modern  society  like  to  keep  the  private  and  the  public  apart,  and  thus  to  a  significant 
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BEEF  *  ..........................  00, 
OTHER  MEAT  (row  bacon)  *  .......  002 
CHICKEN 
.......................  003 
OTHER  POULTRY 
...............  004 
FISH 
(fresh,  frozeN  canned,  dried)  '  ....  005 
CRUSTACEANS  &  MOLLUSKS 
(shrimp,  clams,  etc.  )  .............  006 
T-V.  P.  TYPE  FOODS* 
............  007 
UNKNOWN  MEAT 
..............  ()08 
CHEESE  (including  conage  cheese)  ..  010 
MILK  *  ..........................  Oil 
ICE  CREAM 
(also  ice  milk,  sherbet)  6  ..........  012 
OTHER  DAIRY  (not  butter) 
........  013 
EGGS  (regular,  powdered,  liquid)  0  ..  014 
BEANS  (not  5  cc.  beans)  *  .........  015 
NUTS  ...........................  016 
PEANUT  BUTTER 
................  017 
FATS:  Saturated  *  ..................  018 
Unsaturated  *  ..............  019 
Bacon.  saltpork  0  ...........  020 
Meat  trimming  .............  021 
CORN  (also  com meal  and  masa)  *.  .  022 
FLOUR  (also  pancake  mix)  0  .......  023 
RICE*  ..........................  024 
OTHER  GRAIN  (barley, 
wheat  germ.  etc.  )  ................  025 
NOODLES  (pasta)  ................  026 
WHITE  BREAD 
..................  027 
DARK  BREAD  ...................  028 
TORTILLAS*  ....................  029 
DRY  CEREALS: 
Regular 
........................  030 
High  Sugar  (first  ingredient  only)..  031 
COOKED  CEREALS 
(instant  or  regular)  ..............  032 
CRACKERS  ......................  033 
CHIPS  (also  pretuls)  ..............  034 
UNKNOWN  PRODUCE* 
.........  040 
FRESH  VEGETABLES  *  ..........  041 
CANNED  VEGETABLES 
(dehydrated  also)  *  ..............  042 
FROZEN  VEGETABLES*  .........  043 
POTATO  PEEL  *  .................  044 
FRESH  FRUIT*  ..................  045 
CANNED  FRUIT 
(dehydrated  also)  * 
.............. 
046 
FROZEN  FRUIT* 
.................  047 
FRUIT  PEEL  *  ....................  048 
RELISH,  PICKLES,  OLIVES*  ......  049 
SYRUP,  HONEY,  JELLIES, 
MOLASSES  ....................  051 
PASTRIES  (cookies,  cakes 
and  mix,  pies,  etc.  )  *  ......  ......  052 
SUGAR' 
................. 
: 
......  053 
ARTIFICIAL  SWEETENERS  .......  054 
CANDY*  ........................ 
055 
SALT'  .......................... 
056 
SPICES  &  FLAVORINGS 
(catsup,  mustard,  pepper,  etc.  )  057 
BAKING  ADDITIVES 
(yeast,  baking  powder,  etc.  )  .......  058 
POPSICLES  ...................... 
060 
PUDDING 
....................... 
061 
GELATIN  ....................... 
062 
INSTANT  BREAKFAST  ........... 
063 
DIPS  (for  chips)  ................... 
064 
GARBAGE  MEM  CODE  lJST 
Tlhc  Garbage  Project 
University  of  Arizona 
NON-DAIRY  CREAMERS  & 
WHIPS 
........................  065 
HEALTH  FOODS  .  ...............  066 
SLOPS  .  .........................  069 
REGULAR  COFFEE 
(instant  or  sround)  I  .............  070 
DECAF  COFFEE 
.................  071 
EXOTIC  COFFEE* 
...............  072 
TEA  *  ...........................  073 
CHOCOLATE  DRINK  MIX  OR 
TOPPING 
.....................  074 
FRUIT  OR  VEG  JUICE 
(canned  or  bottled) 
..............  075 
FRUIT  JUICE  CONCENTRATE 
....  076 
FRUIT  DRINK,  pdr  or  lqud 
(T  K  l  id  Hi  C  0  ang,  oo  a  ,  -  )  ..........  077 
DIET  SODA 
.....................  078 
REGULAR  SODA 
................  079 
COCKTAIL  MIX  (carbonated)  ......  080 
COCKTAIL  MIX 
(non-carb.  liquid) 
...............  081 
COCKTAIL  MIX  (powdered)  .......  092 
PREMIXED  COCKTAILS 
(alcoholic) 
.....................  083 
SPIRITS  (booze)  ..................  084 
WINE  (still  &  sparkfing)  ........... 
085 
BEER  *  ..........................  086 
BABY  FOOD  &  JUICE  *  ...........  087 
BABY  CEREAL  (pablum)  ..........  098 
BABY  FORMULA  (liquid)*  ........  089 
BABY  FORMULA  (powdered)  *  ..... 
090 
PET  FOOD  (dry)  .................  091 
PET  FOOD 
(canned  or  moist)  ...............  092 
TV  DINNERS  (also  pot  pies)  ....... 
094 
TAKE  OUT  MEALS 
............... 
(095 
SOUPS  0  .........................  096 
GRAVY  &  SPECIALTY 
SAUCES  *  ......................  097 
PREPARED  MEALS 
(canned  or  packap:  d)  *  ...........  098 
VITAMIN  PILLS  AND 
SUPPLEMENTS 
(commercial)  *  ..................  100 
PRESCRIBED  DRUGS 
(prescribed  vitamins)  ............  101 
ASPIRIN  *  ....................... 
102 
COMMERCIAL  STIMULANTS  AND 
DEPRESSAN75  *  ...............  103 
COMMERCIAL  REMEDIES  '  ......  104 
ILLICIT  DRUGS  *  ................ 
105 
COMMERCIAL  DRUG 
PARAPHENALIA  ............... 
106 
ILLICIT  DRUG  PARAPHENALIA  ..  107 
CONTRACEPTIVES: 
MALE  ......................... 
108 
FEMALE  ...................... 
109 
BABY  SUPPLIES 
(diapers,  etc.  )  *  .................  III 
INJURY  ORIENTED 
(iodine,  bandaids,  etc.  )  ........... 
112 
PERSONAL  SANITATION  *  ....... 
113 
COSMETICS  I 
................... 
114 
CIGARETTES  (butts)  .............. 
123 
CIGARETTES  (pack)*  ............  124 
CIGARETTES  (carton)  '  ...........  125 
CIGARS  ......................... 
126 
PIPE,  CHEWING  TOBACCO, 
LOOSE  TOBACCO  ............. 
127 
ROLLING  PAPERS 
(also  smokinj  items) 
.............  128 
HOUSEHOLD  &  LAUNDRY 
CLEANERS* 
..................  131 
HOUSEHOLD  CLEANING 
TOOLS  (not  deta  St..  )  ..........  132 
HOUSEHOLD  MAINT.  ITEMS 
(paint,  wood,  etc.  )  ...............  133 
COOKING  &  SERVING  AIDS  134 
MUE  CONTAINER  .............  135 
TOILET  PAPER  CONTAINER  ....  136 
NAPKIN  CONTAINER  ...........  137 
PAPER  TOWEL  CONTAINER.....  138 
PLASTIC  WRAP  CONTAINER.....  139 
BAGS  (paper  or  plastic)  *  ...........  140 
BAG  CONTAINER  ......  ........  141 
ALUMINUM  FOIL  SHEETS  .......  142 
ALUMINUM  FOIL  PACKAGE 
..... 
143 
WAX  PAPER  PACKAGE  .......... 
144 
MECHANICAL  APPLIANCE 
(tools)  .........................  147 
ELECTRICAL  APPLIANCE  AND 
ITEMS  ........................  148 
AUTO  SUPPLIES  .................  149 
FURNITURE  .....................  130 
CLOTHING:  CHILD' 
............ 
151 
ADULT  ,  ............  132 
CLOTHING  CARE  ITEMS 
(mime  polish,  thread)  .............  153 
DRY  CLEANING 
(laundry  also)  .................. 
154 
PET  MAINTENANCE  (litter)  .......  155 
PET  TOYS  .......................  156 
GATE  RECEIPTS  (tickets)  ..........  157 
HOBBY  RELATED  ITEMS  .........  158 
PHOTO  SUPPLIES  ................  159 
HOLIDAY  VALUE  (non-fi)od)  0  ....  160 
DECORATIONS  (non  holiday) 
.....  161 
PLANT  AND  YARD  MAINT  ......  162 
STATIONERY  SUPPLIES  ..........  163 
JEWELRY  ....................... 
164 
CHILD  SCHOOL  RELATED 
PAPERS* 
...................... 
171 
CHILD  EDUC.  BOOKS 
(non-fiction)  ....................  172 
CHILD  EDUC.  GAMES  (toys)  ......  173 
CHILD  AMUSEMENT  READING..  174 
CHILD  AMUSEMENT  TOYS 
(games)  ........................  175 
ADULT  BOOKS  (non-fiction)  .......  176 
ADULT  BOOKS  (fiction)  ...........  177 
ADULT  AMUSEMENT  GAMES  ....  178 
LOCAL  NEWSPAPERS*  ..........  181 
NEWSPAPERS 
(other  city,  nadoW)  *  ...........  182 
ORGANIZATIONAL  NEWSPAPERS 
OR  MAGAZINES 
(also  religion)  *  ................. 
183 
GENERAL  IN17EREST 
MAGAZINES  *  ................. 
194 
SPECIAL  INTEREST  MAGAZINE 
OR  NEWSPAPER  0  ............. 
195 
ENTERTAINMENT  GUIDE 
(TV  Guide,  etc.  )  ................. 
186 
MISCELLANEOUS  risms 
'fy  on  back  of  sheet)  .  .......  190 
*  Set  Special  Nom 
PLATE  3  1.  GA"AGE  ITEM  CODE  LIST.  This  list  was  employed  by  researchers  at  the  University  of 
Arizona's  Garbage  Project  in  order  to  identify  items  found  at,  for  example,  garbage  tips  and  landfills.  The 
impulse  to  sort  -  as  seen  in  the  high  degree  of  differentiation  involved  here  -  effectively  brings  garbage 
'back  to  life.  '  This  sorting  overlooks  one  important  aspect  of  garbage  that  tells  us  why  garbage  is  so 
undesirable  -  as  garbage  these  kind  of  items  have  moved  out  of  a  cognitive  'sphere'  of  differentiation 
which  previously  attached  a  value  them.  Garbage  is  undifferentiated  matter;  it  is  nothing.  Sorting  by 
means  of  such  a  typology  confers  identity  on  these  items.  See  William  Rathje  and  Cullen  Murphy,  1992, 
Rubbish!  The  Archeology  of  Garbage,  p.  22. 
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extent  will  undersell  the  self  to  the  outside  world.  In  this  sense  garbage  ultimately  gives 
the  lie  to  our  failing  powers  of  selfflood,  and  indicates  that  garbage,  in  fact,  makes  the 
subject  transparent. 
Employing  a  'Garbage  Item  Code  List,  '  consisting  of  190  ways  of  sorting  garbage, 
ostensibly  to  "transform  raw  garbage  into  data"  the  garbologists  reveal  the  basis  of  their 
particular  Sorting,  and  thus  how  they  manage  to  objectify  this  particular  aspect  of 
(  reality'  (Plate  31).  '  This  method  also  produces  other  interesting  means  of  sorting 
garbage,  including  an  extensive  "pull-tab  typology"  for  distinguishing  the  brand  of  ring- 
pull  once  separated  from  its  parent  can,  and  also  a  map  of  the  spatial  distribution  of 
garbage  in  public  places,  which  allows  them  to  suggest  the  probable  location  of  various 
kinds  of  garbage  ranging  from  broken  glass  to  clothes  and  sexual  objects.  "  For  example, 
discarded  sexual  objects  and  paraphernalia  are  rarely  uncovered  in  household  waste,  but 
are  by  contrast  frequently  found  in  public  garbage  cans. 
Although  the  veracity  of  such  data  might  seem  questionable  (it  depends  on  a 
measure  of  consistency  in  disposal  routines),  the  ingenuity  of  method  undoubtedly 
provides  an  interesting  alternative  to  conventional  consumption  data.  The  project 
unwittingly  reveals  the  importance  of  chance  in  this  particular  sorting  of  the  world,  but 
having  said  that,  it  would  be  rash  to  suggest  their  findings  are  any  less  relevant  than 
other  sciences,  particularly  archeology  and  history,  both  of  which  it  combines,  simply  on 
the  basis  of  methodological  difficulties  that  are  common  to  other  disciplines. 
Garbologists  believe  that  we  can  take  municipal  waste  management  to  provide  the 
best  means  of  accurately  tracking  consumption  patterns.  7  In  the  case  of  landfill  waste, 
which  from  the  point  of  view  of  considering  the  environmental  impact  of  garbage, 
happens  to  be  the  kind  of  garbage  that  most  interests  the  garbage  archaeologist,  and  that 
provides  the  most  contentious  findings,  the  indestructibility  of  garbage  presents  itself  as 
nothing  less  than  a  gift  to  posterity.  In  fact  a  landfill  is  a  perfect  place  for  an  archaeologist 
to  look,  because  our  contemporary  practice  of  burying  garbage  to  guard  against  its 
contaminating  powers  preserves  these  remnants  of  disposed  value  as  'evidence'  much  in 
the  same  way  that  conventional  archaeological  evidence  is  preserved. 
'  Rathje  and  Murphy,  ibid:  22. 
6  Ibid:  57 
'  According  to  the  authors,  as  of  1991,  the  volume  of  garbage  sorted  by  researchers  employed  by  the  Garbage 
Project  was  equivalent  to  1766  cubic  yards,  enough  to  create  a  pyramid  of  56  square  feet  and  45  feet  high.  "The 
majority  of  this  was  garbage  fresh  from  the  truck,  rather  than  landfill  sorts.  "  0  5) 
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Landfill  dumping  is  thus  rather  like  the  ancient  Egyptian  practice  of  burying  the 
dead  in  a  manner  designed  to  preserve  the  physical  body  from  decomposition;  the  one 
major  difference  in  this  case  being  that  this  is  not  what  is  normally,  nor  obviously, 
intended  by  burying  our  waste  in  holes  in  the  ground.  The  durability  of  garbage  also 
stands  in  contradiction  to  the  claims  of  producers  of  'environmentally  friendly' 
products;  products  that  are  supposedly  designed  to  decompose  in  landfills,  but  on  the 
evidence  of  garbologists,  probably  do  not.  The  Garbage  Project  suggests  that  in 
separating  and  excluding  garbage  in  this  way,  we  actually  ensure  its  durability.  In  other 
words,  what  landfill  sites  do  is  create  time  capsules.  ' 
In  order  to  prevent  the  contamination  of  surrounding  land  by  seepage,  the  landfill  is 
actually  sealed  off  from  biologically  degenerative  processes,  and  thus  prevents  the  full 
decomposition  of  matter.  In  other  words  the  scientific  study  of  garbage  only  confirms 
that  no  matter  ever  really  goes  away,  it  is  simply  put  aside  out  of  view,  and  by  such 
means  entombed  and  preserved!  But  whilst  revealing  what  our  breakfast  habits  were  in 
1972  may  be  of  legitimate  scientific,  and  social,  interest,  and  it  may  reveal  something 
hitherto  unknown  about  consumption  patterns,  it  does  not  really  expand  our 
understanding  of  garbage  in  modern  society  beyond  provoking  a  rethinking  of  the  ways 
in  which  we  understand  material  consumption  and  the  categorization  of  waste.  10 
My  point  of  divergence  from  the  concerns  of  the  garbologists  lies  not  in  a 
disagreement  of  their  findings,  or  in  what  they  do  generally,  but  simply  in  a  different 
view  of  the  significance  of  garbage;  that  is  to  say,  in  an  understanding  of  garbage  as  a 
mediator  of  Subject-Object  relations  in  modern  consumer  society.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Garbage  Project's  view  of  waste  is  generated  from  an  interest  in  what  the  garbage 
once  was,  meaning  amongst  other  things  that  if  the  matter  dug  up  during  excavation 
work  is  too  'deformed'  it  cannot  then  be  identified  as  the  product  it  once  was,  and 
"  Rathje  and  Murphy,  ibid,  describe  New  York's  Fresh  Kills  landfill  (one  of  the  largest  in  the  world)  as  "a  treasure 
trove  -a  Pompeii,  a  Tikal, A  Valley  of  the  Kings"  full  of  "wonderful  things.  "  Chapter  1.  In  chapter  three  the  authors 
also  tackle  the  "myth"  of  landfill  biodegradation,  suggesting  that  contrary  to  received  opinion,  not  much  of  it  goes  on 
in  these  sites.  Project  excavations  turned  up  items,  for  example,  that  were  "thirty  years  old  -  sometimes  even  older,  " 
that  is  to  say,  as  old  as  the  landfills  0  13).  Whilst  for  some  'organic  material'  (foodstuffi,  etc.  )  biodegradation  goes  on 
for  a  little  while,  it  eventually  slows  to  "a  virtual  standstill.  For  other  kinds  [of  object]  biodegradation  never  really  gets 
under  way  at  all.  Well-designed  and  managed  landfills  seem  to  be  far  more  apt  to  preserve  their  contents  for  posterity 
than  to  transform  them  into  humus  or  mulch.  They  a-re  not  vast  composters;  rather  they  are  vast  mummifiers.  "  (112) 
'  Waste  that  is  dispatched  to  landfill  sites  is  buried  in  deep,  plastic  lined  cavities.  Each  daily  layer  of  garbage  is 
compacted  then  covered  with  soil  to  fend  off  birds,  rodents,  or  other  scavengers.  Thus  it  continues  until  the  hole  is 
filled.  This  produces  layers  of  waste,  which  are  much  like  soil  and  rock  formations,  according  to  Rathje  and  Murphy. 
That  is  to  say  the  garbage  can  be  identified  as  coming  from  a  specific  time  frame. 
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therefore  it  cannot  make  the  transition,  as  they  put  it  'from  raw  garbage  to  data.  '  The 
archeological,  or  scientific  impulse  is  to  identify  products  themselves,  product 
packaging,  dates  on  buried  newspapers,  and  to  try  and  suggest  what  that  tells  us  about 
the  other  garbage  that  can  be  found  within  the  same  part  of  the  landfill. 
In  the  midst  of  all  of  this  scientific  ordering  what  is  excluded  as  a  matter  of  the 
process  is  the  idea  that  garbage  is  no  longer  this  at  all,  no  longer  a  specific  product,  that 
it  has  become  'garbage'  because  it  is  no  longer  differentiated  (as  a  product  or  any  object 
must  of  necessity  be),  no  longer  categorically  definable,  and  has  departed  from  our 
rational  attempts  at  ordering.  So,  garbage  is  in  this  view  (which  stands  in  contradiction 
to  the  Garbage  Project)  nothing.  It  is  simply  matter  negated,  devoid  of  once  identifiable 
properties,  and  in  virtue  of  this  it  just  is  garbage  and  nothing  else.  What  is  intriguing 
about  objects,  therefore,  is  their  eventual  transvaluation,  the  fact  that  something  ends  up 
as  C  nothing.  '  It  is  that,  and  also  our  relationship  to  the  world  of  objects,  to  our  role  in 
their  transvaluation,  and  how  we  understand  a  world  thus  'created'  that  takes  us  closer 
to  revealing  the  contingency  of  identification  with  the  object  world.  just  what  any  given 
object  used  to  be,  once  discarded,  is  in  this  regard  of  no  importance.  All  that  matters  is 
that  what  was  once  something  has  become  nothing.  Although,  this  should  not  leave  aside 
an  equally  important  fact,  and  that  is  that  the  object  only  becomes  nothing  to  the  one 
who  has  discarded  it.  Chance  creeps  unnoticed  into  the  cons  umption-disposal  cycle,  in 
that  the  cast-offs  we  so  easily  forget  may  still  be  of  some  worth. 
In  a  more  general  sense,  muckraking  as  the  indiscriminate  foraging  and  retrieval  of 
indeterminate  matter,  realizes  the  contingent  territory  that  opens  before  us  as  a  result  of 
the  indestructibility  of  once  beloved  but  now  trashed  objects.  In  terms  of  uncovering  the 
unknown  possibilities  'attached'  to  garbage  there  is  the  slightly  shadowy  figure  of  the 
non-scientific  garbage  sorter,  and  more  so  than  the  academic  endeavours  of  the  Arizona 
archaeologists,  it  is  the  renegade  figure  of  this  modern  day  muckraker,  who,  it  transpires, 
by  very  much  understanding  the  personal,  subjective  qualities  of  garbage,  assumes  a 
greater  significance  by  operating  on  what  turns  out  to  be  the  shifting  ground  between 
the  subject  and  the  object  world. 
This  figure,  from  the  journalistic  muckrakers  of  the  early 
20,  h 
century  (who  first 
earned  the  dubious  epithet)  to  the  present-day  celebrity  dumpster  divers,  succeeds  in 
"  This  is  not  at  all  to  denigrate  this  approach.  On  the  contrary  I  suggest  that  it  shows  another  aspect  of  our 
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getting  closer  to  underlining  the  importance  of  objects  and  garbage  to  a  sense  of  Self  in 
modern  society.  What  becomes  threatening  in  such  activities  is  that  whilst  we  may,  on 
the  one  hand,  accept  that  scientists  could  have  a  legitimate  interest  in  garbage,  it  does 
not  prevent  the  formation  of  an  idea,  on  the  other,  that  messing  about  in  other  people's 
garbage  is  somehow  abnormal. 
In  common  with  the  archaeologists  of  the  Garbage  Project,  the  modern-day 
freelance  muckraker  shares  some  important  beliefs,  and  among  these  would  be  the  view 
that  ultimately  we  are  our  garbage,  and  also  that  garbage,  far  from  being  spent  presents 
some  kind  of  possible  alternative  explanation  of  an  accepted  state  of  affairs  and  does  not 
signify,  as  the  verb  'to  consume'  suggests,  the  exhaustion  of  possibility.  The  manner  in 
which  a  mere  muckraker  can  actually  intervene  in  the  life  of  others  simply  by  paying 
attention  to  what  is  commonly  forgotten,  can  have  devastating  consequences.  '  I  It  is 
axiomatic  that  we  live  in  an  age  characterised  by  daily  transactions  of  one  sort  or 
another,  in  social  relations  of  work  and  consumption,  and  therefore  we  live  by  through 
the  daily  mediation  of  experience,  in  these  relations,  which  subsist  between  more  or  less 
anonymous  parties.  " 
On  the  one  hand,  in  terms  of  commodity  production,  this  gives  birth  to  what  Marx 
recognised  to  be  alienation  from  man's  'species  being,  '  a  disconnection  consequent  upon 
the  transfer  of  human  'qualities'  into  the  discretely  produced  object  as  commodity. 
Equally  so,  it  seems  that  what  we  consume,  also  being  mediated  by  formal  and  objective 
structures  (from  the  high  street  shop,  to  the  checkout  queue  to  the  menu  in  a  restaurant) 
might  be  viewed  as  the  flipside  of  the  producer's  alienation,  and  undeniably  helps  to 
discriminate  the  precise  forms  of  our  consumption,  and  in  the  process,  we  might 
suggest,  placing  limits  on  it.  Thus,  as  consumers  of  objects  we  are  actually  objectified 
personally,  in  both  satisfaction  (self-creation)  and  disappointment  Calienation'),  it 
13  seems. 
consumer  society. 
"  Recently  in  the  U.  K.,  a  gentleman  known  as  Benjy  'the  Binman'  Pell  has  achieved  notoriety  for  his  alleged 
involvement  in  a  number  of  scandals  that  have  rocked  the  British  government,  and  other  well-known  public  figures, 
such  as  Mohammed  al-Fayed.  Al-Fayed,  for  example,  was  accused  by  lawyers  representing  a  former  Conservative 
government  minister  in  a  libel  case  (the  former  M.  P.  for  Tatton,  Neil  Hamilton)  of  engaging  Pell  to  find 
incriminating  documents  that  would  support  his  case.  See  The  Observer,  10  December  2000. 
12  See  Christof  Asendorf  (1993)  Batteries  of  Life,  Berkeley.  In  discussing  Marx's  explanation  of  commodity 
circulation  he  observes  that  "while  the  goods  [in  exchange]  are  indeed  active  within  social  relations  as  if  they  were 
living,  living  social  relations  transform  themselves  into  petrified,  objective  relations.  "  (36) 
13  See  Karl  Marx  (1975)  Early  Writings,  Harmondsworth.  In  the  'Economic  and  Philosophical  Manuscripts' 
Marx  explains  it  thus:  "The  externalization  of  the  worker  in  his  product  means  not  only  that  his  labour  becomes  an 
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On  this  basis  it  is  not  too  difficult  to  think  that  perhaps  just  as  we  do  'pick  up'  little 
bits  of  the  world  we  like  and  then  symbolically  'integrate'  them  as  part  of  the  Self,  we 
also  undoubtedly  must  leave  little  bits  of  ourselves  all  over  the  place,  the  bits  we  don't 
like  anymore.  These  'leavings'  may  be  difficult  to  grasp  as  substantial  'things,  '  in  the  way 
that  we  can  grasp  the  reality  of  the  physical  objects  we  discard,  and  may  even  be 
insubstantial  'things';  perhaps  'objects'  we  give  the  world  through  language,  those 
'hostages  to  fortune'  that  are  so  calamitous  for  politicians,  for  example.  A  stray  comment 
here,  an  ill-considered  opinion  ('a  load  of  rubbish'  perhaps),  or  a  minor  indiscretion. 
But  like  physical  material  such  linguistic  detritus  become  objects  because  they  are 
placed  out  into  the  open,  and  once  in  the  open  can  take  on  a  life  independent  of  a 
previous  determination,  with  the  help  of  others,  open  to  a  multitude  of  interpretations. 
So,  just  as  a  muckraker  may  re-arrange  your  life  from  disparate  fragments  you  have  now 
left  behind,  language  in  all  its  forms  too  assumes  multifarious  forms  in  the  hands  of  the 
wrong  people.  As  modern  society  becomes  more  complex,  and  forces  people  into  an 
ever-increasing  number  of  relations  (reliant  on  vast  amounts  of  information  which  takes 
the  form  of  a  Sorting  of  language  and  knowledge),  the  production  of  useful  goods  and 
object,  an  external  existence,  but  that  it  exists  outside  him,  independently  of  him  and  alien  to  him,  and  begins  to 
confront  him  as  an  autonomous  power;  that  the  life  that  which  he  has  bestowed  on  the  object  confronts  him  as  hostile 
and  alien.  "  (324)  One  example  of  consumer  'alienation,  '  is  illustrated  to  hilarious  effect  in  Bob  Rafelson's  1970  film 
Five  Easy  Pieces,  in  which  the  character  of  Bobby  Dupea  Uack  Nicholson)  makes  a  failed  attempt  to  order  his 
preferred  breakfast,  which  includes  some  wheat  toast: 
Dupea:  I'd  like  a  plain  omelette,  no  potatoes,  tomatoes  instead,  a  cup  of  coffee,  and  wheat  toast. 
Waitress:  (She  points  to  the  menu)  No  substitutions. 
Dupea:  What  do  you  mean?  You  don't  have  any  tomatoes? 
Waitress:  Only  what's  on  the  menu.  You  can  have  a  number  two  -a  plain  omelette.  It  comes  with  cottage  fries 
and  rolls. 
Dupea:  Yeah,  I  know  what  it  comes  with.  But  it's  not  what  I  want. 
Waitress:  Well,  I'll  come  back  when  you  make  up  your  mind. 
Dupea:  Wait  a  minute.  I  have  made  up  my  mind.  I'd  like  a  plain  omelette,  no  potatoes  on  the  plate,  a  cup  of 
coffee,  and  a  side  order  of  wheat  toast. 
Waitress:  I'm  sorry,  we  don't  have  any  side  orders  of  toast  ...  an  English  muffin  or  a  coffee  roll. 
Dupea:  What  do  you  mean  you  don't  make  side  orders  of  toast?  You  make  sandwiches,  don't  you? 
Waitress:  Would  you  like  to  talk  to  the  manager? 
Dupea:  ...  You've  got  bread  and  a  toaster  of  some  kind? 
Waitress:  I  don't  make  the  rules. 
Dupea:  OK,  I'll  make  it  as  easy  for  you  as  I  can.  I'd  like  an  omelette,  plain,  and  a  chicken  salad  sandwich  on 
wheat  toast,  no  mayonnaise,  no  butter,  no  lettuce.  And  a  cup  of  coffee. 
Waitress:  A  number  two,  chicken  sal  san,  hold  the  butter,  the  lettuce  and  the  mayonnaise.  And  a  cup  of  coffee. 
Anything  else? 
Dupea:  Yeah.  Now  all  you  have  to  do  is  hold  the  chicken,  bring  me  the  toast,  give  me  a  check  for  the  chicken 
salad  sandwich,  and  you  haven't  broken  any  rules. 
Waitress  (spitefully):  You  want  me  to  hold  the  chicken,  huh? 
Dupea:  I  want  you  to  hold  it  between  your  knees. 
Waitress  (turning  and  telling  him  to  look  at  the  sign  that  says,  "No  Substitutions")  Do  you  see  that  sign,  sit?  Yes, 
you'll  all  have  to  leave.  I'm  not  taking  any  more  of  your  smartness  and  sarcasm. 
Dupea:  You  see  this  sign?  (He  sweeps  all  the  water  glasses  and  menus  off  the  table.  ) 
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THERE'S  AN 
ALLEGHENY  SHREDDER 
To  MEET  YOUR  NEEDS 
In  todaý',,  conipetitiýe  husines,,  world.  your  .:  onipaný  ',, 
most  valuable  asset  is  Information-in  the  form  of 
financial  records,  personnel  file,,.  payroll  data.  cus- 
tonier  lists,  contract,,,  marketing  plaric,  computer  disks. 
et(--.  Most  companies  protco  their  Information  during 
its  active  and  storage  phases. 
HOývever.  when  this  information 
I,,  no  longer  reqUired.  it  Is  often 
(11,,,  -.  trded  carelessly. 
l'he  problem  I,,  that  if  your 
,,  mpany's  information  were  to 
tall  Into  the  wrono  hands.  the  Z7 
I-CsUll  COLIld  be  anything  from 
-atirstrophic 
lossof  revenue. 
SImpl\  -throýýing  things  away'*  cannot  po,;  sibly 
provide  the  seCLII-Ity  yOLI  need.  Wastebasket,,  and  trash 
bins  are  easy  to  search,  and  CrUniplcd  papers  are  easy  to 
read.  With  the  recent  emergence  of  *'dL11np',  ICI-  dI  ving,  ** 
riflinu,  through  trash  I,  an  ca,,  \  \k-a\  for  an\one  to 
obtain  your  conipaný'ý,  conhdenliýil  Information. 
Shredding  is  the  most  reliable 
wa)  to  keel)  your  un%ianted  and 
obsolete  records  from  being 
read  by  the  wrong  people. 
Toda\.  thousand,,  ol  hmiks. 
insurance  companies.  hospitals, 
!  overnnient  agencies.  and  other 
nclLILI'n,,  Izations  II  the  or,  an 
111a  ority  of  the  Fortune  1000-rely  on  Allegheny  J  paper 
shredders  for  cost-effective  destruction  of  their  confi- 
dential  materials. 
Allegheny  offer,,  the  widest  range  of  paper  shredders 
available-from  office  models  to  1ýwh  \011.1111C  shredding 
systems  that  can  destroy  LIP  to  10  tons  of'paper  per  hour. 
As  the  IIILILIItl-N  leader.  Allegheny  offers  more  than 
jjIst  equipment.  We  offer  solutions.  We  can  assist  Nlou 
ill  Settlil"  LIP  a  complete  document  destruction  program 
-developing  the  most  efficient  means  of  collecting 
your  confidential  ji-ijacrials.  processing  them  throuA 
the  shredding  system.  in(]  recycling  the  shredded  paper 
(Or  a  profit. 
PLATE  32.  THERE'S  AN  ALLEGHENY  SHREDDER  TO  MEET  YOUR  NEEDS.  This  is  one  side  of 
an  information  leaflet  that  extols  the  virtues  of  the  shredding  equipment  manufactured  by  the  Allegheny 
Company.  In  recognition  of  the  value  of  discarded  objects  to  others  the  shredder  is  now  perceived  to  be 
one  of  the  primary  tools  in  the  battle  against  the  misuse  of  information,  or  the  presentation  of  some 
presumed  identity  on  the  basis  of  the  discarded  objects  of  an  individual  or  company,  and  so  on.  Another 
counter  espionage  organization  (Spybusters.  com)  reveals  that  'dumpster  diving'  is  now  the  number  one 
method  of  economic  espionage,  a-nd  that,  for  example,  the  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  of  America 
has  effectively  'legalized'  this  activity,  declaring  that  there  is  no  expectation  of  privacy,  or  ownership,  once 
an  item  has  been  left  for  garbage  pick  up. 
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is  accompanied  by  an  inherent  danger:  if  information  is  valuable,  then  how  do  we 
dispose  of  that?  And  so,  such  problems  create  a  need  for  ever-more  cunning  technologies 
for  'de-materializing'  the  leavings  that  could  be  reSorted  by  an  external  determination. 
That  there  is  a  hidden  potential  in  the  paper  waste  of  modern  society  can  be  seen  in 
the  existence  of  the  paper  shredder,  one  more  device  for  maintaining  the  mask  of  games 
that  becomes  the  edifice  of  modernity.  In  Don  DeLillo's  novel  Underwork  a  story  that 
explores  the  fluidity  of  appearances,  there  is,  on  display  at  a  waste  industry  convention,  a 
"confidential  shredder  called  the  Watergate.  "  Signalling  both  the  need  to  retain  and  then 
elaborate  the  mask  on  the  surface:  the  name  'Watergate'  is itself  redolent  of  modern 
indiscretions,  if  not  Machiavellian  depths  the  device  will  conceal.  In  fact,  one  real 
corporate  waste  company  suggests  "shredding  is  the  way  from  keeping  your  unwanted 
and  obsolete  records  from  being  read  by  the  wrong  people.  "  (Plate  32)  And  yet  another 
that  "scraps  of  seemingly  useless  information  [can  be]  synergistically  related"  and  thus 
the  company's  own  'cross-cut'  shredding  machinery  is  the  best  way  of  reducing  the 
availability  of  "these  puzzle  parts.  "  to  the  muckraker" 
On  the  surface,  however,  a  puzzle  may  be  declared  as  a  need  for  detection.  Mark  C. 
Taylor  employs  this  metaphor  in  suggesting  that  the  world  only  appears  to  be  a  depth- 
supporting  surface.  It  is  actually  just  another  surface  that  conceals  infinite  layers  below. 
The  skin  of  the  world  (the  mask  of  games)  thus  conceals  by  its  own  surface  appearance. 
Or  as  Taylor  says,  the  world  is  "hides  hiding 
... 
if  depth  is  but  another  surface,  nothing  is 
profound  ... 
This  does  not  mean  everything  is  superficial;  to  the  contrary,  in  the  absence 
of  depth  everything  becomes  endlessly  complex.  ""  To  judge  by  our  increasing  sensitivity 
to  disposal,  the  implication  is  that  the  Self  is  no  longer  indissoluble  in  the  modern 
world,  it  can  no  longer  represent  the  concordance  of  the  subject  with  objective 
determinations,  and  thus  garbage  is  a  necessary  byproduct  arising  from  the  fact  that 
others  become  increasingly  involved  in  our  daily  lives.  Others  create  the  conditions 
under  which  me  we  may  become  objectified.  This  is  the  possibility  the  muckraker  sees 
in  garbage. 
16 
The  most  prominent  public  muckraker  of  recent  times,  and  self-declared  founder  of 
"non-governmental  garbology"  was  the  American,  A.  J.  Weberman,  who  first  developed 
"  Murray  Associates,  Counter  Espionage  Consultants.  Found  at  www.  spybusters.  com. 
15  Taylor,  lbid:  18. 
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an  interest  in  the  garbage  of  well-known  public  figures  in  the  1960's.  "  The  fact  that  he 
makes  a  point  of  emphasizing  his  distance  from  authority,  and  thus  establishing  an  anti- 
establishment  status  is  just  another  way  of  saying  what  may  be  less  obvious  about 
muckraking,  and  that  is  that  government  secret  services  are  also  to  be  found  down 
amongst  the  trash.  The  director  of  the  FBI  at  the  time,  Edgar  J.  Hoover,  had  authorized 
muckraking  of  his  own,  or  what  were  then  known  as  'trash  covers,  '  a  practice  more 
commonly  known  in  espionage  circles  as  'trashing'  or  'dumpster  diving.  '  Much  like  the 
errant  muckraker  Weberman,  it  wasn't  any  old  rubbish  the  government  men  were 
interested  in,  and  in  contrast  to  the  garbage  archaeologist  who  was  after  a  snapshot  of 
the  general  tendencies  of  the  American  consumer,  both  the  'official'  and  renegade 
muckrakers  were  concerned  with  obtaining  a  particular  kind  of  'dirt'  on  known  targets, 
that  is  to  say  with  the  leftovers  that  were  to  be  used  as  material  either  to  compromise  or 
smear  individuals. 
For  his  Part  A.  J.  Weberman  claims  to  have  started  with  the  innocuous  idea  that  by 
scanning  the  garbage  of  his  idol,  Bob  Dylan,  he  might  be  able  to  understand  the  singer)s 
increasingly  surreal  songs  and  the  detached  public  persona  he  had  assumed  in  contrast  to 
his  prior  involvement  with  the  more  literal  and  obvious  intentions  of  the  consciousness- 
raising  activities  of  the  'folk  movement.  '  This  ended  up,  however,  with  Weberman 
forming  a  belief  that  Dylan  had  actually  in  this  transformation  betrayed  his  public,  and 
that  the  Bob  Dylan  public  persona  was  not  the  same  as  the  private  family  man,  the 
rather  normal  husband  and  father  that  stood  in  contrast  to  the  public  perception  of  an 
anti-establishment  rebel.  Weberman  was  therefore  motivated  by  some  kind  of  partially 
expressed  anxiety  over  the  exact  identity  of  this  person,  and  that  maybe  the  singer  had 
not  only  assumed  a  different  name  to  that  given  at  birth  but  also  a  different  persona, 
that  he  was  in  fact  an  act  in  many  senses  (and  not  only  as  a  performer),  and  in  fact  a 
phony  of  some  sort.  " 
"  This  state  of  affairs  is  realised  also  in  the  way  government  agencies,  insurance  firms,  consumer  credit  agencies, 
and  so  on,  collate  'information'  based  predominantly  on  consumption  to  provide  an  objective  picture  of  who  we  are. 
17  Weberman  claims  to  have  invented  the  term  'garbology,  '  although  this  is  strictly  applied  to  the  methodology 
devised  by  William  Rathje  and  Cullen  Murphy.  The  Oxford  English  Dictionary  suggests  that  dustmen  in  the  1960's 
were  the  first  to  use  this  term,  describing  themselves,  in  some  cases,  as  garbologists. 
"  A.  J.  Weberman  (1980)  My  Life  in  Garhologv,  New  York.  For  example,  "In  1971  I'd  started  the  Dylan 
Liberation  Front  (D.  L.  F.  ).  Its  purpose  was  to  remind  Dylan  about  his  failure  to  contribute  money  or  energy  to  anti- 
war  and  civil  rights  organizations,  and  his  lack  of  support  for  political  prisoners  despite  the  fact  that  he'd  built  his 
career  singing  songs  about  their  struggles.  Many  others,  along  with  myself,  were  concerned  about  his  refusal  at  that 
time  to  perform  at  political  benefit  concerts,  the  lack  of  social  commitment  in  his  song  lyrics  and  the  fact  that  he 
owned  stock  in  companies  that  produced  weapons  used  in  Vietnam.  "  Chapter  one. 
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Tired  of  people  trying  to  attach  great  significance  to  his  work,  Dylan  had  himself  at 
the  time  withdrawn  from  any  engagement  with  an  audience  that  was  keen  to  have  him 
as  a  spokesman  for  an  alternative  culture  (an  audience  consisting  of  possessive  'fans'  like 
Weberman).  This  kind  of  objectification  was  summed  up  by  his  audience's 
unwillingness  to  grant  him  artistic  licence,  going  so  far  as  to  present  him  with  petitions 
suggestion  he  return  to  'folk'  music,  and  the  concerns  of  the  folk  movement.  By 
attempting  to  'own'  him  in  this  way,  to  determine  his  identity,  they  were  also  denying 
that  he  could  be  the  creation  of  an  autonomous  process.  Aware  that  such  a  role  may 
bind  his  creative  instincts,  his  'nonsensical'  lyrics  and  Delphic  utterances  of  the  time 
were  one  obvious  strategy  to  escape  the  objectification  of  those  who  sought  deep 
meaning  in  his  words,  limiting  his  identity  to  that  of  'protest  singer.  `9  At  the  same  time 
little  could  he  know  that  his  trash  could  provide  the  meaning-seekers  an  alternative 
means  of  objectifying  him.  This  unwelcome  interest  in  his  garbage  was  just  another  trap 
contingent,  not  only  upon  celebrity  status,  but  also  on  his  success  in  making  such  a  vital 
connection  with  people. 
The  realization  that  there  was  potentially  a  way  inside  and  that  garbage  could  be  a 
route  to  some  idea  that  there  was  a  more  objective  'truth'  about  the  Self  was  also  the 
birth  of  a  larger  public  interest,  at  this  time,  in  the  private  lives  of  celebrities,  and  again  a 
tacit  acknowledgement  that  trash  made  all  lives  transparent.  In  the  case  of  famous 
people  this  made  the  cast  offs  of  the  private  sphere  extremely  valuable.  "Whilst  he  may 
figure  as  merely  a  footnote  in  any  social  history  of  garbage,  the  significance  of 
Weberman  as  an  exemplar  of  a  changing  attitude  toward  garbage  in  modern  society 
cannot  be  overlooked.  In  his  memoir  Weberman  made  an  interesting  observation  when 
recalling  his  initial  muckraking  impulse  and  one  that  resonates  with  significance  for  the 
difficulty  in  maintaining  a  distinction  between  the  subject  and  the  world  of  objects  in 
modernity.  This  relates  specifically  to  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  a  separation  in 
modern  society  between  the  private  and  the  public,  of  keeping  and  protecting  the  inside 
from  the  outside,  and  ultimately  of  establishing  an  identity  between  subject  and  object 
that  fulfills  the  promise  of  autonomous  freedom.  "As  I  eyed  the  home  of  the  reclusive 
poet,  "  he  recalls: 
"  In  Don't  Look  Back,  D.  A.  Pennebaker's  famous  film  of  a  1965  tour  of  England,  we  can  see  earnest  journalists 
ask  Dylan  what  his  'message'  was.  With  a  mixture  of  exasperation  and  contempt  he  responds  at  one  point:  "always 
keep  a  clean  head  and  carry  a  light  bulb.  " 
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I  wondered  what  went  down  behind  the  door  that  Dylan  had  slammed  in  my  face.  just  then  I  noticed  Dylan's  shiny  new  steel  garbage  can  and  said  to  myself,  'Now,  there's  something  that  was  inside  and  it's  outside  now.  "O 
And  this  realisation  of  the  boundary  having  been  broached  is  the  transformation 
that  permits  the  entry  of  chance.  Put  another  way,  once  what  is  inside  is  expelled  it  is  no 
longer  controlled,  and  in  effect  the  necessity  of  the  release  of  itself  creates  a  contingency, 
because  garbage  like  death,  as  Ivan  Klima  says  in  his  novel  Love  and  Garbage,  is 
indestructible.  It  never  disappears.  Upon  reflection  we  may  come  to  realise  this  with  the 
certainty  of  a  fact,  but  as  with  the  mortal  end  we  cannot  actually  foresee  its  arrival,  and 
so  what  is  thrown  away  in  a  positive  act,  the  act  of  Self-creation,  becomes  contingent 
because  we  cannot  know  the  final  form  or  use  of  garbage.  Once  placed  outside,  these 
cast-offs  become  ambiguous.  Garbage  is  both  a  threat  to  us  and  a  gift  to  posterity.  And 
in  pursuit  of  these  gifts,  Weberman  continued  to  steal  the  garbage  of  Bob  Dylan  for 
many  years,  and  was  unsurprisingly  considered  to  be  something  of  a  parasite.  Fittingly, 
for  such  an  uncivil  operator,  a  street  encounter  whilst  rifling  bins  put  an  end  to  his 
interest  in  Dylan.  Catching  him  amongst  the  discarded  diapers,  chicken  bones  and 
newspapers,  Dylan  gave  him  a  beating  for  all  the  trouble  he  had  caused  him,  and 
ultimately  for  being  like  "a  pig.,,  21 
Thereafter,  Weberman's  muckraking  was  channeled  in  other  directions,  and 
amongst  others  subjected  to  his  infamous  'garbanalysis'  were  John  Mitchell  (attorney 
general  in  the  Nixon  administration),  Arthur  Schlesinger  C'  a  Harvard  brains-truster  for 
John  F.  Kennedy"),  and  the  vice  president  to  Richard  Nixon,  Spiro  Agnew,  amongst  a 
host  of  other  celebrities  and  politicians.  Neither  is  it  surprising  that  the  famous 
'garbanalysis'  seemed  to  result  in  very  little  of  substance  beyond  serving  up  the  private 
life  of  some  unfortunate  public  figure  for  all  to  see,  and  in  the  end  the  threat  he  once 
posed  was  dissipated  by  his  own  emergence  as  a  public  figure.  In  the  end  he  was  reduced 
to  the  level  of  a  circus-sideshow.  " 
'0  A.  J.  Weberman,  ibid:  vii.  Weberman  may  be  the  source  for  Don  DeLillo's  1960's  'garbage  guerilla',  Jesse 
Detwiler.  See,  DeLillo  (1997)  Underworld,  London:  286ff. 
"  Weberman,  ibid:  14-17.  Dylan  compared  him  to  'government  phone-tappers'  and  his  wife  commented  that 
'compared  to  Bob,  you  are  filth.  ' 
22  On  Spiro  Agnew  for  example:  "I  hit  upon  two  garbifacts  that  took  my  breath  away.  One  was  a  list  tided 
'Honorary  Members  of  the  Senate  Red  Cross,  '  with  the  home  address  of  every  notable  in  the  U.  S.  Senate-people  like 
Mamie  Eisenhower  and  Margaret  Truman  thrown  in  for  good  measure.  This  was  the  key  I  had  always  dreamed  of 
finding.  Now  I  could  realize  my  lifelong  ambition  of  becoming  the  new  J.  Edgar  Hoover  of  Washington,  D.  C.  Only 
I'd  go  even  farther  than  Hoover-not  only  would  I  accumulate  'dirt'  on  everyone  important  in  government,  I'd 
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Another  interesting  aspect  of  this  particular  kind  of  muckraking  is  that  the  so-called 
garbanalysis'  can  best  be  viewed  as  motivated  by  both  the  breakdown  of  identification 
(between  Weberman  and  Dylan  the  'folk  singer')  and  a  dislike  of  otherness  (he  had 
become  'establishment').  Thus,  Bob  Dylan  having  once  been  'one  of  us,  '  part  of  the  so- 
called  'counter-culture'  supported  by  Weberman,  became  perceived  as  'one  of  them,  ' 
and  in  retrospect  this  particular  celebrity  trash  trawling  may  have  had  more  in  common 
with  government  espionage  than  he  would  dare  admit.  Here  in  both  cases  it  is  clear  that 
discarded  objects  are  used  as  a  means  to  target  an  individual,  and  are  therefore  what 
allows  the  target  to  be  objectified.  Garbage,  then,  becomes  gift,  and  the  object  is  once 
again  Sorted,  although  not  according  to  the  desires  of  the  individual  who  bequeathed  it. 
For  the  most  part  Weberman  indulged  in  a  pseudo-ideological  battle  against 
traditional  left-liberal  hate-figures  of  the  time,  and  at  various  points  seems  to  have 
sought  to  provoke  the  kind  of  violent  response  that  might  lead  to  the  most  sensational 
news  headlines.  In  fact  publicity  for  his  deeds  was  essential,  and  Weberman  often  made 
sure  reporters  accompanied  him  on  his  trash  foraging  expeditions.  23  So,  although  fearful 
of  another  target,  Norman  Mailer  (much  more  noted  then  for  his  'pugilism'  than  the 
relatively  unthreatening  Dylan),  Weberman  still  felt  that  it  was  worth  raking  through 
the  garbage  cans  left  outside  his  apartment  because  of  the  guaranteed  publicity.  But 
unexpectedly,  given  his  reputation,  Mailer  did  not  lose  his  temper  when  he  sighted 
Weberman,  nor  did  he  seem  overly  concerned  with  the  sight  of  a  stranger  in  his  garbage. 
"Mailer  looked  at  me  standing  in  the  rubbish,  poking  round  with  a  pocket  flashlight, 
and  walked  on,  "  Weberman  notes.  "From  the  look  on  his  face  he  must  have  thought  I 
was  a  government  agent.  ,  21  In  a  way  Weberman's  perception  of  how  Norman  Mailer 
probably  viewed  him  -  as  a  government  agent  -  revealed  as  much  about  the  similarities 
of  himself  and  the  G-Men  as  about  any  differences.  Both  sought  to  take  leftover 
fragments  and  to  objectify  particular  individual  targets,  and  all  that  differed  were  the 
targets. 
accumulate  everyone  important  in  government's  dirt!  The  other  garbifact  was  a  torn-up  picture  of  Nixon  shaking 
hands  with  Elvis!  This  official  White  House  photograph  was  snapped  right  after  Dick  had  made  him  an  honorary 
narcotics  officer!  "  Weberman  did  also  produce  jokey  'portraits'  of  his  subjects  (these  are  reproduced  in  his  book), 
composed  of  their  garbage,  and  compared  himself  to  the  noted  Parisian  artist,  Armand,  who  used  garbage  in  his  art. 
lbid:  chs.  2&3. 
"  That  publicity  was  his  main  objective  is  notable  throughout  his  book,  and  was  reflected  in  his  choice  of 
associates,  who  turned  out  to  be  equally  adept  at  grabbing  their  own  headlines:  "In  order  to  stay  ahead  of  the 
competition  I  was  forced  to  train  an  associate  garbologist  -  Aron  Morton  Kay  (who  would  later  achieve  notoriety  as 
the  man  who  throws  pies  at  celebrities)"  (xii). 
2'A.  J.  Weberman,  ibid:  117 
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There  was  more  than  a  hint  of  seriousness,  however,  in  the  covert  trash  covers  of  the 
FBI.  These  activities  had  more  to  do  with  cold  war  paranoia  and  with  the  widespread 
fear  of  'reds  under  the  beds,  '  with  'foreign  bodies'  that  threatened  to  infect  the  system, 
than  with  the  titillation  of  celebrity  news  headlines.  The  methods  of  espionage  went  far 
beyond  the  humiliation  of  subjects,  however,  suggesting  a  significant  difference  in  the 
perception  of  garbage,  though  a  similar  awareness  of  the  distinction  between  the  inside 
and  the  outside  (if  not  the  same  belief  in  what  did  and  did  not  belong).  Garbage  was  not 
only  used  to  embarrass,  but  as  a  threat. 
Once  again,  if  garbage  gets  outside  it  represents  a  dangerous  possibility,  and 
therefore  the  point  can  easily  become  to  keep  it  inside.  In  the  political  climate  fostered 
by  people  like  the  FBI  chief  Edgar  J.  Hoover,  to  be  'on  the  inside'  was  primarily  to  be  a 
patriot,  and  by  extension  perhaps,  to  be  aware  that  there  were  traitors,  or  outsiders, 
around.  In  the  paranoia  surrounding  life  during  the  Cold  War  upstanding  American 
citizens  were  supposed  to  conform  to  some  objective  ideal,  or  at  least  to  a  shared  goal,  in 
this  case  'the  American  way  of  life'  -a  kind  of  safe  and  unthreatening  normality  that 
was  free  from  the  malign  influences  posed  by  any  kind  of  deviation.  "  The  danger  of 
non-conformity  from  within,  of  communists  in  America,  for  example,  suggested  an 
acute  awareness  of  how  easily  order  could  become  disorder,  that  what  is  presently 
outside,  despised  and  feared,  must  be  guarded  against  lest  it  find  a  way  in  to 
26 
contaminate  the  body  politic.  Indeed,  the  historical  precedents  are  obvious  .  As 
Machiavelli  would  have  recognised,  Hoover  was  merely  living  up  to  the  reality  that  there 
is  dirty  work  to  be  done,  and  that  the  point  is  not  to  deny  or  neglect  this,  but  rather  to 
wear  clean  gloves,  to  cover-up  as  a  means  of  avoiding  dirty  hands.  So,  in  terms  of  the 
maintenance  of  the  body  politic,  the  FBI  view,  and  arguably  the  view  of  secret 
government  agencies  the  world  over,  activities  like  'dumpster  diving'  provide  one  way  of 
inspecting,  and  hopefully  preserving,  this  body. 
25  This  is  interesting  given  the  public  knowledge  of  Hoover  that  has  emerged  since  his  death.  In  DeLillo's 
Underworld  we  can  also  see  him  cavorting  with  the  barely  concealed  underbelly  of  normality.  Truthfid  or  not,  this 
kind  of  representation  is  consequent  on  a  past  that  emerged  following  his  death.  In  one  scene,  DeLillo  shows  Hoover 
as  he  sits  in  the  stand  at  a  football  match  with  Frank  Sinatra  (suspected  himself  at  various  points  in  his  life  of  mob 
connections  and  consorting  with  known  communists).  They  indulge  in  bawdy  exchanges  over  a  hot  dog  -  in  the 
scene  Hoover  exits  puking  ...  on  Sinatra's  shoes. 
2'  Ever  since  Niccolo  Machiavelli  composed  The  Prince  in  the  early  16"  century  as  a  guide  to  maintaining  power 
against  external  threats,  there  has  been  an  acceptance  that  statecraft  can  be  a  dirty  business.  Like  the  physical 
organism,  it  was  recognised  that  the  political  commonwealth,  often  described  as  an  'orgarusm,  '  or  'body,  '  was  subject 
to  attack  from  debilitating  elements. 
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A  fear  of  disorder  (as  is  implied  by  the  notion  of  'official  secrecy')  had  by  the 
twentieth  century  created  a  whole  economy  of  subterfuge,  which  more  or  less  lived  off 
the  contingencies  of  trash,  off  of  our  'leavings,  '  be  they  the  material  objects  found  in 
trash  cans,  or  in  the  'distorted'  objects  of  unwelcome  ideologies,  and  from  the  fact  that 
this  disconnection  permits  outside  intervention.  The  fear  of  disorder  thrived  also  in  the 
awareness  that  once  a  level  of  control  had  been  assumed,  and  that  social  rationalization 
had  to  some  extent  taken  over,  to  maintain  it  soon  became,  in  itself,  a  necessity,  and  as 
such,  these  imperatives  conceal  an  expanding  'sphere'  of  chance;  namely  the  'sphere'  of 
garbage.  It  was  clear  that  uncontrollable  events  and  unsorted  objects  might  reveal  a 
discontinuity  between  public  and  private  personas,  or  between  subjective  and  objective 
versions  of  'reality.  ' 
So  it  is  that  in  times  when  the  public  has  an  unquenchable  desire  to  know  the 
smallest  detail  about  the  most  insignificant  public  figure  or  minor  celebrity,  garbage 
then  becomes  characteristically  unidentifiable  in  terms  of  the  consequences  it  has  for  us. 
The  idea  of  a  fixed  identity  remains  ultimately  beyond  subjective  control,  it  vanishes  to 
be  replaced  by  the  indeterminate  and  uncategorical  collection  of  devalued  objects  that 
are  themselves  the  consequence  of  progress,  of  control,  and  ultimately,  of  reason. 
Perhaps  we  can  sum  this  up  by  suggesting  that,  in  general,  an  uneasiness  arises  when 
borders  and  distinctions  are  blurred,  and  placing  objects  outside  of  the  Self  certainly 
creates  a  momentary  doubt,  as  it  passes  from  an  object  of  identification,  a  Sort,  to  the 
unsorted  and  devalued  matter  that  constitutes  garbage.  27  A  consciousness  of  this 
uncontrolled  movement  is  necessarily  self-consciousness,  however;  a  realization  that  bits 
of  you  have  been  more  or  less  'chopped  off.  '  To  doubt  is  (in  this  case)  to  ponder  on  the 
wisdom  of  throwing  out,  and  on  the  contrary  implications  of  retention,  which,  as  we 
have  seen,  can  be  equally  debilitating  to  the  Self. 
Objects  are  thus  the  problem,  whether  keeping  them,  or  throwing  them  away,  but 
our  attachment  to  objects  often  makes  it  difficult  to  remove  them,  and  this  gives  objects 
that  are  cast  out  their  potentially  transforming  power.  This  may  also  come  as  something 
"  See  William  Miller  (1997)  Anatomy  ofDisgust,  Cambridge,  Mass.  Miller  explores  the  idea  of  'disgust'  in  these 
terms  suggesting,  "disgust  helps  mark  boundaries  of  culture  and  of  the  self  The  boundaries  of  the  self  extend  beyond 
the  body  to  encompass  a  jurisdictional  territory,  what  Erving  Goffman  calls  a  territorial  preserve,  which  may  be 
defined  as  any  space  that  if  intruded  upon  would  engender  rightful  indignation  or  disgust  in  us.  The  size  of  this 
jurisdiction  varies  by  culture,  age,  gender,  class,  and  status.  Generally,  the  higher  a  person's  status,  the  larger  the  space 
within  which  offenses  against  that  person  can  take  place.  In  contrast,  some  people's  jurisdiction  may  not  reach  beyond 
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of  a  surprise  because  now  that  these  objects  are  garbage,  they  are  surely  spent,  used  up? 
Well,  from  the  evidence  of  scavengers,  ragpickers,  and  muckrakers,  this  is  not  at  all 
obvious.  It  rather  seems  to  be  the  case  that  as  the  worth  of  trash  becomes  divorced  from 
its  original  utility  and  as  soon  as  we  no  longer  'determine'  its  value,  then  we  have 
entered  a  somewhat  disordered  set  of  circumstances.  Instead  of  garbage  being  an 
undifferentiated  mass  of  used  up  worth,  it  has  become  valued  in  the  hands  of  others. 
Perhaps  more  like  a  Santa  sack  than  the  black  plastic  bag  familiar  to  us  all,  except  full  of 
an  unusual  wonder. 
And  here,  as  an  illustration  of  the  precarious  status  of  the  Self  is  one  of  the  most 
enduring  tensions  within  modern  society:  our  ability  to  assert  our  identity  and  to 
exercise  the  power  of  will  over  our  own  lives  is  compromised,  paradoxically,  by  the  very 
act  of  doing  so,  by  consuming.  That  is  because  our  identity  is  so  inseparable  from  what 
we  consume,  and  also,  of  course,  because  what  we  consume  never  really  disappears,  but 
returns  eternally,  in  new  forms.  just  like  the  plastic  that  forms  the  basis  for  so  many 
modern  objects,  a  byproduct  of  oil,  the  'garbage'  of  oil,  oil  which  is itself  transformed 
material.  So,  what  we  consume  doesn't  Just  go  out  through  the  'back  end,  '  end  of  story. 
Once  it  has  been  expelled  there  is  always  the  possibility  of  another  story  to  tell.  And  so, 
the  potential  for  garbage  to  create  a  state  of  anxiety  only  develops  with  the  technological 
and  material  progress  of  modern  society,  within  the  dream  of  modernity:  which  is  to  say, 
only  after  we  have  been  separated  from  the  necessity  of  personally  dealing  with  our  own 
byproducts.  There  is  created  here  a  distance,  which  sees  many  public  and  private  aspects 
of  life  linked  at  opposite  ends,  and  it  gives  them  a  common  order;  from  eating  to 
excrement,  and  fashion  to  garbage,  the  distance  is  created  only  within  the  compass  of 
reason.  And  so  only  rationalized  waste,  particularly  the  remnants  of  the  object  world  of 
modern  consumer  society,  becomes  garbage  that  is  of  interest  to  others. 
Thus,  it  is  plain  that  the  muckraker  is  as  obviously  employed  as  anyone  else, 
occupying  a  more  or  less  hidden  sector  of  the  division  of  labour,  and  the  fact  is  that  if 
we  all  had  to  take  care  of  our  own  waste,  we  would  simply  be  too  busy  doing  that  to 
find  other  waste  interesting.  So,  the  fact  that  our  garbage  becomes,  through  some 
transvaluation,  a  gift,  is  only  incidentally  something  to  do  with  us,  and  actually  more  to 
do  with  chance.  And  chance,  by  some  act  of  poesis,  is  merely  the  rubbish  of  reason. 
their  skin,  may  not  even  include  it:  thus  in  some  instances  prisoners,  slaves,  prostitutes,  and  infants.  "  (50)  All 
categories  of  people,  in  other  words,  who  have  already  been  objectified  as  a  matter  of  defining  who  and  what  they  are. 
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have/  you  stopped  to  think  what  existence  is,  to  be  here/ 
now  where  so  much  has  been  or  is  yet  to  come  and/ 
where  isness  itself  is  just  the  name  of  a  segment/ 
of  flow 
A.  RAmMONS,  Garbage 
There  is  a  dual  aspect  to  the  significance  garbage  has  come  to  assume  in  the  modern 
consciousness,  and  this  applies  also  to  the  practicalities  of  garbage,  to  the  way  that  we 
collectively  deal  with  it,  to  what  we  might  call  the  'social  relations'  of  garbage.  The  effect 
of  our  mediated  experience  of  the  object  world  is  summed  up  by  forgetfulness,  a  rational 
ignorance,  on  the  one  hand,  and  increasingly,  on  the  other,  fear.  At  a  subjective  level  we 
have  a  desire  to  be  in  control  of  our  immediate  environment,  of  the  space  that  provides 
the  basis  for  our  meaningful  activities,  and  that  therefore  must  help  define  who  we  are, 
who  we  may  become. 
If  we  accept  that  life  in  modern  society  is  largely  defined  by  our  relationship  to  these 
spaces,  and  to  the  objects  that  furnish  them,  we  must  also  accept  that  the  proliferation  of 
such  'things'  means  that  we  are  never  really  that  far  removed  from  garbage,  since  this 
order  is  only  maintained  by  creating  garbage.  The  fact  that  an  object  becomes  garbage 
just  means  that  it  is  no  longer  controlled,  it  spells  out  the  fluidity  of  identity  in 
modernity.  Our  temporal  existence  persists  on  the  basis  of  a  succession  of  precarious 
identities;  we  are  always  at  the  risk  of  breaking  free,  being  loosened,  from  the  definitions 
that  bind  us  to  the  shore,  that  seek  to  deny  the  fluidity  of  our  surroundings. 
The  impulse  to  put  garbage  in  its  place  is,  in  terms  of  day-to-day  functioning, 
clearly  a  matter  of  personal  autonomy  in  the  most  basic  sense  that  we  escape  the 
ceaseless  flow  by  establishing  solidity  in  our  identity  relations.  In  other  words,  we  leave 
nothing  to  chance,  and  so  the  removal  of  the  rubbish  of  life  makes  space  more  easily 
negotiable,  more  resistant  to  change  (Plate  33).  The  expulsion  of  garbage  therefore 
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GENTLE  AIDS 
To  Regular  1imination 
MAINTAINING  A  REGULAR  SCHEDULE 
N  THIS  era  of  high  speed  living,  our  practice  of  daily  hygiene 
is  often  forsaken  to  accommodate  modern  modes  of  transly)rta 
tion  and  communication.  Especially  in  the  metropolitan  aic:  t- 
is  this  true,  where  unfavorable  eating  and  working  conditious  ai, 
contributing  factors  to  neglected  habits.  It  is  this  inclination  to  pla(v 
the  value  of  time  and  convenience  above  the  importance  of  go-1 
health  that  is  largely  responsible  for  faulty  elimination  aml  resultant 
chronic  constipation. 
THE  bowel,  like  a  modern  railway  train,  must  have  a  regular 
schedule  of  operation.  There  Ahouid  he  uo  delay.  A  fixed  time, 
preferably  soon  after  breakfast,  shotil(l  I)c  .  1110.  cate(i  ca,  11  (lay  f,  )r 
bowel  movement. 
EQUALLY  important  to  regular  elimination  are  (liet  and  ex(,  t- 
cise.  You  should  have  a  particular  time  for  entinR  ', Wd  "xerci',  i"K  tf) 
avoid  indigestion  and  subsequent  constipation 
CONSULT  your  physician  for  a  proper  diet  awl  t, 
assist  in  establishing  a  regular  habit  time  of  bowel  Y,  mr 
FIN.  mi  are  to  cooperatioti  in  f,  111wAing  his  advice  is  imperative  if 
build  and  maintain  a  strong  healthy  body. 
THIs  is  the  second  of  a  series  of  educational  adverti%ements  on  "Gentle 
Aids  to  Regular  Elimination"  by  the  makers  of  Petrolagar  (an  emulsion  of 
pure  mineral  oi"5%-with  agar-agar).  Petrolager,  because  it  performs 
only  a  lubricating  and  softening  function,  is  also  a  "Itentle  aid*'  to  regular 
elimination.  Hov*ver',  like  diet  or  any  other  "wasure,  PetrolaRar  should  not 
be  self  prewri'bed.  It  is  harmless,  but  certainly  not  a  "cure-all.  "  Rest  rMults 
in  dealing  with  difficulties  of  the  intestinal  tract  will  invariably  be  obtained 
when  a  physician  is  given  the  opportunity  to  make  a  careful  diagnosis  and 
prescribe  whatever  measures  fit  the  individual  case.  Another  advertisment  in 
this  series  will  appear  neirt  montlL 
PETROLAGAR  LABORATORIES,  INC. 
8134  McCormick  Boukvard  *  Chicago,  111. 
PLATE  33.  GENTLE  AIDS.  Ever-faster  motion  threatens  to  hasten  disorder.  One  way  to  tackle  the 
threat  is  by  sorting  our  lives  into  temporally  manageable  portions.  The  establishment  of  a  regularized 
routine,  as  this  advert  so  effectively  points  out,  makes  the  transformation  of  the  human  body  into  one 
more  component  of  a  larger  totality  almost  a  necessity  for  survival.  Like  the  trains  that  could  not  function 
efficiently  without  a  concept  of  time,  the  individual  in  modern  society  may  cease  to  function  without 
acceding  to  external  demands  of  time  and  place,  and  so  the  regularization  of  bodily  functions  objectifies 
the  individual.  Recent  movements  like  Feng  Shui  stress  the  regulation  of  bodily  movements,  of  healthy 
bowel  movements,  with  the  removal  of  garbage  from  life.  See,  for  example,  Karen  Kingston  (1998)  Clear 
Your  Clutter  With  Feng  Shui,  London.  The  author  identifies  at  least  a  dozen  types  of  clutter,  including 
'Mental,  Emotional  and  Spiritual  clutter,  '  and  includes  a  handy  guide  to  'Clutter  Clearing  Your  Body' 
that  reflects  almost  exactly  the  concerns  that  this  poster,  published  in  the  1950's,  sets  out. 
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signifies  the  continual  struggle  for  the  survival  of  the  physical  organism,  and  the 
organism'  of  which  it  is  merely  a  part,  the  body  politic. 
Taken  as  a  sign  of  decomposition  and  degeneration,  waste  matter  therefore  belongs 
outside  of  order.  It  has  already  ceased,  physically,  to  be  ordered  or  sorted  for  the  most 
efficient  realization  of  its  potential,  and  so  it  ceases  to  be  materially  differentiated.  It  is 
exhausted  potential  from  the  point  of  view  of  the  garbage  creator.  So,  whilst  we  may 
agree  with  Mary  Douglas,  who  observes  in  Purity  and  Danger,  her  examination  of 
pollution  taboos  in  primitive  cultures,  that  a  're-ordering'  of  matter  that  seeks  to  exclude 
dirt  and  waste  can  have  a  perfectly  understandable  basis,  and  that  it  is  not  driven  by  fear, 
that  in  fact  it  finds  its  motivation  in  the  positive  ordering  of  one's  environment,  it  is 
nevertheless  apparent  that  within  a  modern  context  that  this  is  where  we  must  insist  on 
a  separation  of  the  significance  of  dirt  and  garbage.  Post  mass  consumerism,  fear  has 
become  a  significant  factor  in  our  attitude  to  garbage,  as  distinct  from  dirt,  as  garbage 
represents  the  likely  impossibility  of  differentiating  Self  from  Other,  because  of  the  sheer 
volume  of  objects.  So,  garbage  in  modern  society,  as  distinct  from  waste  in  'primitive 
cultures'  has  an  added  dimension  because  of  the  amount  of  it  that  is  produced,  and  also 
because  these  voluminous  objects  are  what  leaves  meaning  in  modernity  looking  so 
empty;  unlike  the  primitive  re-ordering  of  matter  (which  sees  the  order  of  persons  and 
matter  as  an  element  of  a  spiritual  order),  our  modern  sorting  is  a  response  to  the 
profanity  of  existence.  Thus,  fears  are  realized  in  the  implicit  acceptance  that  there  is 
ultimately  no  order  of  things,  in  the  undesirability  of  losing  control  over  our  immediate 
surroundings,  or  in  a  fear  of  contamination,  and  ultimately  in  the  reminder  that  we  can 
be  powerless  to  control  our  own  lives.  ' 
The  rapidity  with  which  relations  are  altered  in  modern  society  throws  up  questions 
of  subject,  object  and  identification.  The  transformation  in  matter  that  produces 
garbage  goes,  at  one  extreme,  from  the  positive,  that  is,  from  subjective  identification  to, 
at  the  other,  a  total  negation  in  the  impossibility  of  objective  identification,  and  suggests 
that  we  may  never  be  able  to  leave  behind  the  material  and  objective  world  we  once,  but 
no  longer,  identify  with.  In  Western  societies,  for  example,  the  modern  environmental 
'  See  Mary  Douglas  (1966)  Purity  and  Danger.  -  Chs.  I  and  2,  and  William  Miller  (1997)  Anatomy  of  Disgust, 
CAmbridge,  MA.  Miller  suggests  that  it  is  the  volume  of  things,  and  of  the  sense  we  have  of  matter  uncontrolled  as  a 
result,  that  can  begin  to  erode  our  faith  in  the  power  of  reason:  "A  single  weed  or  a  single  weed  is  unlikely  to  be 
disgusting;  but  a  host  of  them  is  a  different  matter  much  as  the  difference  in  affect  raised  by  one  cockroach  and  a 
thousand,  one  social  inferior  and  a  convocation.  "  (42) 
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movement,  which  has  quickly  developed  over  the  last  thirty  years,  represents  an 
undeniable  fear  that  the  failure  to  introduce  a  variety  of  austerity  measures,  to  limit  the 
production  of  waste,  will  amount  to  the  destruction  of  the  social  and  ecological 
environment.  '  Paradoxically,  this  fear  arises  from  the  success  of  reason  in  sorting  the 
world,  and  thus  promising  that  we  can  stem  the  endless  flow  of  life,  and  also  a  profound 
lack  of  faith  in  the  very  reason  that  has  granted  such  an  awareness.  There  are  two 
distinct  aspects  to  this  crisis  of  reason:  on  one  hand  the  Gaia  hypothesis,  which  suggests 
that  degeneration  would  cease  if  only  we  could  control  the  rubbish  of  life,  and  on  the 
other,  the  Risk  Society  thesis,  which  urges  a  more  realistic  reappraisal  of  reason. 
In  the  case  of  the  former  we  see  something  like  an  anxiety  of  Sorts,  a  need  to  keep 
sorting  eternally,  to  fend  off  death.  This  can  be  considered  as  one  more  extension  of  the 
hubris  of  reason,  suggesting  as  it  does,  that  nature,  the  infinite,  can  be  limited  by 
humanity;  that,  as  Andrew  Ross  has  said,  "the  ecosystemic  operations  of  Earth  as  a  single 
planetary  organism  constitute  the  ultimate  realm  of  judgement  in  all  matters 
biological.  "'  Thus,  just  as  man  created  God,  so  now  he  creates  this  particular 
objectification,  the  'ecosystem';  as  if  the  Earth  truly  'cared,  '  as  if  reason  could  defy  all 
natural  forces  of  alteration,  as  if  we  weredt  passing  through,  part  of  the  flow  just  as  the 
planet  surely  is  itself.  We  should  make  no  mistake  about  the  fact  that  reason  manifested 
in  our  Sorts  is  just  the  delimitation  of  World.  '  The  infinity  of  'the  world'  beyond  reason 
cannot  be  comprehended,  or  more  correctly,  it  has  not  yet  been.  This  is  simply  a  matter 
of  the  world  we  create  through  our  language  use.  '  Each  attempt  to  rationally  recreate  the 
world  only  reveals  a  corresponding  lack  of  reason,  in  both  the  evidence,  or  remains,  of 
what  is  consigned  to  the  garbage,  and  in  what  such  a  reappraisal  teaches  us  about  our 
own  limitations.  Amongst  other  things,  this  entails  that  our  efforts  at  'sustainability' 
mark  a  desperate  urge  to  halt  movement,  and  that  any  success  at  doing  so  only  emanates 
2  In  their  terms  this  entails  the  reduction  of  consumption.  In  understanding  the  ambiguities  of  language 
surrounding  consumption  we  can  see  the  general  point:  Consumption  is  by  definition  destruction. 
'See  A.  Ross  (1994)  The  Chicago  Gangster  Theory  oftife,  London:  introduction. 
'  Cf.  FWJ  Schelling  (1978)  System  of  Transcendental  Idealism,  Charlottesville.  Schelling  observes  that  "the 
concept  of  nature  does  not  entail  that  there  should  also  be  an  intelligence  that  is  aware  of  it.  Nature,  it  seems,  would 
exist  even  if  there  were  nothing  that  were  aware  of  it.  "  (5) 
'  See  Rorty  (1989)  Contingency,  Irony,  Solidarity,  Cambridge,  on  language  and  the  world:  "Positivist  history  of 
culture  sees  language  as  gradually  shaping  itself  around  the  contours  of  the  physical  world.  Romantic  history  of 
culture  sees  language  as  gradually  bringing  Spirit  to  self-consciousness.  Nietzschean  history  of  culture,  and 
Davidsonian  philosophy  of  language,  see  language  as  we  now  see  evolution,  as  new  forms  of  life  constantly  killing  off 
old  forms  -  not  to  accomplish  higher  forms,  but  blindly.  Whereas  the  positivist  sees  Galileo  as  making  a  discovery  - 
finally  coming  up  with  the  words  which  were  needed  to  fit  the  world  properly,  words  Aristotle  missed  -  the 
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from  a  ground  of  degeneration  and  destruction,  and  the  progress  of  reason  only  succeeds 
in  laying  bare  its  limits,  and  thus  the  limitlessness  of  nature.  We  can,  then,  objectify 
nature,  as  the  modern  environmental  impulse  urges,  by  placing  limits  on  our  own 
destructive  tendencies.  But  we  should  not  avoid  the  charge  of  excessive  vanity  in 
supposing  that  we  are  'stewards'  of  nature.  Nature  knows  no  bounds. 
6 
The  risk  society 
thesis,  on  the  other  hand,  developed  as  an  implicit  recognition  of  the  ceaseless 
production  of  contingencies  in  modern  society,  with  the  complexity  and  fluidity  of 
social  relations,  industrial  and  technological  advances  in  all  domains  of  life.  Arguing  that 
risks  are  now  largely  hidden,  this  thesis,  fails  to  fully  acknowledge  the  grounding  of 
reason  in  chance;  as  the  probabilistic  calculation  of  modern  social  problems  is  just  one 
more  aspect  of  the  Sorting  that  by  its  terms  contributes  to  the  contemporary  ignorance 
of  how  close  to  the  surface  the  contingent  always  is.  With  technological  progress  now 
accompanied  by  an  inflation  of  identifiable  risks,  the  response  is  to  suggest  further 
7 
strategies,  involving  more  Sorts,  toward  a  minimization  of  risks  . 
The  problem  in  provoking  a  public  response  to  such  modern  crises  is  that  they  are 
stated  in  such  abstract  terms  that  subjectively  they  become  difficult  to  identify  with.  As 
Zygmunt  Bauman  observes,  these  risks: 
May  never  reach  the  realm  of  subjective  experience  -  they  may  be  trivialized  or 
downright  denied  before  they  arrive  there,  and  the  chance  that  they  will  indeed 
be  barred  from  arriving  grows  together  with  the  extent  of  the  risks.  ' 
The  risk  society  thesis  can  also  be  understood  in  the  following  terms:  it  implies  a 
world  of  looming  Unsorts;  of  industrial,  environmental,  social,  and  every  other  kind  of 
rubbish.  These  domains  remain  impervious  to  our  Sorts,  because  they  are  at  the  point  of 
overflowing  with  excess,  because  of  the  speed  of  movement  that  characterizes  the 
processes  reason  always  has  to  realign  itself  to  contain.  This  overflowing  waste  is  seen  in 
reason's  various  'errors,  '  'accidents,  '  and  'exceptions.  ' 
Davidsonian  sees  him  as  having  hit  upon  a  tool  which  happened  to  work  better  for  certain  purposes  than  any  previous 
tool.  "  (19) 
6  See  David  Thomson  (1999)  In  Nevada,  London.  Thomson  issues  the  charge  of  vanity:  "There  is  a  vanity  and  a 
righteousness  in  the  'stewardship'  of  the  Earth  that  defies  all  the  natural  forces  of  alteration  -  the  drift  of  continents, 
the  upheaval  of  earthquake,  the  rage  of  fire  and  rain  -  that  would  go  on  whether  or  not  the  Earth  was  inhabited.  " 
(156) 
'  See  Beck  (1985)  Risk  Socieq,  London.  Beck  makes  a  distinction  between  modern  and  pre-modern  risks  - 
arguing  that  contemporary  hazards  are  far  more  numerous  and  challenging  to  calculate  than  risks  in  pre-industrial 
cultures.  The  threats  of  plague,  famine,  natural  catastrophes,  wars,  that  induced  fear  and  irrationality  in  pre-modern 
peoples,  had  such  a  power  because  of  their  incalculability  (and  because  they  were  attributed  to  supernatural  forces). 
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If  we  understand  that  garbage  in  modernity  has  become  emblematic  of  a  fear  based 
on  the  impossibility  of  identifying  with  undifferentiated  matter;  ultimately  with 
controlling  it,  then  this  goes  beyond  a  problem  arising  from  the  difficulty  in  positively 
ordering  our  environment.  In  modern  society  the  speed  of  production,  and  the  changing 
pace  of  life  renders  our  very  attempts  to  Sort  the  world  of  objects  by  means  of  criteria  of 
inclusion  and  exclusion,  a  response  to  the  fearful  associations  the  rational  mind  draws 
between  its  own  dictates  and  any  kind  of  excess.  Simply  put,  having  'too  much,  ' 
however  one  might  determine  that,  is  a  compromise  to  self-containment,  because  in 
terms  of  our  identification  with  the  world  surrounding  us,  it  is  to  have  little  'bits'  of 
oneself  all  over  the  place,  exposed  to  chance.  So,  whilst  we  may  elaborate  ideas  of  a 
'better'  or  more  'perfect'  world,  these  are  surely  derived  from  the  fear  of  disorder!  How 
else  can  we  explain  the  extent  to  which  this  desire  to  effect  some  order  on  the  physical 
environment  has  resulted  in  a  kind  of  consumption  paranoia,  a  fear  of  the  consequences 
of  life  lived  through  the  consumption  of  more  than  necessities,  a  recognition  of  the 
creeping  death  that  waste  obviously  comes  to  represent?  'o 
In  his  1995  novel  Underworld,  Don  DeLillo  presents  a  panoramic  view  of  the 
history  of  the  United  States  in  the  last  fifty  years  of  the  twentieth  century.  Central  to  the 
life  of  Nick  Shay,  the  main  character  of  the  story,  is  the  multi-faceted  nature  of  garbage. 
In  his  world,  his  life  we  can  see  is  determined  by  the  past  that  brings  him  face  to  face 
with  the  messed  up  present.  Garbage  comes  to  represent  the  final  frontier  of  human 
autonomy;  it  is  the  sign  that  says  This  Far  and  No  Further,  and  beyond  which  lies  the 
might-have-been,  the  contingent  lives  that  were  snuffed  out  by  the  Leibnizian  necessity  of 
causes:  still  there  in  memory  as  unrealized  causes,  hopes  without  end.  Leibniz,  we 
remember,  tethered  freedom  to  contingent  history.  Memory,  as  Nick  Shay  discovers, 
gets  caught  in  a  thicket  of  chance,  dwelling  on  possible  lives  because,  as  Leibniz  would 
have  it,  whilst  there  is  always  a  reason  -a  greater  inclination  for  what  has  been  chosen  - 
'  Z.  Bauman  (2000)  Liquid  Modernity,  Cambridge:  2  10. 
'  Is  this  the  basis  for  all  Utopias?  It  certainly  seemed  to  be  the  basis  for  Hobbes  justification  of  the  state,  and 
sovereign  power.  See  chapter  two  below. 
'0  For  instance,  Rathje  and  Murphy,  ibid,  suggest  that  concerns  over  the  volume  of  garbage,  as  voiced  by  the 
environmental  lobby,  overtake  the  progress  in  waste  management,  and  innovations  in  reducing  energy  use  and 
pollution  that  have  arisen  merely  as  the  result  of  economic  necessities.  They  argue  that  environmentally  sponsored 
waste  management  policies  in  the  United  States  ignore  the  growing  rationalization  of  garbage,  and  lead  to  the 
promotion  of  a  number  of  myths  regarding  garbage  that  ultimately  lead  to  'environmentafly-friendly'  regulations,  that 
often  turn  out  to  be  environmentally  damaging. 
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"this  inclination  does  not  master  freedom.  ""  In  Underworld,  garbage  'presents'  itself  as 
an  obstacle  to  the  forlorn  hope  that  we  can  be  author  of  our  own  biographies  when  life 
is  more  or  less  trapped  by  the  twin  forces  of  causal  necessity  (i.  e.,  the  present)  and 
memory  (i.  e.,  the  past),  which,  it  is  implied,  are  productive  of  so  much  garbage. 
Garbage,  as  such,  is  the  material  representation  of  a  fear  that  history,  in  the  form  of 
memory,  assumes  dominance  over  the  present  and  future,  as  inevitable  as  the  bodies  we 
stand  in.  And  so,  in  striking  out  against  this  necessity,  a  mania  for  order  becomes  Shay's 
guiding  principle  in  life.  Like  the  past  that  he  is  continually  revisiting  and  trying  to  Sort, 
to  find  meaning  in  it,  his  life  in  the  present  becomes  representative  of  a  keen  awareness 
of  the  power  of  self-consciousness,  of  the  doubt  that  burdens  the  modern  mind.  This,  of 
course,  is  summed  up  in  a  paradox  of  Sorts:  his  memory  of  the  past  is  both  an  emblem 
of  his  freedom,  and  yet  a  power  that  can  also  undermine  rational  autonomy  to 
devastating  effect. 
Shay,  the  mature  man  we  see  flitting  between  past  and  present,  having  been  rescued 
from  a  dissolute  life  by  the  Jesuits,  appropriately  enough  becomes  the  modern  equivalent 
of  these  scholastic  Sorters;  an  organizer  of  the  unnecessary,  a  waste  consultant.  We  are 
asked  to  visualize  this  at  times  haunted  figure  traveling  between  continents  to  observe 
the  workings  of  landfill  sites,  with  his  flitting  to  and  fro  in  imagination,  the  memories  of 
his  past  a  disturbing  analogy  to  the  garbage  that  he  can't  get  away  from,  buried,  like  his 
past,  just  below  the  surface.  Thus,  the  highly  visible  character  of  garbage  in  his  life 
unavoidably  leads  him  to  see  the  world  through  the  teeming  objects  of  a  consumer 
culture  driven  by  commercial  gluttony;  and  these  various  products  as  merely  disguised 
garbage,  their  future  status  assured.  "Marian  and  I  saw  products  as  garbage  even  when 
they  sat  gleaming  on  store  shelves,  yet  unbought,  "  he  says,  revealing  a  rational  foresight 
absent  in  most  consumers: 
We  didn't  say,  what  kind  of  casserole  will  that  make?  We  said,  What  kind  of 
garbage  will  that  make?  Safe,  clean,  neat,  easily  disposed  op.  Can  the  package  be 
recycled  and  come  back  as  a  tawny  envelope  that  is  difficult  to  lick  closed?  First 
we  saw  the  garbage,  then  we  saw  the  product  as  food  or  lightbulbs  or  dandruff 
shampoo.  How  does  it  measure  up  as  waste,  we  asked.  We  asked  whether  it  is 
responsible  to  eat  a  certain  item  if  the  package  the  item  comes  in  will  live  a 
million  years.  " 
See  Leibniz  (1973)  'A  Letter  on  Freedom,  1689,  '  in  Philosophical  Writings,  London:  112-14. 
Don  DeLillo  (1997)  Underworld,  London:  12  1.  On  the  development  of  modern  environmentalism  see  also  A. 
Ross,  ibid. 
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But  as  we  have  seen,  memory  in  the  mass  consumption  object  world  is  flushed  out, 
like  the  excretions  that  might  hinder  our  movement  if  not  expelled.  DeLillo's  Shay 
becomes  stuck  in  a  mess  because  he  is  over-conscious  of  the  causal  connection  between 
past  and  present,  between  consumption  and  garbage.  He  literally  stands  amidst  the 
garbage  of  modernity.  "Every  bad  smell  is  about  us,  "  he  says,  surrounded  by  mountains 
of  trash  heaped  like  pyramids. 
We  make  our  way  through  the  world  and  come  upon  a  scene  that  is  medieval- 
modern,  a  city  of  high  rise  garbage,  the  hell  reek  of  every  perishable  object  ever 
thrown  together,  and  it  seems  like  something  we've  been  carrying  all  our  lives.  " 
This  can  only  be  the  response  when  we  do  become  aware  of  the  consequences  of  the 
eternal  return  of  garbage  -  the  narrator  here  is  in  the  business  of  garbage  control,  and  this 
justly  explains  his  inability  to  banish  garbage  to  the  void  of  his  subconscious.  Having  a 
close  proximity  to  all  sorts  of  garbage  does  not  permit  him  to  forget,  but  more 
importantly  than  that  is  the  kind  of  response  it  provokes.  Contrast  this  with  the  ideal 
consumer  in  a  world  of  arriving  obsolescence;  caught  up  in  desire,  in  the  necessity  of 
satisfying  some  need,  can  anyone  be  concerned  about  the  immediate  future,  never  mind 
the  fate  of  the  world  millions  of  years  hence?  The  character  of  Shay  illustrates  one  more 
overestimation  of  the  power  of  reason,  one  more  possibility  that  the  application  of  will 
can  force  a  standstill;  and  this  in  the  apparent  unwillingness  to  easily  accept  that  there  is 
a  natural  process  of  degeneration,  and  that  reason,  try  as  it  may,  cannot  separate  us  from 
this. 
Such  an  impulse  is  shared  with  the  other  stewards  of  nature.  The  difference  is  that 
Nick  Shay  in  Underworld  meets  his  fears  not  with  a  reduction  of  objects,  but  rather  with 
fresh  holes  in  which  to  bury  these  dead  and  exhausted  products  of  accelerated  hope. 
Standing  over  a  hole  in  the  ground  lined  with  plastic  membrane  and  outfitted  with  a 
gas-control  system,  he  listens  as  his  colleague  mentions  the  value  that  would  be 
produced  by  the  buried  debris  of  modern  life.  And  he  feels  elated.  "  It  seems  unavoidable 
that  we  should  observe  that  someone  who  has  a  great  degree  of  control  over  his  life,  who 
perhaps  has  illusions  of  immortality,  could  mix  up  his  own  destiny  with  that  of  the 
world.  DeLillo's  Shay  illustrates  the  difficulty  of  maintaining  the  Self  against  the 
"  DeLillo,  ibid:  104. 
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contingencies  of  Past  and  Future,  because  the  world  that  was  once  objectified  in  the 
history  books,  and  in  his  schooling  in  the  catholic  seminary,  as  striving  towards  some 
kind  of  harmony  that  repays  diligence,  is  replaced  by  a  world  full  of  Unsorts,  of  sense 
made  nonsense,  and  of  value  transvalued  into  garbage.  This  is,  as  well,  the  disparity 
between  Object(s)  and  beliefs  that  can  no  longer  be  bridged  in  an  act  of  identification, 
in  this  case  with  the  present. 
The  past,  as  the  platform  to  the  present,  dispatches  us  In  a  forward  motion  so  long 
as  we  are  facing  in  the  appropriate  direction.  In  modern  society  we  become  impervious 
to  many  of  the  practicalities  and  effects  of  garbage,  to  the  process  of  its  disposal 
certainly,  and  also  to  the  consequences  of  voluminous  amounts  of  garbage.  The  central 
figure  in  Underworld  represents  a  break  in  the  continuity  of  our  perceptions,  an 
upsetting  of  accepted  causal  relations  that  lead  from  past  to  present.  In  this  tale  garbage 
becomes  a  reminder  of  something  else  -a  world  that  we  don't  really  control,  an  existence 
where  a  contingent  element  grows  ever  greater.  This,  then,  is  the  eternal  return  of 
garbage  as  an  uneasy  fear  or  paranoia.  A  more  accurate  portrayal  of  the  modern  attitude 
toward  garbage,  particularly  the  fear  of  over-consumption,  would  probably  reveal  that  it 
is  in  the  fact  that  we  cling  to  some  idea  that  we  can  construct  a  living  environment  that 
represents  'us,  '  some  Arcadian  dream  of  nature  unspoiled,  that  forces  the  discontinuities 
in  our  experience  to  transform  the  dream  to  a  nightmare. 
In  our  attitudes  to  garbage  we  also  find  a  disproportionate  preoccupation  with  the 
unexpected,  once  again  in  an  apparent  fear  of  having  the  Self  submerged  in  some  other 
conditions  of  objectification,  insofar  as  garbage  makes  the  Self  transparent,  and  also  in 
the  material  sense  that  garbage  threatens  our  spaces,  the  spaces  of  future  plans,  and  thus 
our  ability  to  keep  moving.  An  interesting  consequence  of  this  is  that  we  find  scavengers 
mostly  amongst  non-western  economies;  in  western  economies  the  underprivileged,  may 
still  occupy  this  position,  although  this  has  become  less  prevalent  since  in  the  last  one 
hundred  years.  "  It  seems  that  this  is  not  only  a  question  of  relative  poverty.  "'  The 
existence  of  scavengers  tells  us  something  about  the  amount  of  control  exercised  by 
"  Ibid:  "I  listened  to  Sims  recite  the  numbers,  how  much  methane  we  would  recover  to  light  how  many  homes, 
and  I  felt  a  weird  elation,  a  loyalty  to  the  company  and  the  cause.  "  (285) 
15  See  Susan  Strasser  0  999)  Waste  and  Want.  -  a  Social  History  of  Trash,  New  York:  Ch.  I 
"  Which  is  to  say  that,  in  relative  terms,  the  modern  west  may  have  sizeable  pockets  of  poverty.  But  this  is 
beside  the  point.  What  is  to  the  point  in  considering  the  disappearance  of  scavenging  is  that  the  rationalized  welfare 
states  of  many  western  countries  largely  prevent  the  poor  from  living  off  garbage,  as  they  would  have  done  in  years 
gone  past.  See  Strasser,  ibid. 
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government,  and  also  about  the  connection  between  material  wealth  and  autonomy.  If 
waste  disposal  had  become  first  privatized,  and  through  rational  Sorting,  depersonalized 
the  world  over  for  generations,  as  it  has  in  the  most  'modern'  economies,  then  disgust 
conventions,  at  least,  would  caution  against  proximity  to  garbage,  with  the  likely 
sanction  being  social  exclusion.  In  societies  old  and  new  this  is  indeed  the  fate  of  the 
powerless.  But  as  I  have  said,  the  reasons  for  this  go  beyond  notions  of  purity,  which  are 
built  upon  'sacred'  hierarchies  and  rituals;  it  is  not  just  a  matter  of  garbage  being  dirty.  It 
is  the  fact  that  garbage  can  come  to  be  a  reminder  of  a  past  that  is  the  fact  that  convinces 
us  that  this  is  a  question  of  old  against  new,  and  furthermore  that  a  preoccupation  with 
novelty  and  fashion  is  a  both  a  cause  and  consequence  of  the  abundance  of  objects  in 
modern  society.  Our  need  to  control  garbage  is  a  simple  consequence  of  civilizing 
processes  reaching  toward  some  logical  end;  modernity  undoubtedly  throws  up  all  kinds 
of  industrial  horrors,  but  it  does  so  whilst  providing  the  means  for  "an  unprecedented 
cleanup  of  human  beings  and  their  societies,  "  says  Joseph  Amato  in  his  history  of  dust. 
"It  permitted  humans  en  masse  to  improve  their  dwellings  and  communities,  freeing 
themselves  from  the  old  tyrannies  of  dust,  dirt,  parasites,  and  disease.  ""  This  is  the 
colonization  of  chance  by  reason.  The  problem  is  that  the  territory  we  create,  waste 
filled,  no  less,  keeps  expanding. 
The  transvaluation  of  objects,  which  takes  us  from  invisible  garbage  (potential 
value)  to  visible  garbage  (value  exhausted),  from  forgetfulness  to  fear,  is  predicated  on 
the  realization  that  the  modern  world  cannot  save  us,  that  reason  can  be  fallible  and  that 
we  will  always  have  to  face  the  final  disorder  that  is  death.  Slowly,  perhaps 
imperceptibly,  although  only  upon  reflection,  we  come  to  associate  garbage  with 
destruction,  with  the  possibility  of  the  removal  of  order  and  meaning  and  with  a  loss  of 
control.  In  our  fear  we  seem  to  be  more  conscious  of  death,  and  it  is  perhaps  through 
consideration  of  this  inevitability,  that  we  recognise  decay  in  other  forms,  particularly  in 
the  eternally  returning  garbage. 
The  removal  of  garbage  becomes  a  necessity,  because  in  modern  society  the  removal 
of  the  person  is  no  longer  a  viable  option.  'Normal'  living  is  characterized  as  stable  and 
ordered,  not  itinerant  and  chaotic.  "  We  cannot  walk  away  because  the  motion  of 
17  Joseph  A.  Amato  (1999)  Dust.  -  A  History  ofthe  Small  and  the  Invisible,  Berkeley:  69. 
"  Again  this  point,  and  the  notion  of  property  as  an  aspect  of  the  modern  notion  of  controlled  motion  should 
be  contrasted  with  the  Douglas  notion  of  dirt,  and  perhaps  with  anthropological  views  generally. 
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modern  life  demands  fixed,  and  more  or  less  predictable,  modes  of  living.  The  concept 
of  'property,  '  taken  as  the  objectification  of  a  material  world  we  can  identify  in  terms  of 
its  apparent  solidity,  symbolizes  modernity's  attempt  to  quell  motion.  Bricks  and  mortar 
erect  an  order,  and  psychologically  as  well  as  physically  represent  stability,  a  life  Sorted. 
Thus  normality  is  identified,  in  this  context,  on  a  material  basis;  stability  symbolizes  an 
important  aspect  of  the  relationship  between  subject  and  object  in  modernity,  and  acts 
as  the  delimitation  of  freedom.  "  That  is  to  say,  normality  would  seem  to  signify  a  power 
to  remain  still  amongst  the  flow.  But  it  is  also  a  power  that  contributes  to  the 
continuation  of  this  flow;  to  be  in  a  position  to  conspicuously  discard  'used'  goods,  to 
treat  Previously  valued  items  as  worthless.  Thus  to  create  garbage,  indicates  an  obvious 
ability  to  replenish  one's  material  comfort.  This  is  a  power  to  consolidate,  which  is  at  the 
same  time  a  power  of  exclusion,  and  thus  to  place  motion  within  fixed  limits.  The  fact 
of  this  material  discrimination,  finds  analogy  in  the  way  we  use  language  in  aid  of 
perfecting  Sorts,  to  both  assign  inclusion  and  to  designate  the  excluded. 
"  Conceptually  this  is  a  consequence  of  the  idea,  originated  in  John  Locke's  Second  Treatise  on  Government  of 
1690,  that  property  in  selffiood  is  Uly  realised  as  freedom  only  with  the  attainment  of  fixed  property  in  physical 
space,  parcels  of  land,  which  then  restrict  movement. 
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PLATE  34.  EXPLODED  PIECE  (IN  PROGRESS),  Jackie  Winsor,  1980-82. 
ffJ 
IýI  --  llyllrllý  269 Conclusion 
CONCLUSION 
In  our  country  everything  is  being  forever  remade:  beliefs,  buildings  and  street  names.  Sometimes  the 
progress  of  time  is  concealed  and  at  others  feigned,  so  long  as  nothing  remains  as  real  and  truthful  as 
testimony 
IVANKUMA,  Love  andGarbage 
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§  Ornamental  Existence 
In  modern  society  the  radically  contingent  is  largely  concealed.  By  definition  it  can  be 
no  other  way;  the  radically  contingent  is  the  exception  to  the  rule,  the  accident  that 
crushes  necessity,  and  the  unwelcome  exception  to  rational  expectation.  Thus  the 
relationship  between  social  and  individual  forms  of  ordering  social  life  and  the  human 
social  experience  of  disorder  is,  I  have  sought  to  show,  a  necessary  one. 
In  a  sense  everything  in  life  is  contingent;  life  itself  at  its  most  basic  is  nothing  but 
movement.  It  is,  in  other  words,  constituted  in  history  and  memory  as  a  series  of  chance 
events  (for  example,  the  collision  of  contingent  causal  chains  that  determine  one's  own 
existence),  although  reason  renders  these  as  necessary  contingents,  as  almost  an  orderly 
procession  linking  past  to  present.  To  go  too  far  in  admitting  that  the  present  could 
have  been  other  than  it  is,  would  be  to  undermine  the  relatively  stable  foundations  of 
reason  and  history.  And,  of  course,  this  is  how  it  must  be  as  well  -  but  it  is  only  orderly 
because  we  have  made  it  so;  there  is  no  potential  in  the  past,  only  in  being  and  becoming. 
Thus  there  is  no  inherent  pattern  in  the  course  of  human  affairs  that  does  not  depend 
on  the  strenuous  efforts  of  reason.  Outside  of  order  is nothingness,  or  disorder;  that 
which  cannot  be  accommodated,  or  moulded  within  the  forms  that  allow  reason  to 
establish  the  relations  that  objectify  the  world. 
In  my  elaboration  of  three  negative  categories  of  social  being  ('loss,  '  'residue,  '  and 
(  garbage')  I  have  sought  to  understand  social  and  individual  forms  and  ways  of  ordering 
life  by  starkly  contrasting  forms  of  social  order  that  I  take  to  be  examples  of  the 
regulation  of  life  in  modern  society.  I  have  argued,  however,  that  such  ordering  does  not 
act  as  a  constraint  on  upon  rational  autonomy  (which  is  ultimately  a  self-contained 
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order),  and  that,  in  fact,  it  is  the  way  in  which  modern  society  permits  the  individual 
pursuit  of  freedom  that  often  forces  a  human  confrontation  with  disorder. 
In  virtue  of  the  confrontation  with  disorder  (whether  experienced  in  real  terms,  or 
as  an  unwelcome  possibility  in  imagination)  social  being  is  then  constituted  as  a 
somewhat  ornamental  arrangement  of  what  belongs  -  of  what  is  identifiable  -  and  of 
what  realises  a  rational  form  that  can  be  grasped.  In  other  words  disorder  forces  the 
reason  to  reassert  itself.  The  ornaments  of  existence  thus  provide  the  comfortable 
knowledge  that  if  there  is  no  natural  necessity,  there  is  at  least  order  and  reason,  and  the 
regularity  found  in  the  world  as  ordered  by  reason  gives  form  to  subjective  experience 
and  determines  a  set  of  expectations  based  on  what  our  rational  and  critical 
understanding  apprehends  by  way  of  the  senses. 
In  a  literal  example  of  how  the  realist  world  picture  embellishes  existence,  and  thus 
'makes'  the  world,  we  can  look  at  Exploded  Piece,  a  work  constructed  between  1980  and 
1982  by  Jackie  Winsor,  resulting  in  the  representation  of  perfection  in  the  primary  form 
of  a  cube.  Yet,  like  all  sensible  primary  qualities,  this  form  conceals  what  we  cannot 
apprehend  by  use  of  the  senses  -  in  this  case,  the  secret  of  its  creation.  By  rendering  the 
work  complete  only  with  two  images  -  one  of  the  final  object  (Plate  1)  and  the  other  the 
materials  employed  in  the  making  process  (Plate  34)  -  we  see  that  this  perfect  cube  was 
moulded  into  its  photographically  recorded  appearance  of  purity  from  fragmentary 
remains  (namely,  concrete,  plaster  and  explosive  residue)  after  being  blown-up  by  a 
destructive  charge  to  allow  for  the  literal  act  of  remaking.  This  is  a  dramatic  re- 
enactment  of  the  way  reason  makes  the  object  world,  the  way  we  pattern  and  design 
existence,  and  of  how  ornamental  existence  is  merely  the  re-arrangement  of  once 
random  and  unidentifiable  garbage  into  new  forms. 
Ornamental  existence  consists  of  not  only  physical  objects,  but  objects  of 
knowledge;  objects  of  history  and  memory,  too.  In  subjective  memory  especially,  the 
garbage  of  life  is  covered  by  a  need  to  keep  the  uneasy  past  sorted  into  a  place  where  it 
can  do  no  harm.  In  the  failure  of  forgetting  the  messy  remains  of  experience  ends  up, 
like  landfill  waste,  buried  beneath  a  surface  that  masks  the  contents,  and  that  is  regularly 
smoothed  over  by  fresh  layers  of  dirt.  Thus  in  Don  DeLillo's  Underworld,  Nick  Shay 
knows  that  the  past  is  only  precariously,  contingently,  connected  to  the  present,  that  it  is 
the  'underneath'  that  threatens  to  drag  him  back  from  the  world  selectively  made  by 
memory;  a  world  that  is  only  finally  brought  together  in  the  present  by  smoothing  out 
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the  jagged  surface,  which  is  to  say,  by  putting  things  'in  their  place,  '  and  by  neatly 
arranging  personal  history  in  order  that  the  forward  movement  of  life  is  not  impeded. 
The  radically  contingent  as  the  disordered  and  residual  elements  of  the  creation  and 
elaboration  of  categories  of  value  and  meaning  is  thus  dealt  with  by  an  act  of  separation 
-  by  the  removal  and  assimilation  of  what  can  be  rendered  as  an  object  of  sense,  from 
that  which  does  not  make  sense  and  thus  disorder  becomes  a  necessary  (although 
unacknowledged  part  of  ornamental  life.  Order  in  general  is  then  the  metaphorical 
'mask'  of  being;  a  being  which  itself  contains  an  incipient  disorder  (in  the  form  of 
individual  freedom).  But  this  disorder  is  not  chaos.  It  is  not,  as  I  have  argued,  simply  the 
source  of  nihilism,  but  rather  a  necessary  means  of  re-ordering  (in  allowing  the  value  of 
reason  to  be  re-established  or  elaborated  through  new  categories  of  understanding),  of 
creativity  (for  example,  in  pushing  forth  new  means  of  expressing  life  through  art). 
Disorder  is,  then,  a  somewhat  paradoxical  sign  that  foretells  a  periodic  renewal  of  our 
understanding  of  how  the  world  can  be  more  finely  sorted  for  the  sake  of  maintaining 
that  which  we  value  (life)  against  disorder. 
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